In the week following the events of 11 September, the General Conference adopted a resolution requesting that I initiate a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. You have before you my report, which reflects the initial response to that request. The report describes the threats involved, the current Agency activities that respond to these threats, proposals for additional activities that the Agency could implement, and initial estimates of the resources required.

I will have a few additional remarks when I introduce the report -- but as the report makes clear, much needs to be done to strengthen nuclear security by all States, including those that possess nuclear weapons. Our first and urgent task is to gather the facts, and to develop a plan of action, with milestones that are geared to the identified priorities and the urgency of the required actions. Many measures that are already approved by the Board but lack the required resources can be immediately implemented once resources are made available. I have in mind for example increased security and safety assessment missions, enhanced security training and upgrading of our Emergency Response Centre. And while I believe that initial resources should come through voluntary contributions to ensure speed and flexibility, I also believe that, as we move forward, we need a financing mechanism that is based on both assessed and voluntary contributions to ensure the predictability required for those activities that should be sustained in the long run. Both the Chernobyl accident and the discovery of Iraq's clandestine weapons programme have taught us painful lessons about the value of preventive measures. I trust that these lessons have been fully absorbed.

For nuclear security to be effective, stringent standards must be globally applied, and security upgrades must be measured against such standards. Nuclear security is only as good as its weakest link. Traditional thinking -- that nuclear security is exclusively a national responsibility -- must yield to the reality that a combination of national and international measures is fundamental to an effective nuclear security regime. While national measures are essential to build a robust national security system, international measures are also indispensable in such areas as developing agreed standards, combating transnational trafficking and co-ordinating international assistance.

In my view, the time has come to adopt a new approach to the whole question of nuclear security. Just as we have developed an effective regime to counter the possible diversion of nuclear materials by States, we need an equally effective regime to counter possible acts of theft and violence involving nuclear facilities, nuclear material and other radioactive sources -- a regime with internationally agreed standards for security and appropriate mechanisms which, while taking account of the need for confidentiality, also ensure effective implementation. This approach will require the sustained support of all -- but equally will be of benefit to all. The urgent need to amend the Physical Protection Convention -- to, inter alia, broaden its scope of application -- is the first step in that direction, and I am pleased to note that the meeting of experts to consider amending the Convention will be convened next week.

The nuclear sector is by no means the most vulnerable sector of modern society. But as in other sectors, certain vulnerabilities have become more visible, and must be addressed. Our duty is to minimize the risk by every reasonable means.