The Agency has been operating under a zero real growth budget for a decade and a half. These years of restricted resources have certainly produced greater attention to efficiency gains but over time they have begun to have a corrosive effect on the programme. In the safeguards area in particular, where we are now $20 million underfunded in the regular budget, they have led to a situation where, as I have said before, we are in a position to carry out only adequate safeguards, not optimum safeguards, owing to our inability to modernize equipment and make full use of available new technologies.
The Board has nonetheless shown itself ready over the period in question to take a pragmatic approach when faced with compelling reasons to exceed zero growth: in the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl, after the Iraq disclosure, and in order to finance an expansion in safeguards coverage, primarily in South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. I suggest that the present need for the safeguards equipment and the increase in human resources for technical co-operation should be seen in the same light. It is an urgent programme need, and it should be treated as such.
Over the past four years, a comprehensive process of self-initiated internal reform has been carried out within the Agency. It has led inter alia to: the introduction of the results based approach; reorganizations involving the creation of units for policy co-ordination and programme preparation and assessment; a comprehensive review of the information technology function; and the establishment of an oversight office. We have introduced biennial programming and are awaiting the acceptance of biennial budgeting. We have made extensive reviews of our work processes as well as of the concerns of our staff.
It is clear therefore that, as several of you have recognized, we cannot "save" our way out of the present situation. Yes, of course, there will gradually be more savings as technology develops and new ideas emerge. But at present any additional major cuts in the budget will inevitably involve programme cuts. I should however add that the new results based approach — with its detailed programme formulation — will provide Member States in the future with an in-depth mechanism for consideration of the programme content. Indeed, given our move to true biennial programming, the major emphasis every other year will now be on performance assessment and feedback.
Safeguards Implementation Report for 2000
I turn now to the agenda items on nuclear verification and security of material, which the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Goldschmidt, will address in detail. The Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) contains the Safeguards Statement for 2000, in which the Agency announces that, for all 140 States with safeguards agreements in force, it found no indication of diversion or misuse of material, facilities or equipment that had been placed under safeguards. On this basis the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for.
Moreover, for 7 of the 19 States that had in force both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, the Agency has completed its evaluation and is now able to provide broader assurance: not only that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material, but also that there was no indication of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.
In response to last year’s General Conference resolution, the Secretariat has increased its efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols — by means, for example, of regional seminars that have been convened or will be convened in New Zealand, Japan, Kazakhstan and Peru, and by systematically approaching Permanent Missions and capitals. Despite these efforts, however, 53 States Party to the NPT remain without a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force. For those countries the Agency cannot provide any safeguards assurance. Furthermore, no new additional protocols are before the Board to add to the 57 that have so far been approved. This is regrettable and disappointing.
The continued development of integrated safeguards remains a high priority for the Agency. Last year, an integrated safeguards approach was prepared for light water reactors without mixed oxide fuel, research reactors and spent fuel storage facilities, and in the first half of this year further steady progress has been made with regard to on-load reactors, reactors with mixed oxide fuel and related implementation issues. The Secretariat will conduct a briefing on integrated safeguards for Member State representatives at the conclusion of the Board meeting, to describe the progress achieved.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
As I said in March, despite our continuous inspector presence in the Nyongbyon area of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the implementation of the DPRK’s safeguards agreement with the Agency remains at a standstill, and we are still unable to verify the accuracy and completeness of the initial report on the nuclear material in the DPRK subject to safeguards.
A further round of technical talks with the DPRK took place in Pyongyang at the end of last month. We have previously explained to the DPRK the generic measures needed in order to verify its initial declaration — and stated that, with full DPRK co-operation, the process could take 3–4 years to complete. At the latest round of talks, we provided a proposal for the first steps required, and made it clear again that we are ready to start the relevant activities as soon as possible. I call once more on the DPRK to co-operate fully and promptly with the Agency in order to come into compliance with its safeguards agreement, which is still binding and in force.
Security of Material
In November 1999 I convened an informal open ended expert meeting to discuss whether the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was in need of revision. Last month, the expert meeting adopted its final report, in which it was concluded that the international physical protection regime clearly needed to be strengthened, and that a spectrum of measures should be employed — including the drafting of an amendment to strengthen the Convention, to be reviewed by States Parties with a view to determine if it should be submitted to an amendment conference. As recommended by the expert meeting, I intend to convene a group of legal and technical experts to draft such an amendment.
Other recommendations of the expert meeting dealt with programmatic aspects of physical protection. These included a recommendation to submit, for consideration by the September session of the Board, a set of "Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles". I will carefully review all the recommendations and provide my views on them to the Board by September.
Last month, the Agency also held an International Conference on Security of Material in Stockholm, with participants from 66 States and 5 international organizations. The Conference pointed to: the need for increased co-operation between the relevant organizations, such as customs organizations, INTERPOL, national governments, and the Agency; the importance of improving awareness of potential threats, incidents of theft and sabotage, and illicit trafficking; and the need to enhance research and development on techniques for detection and analysis.
Since the March Board, a number of noteworthy developments have occurred related to nuclear energy and nuclear waste disposal. In the United States of America, the President unveiled a national energy policy that voiced strong support for the reconsideration of investment in nuclear power. The Agency also recently completed its international peer review of the biosphere modeling programme for the proposed US geological repository site at Yucca Mountain, in support of the site recommendation that may be made to the President later this year. In the Russian Federation, the Minister of Atomic Energy announced that six new nuclear power units would be built by 2010, on the site of existing Russian nuclear facilities. Just last week, the Russian Duma also approved, for consideration by the upper House and the President, three draft laws that would allow the import of spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing and storage. And the Finnish Parliament ratified the decision to construct a deep disposal facility for spent fuel at Olkiluoto.
International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)
The Steering Committee of the INPRO project on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles met for the first time last month, with 7 full members and 11 observers, including the OECD International Energy Agency, in attendance. The Committee agreed on the work plan for the first phase of the Project to be completed in July next year. This phase would define the user requirements to be met by the innovative reactors and the methodology for assessing the various technologies.
As I have often said, innovation is crucial to the future of nuclear power, and for the INPRO project to achieve its potential, broad participation is vital. I would urge Member States, and particularly all technology holders, to take an active role in this project.
CSD-9 Results
In March, I drew your attention to two important meetings related to climate change: the ninth session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD-9), which took place in New York in April, and the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Climate Change, which will reconvene in Bonn in July.
The Agency organized two side events in New York, on nuclear power and sustainable development, coinciding with CSD-9. Strong views were presented at the Commission both against and in support of considering nuclear power as contributing to sustainable energy development. In the end, all the Parties agreed that "the choice of nuclear energy rests with [individual] countries." Nonetheless, the debate on nuclear power, sustainable development and climate change will continue. Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change will consider a draft proposal in July in Bonn which, if approved, would not give countries credit under the Clean Development Mechanism for choosing nuclear power. In this context, the Agency will continue to provide all parties with sound technical information in order to ensure that the nuclear option is given a full and fair hearing.
Nuclear Safety Issues
The 26th of April marked the 15th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident — a time for reflecting, together with other organizations in the United Nations system, on the efforts we have made to assist the people affected by the accident and to ensure that an event of this devastating nature never happens again. At an international conference in Kiev in April — organized by the Government of Ukraine in co-operation with the IAEA and other international organizations — the Agency’s efforts were recognized in areas such as the assessment of the radiological consequences of the accident, the restoration of economic life, improving the safety of other nuclear power plants and assisting with the safe decommissioning of the Chernobyl Power Plant. The Agency was also represented at last week’s international conference, co-sponsored by WHO and also held in Kiev, on the health effects of the accident.
Overexposure of Radiotherapy Patients in Panama
I am saddened to report on the recent radiological emergency at the National Oncology Institute in Panama City, which affected 28 patients undergoing radiotherapy — of whom eight have died, with five of the deaths probably attributable to radiation overexposure. The Agency was notified about the emergency by the Government of Panama and, at their request, we responded by assembling a team of international experts. The team completed its visit last week, with preliminary conclusions on the causes and consequences of the emergency.
The apparent cause of the emergency was erroneous data entry into the computer used for the treatment planning system. We have notified States of the circumstances of the emergency, to prevent additional overexposures wherever this configuration of treatment might be in use. We will also publish a detailed report on this event, with the lessons learned and recommended actions.
This event unfortunately underscores the need for international action to strengthen the radiological protection of patients in diagnostic and interventional radiology, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy — topics that were the focus of our international conference in Malaga, Spain, in March. I will submit the findings and recommendations of this conference for the Board’s consideration at its September meeting.
Status of Assessing the Effects of Depleted Uranium
The Agency is still working to respond — in co-ordination with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and WHO — to requests received from various States in the Middle East and the Balkans regarding additional radiological assessments of the residues of depleted uranium. A mission will be dispatched to Kuwait in September. We also have held discussions with Iraq about a possible mission there. Other missions will follow as resources permit.