It is a pleasure to be in Argentina and to address this distinguished meeting of the Council for International Relations. Argentina has a remarkable record of participation in all aspects of the work of the Agency. It has been a member of the IAEA since its establishment in 1957 and has served continuously on the Board of Governors since then.
The vitality of Argentina's nuclear sector is well recognised. Its two nuclear power plants have achieved a capacity factor of over 90% this year, which is well above world average, and have accounted for over 12% of domestic electricity supply. Argentina has developed an active nuclear export sector including the construction and operation of the 22MW multi-purpose reactor for Egypt and the export of heavy water to Germany and the Republic of Korea. I am also glad to note Argentina's interest in the use of small and medium size reactors for electricity supply in isolated areas and for non-power applications such as water desalination. This is an area of technological development strongly supported by IAEA Member States.
Due to the early commencement of its nuclear programme, Argentina has been in a strong position to supply nuclear technology to countries which are developing nuclear activities. It is a leader in the nuclear field in the Latin American region and has made a substantial contribution in providing experts and hosting training in conjunction with the Agency's technical co-operation programme. In many aspects Argentina acts more as a donor than as a recipient country. I congratulate Argentina on these achievements and also on its strong commitment to the cause of nuclear weapons non proliferation and nuclear arms reduction.
My topic today is "The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Technology Transfer for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and the Strengthening of the Safeguards System". First I would like to introduce the IAEA. The IAEA was established 41 years ago to be the focal point for international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy. The Statute outlines the Agency's twin objectives: to seek to enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace and development and to ensure, so far as it is able, that nuclear energy is used at a high level of safety and exclusively for peaceful purposes. The two objectives are interdependent.
As the only world-wide intergovernmental organization dedicated to nuclear science and technology, the Agency has the role of an international focal point for standard setting, independent analysis, technology transfer and verification. Part of this role is to serve as a clearinghouse for scientific and technical information on all aspects of nuclear technology, including radiation protection and safety issues. The value and the reputation of the Agency depend on its scientific and technical competence and objectivity. It is from this perspective that I will focus on the Agency's role in three areas: nuclear power and sustainable energy development, verification and the strengthened safeguards system, and technology transfer.
As I am sure you are well aware, concern about the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on global climate has grown. The importance of meeting the Kyoto Conference targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions was reaffirmed here last month at the Fourth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Indeed, the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action and the announcement of Argentina's voluntary commitment to greenhouse gas emissions reductions were major steps towards concerted global action to address this enormous challenge.
At the same time, global energy demand is growing as a result of economic development and increases in world population. For developing countries it is projected to increase two to three fold in the next thirty years, depending on the economic growth scenario. Thus the challenge for both developed and developing countries is how to meet growing energy demand without unnecessarily contributing to global climate change. Energy produced from fossil fuels accounts for about half of human-made greenhouse gas emissions. While there are many hopes for the use of alternative clean energy sources, including nuclear fusion technology, except for hydro power, which has limited growth potential in many countries, and nuclear power, at present there are no other economically viable, minimal greenhouse gas emission options for base load power generation.
The facts of nuclear power can be stated simply. At the beginning of this year, 437 nuclear reactors, operating in 31 countries, provided about 17% of global electricity and accounted for the avoidance of about 8% of global carbon emissions. The accumulated operating experience reached a figure of over 8,500 reactor-years.
The choice of nuclear power and of a particular energy mix is a national decision to be made in the light of national priorities and considerations. For many countries, nuclear power generation has particular advantages. It is a mature technology for cost-effective mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and reduction of air pollution. It can offer national security advantages by reducing dependence on an import of fossil fuel. And the use of nuclear reactors for co-generation applications such as water desalination and industrial heat can make a positive contribution to meeting national development goals.
But while nuclear power is making a significant contribution to the world energy mix, it is not the right technology for every country. Nor is it the role of the IAEA to seek to promote nuclear power in any commercial sense. However, in the current absence of alternatives, the Agency has a responsibility to ensure that the nuclear power option is given a full and fair hearing. As a centre of scientific and technical expertise, the specific role of the Agency is to ensure that the tools and methodologies are available for objective comparative assessment of all available energy options.
To these ends, the Agency has pursued an intensive programme of helping Member States to develop their own capacity for informed decision making in the energy sector in general and in the electricity sector in particular. Through a number of sophisticated databases and methodologies (such as the DECADES programme, WASP software and FINPLAN full comparative assessments of different energy options can be conducted on an objective basis. This means economic, environmental and risk analysis of all processes throughout the fuel cycle - from mining or resource extraction to electricity generation and waste disposal.
Over 30 countries are presently using these comprehensive analytic tools, many under the aegis of two major IAEA co-ordinated research projects. Several international organizations such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development utilise analytic data from these programmes before approving lending for investment in electricity projects. In this way, IAEA analysis and results contribute to the goals of sustainable energy development.
Ensuring that the facts are known is one part of the challenge for nuclear power. Equally important, particularly for public confidence, is a demonstrated global record of safety in all activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. This decade, the global safety record for nuclear power plants has shown continued improvement. However, as with all materials that can be harmful if misused, continuous efforts are required to ensure that the technical and human requirements of safety culture are maintained at their optimum.
Safety is the responsibility of national governments. The contribution that the IAEA makes is through the development of a comprehensive nuclear safety regime consisting of binding international agreements, detailed safety standards and measures to provide for the application of those agreements and standards.
In recent years, several important international conventions, negotiated under the IAEA's auspices, have helped to fill gaps in the international nuclear safety regime - conventions relating to physical protection, civil liability for nuclear damage, nuclear safety and the safety of waste and spent fuel management. And we remain responsive to initiatives from our Member States concerning other areas in which the international community as a whole might benefit from binding norms.
The Agency's Safety Standards Series publications represent international consensus on safety requirements and their implementation. In the present biennium we have undertaken the preparation or revision of the entire corpus of safety standards - a total of some seventy documents - to ensure that they are comprehensive, scientifically accurate and up to date.
The provision of safety assistance services is vital to achieving best practices in the application of safety standards. The Agency provides a wide range of such services. For example, this year the Agency conducted its one hundredth Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission to examine the adequacy of safety features at nuclear power plants.
An important aspect of nuclear safety concerns waste management. Through assessment of different technologies and information dissemination, the Agency assists Member States in their management of low and intermediate level waste. With respect to high level radioactive wastes, we are encouraging Member States to develop disposal plans and construct disposal facilities nationally or, particularly where small amounts are involved, in co-operation with each other. Only when available technical solutions for safe and permanent disposal of wastes have been demonstrated will the public accept the advantage of nuclear power of generating comparatively very small volumes of wastes.
In this context I would mention the work the Agency is undertaking with respect to "orphan" radiation sources. These are radiation sources that, for a variety of reasons, are not recorded in the inventories of national regulatory authorities. They may have been present before the establishment of national inventories (such as early medical radium sources), they may never have been specifically licensed, or they may have been lost, abandoned or stolen. A resolution of the IAEA General Conference in September requested the Secretariat to prepare a report on how national systems for ensuring the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials can be operated at a high level of effectiveness and whether international undertakings concerned with the effective operation of such systems and attracting broad adherence could be formulated. Last week here in Buenos Aires, a meeting of international experts took place to consider what could be done in response to this problem.
Finally on this subject, I would refer to the concerns expressed by some countries, both at the IAEA and at the International Maritime Organization, about the safety of radioactive material transport. In response to a resolution of the IAEA General Conference adopted last year, the Secretariat prepared a comprehensive report on binding and non-binding international regulations related to radioactive material transport safety and their implementation. The report showed that all major shipping countries have binding regulations which are based on the IAEA Transport Regulations.
In a resolution this year, the General Conference observed that shipments made in compliance with requirements which are based on the IAEA Transport Regulations provide a high degree of safety. The resolution also invited States shipping radioactive materials to provide, upon the request of potentially affected States, appropriate assurances that their regulations take into account the IAEA Transport Regulations and, further, to provide other relevant information. This is a positive development.
Nuclear safety is one side of the coin - nuclear verification is the other. The hopes for a more secure world rest crucially on advancing the agenda for nuclear arms reduction and their eventual elimination. Effective verification is indispensable to the realisation of these hopes. Through its verification activities, the IAEA endeavours to provide the necessary assurance that States are complying with their nuclear non-proliferation and arms control commitments. Over 180 States have undertaken to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear material and activities.
Verification must provide a high degree of assurance that States are in full compliance with their obligations. Until the early part of this decade, IAEA safeguards activities were focused primarily on nuclear material and activities declared by the State. The shortcomings of this system pointed out in Iraq made it clear that to be truly effective, safeguards must be able not only to verify declared nuclear activities but also to detect possible undeclared activities at an early stage.
The Iraq experience led to the development of a more effective safeguards system that is designed to provide a higher degree of assurance not only about nuclear activities declared by a State but also about the absence of undeclared activities. To do this, the system needed to move beyond its focus on nuclear material accountancy - essentially a quantitative audit system designed to keep track of material declared to the Agency - to a qualitative system in which the Agency has a better vantage point from which to develop a comprehensive picture of all nuclear activities to enable it to detect any inconsistency which suggests that information provided by a State may not be correct or complete.
This has required development in three major areas: more information, more access and greater use of advanced technology. Under the strengthened system, States are required to provide more detailed information covering all aspects of their nuclear and nuclear-related activities. The system provides for substantially broader access for inspectors. With respect to technology, next year the Agency will be introducing, on a routine basis, remote monitoring technology which will transmit verification information to IAEA headquarters in near-real time, appropriately authenticated and encrypted.
In order to introduce this strengthened safeguards system, in May last year the IAEA Board of Governors approved a Model Additional Protocol which provides the necessary legal authority for implementing the new measures. On the basis of the model, States are invited to conclude a Protocol additional to their existing safeguards agreement. To date, Additional Protocols have been signed with 34 States. Consultations are at an advanced stage with a number of other States.
I strongly believe that adherence should be global. I would hope that all Latin American countries would continue their tradition at the forefront of the international non-proliferation regime by moving rapidly to conclude Additional Protocols. Our goal is that by the year 2000 all States will have signed and brought into force their Additional Protocols.
This more finely meshed verification system can raise substantially the level of assurance, but it must be recognised that, even with full implementation, nuclear safeguards cannot provide 100% guarantees. Some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical system that aims to prove the negative, i.e. to prove the absence of concealable objects or activities.
Thus, nuclear safeguards must be seen as only one part of the overall non proliferation regime. They are a critical element, but not the only element in establishing whether a State is complying with its undertakings. The level of assurance derived from safeguards must be supplemented and reinforced by other mutually reinforcing components of the non proliferation regime, most importantly, the political elements. These components of the regime include export-import controls, regional and global security arrangements and the engagement of the Security Council as appropriate. Recent experience in South Asia has shown again that all components need to work together for the non-proliferation regime to be fully effective.
Last year we celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first nuclear weapon free zone in a populated region. The Treaty obliges each Contracting Party to negotiate multilateral or bilateral safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Thirty-two countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region are now party to the Treaty. With Cuba's signature in 1995, it is to be hoped that it could soon enter into force for its entire zone of application.
In addition to its respective global and regional responsibilities under the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty, pursuant to the bilateral Argentina-Brazil "Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Utilisation of Nuclear Energy", the Agency is a Party to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement which entered into force in 1994 This Agreement defines the obligations and roles of the two States, the IAEA and ABACC in the implementation of international safeguards. Under the Agreement, ABACC and the IAEA co-operate to avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities but in a manner that enables each organization to reach its own independent conclusions.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the safeguards arrangements pursuant to the Argentina-Brazil bilateral Agreement have helped to keep nuclear weapons out of Latin America and have been a precedent and an encouragement to similar initiatives in other regions. Nuclear weapon free zones have been established in the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia and there are ongoing efforts to establish such a zone in Central Asia. Some of the co-operative safeguards arrangements under the ABACC agreement may be of interest as a precedent in other areas. For example, in the Middle East, pursuant to a mandate from the IAEA General Conference, the Agency has been consulting with States in the region and familiarising government officials with safeguards concepts, tools and possible modalities which may be relevant to any future nuclear weapon free zone in that region.
I would conclude my remarks on the role of IAEA safeguards by mentioning the work we are undertaking with respect to several other prospects for verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements. In addition to a complete ban on nuclear testing, two actions have always been identified as indispensable to nuclear arms reduction and nuclear disarmament: freezing the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such materials. I am pleased to note that measures are being taken in both areas.
In August, the Conference on Disarmament finally agreed to commence negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In furtherance of a UN General Assembly Resolution , I wrote to the President of the Conference on Disarmament to offer, if requested, the assistance of the Agency in developing the technical verification arrangements for such a treaty.
Over the past two years, the Agency's Secretariat has been involved in discussions with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to develop modalities for possible IAEA verification that nuclear material transferred from the military sector in the two countries remained irreversibly in the peaceful sector. Progress was made in September when I met Ministers of both countries to set goals for future work.
I have also welcomed the recent decision of the UK, as a result of its Strategic Defence Review, to determine that substantial amounts of fissile material are now surplus to its military programme and that these will be available for IAEA safeguards under the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement between the UK and the Agency.
The Agency stands ready to contribute its verification and safeguards expertise and experience to the full realisation of these initiatives. An important question that still needs to be addressed is financing. In response to a request from the Board of Governors, the Secretariat is preparing an options paper on this subject. In my view, the possible establishment of a Nuclear Arms Control Verification Fund based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions could be a viable option to finance these initiatives and possibly the verification of other nuclear arms control and reduction measures.
The potential for nuclear weapons proliferation and for threats to public safety from illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources is an area of major international concern. In the past 15 months, the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database Programme has recorded 17 incidents involving nuclear material (mostly in insignificant quantities) and 22 involving other radioactive sources. Through information exchange, training, technical assistance and other support services, the Agency assists Member States to prevent, detect and respond to theft, diversion and other unauthorised uses of nuclear material and other radioactive sources. Also, at the request of the UN General Assembly, the Agency has been contributing to the ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly to elaborate a draft convention on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.
I turn now to the IAEA's role in technology transfer. Meeting the needs and aspirations of the world's growing population requires the application of the best available technologies, including nuclear technology. The IAEA is the principal vehicle for multilateral nuclear technology transfer. It collaborates with a wide range of organizations to meet scientific and technical challenges in areas such as health, food security, pollution control, water resource management and safe and sustainable energy production.
Nuclear techniques are often one component of larger national and regional development programmes. Frequently they are used to gather essential scientific data for project planning or to test results. Their value lies not only in their direct impact on developmental goals but also as a catalyst and a contributor to the efforts of others. For this reason, the Agency places high priority on establishing partnerships for development with other organizations.
The Agency pursues an integrated approach to technology transfer. Under the Regular Budget the results of some 400 scientific and technical meetings each year are widely disseminated through IAEA scientific, technical and information publications. Through the Agency's INIS database, which was established in 1970, bibliographic records on all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology are easily accessible.
Unique in the UN system, the IAEA operates its own research and service laboratories. These provide a wide range of technical services in physics, chemistry, hydrology, nuclear instrumentation and agriculture to assist developing countries. In this UN International Year of the Ocean, the role of the Agency's Marine Environment Laboratory (MEL) in Monaco has been highlighted. MEL is dedicated to studies of pollution including radioactivity and the effects of human activities on the marine environment. The Agency also awards Research Contracts which bring together scientists in developing and industrialized countries to progress towards common goals through information exchange on research activities.
The Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme is funded by Member States through voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund with the specific objective of technology transfer, bearing in mind the special needs of developing countries. Support for this Fund is an integral part of the international consensus relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy that is embodied in the IAEA Statute and the NPT.
The goal of our technical co-operation strategy is to promote tangible socio-economic impact by contributing directly in a cost effective manner to the achievement of the major sustainable development priorities of each country. The role of the Agency is threefold: a) to ensure that nuclear technology is the most effective and appropriate technology to address a particular problem; b) to ensure that this technology is transferred safely, in the most efficient and effective manner, and; c) to ensure that the recipient country has adequate infrastructure to adopt and sustain such technology. The size of the programme is modest - about US$ 80 million per year - but the results have been outstanding.
The Technical Co-operation Programme is driven by the requests of Member States for assistance in practically all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It comprises national, regional and interregional projects. In order to support common interests between countries and permit better use of resources, we are particularly fostering regional co-operative agreements for technical co-operation among developing countries.
In Latin America, the ARCAL regional co-operative arrangement was established in 1984. This year it was elevated to the status of a regional intergovernmental agreement. The achievements of ARCAL include the training of hundreds of scientists in the region, establishment of a network of laboratories for maintenance of instruments, production of radioisotopes used to improve livestock breeding, upgrading of radiation protection programmes, introduction of isotopic techniques for hydrology studies and establishment of a regional information network.
I am pleased to say that Argentina is an active participant in the Agency's technical co-operation activities at both the national and regional levels. For example, as a result of an Agency technical co-operation project, probabilistic safety analysis studies at various levels were completed for Argentine nuclear facilities and a well qualified PSA team was established at CNEA.
A second project relates to the study of factors limiting reactor material lifetime. The knowledge and technologies developed locally with the assistance of the Agency have helped to improve the quality of services that CNEA offers to Argentine nuclear power station operations in areas including non destructive testing, corrosion and material mechanics.
In the area of agricultural development, Argentina is making exceptional use of the Sterile Insect Technique to successfully eradicate the Medfly from the southern parts of the country. As a result of this project the Medfly is no longer a threat to fruit production in the regions of Patagonia, Mendoza and San Luis.
In the area of human health, the province of Mendoza has established an advanced programme for early diagnosis of cancer and for assistance during treatment and post-treatment. The Agency is supporting the School of Nuclear Medicine in Mendoza in the use of a specific radioisotope for the early diagnosis of residual cancer in tumours. And these are but a few of many examples of the success of the Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme.
As is evident from this brief overview of only a portion of the activities and programmes of the IAEA, the international nuclear agenda is growing not shrinking. The same cannot be said for the IAEA budget which for many years has been kept to essentially zero real growth. In this situation, it is essential that we ensure that our own house is in the best possible order, that we are meeting the priorities of our Member States in a rapidly changing world and that we make the most efficient and effective use of the funds that they allocate for our work. So, although the Agency has always enjoyed a reputation for good management, we have recently redoubled our efforts to improve our internal working procedures and extend and strengthen our internal 'efficiency culture'.
At the end of the day, the success of the IAEA is the success of its Member States. Nuclear energy has always been met by a mixture of hopes and apprehensions. I firmly believe that it is incumbent on us all to strengthen international co-operation to maximize the hopes and eliminate the sources of apprehension. This is a task to which the IAEA remains dedicated.