The first Review Meeting of Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety showed, among other things, that States continue to make improvements in safety. A conference held here in Vienna in June concluded that considerable progress on nuclear power plant safety had been made in Eastern Europe. Improvements in plant performance worldwide can be seen in the various indicators released annually by the Agency and by the World Association of Nuclear Operators. These show steady increases in capacity factors and decreases in unplanned reactor shutdowns, which now occur roughly once per year compared with some seven per year two decades ago. Plants with good performance are generally not only more reliable, but also have high margins of safety, as shown by the consistent decrease in radiation doses to workers at the plants and in the rate of industrial safety accidents.
In the area of waste safety, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, USA, which has begun receiving shipments of long lived radioactive waste, represents an important milestone for geological disposal, being the first operating deep geological facility in the world.
On the subject of geological disposal for high level waste, the dominant opinion of specialists is that it can be implemented safely, economically and in an environmentally sound manner, using technologies that are already available. However, lack of acceptance by the public and therefore by policy makers continues to be the major hurdle in most countries. This issue and others were the subject of a major international conference on the safety of radioactive waste management that took place in Córdoba, Spain, last week. The conference, which was organized by the Agency and hosted by the Spanish Government, with the participation of more than 300 experts from 55 Member States, focused on ways and means to ensure radioactive waste safety and on closing the gap between specialist perception and public perception. One of the major conclusions of the conference was that the participation and involvement of all interested parties - specialists, policy makers, civil society, the media, etc. - in the decision making processes relevant to radioactive waste management are essential for reaching national and international consensus on acceptable solutions.
Since 1997, we have been asked to provide assistance to people exposed to radiation as a result of inadequate regulatory control of radiation sources in Venezuela, Georgia, Turkey, Peru and now in Thailand. Aside from the human cost, these avoidable accidents unfortunately do damage to the overall image of nuclear energy among the public. I want once again to stress that a sound national safety infrastructure in the nuclear application field should be a high priority and I urge all governments to maintain registers of all radiation sources in their territories and provide for proper supervision of the use and disposal of the sources at all times. The Secretariat will continue to spare no effort to support countries in dealing with problems of orphan sources but, unfortunately, its resources for such assistance continue to be limited. Within existing resources, however, the Secretariat continues to implement the action plan. One element of the plan is to develop agreed international norms relevant to the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive material. Earlier this month we convened an open ended meeting of legal and technical experts to begin the preparation of a Code of Conduct on this issue.
As I have mentioned on previous occasions, the Secretariat continues to be concerned with the safety of research reactors, including the management of their spent fuel facilities. The safety situation in two research reactors warrants special mention. The first is the Vin?a reactor near Belgrade. You will recall that, with the Board’s concurrence, the Secretariat has been supporting activities which have resulted in improvements in the condition of the spent fuel pool at Vin?a. Problems with storage of the fuel, however, remain. It appears that the authorities in Belgrade are not in a position to fund the remediation activities that have already begun and there are potential health, safety and environmental concerns.
Another research reactor that requires attention is the one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An Agency mission sent at the request of the Congolese authorities confirmed that soil erosion around the facility could soon threaten safety. The Agency made a number of recommendations whose implementation is necessary to ensure the safety of the reactor. I have written to the President of the Republic to request that the recommendations be implemented and that the reactor not be operated until good progress is made.
I should note that the Agency has project and supply agreements in place for some 25 research reactors. These agreements require the States concerned, inter alia, to apply the Agency’s basic safety standards in connection with these reactors. They further provide that the Agency should determine that the safety measures are adequate. The Secretariat is currently in the process of reviewing these agreements with a view to enhancing its knowledge about the current safety operations and practices of these research reactors. The Secretariat intends, in accordance with the terms of the relevant agreement, and as necessary, to field safety missions to assist and advise on safety measures.
The Board has before it draft texts for Protocols Additional to the safeguards agreements with the Russian Federation, Namibia and Estonia. With these new agreements, the number of States with Additional Protocols approved will become 49. This is still far below the desired goal of universality.
I should stress that the Agency's ability to implement fully the safeguards required by Article III of the NPT, and other comparable non-proliferation agreements, depends not only on all the safeguards agreements being in place, but also on the conclusion of Additional Protocols. That is to say, only with respect to States which have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol, will the Agency be able to provide comprehensive and therefore credible assurance that covers the non-diversion of declared nuclear material as well as the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
The thirteenth round of Technical Talks with the Democratic People′s Republic of Korea (DPRK) took place in Vienna from 13 to 16 December 1999.
The talks did not result in progress on key issues and little that was tangible was achieved with regard to the preservation of information. We naturally hope for better progress in the future on this and other outstanding issues.
In accordance with the Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK, construction work on the light water reactor project started in February after site preparation. As foreseen in that Framework, the DPRK must be in compliance with its safeguards agreement before the delivery of key nuclear components. This in turn means that the DPRK must co-operate with the Agency with regard to the verification of the correctness and completeness of its initial declarations.
During the December meeting of the Board I mentioned to you the Agency’s need to conduct, by the end of December at the latest, a physical inventory verification inspection in Iraq under the safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT. I also mentioned at the time the letter that I sent to the President of the Security Council on the matter that was later reproduced as a Security Council document (S/2000/120, 15 February 2000).
Because the Government of Iraq provided the necessary visas only in January, the inspection took place on 22 - 25 January. Nonetheless, the Agency inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material subject to safeguards, which consists of low enriched, natural and depleted uranium.
As I mentioned before, however, such verification had the limited objective of verifying the declared nuclear material in question. It could not serve as a substitute for the Agency’s activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions, which are essential if the Agency is to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it under those resolutions and to provide the necessary assurances sought by the Council. The "relevant Security Council resolutions" now include Resolution 1284, which was adopted by the Council on 17 December 1999, reaffirming the Agency’s mandate.
The Board will recall that the Secretariat has been involved since 1996 in preparatory discussions with the Russian Federation and the USA in anticipation of a request by these two countries to submit fissile material removed from nuclear weapon programmes to Agency verification. A joint working group was established to investigate the technical, legal and financial issues involved.
The working group agreed in December 1999 to an accelerated work schedule with the intent of achieving as much progress as possible prior to the NPT Review Conference in April. I can report that some progress has been made both on the development of the technical measures required for the verification of such fissile material, and on the text of a verification agreement which would be the basis for bilateral agreements between the Agency and the two States. Other technical and legal issues are still to be resolved. Ensuring that fissile material subject to such agreements remains irreversibly removed from nuclear weapon programmes has been a key in the Secretariat’s approach in the discussions.
In talking about the programme and budget for the 2002–2003 biennium, I should refer to a fundamental issue that has, for far too long, been neglected. I refer to the fact that our mandate - particularly in the areas of safeguards and safety - is underfunded annually by some $15–20 million. And, the problem is only getting worse by the year. The situation has reached the point where I fear I will soon be unable, in good faith, to give you assurances that the mandate in these two areas can be fully implemented.