Events and highlights on the progress related to recovery operations at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

June 2021

The Government of Japan

Section 1: Summary of updates from January through April 2021

1.1: Decommissioning and Contaminated Water management

Since the last report, there has been progress on the decommissioning and contaminated water management at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter "Fukushima Daiichi NPS") as detailed below. For specifics please refer to section 2.

1. Basic Policy of ALPS treated water

On 13 April 2021, the GOJ announced its basic policy, based on which preparation for discharging the ALPS treated water of FDNPS into the sea will be started. TEPCO will submit plans for the discharge. The discharge is subject to receiving necessary approval from the NRA. The actual discharge is envisaged to be conducted approximately after two years. (For further details please refer to Page 10.)

2. Removal of all fuel assemblies from the Unit 3 completed

Removal of 566 fuel assemblies remaining in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool was completed. This is the first among the units in which fuels were melted. (For further details please refer to Page 15.)

3. Earthquake that occurred on February 13, 2021

February 13, 2021, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake struck off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture. Some shift of the tanks at the site and lowering the water level inside of PCVs were confirmed, but no radiation impact to the outside was observed. (For further details please refer to Page 4.)

1.2: Monitoring results

There were no significant changes in the monitoring results of air dose rates, dust, soil, seawater, sediment and marine biota during the period from January to April 2021. For further details please refer to the section 3.

1.3: Off-site Environmental Remediation

The Ministry of the Environment (MOE) completed the whole area decontamination in the Special Decontamination Area (SDA) by the end of March 2017 as planned, while decontamination conducted by the municipalities in the Intensive Contamination Survey Area (ICSA) was also completed in March 19th, 2018. This means that the whole area decontamination based on the Act on Special Measures was completed, excluding the *Restricted area*. For further details please refer to the section 4.

1.4: Food products

Japan has a robust control system which prevents the distribution of food exceeding the Japanese maximum levels (JMLs), conservatively set in the safe side. Monitoring and inspections of radioactive materials in food are continuously being conducted, and restrictions on food distribution and the removal of these restrictions are taken based on monitoring results. Restrictions on several agricultural products and fishery products were lifted during the period January to April 2021.

Monitoring data from the major food products in FY2019 in Japan show that all are below the JMLs. According to the Total Diet Study for Japanese food, the effective dose in CY2020 is estimated as far below 1 mSv/year (0.0005-0.0014 mSv/year). These results confirm the safety of Japanese food.

For further details please refer to the section 5.

1.5: Radiation protection of worker

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) has provided guidance on the prevention of radiation hazards to workers engaged in the decommissioning work at Fukushima Daiichi NPS or decontamination and related work; additionally, the Ministry has taken relevant and necessary measures such as the provision of long-term healthcare for emergency workers. For further details please refer to the section 6.

Section 2: Decommissioning, contaminated water and treated water management at Fukushima Daiichi NPS

2.1: Mid-and-Long Term Roadmap


Decommissioning work at Fukushima Daiichi NPS has been conducted by the following milestones described in the "Mid-and-Long Term Roadmap" with safety as the priority.

The entire decommission process will take 30 to 40 years, and the decommissioning is an unprecedented work with technical challenges. Therefore, the Government of Japan and TEPCO have prioritized each task and set the goal to achieve them.

Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPS (revised on December 27, 2019)

- <Outline of the Mid-and –Long-Term Roadmap>
 - https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20191227 1.pdf
- <The Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap>

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20191227 3.pdf




^{*} Excluding the reactor buildings of Units 1-3, process main buildings, and High temperature incineration building.

2.2: Water management

1. Major initiatives for water management

The preventive and multi-layered measures against contaminated water issue are implemented based on the three principles; "Removing contamination sources", "Redirecting ground water from contamination source" and "Preventing leakage of contaminated water".

In relation to the earthquake that occurred on February 13, 2021, TEPCO has confirmed that 53 tanks have been displaced by up to 19 cm, no leakage has been confirmed from these tanks and no any influence on the outside. Tanks storing ALPS treated water are intentionally not fixed but placed flat for earthquake resistance, and are designed so that when a certain amount of force is applied to them, they move to release the force and prevent collapse and leakage. The water levels of the PCV were declined from February 15 at Unit 1 and from February 17 at Unit 3 respectively. The declined in water-levels were considered attributable to the change in condition of the PCV-damaged parts due to the earthquake. There was no significant change in the monitoring posts, dust monitors and others on the site boundary, nor any influence on the outside. It was confirmed that water was being injected to the reactor appropriately. In response to this event, enhanced monitoring of plant parameters has been implemented for Units 1-3 from February 19, 2021.



Source: TEPCO

(1) Groundwater bypass

(a) Objective

The groundwater bypass function is to isolate water from contamination by pumping it and reducing its inflow into the reactor buildings.

(b)Mechanism

Clean groundwater is pumped from the wells installed on the mountain-side area of the reactor buildings and then discharged into the port area after confirming that water quality met the operational targets.

(c) Recent situations

As of April 26, 2021, 634,000m³ of clean groundwater was released into the ocean. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that the quality met the operational targets. The pumps are inspected and cleaned as necessary to operate appropriately.

The result of sea area monitoring shows that the radiation level of seawater outside the port area remains low enough compared to the density limit specified by the Reactor Regulation and WHO guidelines for drinking water quality, in addition significant change in the radioactivity has not been observed.

TEPCO's website related to groundwater bypass:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommision/planaction/groundwater/index-e.html

Detailed analysis results regarding the water quality of the groundwater being pumped out for by-passing at Fukushima Daiichi NPS (published by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI))

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/sd202102.pdf (January 2021)

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/sd202011r.pdf (February 2021)

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/sd202012.pdf (March 2021)

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/sd202101.pdf (April 2021)

(2) Sub-drain and groundwater drain systems

(a) Objective

The function of the sub-drain system is to prevent clean groundwater from being contaminated by pumping it and reducing its inflow into the reactor buildings, and thus it is reducing the generation of contaminated water.

The function of the groundwater drain system is to prevent leakage of contaminated groundwater by pumping it before flowing into the port.

(b)Mechanism

Groundwater that contains slight radioactivity is pumped from the wells installed in the vicinity of the reactor buildings (called sub-drain) and the wells installed in the bank protection area (called groundwater drain) and then the groundwater treated through special purification equipment to meet the stringent operational targets set by TEPCO. The purified groundwater is discharged into the port area after passing water quality inspections.

(c) Recent situations

The operation of the sub-drain and groundwater drain systems started in September 2015. The effects of the sub-drain system are measured by two markers: the water level of the sub-

drain, and the difference between the water level of the sub-drain and that of the reactor buildings.

Up until April 25, 2021, 1,071,000m³ was drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization confirmed that the quality met the operational targets. The result of sea area monitoring confirms that the radiation level of seawater outside the port area remains low enough compared to the density limit specified by the Reactor Regulation, and no significant change in the radioactivity level has been observed.

TEPCO's website related to the sub-drain and groundwater drain systems:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommision/planaction/sub-drain/index-e.html

Detailed analysis results regarding the water quality of the groundwater pumped up by sub-drain and purified at Fukushima Daiichi NPS (published by METI)

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/sd202102.pdf (January 2021)

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/sd202103r.pdf (February 2021)

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/sd202104.pdf (March 2021)

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/sd202105.pdf (April 2021)

(3) Land-side impermeable wall (Frozen soil wall)

(a) Objective

The installation of the land-side impermeable wall aims to prevent clean groundwater from being contaminated. This will be achieved by surrounding the reactor buildings with an inground frozen barrier and blocking groundwater from flowing into the buildings.

(b)Mechanism

An approximately 1,500 meters long wall, composed of frozen pipes driven into the ground, surrounds the Unit 1-4 reactor buildings. The barrier will be formed around the buildings to block groundwater inflow by supplying chilled brine (a freezing material) through the pipes and freezing the soil.

(c) Recent situations

In March 2018, the construction of the land-side impermeable walls was completed, except for a portion of the depth, based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature declined below 0 °C in almost all areas, while, on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. The 21st Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, 2018, which evaluated that together with the function of sub-drains, etc., a water-level management system, which keeps groundwater isolation from the buildings, had been established and it had allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.

A supplementary method was implemented for the unfrozen depth and it was confirmed that the temperature of this portion declined below 0 °C by September 2018.

The groundwater level in the inner area of the land-side impermeable walls has been decreasing year by year, and the difference between the inner and outer water levels is maintained on the mountain side, although there are some fluctuations due to rainfall. The water level in the groundwater drain observation well is about T.P.+1.5 m, which is well below the ground surface (ground surface height T.P.*2.5 m).

*T.P.: Tokyo Pail; The elevation of the ground surface, i.e., the reference level for expressing the height above sea level.

TEPCO's website related to the land-side impermeable wall:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommision/planaction/landwardwall/index-e.html

(4) Sea-side impermeable wall

(a) Objective

The installation of the sea-side impermeable wall aims to prevent the leakage of contaminated water into the ocean. This was achieved by installing a wall to block groundwater from flowing into the port area, and thus protecting the marine environment against pollution.

(b)Mechanism

A wall, approximately 780 meters long and composed of 594 steel pipes with a diameter of 1.1 meters and a length of 30 meters, were installed around the bank protection area near the reactor buildings. The groundwater flowing from the site is blocked by the wall and pumped by the sub-drain and the groundwater drain systems. Consequently, the wall prevents groundwater from flowing into the port area and also reduces the risk of contaminated water flowing into the ocean in case of any leakage.

(c) Situations

In October 2015, the sea-side impermeable wall construction was completed. It has been confirmed that the radiation level of seawater inside the port area substantially decreased. In addition to the operation of the sub-drain and the groundwater drain systems, the completion of the wall marks major progress in water management at Fukushima Daiichi NPS.

TEPCO's website related to the sea-side impermeable wall:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommision/planaction/seasidewall/index-e.html

(5) Completion of waterproofing and closure work of seawater piping trench

Highly concentrated contaminated water was generated because of the accident and it became stagnant inside the seawater piping trench of Unit 2, 3 and 4. In order to prevent the risk of the contaminated water leaking into the ocean, the stagnant water was removed and the seawater piping trench was waterproofed.

The work at Unit 2 was completed in 2017, following the work at Unit 3 and 4, which was completed in 2015. No stagnant water inside the seawater piping trench is in each unit.

(6) Progress of stagnant water removal and treatment in buildings

To reduce the risk of stagnant water in the basement buildings, water levels in the Unit 1-4 buildings are being lowered sequentially. The connecting part between Unit 1 and 2 was separated on September 13, 2018. And separation of the connecting part between Unit 3 and 4 was completed in December 2017.

Towards the floor-surface exposure of basement of the buildings, excluding the Unit 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and the High Temperature Incinerator Building within 2020, which is a milestone (main target process) of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap, levels of contaminated water in buildings were reduced. On December 24, 2020, the achievement of the milestone was confirmed. To achieve another milestone set for FY2022-2024 to reduce the amount of stagnant water in the reactor buildings to about half of the amount at the end of 2020, ongoing efforts to manage contaminated water will be continued.


(7) Control of the generation of contaminated water

Multi-layered measures, including pumping up by sub-drains and land-side impermeable walls, which were implemented to control the continued generation of contaminated water, reduced the groundwater inflow into buildings.

Following the steady implementation of measures (groundwater bypass, sub-drains, land-side impermeable walls, etc.), the inflow of the groundwater and rainwater into buildings reduced from approx. 350 m³/day (in FY2014) to approx. 90 m³/day (in FY2020), though it depends on rainfall.

Subsequently, the generation of contaminated water decreased from approx. 470 m³/day (in FY2014) to approx. 140 m³/day (in FY2020). With this, the milestone (150 m³/day within 2020) set by the Roadmap has been achieved.

Measures will continue to further reduce the volume of contaminated water generated.



^{*1} Values differ from those announced at the 20th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50th and 51st meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.

2. Purification treatment of contaminated water and management of treated water

(1) Objective

^{*2:} The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday.

The purification treatment of contaminated water aims to remove sources of contamination.

(2) Mechanism

Contaminated water that accumulated at the site of Fukushima Daiichi NPS is treated at multiple facilities including Multi-nuclide Removal Facility (Advanced Liquid Processing System = ALPS). In this process, after the concentration of caesium and strontium in the contaminated water is reduced, ALPS removes most of the radioactive materials except tritium and radioactive materials are reduced to about one millionth, compared to the water before purification.

(3) Recent situations

As of April 15, 2021, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multinuclide removal equipment were approx. 467,000, 698,000 and 103,000 m³, respectively.

TEPCO's website related to purification treatment of contaminated water: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommision/planaction/alps/index-e.html

TALPS treated water, which is treated to remove most of the radioactive materials except tritium, is stored in tanks located on the hill at the site. The total amount of the ALPS treated water is approx. 1.26 million tons as of April 15, 2021.

TEPCO has reviewed the total amount of tritium stored in the tanks. The total amount of tritium in the tanks was previously estimated to be about 860 trillion Bq assessed as of the end of October 2019. As of April 1, 2021, it was estimated as about 780 trillion Bq. The reason for the decrease in amount of tritium is thought to be that the actual measurement in the tank has progressed and the actual concentration was found to be lower than the concentration used for the estimation in 2019.

Secondary treatment and analysis of 1000 m3 of water from each of two tank group area (J1-C and J1-G area) was completed on December 24, 2020. For treated water from In both areas, it was confirmed that radionuclides other than tritium meet the regulatory standard for discharge * as follows:

• J1-C	[before] 2,406	[after] 0.35
• J1-G	[before] 387	[after] 0.22

^{* &}quot;The regulatory standards for discharge" is the limit applicable to release the radioactive waste to the environment, which is stipulated in the ordinance of the Reactor Regulation Act. If the radioactive waste contains multiple radionuclides, the sum of the ratios of each radionuclides concentration to the regulatory standards for them should be 1 or less.

In the future, analysis of secondary processing samples will be conducted by an independent third-party organization, and issues related to the analysis will be identified.

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Results from secondary treatment performance confirmation tests on water treated with multi-nuclide removal equipment (final report)

https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/images/201224.pdf

(4) Management of treated water

On 13 April 2021, the GOJ announced its basic policy, based on which preparation for discharging the ALPS treated water of FDNPS into the sea will be started. Discharge of the ALPS treated water into the sea will be implemented at FDNPS, on the premise to make best efforts to minimize the risks by taking measures such as purification and dilution based on the ALARA principle, under strict control. TEPCO will submit plans for the discharge to NRA to receive necessary approval from the NRA. The actual discharge is envisaged to be conducted approximately after two years.

For more than six years, the handling of the water has been studied by Tritiated water Task Force and ALPS subcommittee. The subcommittee report was published in February 2020. After publication of this report, hundreds of meetings were held with local municipalities and relevant people in agricultural, forestry and fishery industries and various other parties concerned. Seven "meeting for hearing opinions" were held, with the attendance of vice ministers of related ministries. In addition, more than 4,000 opinions have been received through public comment.

The GOJ selects discharge into the sea, based on achieving certain and consistent compliance with their regulatory standards set forth based on the recommendation of the ICRP and considering the successful precedence in Japan, as well as in conducting secure and sound monitoring.

The discharge of the ALPS treated water into the sea will be conducted after i) purification/re-purification to meet regulatory standards set based on international standards with an exception of tritium and ii) sufficient dilution (at least more than 100 times) to make the concentration of tritium to be less than 1/40 of its regulatory standards which are based on the international standards (1,500 Bq/L, which is around 1/7 of the WHO Guidelines for drinking water quality value). By taking such measures, the safety of the public, environment, agricultural, forestry and fishery products and others in the surrounding areas will be ensured as it was always been. In addition to these measures, the Government and TEPCO will strengthen and enhance monitoring before and after the discharge by activities including newly introduced monitoring of tritium at fishing ground, swimming beaches and other areas. And all measures will be taken so as to gain national and international understanding regarding the discharge.

Since no technology for separating tritium has yet been found as being immediately practical use at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, the discharge will be conducted with dilution. However, new technological trends will be carefully and continuously monitored, and if a viable technology emerges, it will be implemented as rapidly as practicable.

Taking the decision on the Basic Policy as an opportunity, the definition of ALPS treated water was changed. In the future, only "water that meets the regulatory standards for discharge into the environment regarding nuclides other than tritium" will be termed "ALPS treated water."

Basic Policy on handling of ALPS treated water at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings' Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station:

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/bp_alps.pdf

Briefing material of Basic Policy on handling of the ALPS treated water https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/202104_bp_br eifing.pdf

3. Fuel removal from the reactor buildings

(1) Basic information

At the time of the accident in March 2011, the nuclear power station operator of Unit 1, 2 and 3 were unable to maintain the cooling of the reactor cores due to power loss. This resulted in the generation of a huge amount of hydrogen gas from the melted fuel. The pressure in the containment buildings continued to increase from the accumulation of hydrogen which eventually caused hydrogen explosions in Units 1, 3 and 4, resulting in structural damage. However, since November 2011, the nuclear power station operator has been maintaining these units in a stable condition with no significant release of radioactive material to the environment.

The most important tasks in the decommissioning process are the fuel removal from the spent fuel pools and the retrieval of fuel debris (melted and solidified fuel) from the Primary Containment Vessels (PCV). Currently, various measures are being implemented in order to make progress towards these goals, including removal of rubble accumulated in the buildings and investigation of the condition inside the PCV through the use of state-of-the-art technologies.

(2) Unit 1

In July 2015, TEPCO started to dismantle the building cover of the reactor building as a step towards starting fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP). In October of the same year, the removal of roof panels was completed in October 2015, and dismantling of wall panels (18 in total) was completed in November 2016. The removal of the rubble on the operating floor started on January 2018. After an onsite investigation, to create an access route for preparatory work to protect the SFP, etc., four sections of X-braces (one each on the west and south sides and two on the east side, respectively) had been removed by December 2018. On March 2019, the creation of an access route from the west working floor was completed and the floor opening was covered to prevent small rubble falling from the operating floor during the work. From April 2019, rubble removal in the same area began using a remote-controlled heavy machine.

Dismantling of the Reactor Building cover steadily continues. Before installing a large cover over the Reactor Building, dismantling of the interfering building cover (remaining part) started from December 19, 2020 and will be completed in the first half of FY2021. At present, beams and pillars (upper part) are being dismantled. Toward completing the installation in FY2023, work will continue according the plan.

With regard to fuel removal from the SFP, before removing the fallen roof on the south side, the surface of the SFP will be covered by a bag filled with air mortar. In preparation, the transparency of the pool water was investigated from August to September 2019. The investigation confirmed that by installing lightning and a scope to create an environment to investigate the upper part of the pool using an underway camera, a view of approx. 7 meters would be available. This investigation also detected an accumulation of rubble on the upper surface of the fuel rack in a part of the cables of the fuel-handling machines submerged in water.

Before retrieving fuel debris, an investigation of the condition inside the PCV was commenced. From February to May 2015, TEPCO investigated the inside of the PCV by using "muon", a kind of cosmic rays, and studied the condition of fuel debris inside. In addition, in April 2015, TEPCO sent robots into the PCV to investigate and collect important information such as radiation level and temperature and also took images from inside. Based on this results, the status of debris spreading to the basement floor outside the pedestal was inspected using a self-propelled investigation device in March 2017. The purpose of the investigation was to identify the status inside the Unit 1 PCV and to make progress towards fuel debris retrieval. In this investigation, cameras and a robot were inserted into the PCV by remote control. A dosimeter and an underwater camera were suspended from the 1st floor, where grid-like scaffold is installed, to collect information to infer the distribution of fuel debris.

The investigation identified that the existing structures such as steel or valves did not suffer severe distortion and damage. In addition, deposits of constant thickness were confirmed at the PCV bottom. There has been no effect to the surrounding environment, and no significant change was identified in the monitoring data due to the investigation.

Toward investigating the inside of the Unit 1 PCV, an access route is being constructed. Creation of the three holes in the inner door was completed on April 2020.

(3) Unit 2

As for Unit 2, a hydrogen explosion did not occur and therefore the building remained undamaged. However, TEPCO concluded that it would be better to dismantle the upper part of the reactor building to help facilitate the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool. Currently, TEPCO is proceeding with preparation work, such as the removal of rubble around the reactor the building and building of scaffolding.

In November 2018, before the investigation into formulating a work plan to dismantle the Reactor Building rooftop, etc., work to move and contain the remaining objects on the operating floor (1st round) was completed. In February 2019, an investigation into measuring radiation doses on the floor, walls and ceiling inside the operating floor and confirm the contamination status was completed. After analysing the investigative results, the "contamination density distribution" throughout the entire operating floor was obtained, based on which the airborne radiation dose rate inside the operating floor could be evaluated. A shielding design and measures to prevent radioactive material scattering, etc. will be examined. From April 2019, work to move and contain the remaining objects on the operating floor (2nd round), such as materials and equipment which may hinder fuel removal work commenced. The 2nd round included placing the remaining objects in the container and cleaning the floor to suppress dust scattering, all of which were not scheduled in the 1st round. The status of dust density, etc. is being monitored to steadily implement the work with safety first.

An investigation to capture the location of fuel debris inside the Unit 2 was conducted from March to July 2016. This operation applied the muon transmission method of which effectiveness was demonstrated in its appliance for locating the debris inside Unit 1. These operations used a small device developed through the "Development of Technology to Detect Fuel Debris inside the Reactor" project funded by a government subsidy.

The results of the investigation indicate that high-density materials which are considered as fuel debris are at the bottom of the RPV as well as the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It is assumed that most of the fuel debris existed at the bottom of the RPV.

An investigation inside the Unit 2 PCV has been conducted to identify the status of debris inside the RPV pedestal (The base supporting the RPV). From January to February 2017, a camera and a robot were inserted closely to the RPV by remote control. The internal situation

was understood through the digital images. From the result of this investigation, fallen scaffolding below the RPV and the status of deposits were identified directly for the first time. Moreover, the actual radiation dose rate and temperature inside the PCV was measured.

In January 2018, the status below the platform inside the pedestal was inspected using an investigative device with a hanging mechanism. From the analytical results of images obtained during the investigation, deposits which probably included fuel debris were found at the bottom of the pedestal.

In February 2019, a contact investigation on the detected deposits inside the PCV was conducted to determine their characteristics (hardness, fragility, etc.). This contact investigation confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist. In addition, images of radiation dose and temperature data that would help determine the contour and size of the deposits could be collected by moving the investigative unit closer to the deposits. The result of this investigation will be utilized in the internal investigation in the second half of FY 2019, examination of the retrieval method.




Image: Before and while touching the deposit at the investigation of Unit 2

Regarding retrieval of fuel debris, toward starting the trial retrieval of Unit 2 fuel debris scheduled in 2021, retrieval equipment is being developed in the UK. However, development in the UK has been delayed due to the spreading COVID-19 infection and transporting to Japan scheduled for January 2021 has been delayed. To avoid further delay, it was decided that among the performance verification test and others planned in the UK, those that may be conducted in Japan will be relocated to Japan. Toward the trial retrieval, efforts will continue with safety first to minimize the process delay within almost one year.

In the trial retrieval plan, a robot arm will be used to access the PCV, obstacles inside the PCV will be removed by the cutting equipment and powder fuel debris will be collected by metal-brush type adhering equipment or vacuum-container type suction equipment. For remotely operated work in a severe environment with high exposure to radiation and within a confined space, tests and training will be implemented using a realistic mock-up in advance and work will be implemented steadily with safety first. Fuel debris retrieved from the trial will be placed in closed metal transportation casks to be transported to the existing analysis facility.

During the period April 2-16, 2019, a water injection reduction test (STEP 1) was conducted. Through this test, the water injection rate into the reactor was temporarily changed for check the temperature variation, in order to take the heat release in the air into consideration. When the water injection rate was changed from 3.0 to 1.5 m 3 /h, the maximum temperature increase at the RPV bottom was up by 5°C from about 20°C at the test start. It was confirmed

that the overall temperature variation, including other parameters, was almost within predictions.

To optimize the emergency response procedures, a test (STEP 2) involving temporarily suspending water injection to the reactor (3.0 to 0.0 m³/h) was completed on May 24, 2019). The graph below shows the changes in RPV bottom temperature during the test to suspend water injection to the reactor. The test confirmed that the temperature increase rate at the RPV bottom was at the same level of 0.2°C/h or less as predicted and that the temperatures at the RPV bottom and inside the PCV during the test also varied almost within expectations. No abnormality was detected in other parameters such as the dust density. The difference between the prediction data and the test data and the behavior variation depending on the location where the thermometer was installed will be evaluated to utilize the results in optimizing emergency response procedures.





Figure. Changes in PRV bottom temperature during the test to suspend water injection

(4) Unit 3

In 28 February, 2021, removal of 566 fuel assemblies remaining in the spent fuel pool was completed. As the top floor of the Unit 3 Reactor Building, where the spent fuel pool was located, was in a high-dose environment, fuel assemblies were removed by remote operation.

Despite various problems encountered during work, partner companies and TEPCO collaborated on an ongoing basis to improve matters and subsequently finished the planned work.



(5) Unit 4

Despite a hydrogen explosion, the fuel assemblies of Unit 4 were not damaged, as the nuclear power station was in cold shutdown status and all the fuel had been stored in the spent fuel pool before the accident. The fuel assemblies in the pool were taken out and transferred to the common pool located within the station site. This fuel removal operation started on November 2013 and was safely completed in December 2014.

(6) Unit 5 and 6

These reactors were not operating at the time of the accident, but the fuel remained in the reactor. In addition, unlike the case of Units 1, 2 and 3, the reactors of Unit 5 and 6 did not encounter power loss and the reactor cores were successfully cooled off.

Given that the conditions of the buildings and the equipment for storing the fuel are stable and risks of causing any problem in the decommissioning process are estimated to be low compared to the other Units, the fuel assemblies of Units 5 and 6 are safely stored in the spent fuel pool in each building for the time being. The milestone is to complete the fuel removal within 2031, and from now on, fuel will be carefully removed fuel from the spent fuel pools without impact on fuel removal from Units 1, 2 and 3.

(7) Completion of dismantling plan for the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack

The dismantling of the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack, which was entrusted to Able Co., Ltd., was completed in May 2020. This work improved the seismic tolerance of the exhaust stack and reduced risks.

4. Waste management

As of the end of March 2021, the total storage volume of the concrete and metal rubble was approx. $311,000 \, \text{m}^3$ (+1,100 $\, \text{m}^3$ compared to the end of February, with an area-occupation rate of 77%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. $134,500 \, \text{m}^3$ (with an area-occupation rate of 77%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. $32,2100 \, \text{m}^3$ (+1,000 $\, \text{m}^3$, with an area-occupation rate of 47 %).

As of April 1, 2021, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 420 m³ (area-occupation rate: 60%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,345 m³ (area-occupation rate: 91%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc., was 5,090 (area-occupation rate: 80 %).

5. Working environment

In order to achieve a long-term decommissioning, it is important to ensure a stable workforce (about 3,400-4,200 workers per day after 2019FY). TEPCO has implemented the improvement of the working environment such as (1) providing warm food, (2) setting up a large rest area, and a convenience store, (3) developing emergency medical facilities and systems, and ensuring workplace safety which starts from the reduction of radiation exposure. By the decontamination work including pavement and contaminated water management, the ordinary clothing area which does not require wearing protective clothing and full-faced masks, is expanded to about 96% of the site.

Considering the latest situation, countermeasures are being implemented to prevent the COVID-19 infection spreading, such as requiring employees to take their temperature prior to coming the office, wear masks at all times and avoid the "Three Cs" (Closed spaces, Crowded places, Close-contact settings) by shift-use of the rest house, etc. 15 patients were confirmed to be infected as of April 26, 2021, but no significant influence on work, such as a delay to the work processes, was identified.

6. The 4th IAEA peer review mission & the Follow-up review

Japan received the 4th visit of the review mission team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during the period November 5-13 2018 (after three and half years since February 2015).

The main findings and conclusions in the summary report of the review mission reads: "The IAEA Review Team considers that significant progress has already been accomplished to move Fukushima Daiichi from an emergency situation to a stabilized situation. Many improvements have been recorded since the previous mission in 2015."

For the full version of the Report of IAEA International Peer Review Mission on Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the decommissioning of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station:

https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-issues-final-report-on-fourth-review-of-fukushima-decommissioning

As described in 2.2 2. (4), the ALPS Subcommittee published the report on 10 February 2020 to show available options for discharge of the ALPS treated water. Taking into account the advisory point "The IAEA Review Team holds that a decision on the disposition path for the stored ALPS treated water containing tritium and other radionuclides, after further treatment as needed, must be taken urgently, engaging all stakeholders, to ensure the sustainability of the decommissioning activities and of the safe and effective implementation of other risk reduction measures." which was provided by IAEA in 4th Review mission, the Government of Japan provided IAEA the report as informing progress on the advisory point and requested IAEA to review the progress made in water management, including a review of the ALPS Subcommittee report.

The IAEA Review Report on management of ALPS treated water and the ALPS Subcommittee Report was published on April 2, 2020. In this report, the IAEA team noted that "the two options (namely controlled vapor release and controlled discharge into the sea, the latter of which is routinely used by operating nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities in Japan and worldwide) selected out of the initial five options are technically feasible and would allow the timeline objective to be achieved". The IAEA Review Team also notes that "the ALPS treated water will be further purified as necessary to meet the regulatory standards for discharge

before dilution". Regarding the tritium separation technology, "the IAEA Review Team is not aware of a solution currently available for the separation of tritium commensurate with the concentration and the volume of ALPS treated water". The IAEA Review Team holds the view that "a decision on the disposition path for the stored ALPS treated water containing tritium and other radionuclides, after further treatment as needed, must be taken urgently, considering safety aspects and engaging all stakeholders".

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/4fu-report.pdf

2.3: Organizations related to decommissioning and contaminated water and treated water management

1. Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning (D&D) Engineering Company

In April 2014, TEPCO established a company for the purpose of clarifying the responsibilities and authorities inside the company, and streamlining the process of decision making regarding decommissioning and contaminated water management at Fukushima Daiichi NPS.

In addition, the company invited nuclear specialists from outside TEPCO, such as high ranking nuclear executives of manufacturers, in order to collect and share expertise and technology of manufacturers.

This company is playing an important role on the frontline of decommissioning and contaminated water management.

TEPCO's website related to Fukushima Daiichi D&D Engineering Company:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommision/team/index-e.html

2. Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF)

In August 2014, the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Fund, originally established in 2011 to support the compensation for nuclear damage resulted from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, was reorganized into Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF).

NDF's mission is to support decommissioning activities at Fukushima Daiichi NPS. As an example, it formulates decommissioning strategies and develops plans for the research and development (R&D) program on technology necessary for decommissioning.

NDF published the "Technical Strategic Plan 2020 for Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc." on October 6, 2020; aiming to provide a firm technical basis for the government's "Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap" and facilitate the smooth and steady implementation of decommissioning. This plan defines the concept of how to ensure safety in which perspectives in terms of the safety and operator are reflected in the decommissioning, and describes about the setting of requirements (boundary conditions) in association with the further expanded fuel debris retrieval and an enhanced management system for R&D.

In August 2019, NDF held the 4th International Forum on the Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS to listen to locals and provide them with easily understandable information on the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and widely share the latest progress on the decommissioning work and technical outcomes with Japanese and foreign experts. The forum was attended by 1,297 people from 10 countries. The 5th forum is under consideration to be held in the fall of 2021.

NDF's booklet:

http://www.ndf.go.jp/soshiki/pamph e.pdf

Technical Strategic Plan 2020 for Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.:

http://www.dd.ndf.go.jp/en/strategic-plan/book/20201214_SP2020eFT.pdf

The 4th International Forum on the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2019): https://ndf-forum.com/en/

3. International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

In August 2013, IRID was established by 18 corporations and organizations related to R&D of technology for the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPS. In accordance with the Midand-long-term Roadmap written by the Government of Japan, IRID is conducting R&D on removal of fuel from the spent fuel pools, removal of fuel debris from the PCVs and disposal of radioactive wastes, and gathering domestic and international expertise. The methods developed at IRID are helping decommissioning efforts.

IRID's website:

http://irid.or.jp/en/

4. Collaborative Laboratories for Advanced Decommissioning Science (CLADS)

In April 2015, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) established the CLADS, based on the Acceleration Plan of Reactor Decommissioning R&D for Fukushima Daiichi NPS, TEPCO, proposed by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). This institution is aimed at being an international hub for R&D on decommissioning, and promoting cooperation in R&D and human resource development (HRD) among government, industry and academia.

CLADS main building was established in Tomioka-machi, Fukushima in April 2017, which is a central facility of CLADS where educational and research institutions at home and abroad work together to conduct R&D on decommissioning.

CLADS is expected to collaborate on research activities with the following JAEA's centers in Fukushima. Naraha Center for Remote Control Technology Development, which started operation in April 2016, and Okuma Analysis and Research Center, which consists of an Administrative Building, Radioactive Material Analysis and Research Facilities. The Administrative Building started operation in March 2018.

CLADS has held a series of Fukushima Research Conference (FRC) on Decommissioning Research and Development since 2015. In 2020, FRCs on themes such as "Workshop on JAEA Nuclear Energy S&T and Human Resource Development Project; Matching Seeds from Academia with On-site Needs (November)" and "OECD/NEA Specialist Workshop on Advanced Measurement Method and Instrumentation for enhancing Severe Accident Management in an NPP addressing Emergency, Stabilization and Long-term Recovery Phases; SAMMI-2020 (December)" were held webinars with the positive participation of young researchers including from foreign countries.

JAEA's website related to the CLADS:

https://clads.jaea.go.jp/en/

2.4: Communication

(1) Briefing session

The Government of Japan has held briefing sessions periodically on Fukushima Daiichi NPS to the Diplomatic missions in Tokyo. Most recently, the 108th session was held by video conference on April 13, 2021.

Briefing material:

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/202104_bp_breifing.pdf

Press Release by MOFA:

(2) https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000184.htmlCommunication with parties concerned on handling of ALPS treated water

As described in 2.2, the ALPS Subcommittee published its report on 10 February 2020 which shows the options for discharge of the ALPS treated water.

Based on the report, the Government of Japan has been holding meetings as an opportunity to receive opinions from a wide variety of parties concerned, including representatives of local municipalities and associations in the fields of agriculture, forestry and fisheries. GoJ held the seven7th "Meetings as Opportunities for Receiving Opinions" on October 8. In addition, public comments were made from April to July, and about 4,000 opinions were received.

<Outline of the report>

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20200210 alps sum.pdf

<Report>

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20200210 alps.pdf

(Reference: IAEA, Final report of the follow-up review mission)

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/4fu-report.pdf

(3) Side event at IAEA General Conference

In September 2020, METI and MOE held "the Side event on Fukushima Daiichi Decommissioning & off-site Decontamination" remotely at the 64rd IAEA General Conference. Over 360 people from 41 countries, regions, and international organizations registered.

Presentation materials:

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/index.html#iaea

Section 3: Monitoring results

3.1: Onsite monitoring results reported by TEPCO

(1) Outline of the item

On-going monitoring of the air at the site of Fukushima Daiichi NPS has detected no significant increase in radiation levels.

Results of radioactive nuclide analysis are published for the samples of groundwater at the site and seawater at the port in order to monitor the source.

(2) Noteworthy change in data during the period from January to April 2021

The monitoring result is ND (ND indicates that the measurement result is below the detection limit). In this regard, no announcement has been made by TEPCO for this item.

(3) Monitoring result data

The monitoring results in the air at the site and the monitoring results of the seawater near the NPS as well as sampling data from sub-drain and groundwater drain are available in the following webpage.

https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/index-e.html

TEPCO also publishes the data on radioactive concentration in seawater measured by seawater radiation monitors as well as air dust monitors near the site boundary in real time.

https://www7.tepco.co.jp/responsibility/decommissioning/1f newsroom/data/index-e.html

3.2: Offsite monitoring results

1. Monitoring results of air dose rates obtained within the 20 km zone around Fukushima Daiichi NPS

(1) Outline of the item

The monitoring of air dose rates within the 20 km zone around Fukushima Daiichi NPS has been conducted. The air dose rates within the 20 km zone have gradually declined over time since May 2011 (soon after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPS on March 11, 2011).

(2) Noteworthy updates in the past months

As described in (1) above, the air dose rates within the 20 km zone around the NPS have been on a downward trend, and the monitored air dose rates were stable in March 2021. Based on these results, no further announcement was made on this item (e.g., a significant rise of air dose rates within the 20 km zone) during this period.

(3) Monitoring results

The following URL leads to the monitoring results of air dose rates in Fukushima prefecture including the 20 km zone around Fukushima Daiichi NPS:

http://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/map/ja/ (in Japanese) https://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/list/239/list-1.html

2. Monitoring results of dust in air and soil within the 20 km zone around Fukushima Daiichi NPS (1) Dust

The monitoring results of dust obtained in April 2021 shown that the concentrations of dust were either ND (ND indicates that the measurement result is below the detection limit) or very low. Based on the results, no further announcement was made on this item (e.g., a significant rise of the activity concentrations obtained from dust samples) during this period.

(2) Soil

Radiation monitoring of soil is conducted as appropriate. The most recent monitoring of soil was conducted in September 2020.

(3) Monitoring results

The following URL provides the monitoring results (from April 2011 to the present):

http://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/list/240/list-1.html

- 3. Converted values and measured values of environmental radiation dose rates at 1m height from the ground surface in 46 prefectures in total other than Fukushima Prefecture
- (1) Outline

The air dose rates measured using the monitoring stations located in other prefectures have mostly returned to the same level of the air dose rates before the accident.

(2) Updates from January to April 2021

The converted and measured values were relatively stable from September January to April 2021. Based on the results, no further announcement was made on this item (e.g., a significant rise of the converted and measured values) during this period.

(3) Monitoring results

The following URL leads to the estimated and measured values, and new monitoring results are uploaded:

http://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/list/192/list-1.html

3.3: Sea area monitoring results of seawater, sediment and biota

1. Outline

Sea area monitoring results in the area around Fukushima Daiichi NPS have indicated that the radioactivity levels obtained from outside of the port or in the open sea have been relatively stable.

2. Updates during the period from January to April 2021

As described above, the sea area monitoring results were relatively stable from January to April 2021. Based on the results, any further announcement was not made on this item (e.g., a significant rise of sea area monitoring results) during this period.

3. Related information

Sea area monitoring is classified to be conducted in 5 areas (Area 1: Sea area close to Fukushima Daiichi NPS, Area 2: Coastal area, Area 3: Off-shore area, Area 4: Outer sea area,

and Area 5: Tokyo bay area), and this information is available under the "Monitoring of sea water", section of the NRA webpage entitled "Readings of Sea Area Monitoring". This webpage also includes monitoring results of sediment under the "Monitoring of marine soil" section, and it is also classified into 4 areas (Area 1: Sea area close to Fukushima Daiichi NPS, Area 2: Coastal area, Area 3: Off-shore area, Area 4: Tokyo bay area). The NRA has been providing report on sea area monitoring results. The "Readings of Sea Area Monitoring" webpage covers various issues and the webpage's information is periodically updated on a weekly basis. The following URLs lead to the webpage and report on sea area monitoring:

Readings of Sea Area Monitoring http://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/list/205/list-1.html

Sea Area Monitoring (Monthly Report) http://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/list/295/list-1.html

Section 4: Off-site Environmental Remediation

4.1: Decontamination

The whole area decontamination in the Special Decontamination Area (SDA) was completed in the end of March, 2017 as planned under the responsibility of the Government of Japan. The decontamination conducted by the municipalities in the Intensive Contamination Survey Area (ICSA) was also completed in March 19th, 2018. This means that the whole area decontamination based on the Act on Special Measures was completed, excluding the Restricted area. The air dose rates in the environment have been continuously decreasing.

4.2: Interim Storage Facility (ISF)

As for the Interim Storage Facility (ISF), in which the soil generated from decontamination activities in Fukushima (hereinafter referred to as "removed soil") is stored intensively and safely, MOE has been processing land acquisitions to secure the necessary areas. The soil storage facility started operation in October 2017.

As of the end of April 2021, approximately 10,730,000 m³ of removed soil and waste has been transported to the ISF. Almost all of the removed soil will be delivered to the ISF by the end of March, 2022.

4.3: Recycling of Removed Soil

MOE has to take necessary measures to complete the final disposal outside Fukushima Prefecture within 30 years from the start of ISF operation, which is determined by the law. As the amount of final disposal outside Fukushima Prefecture should be reduced, MOE is making efforts for volume reduction and recycling. Currently demonstration project of recycling has been conducted in farmland development in litate Village in Fukushima Prefecture. From 2019, for example, flowering plants and energy crops are being grown, and from 2020, food crops such as tomatoes, cucumbers, and corns are being grown on a trial basis. In Minamisoma City, MOE is also constructing test embankments and monitoring them to confirm their safety.

The following URL leads to MOE's website, in which updated information related to the Environmental Remediation is posted.

http://josen.env.go.jp/en/

Section 5: Food products

5.1: Summary of testing

Food samples are routinely monitored to ensure that they are safe for all members of the public. During the month of January 2021, 2,994 samples were taken and analysed. Among these samples, 2 samples were found to be above the limits*. This represents 0.07 percent of all samples.

During the month of February 2021, 2,789 samples were taken and analysed. Among these samples, 7 samples were found to be above the limits. This represents 0.25 percent of all samples.

During the month of March 2021, 3,540 samples were taken and analysed. Among these samples, 2 samples were found to be above the limits. This represents 0.06 percent of all samples.

During the month of April 2021, 1,373 samples were taken and analysed. Among these samples, 1 samples were found to be above the limits. This represents 0.07 percent of all samples.

Restrictions will be imposed on the distribution of food products, if the level of radioactive contaminants of the food product exceeds the limit (caesium-134+caesium-137: 100 Becquerel/kg). Restrictions are to be removed, when the level of radioactive contaminants of the food product is constantly below the limit for a certain period of time. Therefore, the products, on which the distribution restrictions are newly imposed, are the products whose radioactive contaminant level exceeded the limit in the past month. By the same logic, the products whose restrictions are newly removed are the products whose radioactive contaminant level has been lower than the limit for a certain period of time.

*limits: caesium-134+caesium-137: 100 Becquerel/kg of general foods, 10 Becquerel/kg of drinking water, 50 Becquerel/kg of milk, 50 Becquerel/kg of infant foods.

5.2: Results of monitoring food products

1. The current situation and protective measures

A fact sheet uploaded in the link below is the summary of the current situation and the measures taken by the Government of Japan:

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/dl/food-130926 1.pdf

- 2. Noteworthy updates in the past months (during the period from January to April 2021)

 The lists of food products, whose status on the restrictions was changed, are as follows.
 - (1) Products whose distribution was newly restricted in January 2021
 - None
 - (2) Products whose restrictions were removed in January 2021
 - None
 - (3) Products whose distribution was newly restricted in February 2021
 - None
 - (4) Products whose restrictions were removed in February 2021
 - Chars (Iwana) (excluding farmed fish) captured in Satetsu River (including its branches) in Iwate prefecture.
 - (5) Products whose distribution was newly restricted in March 2021
 - Rice produced in parts of Fukushima prefecture* in 2021 (excluding rice controlled under the concept of management of Fukushima prefecture)

*Okuma-machi (limiting to areas except 'restricted area' designated by the Instruction on November 30, 2012 (excludes the specified reconstruction and revitalization base area certified on November 10, 2017)), Futaba-machi (limiting to areas except 'restricted area' designated by the Instruction on May 7, 2013 (excludes the specified reconstruction and revitalization base area certified on September 15, 2017)), Katsurao-mura (limiting to the specified reconstruction and revitalization base area certified on May 11, 2018)

(6) Products whose restrictions were removed in March 2021

- Non-head type leafy vegetables, head type leafy vegetables, flowerhead brassicas and turnip produced in Futaba-machi (excluding 'restricted area' designated by the Instruction on May 7, 2013), Fukushima prefecture.
- Log-grown shiitakes (outdoor cultivation) produced in Hitachiomiya-shi, Ibaraki prefecture which are controlled under the management policy set by Ibaraki prefecture.
- (7) Products whose distribution was newly restricted in April 2021
 - Black rockfish captured in Fukushima offshore for Governor of Fukushima.
- (8) Products whose restrictions were removed in April 2021
 - Ostrich fern produced in Furudono-machi, Fukushima prefecture.

3. Monitoring results data

See the link below (new monitoring results are added once a month): http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/index_food_radioactive.html

4. Information focused on the safety of the fishery product

(1) Summary of monitoring on fishery products

According to the monitoring results of fishery products, from January to April 2021, in marine fish species, the excess ratio* was 0.06% (2 samples that exceeding the JML out of 3,307 samples) and in freshwater fish species, the excess ratio was 0 % (There is no sample that exceeding the JML out of 344 samples).

*excess ratio: (Number of samples containing more than 100 Bq/kg) / (Total number of samples)

Further information, including monitoring data and actions to ensure the safety of fishery products, is available on the Fisheries Agency's website.

http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/inspection/index.html

(2) Report on the Monitoring of Radionuclides in Fishery Products

Since the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, the Government of Japan and local authorities have cooperated closely with relevant bodies to secure the safety of fishery products. With an aim to promote accurate understanding on the safety of Japanese fisheries products at home and abroad, the data and information accumulated by monitoring in the last three years was evaluated comprehensively in the report, which was published in May 2014.

In October 2017, the Fisheries Agency of Japan released an updated report, which reflects the latest data and recent research results. It shows that, after six years since the accident, the level of radioactive Cs in fishery products has declined substantially.

The Report is available at the following URLs:

Japanese version, full Report

http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/housyanou/attach/pdf/kekka-240.pdf

Japanese version, summary

http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/housyanou/attach/pdf/kekka-216.pdf

English translation, full report

http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/inspection/attach/pdf/index-34.pdf

English translation, summary

http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/inspection/attach/pdf/index-35.pdf

5.3: Total Diet Study

The dietary intake of radionuclides in 15 areas across Japan including Fukushima, is surveyed biannually, and the effective dose is estimated as far below 1 mSv/year (0.0005-0.0014 mSv/year, CY2020).

Japanese version, press releases

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/shinsai jouhou/shokuhin.html

Japanese version, summary of the latest version is available at the following URL (page 14) https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/000495158.pdf

English translation, summary of the latest version is available at the following URL (page 10) http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/dl/food-130926 1.pdf

Section 6: Radiation Protection of Workers

Information pertaining to radiation protection of workers involving TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident is updated on the following website of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW):

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/index.html

6.1: Regulations and Guidelines, etc.

Regulations and Guidelines, etc. from the MHLW on radiation protection of workers are available on the following webpage:

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/ri/index.html

6.2: TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS

The status on the exposure dose, health care management and radiation protection of the workers at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS are as follows:

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/tepco/index.html

1. Status of Radiation Exposure

Exposure doses of the workers at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS are reported to the MHLW once a month. The latest monthly report is available on the following webpage:

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/irpw/index.html

2. Radiation Protection

Ensuring occupational safety and health of specified skilled foreign workers for the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Updated on May 21, 2019)

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/ri/gr/gr 190521.pdf

Results of supervision and instruction activities for employers of decommissioning workers at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and employers of decontamination workers in Fukushima Prefecture (for 2019) (Updated on August 3, 2020)

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/ri/gr/gr 200630.pdf

Measures for occupational safety and health management are enhanced at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant - A guideline was formulated - (Updated on August 26, 2015)

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/tepco/rp/pr 150826.html

3. Long-term Health Care

Updated Information on long-term health care of emergency workers including health examination and guidelines;

"Guidelines on Maintaining and Improving Health of Emergency Workers at Nuclear Facilities, etc." is available on the following webpage. (Updated on August 31, 2015)

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/tepco/rp/pr_150831_attachment06.pdf

4. Good Practices in Radiation Exposure Controls

Good Practices in Radiation Exposure Dose Reduction Measures (Commissioned by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in FY2019Project) (Updated on Aug, 2020)

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/tepco/gre/gre_2001.pdf

5. Other Related Topics

Updated other related information on the workers at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS:

Healthcare of Workers at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Updated on Jan 28, 2021) https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/tepco/ort/ort_210128.pdf

Start of a weekly on-site consultation desk to address health matters of decommissioning workers, etc. (Updated on June 24, 2016)

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/tepco/ort/ort 160624.html

6.3: Decontamination/Remediation

The status on radiation protection of the workers engaged in decontamination and remediation of contaminated materials derived from Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident is as follows.

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/dr/index.html

1. Decontamination/Remediation

Updated Information on decontamination and remediation including guidelines and results of labour inspection:

Results of supervision and instruction activities for employers of decommissioning workers at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and employers of decontamination workers in Fukushima Prefecture (for 2018) (Updated on August 3, 2020)

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/ri/gr/gr 200630.pdf

2. Waste Disposal

Information on waste disposal work including guidelines:

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/dr/index.html#wd

3. Other Related Topics

Other related information on waste disposal work:

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eg/workers/dr/index.html#ort

6.4: Other Information

Statistics on Radiation Exposure Doses of Decontamination Workers and Other Items Have Been Announced.

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/ors/index.html

1. Related Information

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/ors/index.html#ri

2. Other Institutions

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/workers/ors/index.html#io

3. Other Institutions

Dose Statistical Data Based on the Information Registered with the System of Registration and Management of Radiation Exposure Doses for Decontamination and Related Work (2019) (by Radiation Effects Association) (Updated on Jul 21, 2020)

http://www.rea.or.jp/chutou/koukai_jyosen/2019nen/English/honbun_jyosen-2019-English.html

Section 7: Other issues on recovery operations

7.1: Public communication

1. Provision of updates to the IAEA

The Government of Japan has actively been strengthening its communication process to ensure timely dissemination of accurate information on the current status of activities onsite in multiple languages for the international community. Japan provides updates in a timely manner and all of the updates provided to the IAEA are available on this webpage:

https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/status-update

2. Lifting of evacuation orders

Current condition of evacuation order areas of Fukushima Daiichi NPS (as of June 2021)

In Tamura city, the order of Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order was lifted on April 1st 2014. In Naraha town, the order of Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order was lifted on September 5th 2015. In Katsurao village, the order of Habitation restricted areas and Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order were lifted on June 12th 2016. In Kawauchi village, the order of Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order was lifted on June $14^{
m th}2016$. In Minamisoma city, the order of Habitation restricted areas and the order of Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order were lifted on July 12th 2016. In litate village, Kawamata town and Namie town, the orders of Habitation restricted areas and Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order were lifted on March 31st 2017. In Tomioka town, the orders of Habitation restricted areas and the order of Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order were lifted on April 1st 2017. In Okuma town, the order of Habitation restricted areas and the order of Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order were lifted on April 10th 2019. Except for the Evacuation Orders of Futaba town, all of the orders of Habitation restricted areas and the orders of Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order were lifted by spring 2019. The evacuation orders were lifted for parts of Futaba Town on March 4th, 2020, Okuma Town on March 5th, and Tomioka Town on March 10th. As a result, the evacuation orders were lifted for all areas except for the Restricted areas by March 2020. The JR Joban line also resume full operation from March 14th, 2020.

As for cities, towns, and villages, where evacuation orders were lifted, it was confirmed that annual cumulative dose, the total radiation dose which residents in the cities, towns, and villages would receive per year, was surely below 20mSv, and also the reconstruction of infrastructure necessary for people's daily life and decontamination were steadily advancing. In the wake of consultation with these cities, towns, and villages and adequate explanation to the residents through briefing sessions and by other means, the above-mentioned lift of the evacuation orders was determined.

< Reference > Classification of evacuation orders:

Preparation areas for lift of evacuation order

Entry into the area is permitted. Overnight stay in the area is generally prohibited. Business activities are permitted except those to be provided for residents living inside the area.

Habitation restricted areas

Entry into the area is permitted.

Overnight stay in the area is prohibited in principle. Business activities are permitted but limited in some cases.

Restricted area area

Entry into the area is prohibited in principle, and staying in this area is also prohibited.

Restricted area effective from March 10, 2020
 https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/index.html

3. Relevant activities in disseminating information to the public

(1)Press Conference

Recovery operations at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS including contaminated water issues are one of the major issues which the Government of Japan has been focusing on. Since progress has been made frequently, there are updates arising on a daily basis. To explain the updates to the public, the Government of Japan disseminates the relevant information through press conferences. The Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry are the main briefers of the press conference, but other ministers or press secretaries may also be the briefer, depending on the subject.

(2) Information delivery to media

The government has been providing relevant information for both the domestic and the foreign press including those stationed in Tokyo and for other media, using various means such as press conferences, press briefings, press tours and press releases. As an example, the Fisheries Agency has conducted a media tour to a radioactivity monitoring site for fishery products (Marine Ecology Research Institute) in order to facilitate better understanding for monitoring on fishery products.

(3) Providing information to foreign nations

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends out a notification with relevant information to all foreign missions stationed in Tokyo and IAEA, in principle once a month. The same information is conveyed to all Japanese embassies, consulate generals, and missions. If necessary, the information would be shared with foreign nations and relevant organizations through these diplomatic channels.

In addition, The Government of Japan has held briefing sessions periodically on Fukushima Daiichi NPS to the Diplomatic missions in Tokyo. Most recently, the 108th session was held on April 13, 2021.

Briefing material:

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/202104 bp breifing.pdf

Press Release by MOFA:

https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e 000184.html

Furthermore, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has produced a short video clip on the current situation in Fukushima Daiichi NPS and a brochure entitled "Important stories on Decommissioning Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Now and in the future".

The video clip and the brochure are available at the following link:

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/index.html

(4) Measures taken by TEPCO

TEPCO has been disseminating information on the situation at the FDNPS both domestically and internationally via its website and social media. TEPCO is also conducting a site visit to the FDNPS with the aim of allowing people to experience the actual situation by visiting and observing the actual site. In addition, a virtual tour is available on the website.

< Inside Fukushima Daiichi >

https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/insidefukushimadaiichi/index-e.html

(5) Disseminating information to Japanese populations

In general, the information is shared with Japanese populations through the channels shown above in (1)-(2). In addition to these efforts, the Government of Japan has improved public communication by enriching the content of relevant ministries' webpages and by hosting local briefing sessions on a case by case basis. METI regularly informs the progress of the decommissioning activities and contaminated water countermeasures to Fukushima prefecture and 13 local municipalities surrounding the site through vide o conference and direct visits.

4. Efforts on eliminating negative reputation impact and risk communication

(1) The Strategy for the Enhancement of the Elimination of Negative Reputation Impact and Risk Communication

In December 2017, the Government of Japan formulated the "The Strategy for the Enhancement of the Elimination of Negative Reputation Impact and for Risk Communication", based on a thorough review of the past efforts by relevant ministries and agencies, in order to clear up negative reputation impact which lacks in scientific grounds, and unfounded prejudice and discrimination.

In addition to the risk communication with the affected people, this strategy, focusing on providing information to the general public in a simple manner, specifies objects and contents for information in order of importance, from three perspectives, that is, "To inform", "To treat" and "To invite", and examines concrete ways of delivering information. Under this strategy, relevant ministries and agencies cooperate in a unified manner both at home and abroad.

(a)To inform

To inform the general public, mostly schoolchildren, their parents, and expectant and nursing mothers, of basic points of radiation, health effects of radiation, the safety of foods and

drinking water made in Fukushima, the status of the affected areas in which the recovery is in progress, etc.

(b) To treat

To inform retailers, distributors, consumers, embassies in Tokyo, and foreign VIPs, press, residents and tourists, of the appeal and tastiness of Fukushima products, system of ensuring the safety of foods and drinking water, the standards of radioactive substances, the control system of foods at production stage, etc.

(c) To invite

To inform teachers, those involved with a Parent-Teacher Association, travel agencies, foreign tourists, VIPs and press, and visitors from outside Fukushima, of the attraction of Fukushima as a destination, air dose rate and the safety of foods in Fukushima, and the supports for educational travels provided by Fukushima Prefecture.

(2) The Policy Package on Radioactive Risk Communication for Evacuees Returning to Their Homes

In February 2014, the Government of Japan compiled "The Policy Package on Radioactive Risk Communication for Evacuees Returning to Their Homes", in order to promote the implementation of detailed risk communication in response to the concerns of individuals. Relevant ministries and agencies also work together to promote measures including the organization of follow-up meetings on the policy package, focusing on the viewpoints of (a) dissemination of accurate and easy-to-understand information, (b) continuous development of risk communication on a national scale, and (c) improving detailed risk communication.

(3) Practical measures for evacuees to return their homes by NRA

NRA formulated practical measures of radiation protection for the evacuees, who will return to their homes, from scientific and technological points of view in cooperation with other governmental organizations. The practical measures continue to address the difficulties which the evacuees have been facing. It is expected that the practical measures will be helpful for the evacuees to make decisions on whether they will return to their homes or not.

The detail of these measures taken by NRA are available at the following link:

https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000067234.pdf

7.2: Websites for your reference

Further information on each section above is available at the following websites:

The Prime Minister's Office

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/ongoingtopics/waterissues.html

The Food Safety Commission (FSC)

http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/emerg/radiological index e1.html

The Reconstruction Agency (RA)

http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

http://www.mofa.go.jp/j info/visit/incidents/index.html

The Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare (MHLW)

http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/index food.html

The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)

https://www.maff.go.jp/e/export/reference.html

The Fisheries Agency (FA)

http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/index.html

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)

http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/index.html

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/atw.html

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/

The Ministry of the Environment (MOE)

http://josen.env.go.jp/en/

The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)

http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/index.html

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)

http://www.jaea.go.jp/english/index.html

Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/index-e.html

Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2014/1235009 5892.html

Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF) http://www.ndf.go.jp/soshiki/pamph e.pdf

International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

http://irid.or.jp/en/

The Collaborative Laboratories for Advanced Decommissioning Science (CLADS) https://clads.jaea.go.jp/en/

IAEA assessment on aspects presented in the June 2021 report 'Events and highlights on the progress related to recovery operations at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station'

Basic policy on handling of ALPS treated water

Japan reported that the Government of Japan has established and announced its basic policy on the handling of Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water, through discharge into the sea, based on the ALPS Subcommittee Report published in February 2020 after 6 years of work. Following the publication of this report, hundreds of meetings were conducted with representatives from local industries and other stakeholders, as well as public consultations. The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) will submit to Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) its plans for the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, seeking for NRA's approval for such a discharge. This discharge is expected to start in approximately two years after the announcement of the Basic Policy (April 2021).

Japan also reported that Government bodies and TEPCO will strengthen environmental monitoring as part of the preparation for implementing its basic policy for discharge of ALPS treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) into the sea, including additional monitoring of tritium at fishing grounds and swimming beaches.

The IAEA notes the decision by the Government of Japan on issuing its basic policy on handling of the ALPS treated water. This constitutes a milestone that will help pave the way for continuous progress in the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS. The IAEA welcomes Japan's intention to strengthen environmental monitoring to collect and analyze additional data specific to this future release. These data will serve to ensure the radiation safety of the public and the environment and will also help to increase transparency regarding the implementation of the basic policy for discharge of ALPS-treated water.

In addition, upon Government of Japan's request, the IAEA will conduct a review of the planned discharge against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards (IAEA to Review and Monitor the Safety of Water Release at Fukushima Daiichi | IAEA). The IAEA will work closely with Japan before, during and after the discharge of the water. This will help build confidence that the water disposal is carried out without an adverse impact on human health and the environment.

Fuel removal from the SFP in Unit 3

Japan reported that the removal of all the 566 fuel assemblies stored in the SFP in Unit 3 was completed on 28 February 2021 through remote operations. It is the first achievement of this kind in one of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS units where fuel meltdown occurred in 2011.

The IAEA acknowledges completion of fuel removal from the SFP in Unit 3 and commends the efforts of all parties involved in completing the difficult work within the target period even under the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.

Impact of the earthquake that occurred on 13 February 2021 at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Japan reported that 53 tanks were displaced by up to 19 cm due to the earthquake that occurred on 13 February 2021, but no leak has been confirmed on these tanks. This includes tanks storing ALPS treated water, which are stored in a way to maximize their resistance to earthquakes. The water level in the Primary

Containment Vessels (PCV) of Unit 1 and Unit 3 decreased likely due to the displacing of parts of these PCVs that were already damaged prior to the earthquake. However, no significant variation in the environmental monitoring results was identified following the earthquake. In addition, water keeps being injected appropriately in the PCVs.

The IAEA notes that the tanks storing ALPS treated water are designed and placed in order to maximize their resistance to earthquakes. Consequently, the earthquake that occurred on 13 February 2021 did not affect the tanks storing ALPS treated water and did not impair decommissioning operations. The IAEA acknowledges that enhanced monitoring of plant parameters for Unit 1 and Unit 3 has been implemented in response to this event.

Sea area monitoring results

Japan reported that the results of the marine environmental radioactivity monitoring at locations outside of the port and in the open sea around Fukushima Daiichi NPS indicate that levels have been relatively stable during the period January to April 2021. Monitoring results continue to be published regularly by NRA and TEPCO. The data shows that the levels of the radionuclides included in Japan's Sea Area Monitoring Plan in seawater, sediment and biota in the areas around TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS have not been adversely affected by decommissioning and contaminated water management activities on-site. In particular, the water discharged to the sea from the groundwater bypass and the sub-drain and groundwater drain systems continues to have no detectable effect on the levels of radioactivity measured in the marine environment in these areas. Japan reported that no release to the marine environment took place as a consequence of the earthquake which struck off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture on 13 February 2021.

Japan further reported that the ongoing monitoring of marine fish had identified two samples of Black Rockfish collected off the coast of the Fukushima Prefecture, for which levels of Cs-137 and Cs-134 were above the Japanese national standard limit of 100 Bq/kg during the reporting period. In total, more than 3300 samples of marine fish were tested for radiocaesium between January 2021 and April 2021.

Based on the information provided by Japan, while noting the detection of levels of radiocaesium elevated as compared to Japan's national standard limit in two marine fish samples, the IAEA acknowledges that no significant changes were observed in the monitoring results for seawater, sediment and marine biota, including fishery products, during the period covered by this report. The levels measured by Japan in the marine environment are low and relatively stable. For the purpose of public reassurance, the IAEA encourages the continuation of sea area monitoring. Furthermore, the IAEA considers that the ongoing data quality assurance programme that is in place is key for ensuring the accuracy and the quality of the results of the monitoring programme. It also contributes to facilitating transparency and building stakeholders' confidence.

Food products

Based on the information provided by Japan, it is noted that the situation regarding the safety of the food supply, and fishery and agricultural production, continues to remain stable. The ingestion dose assessed by the authorities in Japan for calendar year 2020 in their total diet study is less than 0.0014 mSv/year.

The IAEA notes that the ingestion dose is less than 0.14% of the $1\,\text{mSv/year}$ specified in the International Basic Safety Standards¹.

Public communication on the monitoring results and associated regulatory actions is helping to maintain confidence. Food restrictions continue to be revised and updated as necessary in line with food sampling results. Thousands of food sampling results were reported each month over the reporting period. This attention paid to monitoring food products continues to indicate the vigilance of the authorities in Japan and their commitment to protecting consumers and trade. Monitoring, appropriate regulatory action and public communication are helping to maintain confidence in the safety of the food supply.

Based on the information that has been made available, the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture understands that measures to monitor and respond to issues regarding radionuclide contamination of food are appropriate, that the food supply chain is controlled effectively by the relevant authorities and that the public food supply is safe.

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¹ Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014). See Requirement 51