GC 59 Senior Regulators' Meeting

Session I on Regulatory Challenges for the Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities

Chairperson Summary

- To begin, please allow me to extend my thanks to all of our presenters today. To DDG Flory, I extend my thanks for his opening remarks in which you emphasized the need to consider safety and security at the outset from design to the decommissioning phase, or 'cradle to grave'. To Director Mrabit, thank you for setting the scene and laying out the international framework for the security of radioactive material, and for providing concrete examples of ways in which the IAEA continues to support States to establish their nuclear security regimes for radioactive material and associated facilities. To our presenters from the United States, Hungary, Ghana, thank you for candidly sharing your experiences and the challenges you faced in establishing your regulatory infrastructures. In addition, I thank our additional participants from Brazil and France who amplified the presentations by sharing their national experiences during the panel discussion.
- Based on the presentations and remarks provided by our group of experts, it is fair to say
 that States have come a long way to establish regulatory infrastructures for the security of
 radioactive material and associated facilities. However, we still face specific challenges in
 this regard.
- One key challenge remains in the area of integrating safety and security. At times, the requirements of one can come into conflict with those of the other, so achieving the appropriate balance between the two is essential. The need for appropriate integration also relies upon an adaptable regulatory system where national requirements for security and safety can be harmonized. In many cases, regulatory authorities have both safety and security responsibilities in the authorization, inspection, and enforcement processes so efforts should continue to streamline these effects to reflect real word situations.
- Regulating the security of radioactive material presents different challenges than those for nuclear material so a 'one size fits all' approach cannot be applied.
- There is a need for a balanced as well as graded approach to regulation so as to avoid overregulation.
- Specifically on the regulatory infrastructure for the security of radioactive material and
 associated facilities, it is critical for policy and decision-makers to remain engaged and
 committed to nuclear security. With this commitment at the policy and strategic levels,
 there needs to be the clear allocation of responsibilities to the various competent
 authorities involved in the security of radioactive material. Further, competent authorities
 should be given the necessary human and financial resources to implement the regulatory
 infrastructure.
- It is important to recall that the security of radioactive material is a lifecycle issue. It is not sufficient to protect radioactive material when it is in use, but rather, to establish policies

- and mechanisms at the outset so that once radioactive material, there are options to ensure that this material remains in secure conditions once it becomes disused.
- Finally, the nuclear security regime for radioactive material and associated facilities is made up of three main pillars: (1) the legal and regulatory framework; (2) the institutions and organizations responsible for implementing this legal and regulatory framework as well as administrative security measures; and (3) the security systems and measures.
 Each of these pillars must be sufficiently strong because if not, the entire nuclear security regime becomes vulnerable. Let us continue to work nationally, regionally, and internationally to put the appropriate emphasis on each pillar in order to strengthen the security of radioactive material and associated facilities globally.