BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED IN LANL APPROACHES TO TRANSPORTATION SECURITY



November 16, 2017

Katherine Drypolcher

Introduction

- Programmatic mission
 - unwanted radioactive and nuclear sealed sources of US origin
- During transportation of nuclear material the risk of sabotage or theft is heightened.

Physical Protection of Material in Transit

- Prevent theft and/or diversion for malevolent use
- Prompt detection, assessment, and reporting
- Prompt Local Law Enforcement Authority (LLEA) response



Graded Approach for Implementation Controls

Risk Category	Security Plan	State / City Notification S	Engineered Delays	GPS Tracking	Intrusion Alarm	Additional Requiremen ts
High	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Medium	Ο	Ν	Y	Y	Ν	Ν
Low	Ν	Ν	Ο	Ν	Ν	Ν

Y = yes, O = optional, N = no

Security Requirements

Engineered

- -Hardened locks and doors
- Stop Boxes
- Real Time GPS tracking with or without intrusion notification
- Administrative
 - Notifications to appropriate authorities
 - Background vetted drivers
 - Transportation security plans
 - Procedure changes







Los Alamos National Laboratory

UNCLASSIFIED | LA-UR-17-29759

LANL Lessons Learned

#1 Shipping Violation

- Air shipment of fissile material
- LANL-wide pause of all Class 7 shipping operations.
 - Corrective Action Plan
 - New Procedure
 - Use Every Time Checklists

#2 Unmonitored Shipment

 94 sealed sources at a US commercial licensee

 The shipment quantities did not trigger any supplemental physical security or tracking requirements.



#3 Foreign shipment

- May 24th 2005 one 293Pu/Be was packaged in Uruguay for transportation to the US.
 - No support
 - Conflicting priorities
 - High costs

Conclusion

DOE – owned truck

- Real-time tracking
- Stop box
- Reliable drivers
- Minimized transport time

Improvements from Lessons Learned