

Australian Government

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office



Australian Government

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

REGULATING THE TRANSPORT OF URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE IN AUSTRALIA

Prepared by Michal Botha, Nuclear Security Section Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office Presented 13-17 November 2017

IAEA-CN-254-88-ORA D17/1457383

FEDERAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN AUSTRALIA

NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

CPPNM Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials



Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987

- SECURITY
- SAFEGUARDS
- NUCLEAR COOPERATION
 AGREEMENTS



REGULATING THE TRANSPORT OF UOC IN AUSTRALIA

REGULATORY REVIEW



PERMIT REVIEW – TRANSPORT OF UOC

Australian UOC exports for 2016-2017 \approx 7 081 tonnes²

- Reduce the regulatory burden on the industry
 - Exploit other existing regulatory requirements



- Provide clear outcome objectives by applying industry performance terminology
- Include a broader consultative stakeholder participation
 - Mines Consignor, generally produces transport plans for consignments
 - State and Territory Government requirements for transport of Class7 material
 - Carriers Providing performance "tick and flick" based objectives
 - International best practice
- Meet Australian public's expectation for the nuclear industry



REGULATORY REVIEW

ASNO Permits required for transport of UOC¹

- Permits brought in line with new Permit model
 - Permit Section and Compliance Code section
- Consultation with stakeholders
 - Transport operators
 - Mines (generally provide transport plans)
 - State and Territory Government regulatory bodies
- Review drew on IAEA material
 - Nuclear Security in the Extraction Industry IAEA-TDL-003



¹Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987

PERMIT FUNCTIONAL FORMAT



Title of Presentation

7

Route

Pre – Transport	 Container / Seal Inspection Transport Briefing Communications Operational Test
During Transport	 Convoy Communication Predetermined stops Security and Situational Awareness
Interim Storage	 Interim Security Arrangements Approved Secure Compounds Container storage to be door-to-door
Emergency Response	 Restoring Communications Maintaining Security Training
Escalated Threat	

STORAGE INCIDENTAL TO UOC TRANSPORT

Australian Geographical limitations

- Transporting over long distances
- Unsealed roads in varying condition
- Limited road options
- Weather influences
- Limited communication options

Stationary for short periods (planned and unplanned stoppages)

Secure Location storage requirements for periods beyond 72 hours



SCALABLE THREAT MODEL FOR THE TRANSPORT OF UOC

ASNO utilizes a threat scale based on the Australian National Terrorism Threat Advisory System³



Australian Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 in keeping with ISPS⁴ requires the

application of maritime security levels



REGULATING THE TRANSPORT OF UOC IN AUSTRALIA

⁴International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 2003

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN UOC TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP

The majority of UOC exports are currently shipped through the Port of Adelaide in the State of South Australia

South Australian UOC Transport Working Group consisting of Federal and State Government, Industry and First-Responder representatives

Recent action items include:

- Best practice guidance for a model Transport Plan;
- determining standards and obligations for incident responses,
 - abilities of the broader industry to contribute to a timely response due to extensive distances of transports;
- Industry expertise contributing towards establishing specific training for first responders.





Australian Government

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade