IAEA International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

THE REGULATOR'S TOOLS TO SUPPORT THE OPERATOR'S SECURITY CULTURE

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Vienna, Austria 13-17 November 2017



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"AWARENESS WITHOUT ACTION IS Worthless."

PHIL MCGRAW

Talking points

- Why fostering a robust security culture?
- What are the main challenges?
- What actions the regulator may support?
- Summary







IAEA **Nuclear** Security Series

Folie 3

NSS No 20 (2013)

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NM (2005)

Sustaining A Nuclear rity Regime maintaining a ULTURE; should be hysical

> individuals involved in urity should give due UCLEAR SECURITY

with regard to radioactive

The State should implement relevant elements of the NUCLEAR SECURITY **CULTURE** for the trustworthiness program"

"A robust computer SECURITY CULTURE is an

+ UN SCR 1540 (2004) + EU CBRN Action Plan (2009)

+ A-

berg NERGIEWIRTSCHAFT



Baden-Württemberg

On the other hand: is physical protection sufficient?





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Some examples for security culture in practice?

- stolen or lost radioactive sources (*laid back attitude toward security rules*)
- people ignore or even do not know security rules (apathy, laziness)
- bored, apathetic or even sleeping guards (security is an unnecessary obstacle to hinder effective production)
- managers refuse to follow security rules when entering protected areas (*claiming special rights for them no time*)
- maintenance of security systems postponed due to financial reasons (*short cuts due to business goals*)
- missing feedback culture ("my bosses know exactely what to do" vs." frequently reported gaps and however nothing happend")



What about the contribution of the regulator do? (Part I)

- Giving the **initial impulse** to the operator to start a self-assessment campaign
- Developing an **appropriate** and **tailored** self-assessment plan
- Evaluating the results and helping to derive an action-plan
- **Monitoring** the progress of the action plan
- "Appreciating" the effectiveness of the action plan



What about the contribution of the regulator do? (Part II)

- Specifying a **subsequent** self-assessment campaign
- Offering help to create tools to raise the awareness level of the staff
- Offering **realistic examples** (e.g. taken from the IAEA ITDB)
- Organizing regional or national workshops on NSC or applying for IAEA workshops on NSC
- Offering participation in national or international conferences and workshops



root causes of complacency



Attitudes toward security

Avoidance

people regard security as inherently dangerous, unnecessary, or even harmful

Apathy

people don't care one way or another about security

Participation

people follow the rules while acting like security is not their problem

Ownership

people assume responsibility and regard security as their programme





To be more precise...



Goal: Effective Nuclear Security

Management systems are well developed and prioritize security

(a) Visible security policy (b) Clear roles and responsibilities (c) Performance measurement (d) Work environment (e) Training and qualification (f) Work management (g) Information security (h) Operation and maintenance (i) Continual determination of trustworthiness (j) Quality assurance (k) Change management (I) Feedback process (m) Contingency plans and drills (n) Self-assessment (o) Interface with the regulator (p) Coordination with off-site organizations (q) Record-keeping

Behavior fosters more effective nuclear security

Leadership behavior (a) Expectations (b) Use of authority (c) Decision-making (d) Management oversight (e) Involvement of staff (f) Effective communication (g) Improving performance (h) Motivation

Personnel behavior (a) Professional conduct (b) Personal accountability (c) Adherence to procedure (d) Teamwork and cooperation (e) Vigilance

Principles for Guiding Decisions and Behavior

(a) Motivation (b) Leadership (c) Commitment and responsibility (d) Professionalism and competence (e) Learning and improvement

Beliefs and Attitudes (a) Credible threat exists (b) Nuclear security is important









The data collecting and evaluation method and its processes have to be regularly checked (and modified)!



Summary

 Security culture is essential to grant efficient security (...human factor!)



- Before improving s.th. you have to know the current state (...improving something unknown?)
- Biggest benefit: raising awareness and a feeling of self-responsibility to security!
- The regulator is a team player with various opportunities to support the operator.

Thank you for your attention!



"Organizational culture means to the organization the same thing as the oil in the gearbox: It supports the long-term effectiveness and functionality"

(A. Hagemann)



Any questions?

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...and C. Speicher says:

"Taking care of the oilcan and its content is the duty of and the task for any operator and regulator!"

