

# Integration of Security into a Concept Design for a Facility

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### Systematic Approach

Information, Assessment, Decision and Process

Categorise Assets for Theft and Sabotage

Identify requirements for:

- ★Delay;
- ★Detect;
- ★Assess;
- ★Control of Access; and
- ★Insider Mitigation.

Design including Performance Specification

Performance and Vulnerability Assessment



# Categorisation for Theft and Sabotage



#### Need to Understand Assets and Potential Consequences

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#### Assets



Nuclear Material Other Radioactive Materials Structures, Systems and Components



Threat



#### **Design Basis Threat**



Potential Adversarial Forces



# Identification of Security Outcomes



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Understand Physical and Technical Regulatory Expectations Categorisation drives required 'Security Outcomes'

# Specification and Integration into Design





Once Security Outcomes are Specified then Performance Specifications can be Provided to 'Design and Engineering' Teams

#### Integrated Security





### Vulnerability Assessment





Updated Design is then Tested against Credible Scenarios (based on the Design Basis Threat) Improvements to the Design are made as Required

#### Vulnerability Assessment





# Security into Design (Conclusions)



Iterative Process for Designing and Testing Concept Design

Ensures Appropriate Inclusion of Security at an Early Stage

Enables Safety and Security to be Discussed Before Large Investment Decisions are Made

Leads to a 'Right First Time' Result

Project Cost and Operational Efficiencies are Delivered





# Integration of Security into a Concept Design for a Facility

Any Questions?

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