The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established with two objectives: to seek to enlarge the safe use of nuclear energy for peace and development, and to ensure, so far as it is able, that nuclear energy is used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The pursuit of these twin objectives is more important than ever. The challenges of eradicating poverty and preserving our precious ecological heritage give rise to the need for the efficient transfer of appropriate technologies, including nuclear technology. The Kyoto Conference, which raised awareness of the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change, has highlighted the necessity to use environmentally benign sources of energy. And the recent nuclear weapon tests made it clear that the international community must accelerate its efforts towards nuclear arms reduction and nuclear disarmament.

The General Assembly has before it the IAEA Annual Report for 1997 (A/53/286). In this statement, I will focus on the priority work of the Agency under three headings: the contribution to peace and security; co-operation for development; and meeting global challenges in the fields of energy, the environment and nuclear safety. I will conclude with a description of the process of review and reform that I have initiated to ensure that the Agency is responding efficiently and effectively to the needs and priorities of its Member States.

The IAEA Strengthened Safeguards System
As noted by the Secretary General in his recent statement to the First Committee, global nuclear disarmament must remain at the top of the international agenda. The United Nations has worked for over half a century to eliminate nuclear weapons everywhere and to oppose their acquisition anywhere. Through its verification and safeguards system, the IAEA endeavours to provide the necessary assurance that States are complying with their nuclear non-proliferation and arms control commitments. Over 180 States have undertaken to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

To be effective, a verification system should provide a high degree of assurance that States are in full compliance with their obligations. As we learned in the case of Iraq, such a system must be able not only to verify declared nuclear activities but also to detect possible undeclared activities at an early stage. This is the main objective of the Model Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements which was adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.

I am pleased to report progress in the conclusion of Additional Protocols. To date, Additional Protocols for 33 States and Parties to safeguards agreements have been approved by the Board of Governors. A strengthened safeguards system is a fundamental requirement for an effective non-proliferation regime. Adherence should be global. I would hope that by the year 2000 all States will have signed and brought into force their Additional Protocols. When this happens, a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with an Additional Protocol will become the standard verification norm for the twenty-first century.

While the introduction of the strengthened safeguards system is proceeding well, in two special cases Agency safeguards activities are meeting difficulties.

Iraq
The present status of the Agency's activities in Iraq is described in my report to the Security Council (S/1998/927). As the report notes, the Agency's verification activities in Iraq have resulted in a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. In the course of these verification activities, all of Iraq's known nuclear weapons-related assets have been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. As a result, there are now no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability - facilities or hardware - for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material in quantities of any practical significance.

This statement is made on the basis of all available, credible information. This same information provides no indication that Iraq has assembled nuclear weapons with or without fissile cores. However, there is an inevitable degree of uncertainty in any countrywide verification process which precludes providing absolute assurance of the absence of readily concealed material or equipment. Although we have identified the facilities, materials and equipment that comprise the "big picture", it is beyond the capability of any countrywide verification process to discover "all" items. The Agency's thorough and wide-ranging verification activities provide credible assurance that little has been overlooked. But credible assurance is not the same as a so called "clean bill of health".

There are a few outstanding questions and concerns but, from a technical point of view, they do not provide any impediment to the full implementation of the Agency's Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) plan. If Iraq resumes and maintains full co-operation, the Agency would be in a position to carry out all of its activities under the OMV plan, which include the right, on the basis of any information that comes to its attention, to continue to investigate the few remaining outstanding questions and concerns and any other aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and to neutralize any items discovered through such investigation.

The techniques and procedures used in OMV are essentially the same as those used to detect, verify and, as necessary, neutralize the components of Iraq's clandestine programme. For that reason, OMV activities in Iraq would be largely unaffected by a Security Council determination on Iraq's compliance with its obligations under resolution 687.

All the above is predicated on Iraq's resumption of co-operation and the restoration of the Agency's right to full and free access. Without such access the Agency cannot fully implement its OMV plan. The OMV plan is an integral whole and can only be meaningfully implemented in its entirety. It must incorporate a robust detection and deterrence capability so as to provide substantial assurance of the absence of prohibited activities and material in Iraq. Our current inability to inspect new sites seriously weakens the OMV plan and the assurances the Agency is able to give.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
In the DPRK, the Agency continues to assert its right to perform inspections under the NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement, which remains in force. At the same time, since 1992 and at the request of the Security Council, we are verifying a freeze of the graphite moderated reactors and related facilities in accordance with the "Agreed Framework" between the United States of America and the DPRK.

While the Agency has been able to verify the freeze, it continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration of nuclear material, and hence unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material. This is because the DPRK accepts Agency activities solely within the context of the Agreed Framework and not under its safeguards agreement.

Little progress has been made in eleven rounds of technical discussions between the Agency and the DPRK. During the most recent round in October, the DPRK provided a list of documents which, in its view, should be preserved for the Agency to be able to verify the nuclear material declaration of the DPRK at a future date. The list is not complete. Since 1995, our efforts to secure access to the necessary information and to agree on the required measures for the preservation of the documents have been futile. Unless all the relevant information is made available, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Agency to verify in the future the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's declaration of nuclear material.

The DPRK has repeatedly linked progress in discussions with the Agency to progress in the implementation of the Agreed Framework and the construction of the two light water reactors. I should like to recall in this connection that under the Agreed Framework, the Agency must have verified compliance of the DPRK with its safeguards agreement before any key components of the light water reactors under construction are delivered.

Future Prospects of Verification
In addition to a complete ban on nuclear testing, two actions have always been identified as indispensable to nuclear arms reduction and nuclear disarmament: freezing the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such materials. I am pleased to note that measures are being taken in both areas.

In August, the Conference on Disarmament finally agreed to commence negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In furtherance of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/75 (1993), I wrote to the President of the Conference on Disarmament to offer, if requested, the assistance of the Agency in developing the technical verification arrangements for such a treaty.

Over the past two years, the Agency's Secretariat has been involved in discussions with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to develop modalities for possible IAEA verification that nuclear material transferred from the military sector in the two countries remained irreversibly in the peaceful sector. Progress was made in September when I met with Minister Adamov of the Russian Federation and Secretary Richardson of the USA to set goals for future work.

The Agency stands ready to contribute its verification and safeguards expertise and experience to the full realization of these initiatives. An important question, however, that still needs to be addressed is financing. In response to a request from the Board of Governors, the Secretariat is preparing an options paper on this subject. In my view, the possible establishment of a Nuclear Arms Control Verification Fund based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions could be a viable option to finance these initiatives and possibly the verification of other nuclear arms control and reduction measures.

Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material
Nuclear weapons proliferation and threats to public safety could also arise from illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources. Of the nearly 300 incidents in the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database, some 130 involve nuclear material. However, only 10% of these involve highly enriched uranium or plutonium - the materials for making nuclear weapons - and then mostly in insignificant quantities. The Agency's programme in this field consists of co-ordinating information exchange, providing advisory services on physical protection and giving technical guidance to international organisations.

With regard to terrorism, the Agency welcomed the invitation of the General Assembly in its resolution 52/165 (1997) to assist in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee assigned the task of elaborating an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. The General Conference of the Agency this year adopted a resolution which invited the General Assembly, in elaborating the convention on nuclear terrorism, to bear in mind the Agency's activities in the field of illicit trafficking. I am pleased that, within the Working Group of the Sixth Committee which recently met on this matter, a draft convention was prepared which recognizes the Agency's expertise and on-going activities in this field. We look forward to a successful conclusion of work on this subject and stand ready to assist.

The second area I wish to focus on is the contribution of nuclear technology transfer for development. Meeting the needs and aspirations of the world's growing population requires the application of the best available technologies. Support for nuclear technology transfer for exclusively peaceful purposes, bearing in mind the special needs of developing countries, is an integral part of the international consensus relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy that is embodied in the IAEA Statute and the NPT.

The role of the Agency is to ensure that where nuclear technology is the most effective and appropriate technology to address a particular problem, and that where the recipient country has adequate infrastructure to adopt and sustain such technology, that this technology is transferred safely and in the most efficient and effective manner.

Nuclear techniques are usually one component of larger development programmes. Frequently they are used to gather essential scientific data for project planning or to test results. Their value lies not only in their direct impact on developmental goals but also in their contribution to making more effective the efforts of others. For this reason, partnerships with other agencies and organizations in the field of development are among the Agency's highest priorities.

Some examples of the Agency's activities are especially worth highlighting. In the area of contributing to food security, use of biofertilizer technology to improve nitrogen fixation in soil tilled by small farmers in Zimbabwe has yielded increases in soybean production of more than 100% and in some cases up to 500% while reducing dependency on chemical fertilizers. This project is being expanded to support activities in several sub-Saharan countries utilizing the experience and capabilities in Zimbabwe.

The use of the Agency developed Sterile Insect Technique (SIT) for area wide eradication of agricultural pests is increasing. Based upon the results of first phase activities in tsetse fly eradication on Zanzibar island, the Agency and the International Fund for Agricultural Development are jointly supporting the Ethiopian Government in a project to eradicate the tsetse fly in the southern Rift Valley. In Jamaica, a new project to eradicate the new world screw worm using SIT has attracted an $8 million loan from the US Department of Agriculture.

In the area of health and life expectancy, where women and children in developing countries are most vulnerable, nuclear techniques will help evaluate an $18 million community nutrition programme in Senegal, supported by the World Food Programme and the World Bank. Joint project formulation with UNICEF has led to an isotope-based study in Indonesia of the efficiency of iron and zinc supplementation to reduce anaemia and growth faltering in infants. In co-operation with national and regional public health authorities, isotopic evaluations to improve national nutrition interventions are being introduced with IAEA assistance in five Latin American countries, targeting over 10 million women and children.

The Agency currently supports 40 national projects and four major regional projects to upgrade radiation therapy services for the treatment of cancer and has recently assisted the Governments of Ghana, Ethiopia, Mongolia and Namibia to open their first such facilities. This adds a new dimension to medical management in these countries.

Freshwater scarcity is a problem that could affect two thirds of the world's population by the year 2025. The Agency is contributing to meet this challenge. Environmental isotopes and artificial tracer techniques are particularly effective in the investigation of water leakage in dams and reservoirs and in the assessment of water resources. They were demonstrated recently in identifying the origins of a serious leak in the Aoulouz dam in Morocco. In co-operation with the 24 members of the African Regional Co-operative Agreement, planning has commenced to establish a regional capability to expand the utilization of these techniques.

There is also much ongoing research and development in the area of nuclear desalination to produce potable water competitively. At the IAEA's General Conference last month, Member States adopted a resolution supporting strengthening of the Agency's activities relating to nuclear desalination and to small and medium reactor development. This programme includes promoting international information exchange and co-operation and assisting developing countries in planning and implementing demonstration programmes.

I am pleased to be able to report some positive developments with respect to the Agency's Technical Co-operation Fund. This year, a number of Member States have resumed their contributions, several States have made substantial payments to clear their arrears of assessed programme costs and others have contributed for the first time. I would encourage more States to follow these trends. They are a strong testament to the value of the Technical Co-operation programme and an encouragement for us to make it even more effective and efficient.

The last area of focus concerns energy, safety and the environment. Mr. President, as the international focal point for applications of nuclear science and technology, the Agency has important functions with respect to several global issues that require international co-operation. While the authority and responsibility for decision making in the field of nuclear technology is at the national level, the implications of those decisions quite often transcend borders. I will deal with three key areas: energy for sustainable development, nuclear safety including radioactive waste and management of spent fuel, and preserving the environment.

Energy for Sustainable Development
Energy is essential for development. Global energy demand is growing. It is projected to increase two- to threefold for developing countries in the next thirty years, depending on the economic growth scenario. Concern about the possible impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is also growing. Energy produced from fossil fuels accounts for about half of human-made greenhouse gas emissions. The challenge is to ensure that environmental concerns, as represented by the commitments made at the Kyoto Conference on Climate Change last December, are factored into national consideration of energy options.

At the end of 1997, 437 nuclear reactors operating in 31 countries provided about 17% of global electricity and accounted for the avoidance of about 8% of global carbon emissions. Several existing reactors are now approaching the end of their design life. Decisions must be made to extend their time in service, to replace them with new plants or to find other options.

With varying degrees of urgency, both developed and developing countries are thus faced with major energy choices to meet the needs of their growing economies and populations without unnecessarily contributing to greenhouse gas emissions. Except for nuclear or hydro power, which has limited growth potential, there are not yet any other economically viable, minimal-greenhouse gas-emission options for baseload power generation. The extensive use of renewable resources for this purpose does not appear to be close at hand.

The choice of nuclear power and of a particular energy mix are national decisions which have potential global impacts. There are compelling reasons why nuclear power, together with improved energy efficiency, greater use of renewable energy sources and clean technologies for improved use of fossil fuels, should continue to be a major component of many national energy strategies. But there are also substantial hurdles, particularly with respect to public acceptance in some countries.

The role of the IAEA is to ensure that the facts are available for the nuclear power option to be given a full and fair hearing. To this end, in close co-operation with eight other international organizations, the IAEA has developed the 'DECADES' database and methodology for the comparative assessment of different energy chains and conversion technology options. The comparisons include energy demand scenarios and supply options, economic analysis, the health and environmental impacts, the risks of energy systems, and sustainable energy development. This methodological framework is being used presently by over 30 Member States to evaluate independently their energy options.

The Agency is also prepared to contribute to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Third Assessment Report and is working together with UNDP, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the World Energy Council to conduct a world energy assessment for the UN Commission on Sustainable Development which, at its Ninth Session in 2001, will address energy issues for the first time.

Safety
Nuclear safety is a global public concern. In recent years the global safety record for nuclear power plants has shown continued improvement. However, the Agency's Nuclear Safety Review for 1997 identifies events concerning management practices in power plants which provide a warning that established nuclear power programmes can experience a gradual deterioration in safety performance unless there are continuous efforts to maintain and improve safety. Some continued incidents involving radiation sources underline the need for effective safety practices in all nuclear activities. And a high degree of national vigilance is required with respect to the potential impact on nuclear safety of new developments such as the deregulation of domestic energy markets.

The IAEA's role is to develop a comprehensive nuclear safety regime that consists of three elements: international binding agreements; safety standards; and measures to provide for the application of those agreements and standards.

In recent years several important international conventions, negotiated under the IAEA's auspices, have helped to fill gaps in the international nuclear safety regime. These include new conventions on Nuclear Safety and on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive Waste Management, as well as improvements to the Nuclear Liability Regime. But we also remain alert to the possibility that there might be other areas in which the international community as a whole would benefit from binding norms. The Agency's Safety Standards Series which covers the areas of nuclear, radiation, waste management and transport safety, represents international consensus on safety requirements and their implementation. In the present biennium we will largely complete the preparation or revision of the entire corpus of safety standards - a total of some seventy documents - to ensure that they are comprehensive, scientifically accurate and up to date.

It is not enough to adopt safety standards and measures; the priority is to ensure their application in an effective manner. The Agency offers a wide range of services, including several peer review services, information exchange, education and training, and co-ordination of safety-related research and development to ensure, in all countries with nuclear programmes, that prudent safety measures and procedures are carried out effectively and efficiently. Agency safety services are key to achieving a world standard of excellence in the application of safety standards.

Also, the General Conference of the IAEA has recently recognized and encouraged the Agency's activities to assist Member States to diagnose and remediate possible year 2000 computer systems problems in civilian nuclear power plants, fuel cycle facilities and medical facilities which use radioactive materials.

Mr. President,

Decisions on the management of spent fuel and the final disposal of radioactive waste can be delayed but cannot be avoided. The quantities involved are growing. Existing and planned storage capacity will keep ahead of accumulated inventories, but there is concern that in some countries the resources will not be available to construct planned facilities. This is an area for urgent national attention and co-operation on an international or regional basis, as appropriate.

Through the assessment of different technologies and the dissemination of information, the Agency is supporting Member States in properly addressing low and intermediate level waste management issues. With respect to high level radioactive waste, experts agree that technical solutions exist for its safe and permanent disposal. But progress in demonstrating these solutions has not been rapid. One of the comparative advantages of nuclear power is the small volume of wastes generated. However, this will not be perceived as an advantage until available technical solutions for safe and permanent disposal of wastes are demonstrated. The need for Member States to develop disposal plans and construct facilities has thus become an urgent priority.

Preserving the Environment
In this UN International Year of the Ocean, I would highlight the unique contribution of the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco to addressing the global issues of marine pollution, particularly through its active support of the UN Global Plan of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities. It is worth recalling that some 80% of marine pollution originates from human activities on land. Monitoring and assessing the impact of land- based pollution, discharges from ships, nuclear weapons testing and dumping of hazardous wastes is one of the responsibilities of the Marine Environment Laboratory.

In October, I had the pleasure of opening the new purpose-built facilities of the Marine Environment Laboratory. In co-operation with the Principality of Monaco, UNEP, UNESCO/IOC, and the International Commission for Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea, the Agency organized a major Symposium on Marine Pollution to share the latest scientific knowledge on the sources, behaviour and impact of marine contaminants throughout the oceans of the world.

At the same time, the Agency hosted a Ministerial level meeting to strengthen international co-operation in marine environmental assessment of the Black Sea region, where environmental degradation as a result of human activities has had devastating economic and social effects. The application of nuclear techniques is demonstrably the most effective and appropriate technology to assess the environmental degradation of the Black Sea.

Mr. President, as you will note from the description I have given, of the many urgent items which require the Agency's attention, the international nuclear agenda is growing, not shrinking. Throughout this decade, the Agency has met increased responsibilities most often within the constraints of a zero real growth regular budget. But as we seek to respond to the expectations of our Member States in this period of rapid change, the gap between priorities and affordabilities is growing.

For the Agency the implications are clear. We must achieve greater efficiency wherever possible and we must check that our programmes meet the priorities of our Member States.

To these ends, at the beginning of this year I initiated a comprehensive three level review process covering the Agency's management and programme. The first level, management review, consists largely of measures to improve efficiency in three areas: policy and co-ordination, programme development and evaluation, and procedures and personnel. I am placing particular emphasis on the creation of a 'single Agency' culture to ensure that the Secretariat is clear on its priorities, co-ordinated in its activities and efficient in its processes.

The second level comprises an external review of the Agency's overall programme by a Senior Expert Group to assess priorities and to present recommendations on future directions. In consultation with Member States, and drawing on the proposals of the Senior Expert Group, an Agency "Medium Term Strategy" is being prepared. It will set out the Agency's overall objectives and goals for the next five years.

The importance of public understanding of the role of nuclear energy and that of the Agency means that effective public information must be an integral part of the Agency's activities. Therefore the third part of the review process focuses on the role and management of public information and the Agency's outreach to Civil society, particularly the nuclear, arms control and development communities and the media, using the most modern and effective tools.

We live in times of change and uncertainty. Nuclear science and technology has always drawn two reactions: hope, that its safe and peaceful application would help us on the path to a better future; and apprehension, that its misuse could have catastrophic effects.

Today, the beneficial applications of nuclear science and technology is a global reality. As we seek solutions to the urgent problems of combating climate change, preserving the environment, feeding and improving the health of growing populations and supplying the energy needed for economic growth and development, there are compelling reasons to increase co-operation for the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technology.

In this regard the IAEA plays the central role in fostering the global sharing of the benefits of nuclear energy while assisting the international community to be able to curb nuclear weapon proliferation and to move towards nuclear disarmament.

As often mentioned, freedom from want and freedom from fear are two sides of the same coin. To the achievement of both of these objectives, the IAEA is fully committed.

I would like to conclude by expressing my appreciation to the Government of Austria, which continues to be a most gracious host.