

The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2024

Safeguards Statement

Background to the *Safeguards Statement* and Summary



A. Safeguards Statement for 2024^{1,2}

In 2024, safeguards were applied for 190 States^{3,4} with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat's findings and conclusions for 2024 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

1. One hundred and thirty-seven States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:

- (a) For 75 of these States⁴, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**
- (b) For 61 of these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**
- (c) For one of these States that had an operative small quantities protocol based on the original standard text the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusion.**

2. Forty-five States had comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but no additional protocols in force:

- (a) For 31 of these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**
- (b) For 14 of these States that had operative small quantities protocols based on the original standard text the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusion.**

3. As of the end of 2024, three States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency

¹ The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report, including the numbers cited, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Agency or its Member States concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

² The referenced number of States Parties to the NPT is based on the number of instruments of ratification, accession or succession that have been deposited.

³ These States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

⁴ And Taiwan, China.

as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States Parties, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.


4. Three States had safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force, requiring the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. One of these States had an additional protocol in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.

5. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in all five States. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the undeclared withdrawal from safeguards of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

B. Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary

B.1. Safeguards conclusions

1. The *Safeguards Statement* reflects the Secretariat's findings and conclusions resulting from the Agency's activities under the safeguards agreements in force. The Secretariat derives these conclusions on the basis of an evaluation of the results of its safeguards activities and of all other safeguards relevant information available to it. The Secretariat follows uniform internal processes and defined procedures to draw independent and objective safeguards conclusions based on its own verification activities and findings. This section provides background to the *Safeguards Statement*.



2. A summary of the status of safeguards agreements and other information presented below is provided in Tables 1 to 5 in Section B.7.

B.1.1. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force

3. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), the Agency has the “right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its

⁵ A significant quantity is the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.

⁶ Material balance areas (MBAs) containing locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).

⁷ Calendar-days in the field for verification (CDFVs) comprise calendar-days spent on performing inspections, complementary accesses, design information verifications at facilities and information verifications at LOFs and on the associated travel and rest periods.

jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.⁸

4. CSAs consist of Part I, Part II, and Definitions. Part I consists of general provisions and Part II describes the procedures for implementing those provisions. These procedures include the State’s record keeping and reporting obligations with regard to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs. They also include procedures related to Agency access to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs.

5. The procedures set out in Part II of a CSA include certain reporting requirements related to the export and import of material containing uranium or thorium which has not yet reached the stage of processing where its composition and purity make it suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment. Nuclear material which has reached that stage of processing, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage, is subject to all the other safeguards procedures specified within the agreement. An inventory of such nuclear material is established on the basis of an initial report provided by a State, which is then verified by the Agency and maintained on the basis of subsequent reports by the State and by Agency verification. The Agency performs its verification and evaluation activities in order to confirm that these declarations by the State are correct and complete, i.e. to confirm that all nuclear material in the State remains in peaceful activities.

Small quantities protocols

6. Many States with minimal or no nuclear activities have concluded a small quantities protocol (SQP) to their CSA. Under an SQP based on the original standard text⁹ submitted to the Board of Governors in 1974, the implementation of most of the safeguards procedures in Part II of a CSA are held in abeyance as long as certain criteria are met. In 2005, the Board of Governors approved the revision¹⁰ of the standard text of the SQP. This revision changed the eligibility criteria for an SQP, making it unavailable to a State with an existing or planned facility, and reduced the number of measures the implementation of which are held in abeyance. Of particular importance is the fact that, under the revised standard text of the SQP, the requirement that the State provide the Agency with an initial inventory report and the Agency’s right to carry out ad hoc and special inspections are no longer held in abeyance.

7. For States with a CSA in force with an operative SQP based on the original standard text, the Secretariat is no longer in a position to draw a credible and soundly-based annual safeguards conclusion. This is due, inter alia, to the fact that the original standard text of the SQP holds in abeyance the implementation of the requirement for these States to provide to the Agency an initial report on all nuclear material as well as the Agency’s right to perform verification activities in these States under their CSA.

Additional protocols

8. Although the Agency has the authority under a CSA to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness of the State’s declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited. The *Model Additional Protocol*¹¹, approved by the Board of Governors in 1997, equips the Agency with important additional tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol (AP) thus

⁸ Paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

⁹ GOV/INF/276/Annex B.

¹⁰ GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 and Corr.1.

¹¹ INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), *Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards*.

significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a CSA.

B.1.1.1. States with both CSAs and APs in force

Status of implementation

9. As of 31 December 2024, 137 (136)¹² States had both CSAs and APs in force.

10. Safeguards implementation involved, as appropriate, activities carried out in the field, at regional offices and at Agency Headquarters in Vienna. The activities at Headquarters included the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under CSAs and APs and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

Deriving conclusions

11. A safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the Agency's finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, no indications of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs, and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The Agency draws such a conclusion only where a State has both a CSA and an AP in force and the evaluations described below have been completed.

12. To ascertain that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, no indications of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs, and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State as a whole, the Agency needs to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the consistency of all safeguards relevant information available to it about a State. This includes:

- Information provided by the State itself under the CSA and AP in force with regard to, inter alia, the design and operation of nuclear facilities and LOFs, the State's nuclear material accounting reports and AP declarations, including clarifications and amplifications at the Agency's request, and information provided voluntarily;
- Information from safeguards activities conducted by the Agency in the field and at Headquarters to verify the information provided by the State under the CSA and AP; and
- Other relevant information, e.g. open-source information or third-party information.

13. The Agency evaluates, inter alia, whether information has been submitted by the State as required and whether access to nuclear material, facilities, sites and other locations was provided in accordance with the CSA and AP. Moreover, all anomalies, discrepancies, or inconsistencies identified in the course of the Agency's implementation of safeguards must be addressed appropriately.

14. When the evaluations described in paragraphs 12 and 13 have been completed and no indication has been found by the Agency that, in its judgement, would give rise to a safeguards concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State remained in peaceful activities. Subsequently, when the necessary arrangements have been completed, the Agency implements integrated safeguards — an optimized combination of safeguards measures available under CSAs and APs — based on the State-level safeguards approach (SLA) developed for that State. Due to increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole,

¹² The numbers in parentheses provide the respective data for 2023.

the frequency and the intensity of verification activities at declared facilities and LOFs are optimized. Integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of 2024 or part thereof for 71 (70) States.^{4,13}

Overall conclusions for 2024

15. On the basis of the evaluations described in paragraphs 12 and 13, the Secretariat drew the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* for 75 (74) States⁴ — Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark¹⁴, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Kingdom of the Netherlands¹⁵, New Zealand¹⁶, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

16. Because the evaluation process described in paragraphs 12 and 13 had not yet been completed for 61 (62) States, the conclusion drawn for these States relates only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities. The conclusion in paragraph 1(b) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Benin, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, the Niger, Panama, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.

17. Due to the fact that the SQP for Kyrgyzstan which is based on the original standard text holds in abeyance the implementation of the requirement for Kyrgyzstan to provide to the Agency an initial report on all nuclear material as well as the Agency's right to perform verification activities in Kyrgyzstan under its CSA, the evaluation process described in paragraphs 12 and 13 could not be completed for Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the Secretariat was not in a position to draw any safeguards conclusion for this State as referred to in paragraph 1(c) of the *Safeguards Statement*.

¹³ Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

¹⁴ This conclusion is drawn with regard to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. Denmark and the Faroe Islands, and to Greenland for which Denmark has concluded a separate CSA and an AP thereto (INFCIRC/176 and INFCIRC/176/Add.1, respectively).

¹⁵ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Europe, which excludes the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has concluded a separate CSA with an SQP based on the original standard text that applies to its constituent parts mentioned above (INFCIRC/229). The SQP has not been amended and an AP to this agreement has not been concluded.

¹⁶ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to New Zealand which is covered by INFCIRC/185 and Mod.1 (CSA with an amended SQP) and INFCIRC/185/Add.1 (AP); it is not drawn for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are also covered by INFCIRC/185 (CSA with an original SQP), but not by INFCIRC/185/Mod.1 (amended SQP) and INFCIRC/185/Add.1 (AP).

B.1.1.2. States with CSAs in force but no APs in force

Status of implementation

18. As of 31 December 2024, safeguards were implemented for 45 (45) States in this category. Safeguards implementation involved activities in the field and at Headquarters, including the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under CSAs and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

Deriving conclusions

19. For a State with a CSA, the Agency's right and obligation are as described in paragraph 3. The evaluation process performed for such States is as described in paragraphs 12 and 13. However, the safeguards relevant information available to the Agency for such States does not include any AP related information. Moreover, although the implementation of safeguards strengthening measures¹⁷ under such an agreement have increased the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities, the activities that the Agency may conduct in this regard are limited for a State without an AP. Thus, the conclusion in the *Safeguards Statement* for a State with a CSA alone relates only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities.

20. In the course of its evaluation, the Agency also seeks to determine whether there is any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole which would need to be reflected in the *Safeguards Statement*. However, without the measures provided for in the *Model Additional Protocol* being implemented, the Agency is not able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.

Islamic Republic of Iran

21. During high level meetings in 2024, the Director General made concrete proposals to revive the Joint Statement agreed on 4 March 2023.¹⁸ Unfortunately, there was no significant progress on any of these proposals throughout the year.

22. In 2024, the Board of Governors adopted two resolutions entitled *NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran* (GOV/2024/39 and GOV/2024/68), in which the Board of Governors, inter alia, reaffirmed its decision that it was "essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding safeguards issues", take without delay the actions specified in these resolutions. Nevertheless, the outstanding safeguards issues related to the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations in Iran, and a discrepancy between the amount of uranium declared by Iran and the amount verified by the Agency at a declared facility in Iran, which stem from Iran's obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, remained unresolved despite the best efforts of the Agency to make progress on these issues. As noted by the Director General, the fact that these issues remain unresolved is a matter of serious concern. Unless and until Iran resolves these outstanding safeguards issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

23. Iran continues not to implement modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, which is a legal obligation for Iran. Specifically, Iran has made announcements regarding the start of construction of two nuclear power plants and a research reactor for which it has yet to provide preliminary design information as required under modified Code 3.1, despite Agency requests for it to do so.

¹⁷ Such measures include the early provision of design information, environmental sampling and the use of satellite imagery.

¹⁸ GOV/2023/9, Annex.

24. During 2024, the Director General repeatedly expressed his concern related to Iran's withdrawal of the designation of several experienced Agency inspectors, which has directly and seriously affected the Agency's ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively, in particular at declared enrichment facilities. Although, in November 2024, Iran agreed to consider the acceptance of the designation of additional experienced inspectors, it subsequently rejected four inspectors proposed by the Agency.

25. During 2024, the Director General submitted four quarterly reports to the Board of Governors entitled *NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran* (GOV/2024/8, GOV/2024/29, GOV/2024/44 and GOV/2024/62) and one other report entitled *Implementation of the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023* (GOV/INF/2024/1).

Syrian Arab Republic

26. In August 2024, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic* (GOV/2024/43) covering relevant developments since the previous report in August 2023 (GOV/2023/42). The Director General informed the Board of Governors that he welcomed Syria's renewed engagement with the Agency in relation to the unresolved safeguards issues.¹⁹

27. On 19 March 2024, the Director General visited Syria and held discussions with the President and Foreign Minister in Damascus. As a result of those discussions, the Agency, in coordination with the Syrian government, agreed to undertake a process of clarification of the pending safeguards issues related to past activities in Syria that require further inquiry in order to exclude any proliferation concern.

28. In May 2024, as part of its planned verification activities under Syria's NPT Safeguards Agreement, the Agency carried out a physical inventory verification and a design information verification at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor facility near Damascus, and a physical inventory verification at a LOF in Homs.

29. In late June 2024, Syria conducted technical discussions with the Agency concerning the three locations that were allegedly functionally related to the Dair Alzour site, and in the months thereafter allowed the Agency to visit them and take environmental samples.

30. On the basis of the evaluation of information provided by Syria, and all other safeguards relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs. For 2024, the Agency concluded for Syria that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Overall conclusions for 2024

31. On the basis of the evaluation performed and as reflected in paragraph 2(a) of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat concluded that for 31 (45) States²⁰, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. This conclusion was drawn for Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Lao People's Democratic Republic,

¹⁹ The Board of Governors, in its resolution GOV/2011/41 of June 2011 (adopted by a vote), had, inter alia, called on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and, in particular, to provide the Agency with updated reporting under its Safeguards Agreement and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency could provide the necessary assurance as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme.

²⁰ In addition, this conclusion is drawn for France's territories covered by the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, EURATOM and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco; and for the United States of America's territories covered by the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, the State of Palestine²¹, the Sudan, Suriname, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga, Tunisia, Tuvalu and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

32. Due to the fact that the SQPs for 14 States which are based on the original standard text hold in abeyance the implementation of the requirement for these States to provide to the Agency an initial report on all nuclear material as well as the Agency's right to perform verification activities in the States under their CSA, the evaluation process described in paragraphs 19 and 20 could not be completed for these 14 States. Therefore, the Secretariat was not in a position to draw any safeguards conclusions for these States as referred to in paragraph 2(b) of the *Safeguards Statement* — Barbados, Bhutan, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Myanmar, Nepal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Yemen and Zambia.²²

B.1.2. States Parties to the NPT without CSAs in force

33. As of 31 December 2024, three (four) States Parties to the NPT had yet to bring CSAs into force pursuant to Article III of the Treaty.

Overall conclusions for 2024

34. As indicated in paragraph 3 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusion for Equatorial Guinea, Guinea and Somalia.

B.1.3. States with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force

35. Under safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency applies safeguards in order to ensure that nuclear material, facilities and other items specified under the safeguards agreement are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose, and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

Status of implementation

36. As of 31 December 2024, safeguards were implemented at facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. India has an AP in force to its INFCIRC/754 safeguards agreement.

Deriving conclusions

37. The conclusion referred to in paragraph 4 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for these three States, and relates to the nuclear material, facilities and other items to which safeguards were applied. To draw such a conclusion in respect of these States, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available to it, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

²¹ The designation employed does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

²² In addition, the Secretariat was not in a position to draw any safeguards conclusions for those constituent parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands which are covered by INFCIRC/229 and are referred to in footnote 15 – i.e. the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten; and for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are covered by New Zealand's CSA with an original SQP (INFCIRC/185) but not by New Zealand's amended SQP (INFCIRC/185/Mod.1) and its AP (INFCIRC/185/Add.1) – see footnote 16.

Overall conclusions for 2024

38. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied in India, Israel and Pakistan remained in peaceful activities.

B.1.4. States with both voluntary offer agreements and APs in force

39. Under a voluntary offer agreement, the Agency applies safeguards to nuclear material in those facilities that have been selected by the Agency from the State's list of eligible facilities in order to verify that the material is not withdrawn from peaceful activities except as provided for in the agreement. In selecting facilities under voluntary offer agreements for the application of safeguards, the Agency takes such factors into consideration as: (i) whether the selection of a facility would satisfy legal obligations arising from other agreements concluded by the State; (ii) whether useful experience may be gained in implementing new safeguards approaches or in using advanced equipment and technology; and (iii) whether the cost efficiency of Agency safeguards may be enhanced by applying safeguards, in the exporting State, to nuclear material being shipped to States with CSAs in force. By implementing measures under the AP in these five States with voluntary offer agreements, the Agency also seeks to obtain and verify information that could enhance the safeguards conclusions for States with CSAs in force.

Status of implementation

40. During 2024, safeguards were implemented at ten facilities selected by the Agency in the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and the United States of America.

Deriving conclusions

41. The conclusion referred to in paragraph 5 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force in which safeguards were applied to nuclear material in selected facilities. To draw the safeguards conclusion, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available to it, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2024

42. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded for China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. There were no such withdrawals from the selected facilities in France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.

B.2. Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

43. Between 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day) and 8 May 2019, the Agency, in light of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), verified and monitored Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). From 8 May 2019 onwards, however, Iran reduced the implementation of those commitments on a step-by-step basis until, on 23 February 2021, it stopped implementing them altogether, including the AP. This seriously affected the Agency's JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities, which was exacerbated in June 2022 by Iran's decision to remove all of the Agency's JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment. Consequently, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in

relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate, which it will not be able to restore.

44. Throughout the year, Iran continued to accumulate enriched uranium well beyond the limits agreed under the JCPOA and expanded considerably its enrichment capacity and production for both high and low enriched uranium at its declared enrichment facilities. As a result of this expansion, the Agency strengthened its safeguards approach at declared facilities producing and storing high enriched uranium. Iran remains the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State that is producing and stockpiling high enriched uranium. The increased rate of production of high enriched uranium resulted in an estimated stockpile at the end of 2024 of 3.9 significant quantities in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 60% U-235.

45. During 2024, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the United Nations Security Council four quarterly reports (GOV/2024/7, GOV/2024/26, GOV/2024/41 and GOV/2024/61), and five reports (GOV/INF/2024/8, GOV/INF/2024/9, GOV/INF/2024/16, GOV/INF/2024/17 and GOV/INF/2024/18) providing updates on developments in between the issuance of the quarterly reports, entitled *Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)*.

B.3. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

46. In August 2024, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled *Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (GOV/2024/42-GC(68)/15), which included new information since the Director General's report of August 2023 (GOV/2023/41-GC(67)/20).

47. Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the DPRK's NPT Safeguards Agreement. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able — and, since April 2009, has not been able — to implement any verification measures in the DPRK, and, therefore, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the DPRK.

48. In 2024, no verification activities were implemented in the field but the Agency continued to monitor developments in the DPRK's nuclear programme and to evaluate all safeguards relevant information available to it, including open-source information and satellite imagery.

49. In 2024, the Secretariat continued to maintain the Agency's enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme. The Secretariat continued its collection and analysis of safeguards relevant open-source information on the DPRK's nuclear programme, increased its collection and analysis of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery, maintained necessary equipment and supplies, prepared Agency inspectors for verification and monitoring activities in the DPRK, and continued to review and document the Agency's knowledge of the DPRK's nuclear programme. Once a political agreement has been reached among the countries concerned, the Agency is ready to return to the DPRK in a timely manner, if requested to do so by the DPRK and subject to approval by the Board of Governors.

50. In 2024, the Agency continued to monitor the Yongbyon site. There are indications that the light water reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon continues to operate, which is consistent with an ongoing commissioning process. The Agency has observed that the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5MW(e)) reactor was not operating between mid-August and mid-October 2024, which provided sufficient time to refuel the reactor and start a new operational cycle. The 5MW(e) reactor has been operational again since mid-October 2024. If irradiated fuel has been withdrawn from the reactor, it could be reprocessed after being allowed to cool for several months. The steam plant serving the Radiochemical Laboratory operated briefly from late November until early December 2024, possibly in preparation for a reprocessing campaign. There were indications during 2024 that the reported centrifuge enrichment facility (CEF) at Yongbyon continued to operate.

51. In late February 2024, work commenced on the construction of an annex to the main building in the Kangson Complex near Pyongyang, significantly expanding the available floorspace. The annex was externally complete by June 2024. In mid-September, the DPRK published photographs of General Secretary Kim Jong Un visiting a “uranium enrichment base.” The depicted centrifuge cascades and infrastructure are consistent with the layout of a centrifuge enrichment facility and with the structure of the main building at the Kangson Complex and its newly constructed annex. The photograph assessed to be taken from inside the annex showed ongoing installation of centrifuges, which is consistent with General Secretary Kim’s call “to further augment the number of centrifuges in order to exponentially increase the nuclear weapons”. This display of an undeclared enrichment facility at Kangson and the call “to further strengthen the foundation for producing weapon-grade nuclear materials” are of serious concern.

52. There were no indications of significant changes at the Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri, which remains prepared to support a nuclear test. The conduct of a nuclear test would contravene UN Security Council resolutions and would be a cause for serious concern.

53. The Agency has not had access to the Yongbyon site or to other locations in the DPRK. Without such access, the Agency cannot confirm either the operational status or configuration/design features of the facilities or locations, or the nature and purpose of the activities conducted therein.

54. The DPRK’s nuclear activities continue to be a cause for serious concern. The continuation of the DPRK’s nuclear programme, including construction and operation of the LWR, is a clear violation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

B.4. Areas of difficulty in safeguards implementation

55. The armed conflict in Ukraine that began in late February 2022 created unprecedented challenges for the Agency in the implementation of safeguards in Ukraine under the CSA (INFCIRC/550) and the AP (INFCIRC/550/Add.1). Nevertheless, the Agency continued to undertake its vital verification role in Ukraine throughout the year and was able to conduct sufficient in-field verification activities necessary to draw the safeguards conclusion for Ukraine for 2024.

56. The performance and the effectiveness of State or regional authorities responsible for safeguards implementation (SRAs) and of their respective systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs/RSACs) have a significant impact upon the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards implementation. The effectiveness of some SRAs is affected by issues identified by the Agency in one or more of the following areas: provision of safeguards information to the Agency; provision of access to the Agency to conduct in-field verification activities; technical effectiveness of SSACs; and States’ cooperation and logistical support related to the Agency’s verification activities in the field or at Headquarters. Addressing these issues led to additional costs, effort and use of resources for the Agency.

57. In 2024, despite the above-mentioned issues, the Agency — based on the evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to it — was able to draw the safeguards conclusions as reported in the *Safeguards Statement* for 2024.

58. The Agency continues to address these issues to resolve them through cooperation and engagement with the States concerned. There are different causes of these issues. Some States have still not established SSACs, which are required under CSAs, while not all SRAs have the necessary legal authority, independence from facility or LOF operators, resources or technical capabilities to implement effectively the requirements of safeguards agreements and APs.

59. As concluded by the Board of Governors in 2005, the SQP based on the original standard text is a weakness in the Agency’s safeguards system. For States with an operative SQP based on the original standard text, the Agency’s authority to require the submission of an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards and early design information, to determine the status of any nuclear facilities and

to be able to perform verification activities in the field is held in abeyance under the CSA. Therefore, the Agency's ability to draw a credible and soundly-based annual safeguards conclusion for those States is significantly affected. In recent years, the Director General has reiterated to the Board of Governors that the SQP based on the original standard text was inadequate for the Agency safeguards system and, on repeated occasions, called upon States with an SQP based on the original standard text to amend or rescind their SQPs as soon as possible. At the end of 2024, 15 (21) States²³ had operative SQPs that had yet to be amended or rescinded. In light of the aforementioned limitations, and given the significant lapse of time since the decision of the Board of Governors in 2005 authorizing the Director General to conclude with each State with an SQP based on the original standard text an exchange of letters giving effect to the revised standardized text and the modified criteria, the Secretariat is no longer able to draw a safeguards conclusion for such States.

60. The Agency remains ready to provide assistance to the States concerned in amending or rescinding their SQP as well as in establishing and maintaining their SSAC as required under their CSA.

B.5. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards

61. The Agency has continued to improve the efficiency of safeguards implementation while strengthening its effectiveness wherever possible. These improvements are essential since the number of safeguards agreements and APs in force, the quantities of nuclear material under safeguards and the number of facilities and LOFs under safeguards continue to increase year on year. In contrast, the Agency's financial resources have not risen commensurately. While a number of facilities are being retired from service, this does not immediately reduce the Agency's verification effort as safeguards continue to be applied to those facilities until their status is confirmed by the Agency as 'decommissioned for safeguards purposes'.

62. Some of the factors contributing to strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards are shown in Fact box 2. As a result of these improvements, safeguards have been implemented more effectively in the field and have been complemented by enhanced and improved activities at Headquarters.


63. In January 2024, the Agency initiated the new implementation cycle of the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs (COMPASS) in four States — Bangladesh, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cameroon and Ghana. During 2024, a total of 16 activities were delivered, including one joint review of safeguards regulations, one nuclear material accountancy training, one mock inspection, and two virtual consultations on safeguards regulations.

64. In 2024, based on the refined departmental methodology, the Agency developed an SLA for three States, and updated SLAs for another 12 States, all having a CSA and an AP in force and for which the broader conclusion has been drawn. This brings the total number of States in this category for which an SLA has been developed or updated using the refined methodology to 45.

65. To further ensure consistency and non-discrimination in the development and implementation of SLAs, in 2024 the Agency finalized its internal procedure for the development of SLAs for States with a CSA and AP in force for which the broader conclusion has been drawn. Under the revised procedure, acquisition path analysis is performed and path coverage goals are determined for each State according to departmental standards. Technical objectives for the detection of individual steps on a path are

²³ At the end of 2024, the following States had operative SQPs in force based on the original standard text: Barbados, Bhutan, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nepal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Yemen and Zambia. In addition, there is an SQP based on the original standard text to the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/229 between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Agency pursuant to the NPT and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. New Zealand's CSA with an SQP based on the original standard text reproduced in INFCIRC/185 applies to the Cook Islands and Niue.

assigned performance targets to meet these path coverage goals. The specific safeguards measures and activities provided for in a State's safeguards agreement that will be used to meet the performance targets, along with their frequency and intensity, are documented in the SLA. The development and use of information technology (IT) tools have been essential in facilitating efficient implementation of the revised procedure, in promoting its consistent application and in delivering reproducible and traceable results.




66. Under the departmental quality management system (QMS), regular oversight of the key safeguards processes and their output is provided through internal quality audits, assessments and improvement activities. These are intended to ensure impartiality, effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation.

67. Internal evaluation of the effectiveness of safeguards implementation was performed through peer reviews of annual implementation plans (AIPs) and State evaluation reports. In 2024, all AIPs approved at the beginning of the year were reviewed. Moreover, the effectiveness of safeguards implementation was evaluated for 36 (37) AIPs implemented in 2024. In addition, the State evaluation of three States was peer reviewed by ad hoc departmental teams. This additional layer of internal evaluation further

²⁴ At the end of 2024, the following States had SQPs in force based on the revised standard text: Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, the Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Kuwait, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, the State of Palestine²¹, the Sudan, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe. In addition, the SQP to the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, EURATOM and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the SQP to the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco were amended. New Zealand's amended SQP reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Mod.1 does not apply to the Cook Islands and Niue.

strengthens the effectiveness of safeguards implementation and increases the level of consistency and standardization across the Department of Safeguards.

68. The Agency continued to promote the use of the protocol reporter software (PR3), which supports the preparation and submission of AP declarations. During 2024, the Agency focussed its efforts on the distribution of the new version of the software (r.1.6), which was released in 2023. This version includes improvements in the browsing, searching and validation functions, facilitates the exchange of information, and provides more flexibility, especially for users dealing with large data volumes. By the end of 2024, the Agency had provided the software to 125 (124) States⁴, and 87 (45) of these States⁴ had upgraded to the newest release. The number of States that use the protocol reporter software to submit their AP declarations has been steadily increasing over the past years. During 2024, 87 (85) States⁴ submitted declarations using this software, which is approximately 70% (70%) of the States that received the software, and 61% (60%) of the States with an AP in force.



69. Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) and the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) continued to make substantial contributions to Agency safeguards through the provision of assistance and advice. MSSP activities, in partnership with 23 States and the European Commission, focus on addressing specific development and implementation support needs for safeguards through collaboration, research and development, and the provision of equipment, materials, and access to facilities for training or equipment testing purposes.

70. In 2024, the Agency extended existing practical arrangements with four non-traditional partners to maintain the support base for Agency safeguards that such arrangements provide.

B.6. Safeguards expenditures and resources

71. During 2024, the activities of Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — were funded through the Regular Budget primarily, but also through extrabudgetary contributions. The Regular Budget appropriation of €167.7 (€163.8) million²⁵ for 2024 was adjusted to €165.7 (€161.9) million at the United Nations operational average rate of exchange for the year. Figure 1 presents the budget growth for the period 2020–2024 by comparing the growth of the final budget²⁶ to the growth of the approved budget²⁷.

²⁵ At an exchange rate €1=\$1, excluding Major Capital Investment Fund.

²⁶ Represents the operational portion of the Regular Budget appropriation as presented in the annual Agency’s Financial Statements, including the effects of the price adjustment and the recalculation of the Regular Budget portion of US dollars at the United Nations operational average rate of exchange for the year.

²⁷ Represents the Regular Budget approved by the Agency’s policy-making organs excluding the effects of currency revaluation.




Figure 1. Budget growth of the Regular Budget, 2020-2024 (base 2020=0%); real growth of Major Programme 4 approved budget since 2014 (base 2014=0%)

72. The Regular Budget of Major Programme 4 has been subject to a zero real growth policy starting 2020. Figure 1 also shows the real growth of Major Programme 4 approved budget since 2014.

73. The expenditures for Major Programme 4 were €164.4 (€161.8) million from the 2024 Regular Budget, an increase of 1.6% compared with 2023. The Regular Budget utilization rate for 2024 was 99.2% (100%) with the unobligated balance available for obligation in the second year of the biennium 2024-2025 to cover costs of several projects which were delayed to 2025. Figure 2 shows the utilization trend of the Regular Budget of Major Programme 4 for the period 2020–2024.




Figure 2. Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — budget and expenditures, 2020-2024

74. The expenditures²⁸ from the extrabudgetary allotments were €29.8 (€28.4) million, an increase of 5% compared with 2023. This increase resulted mainly from staff costs associated with the Agency's activities in Ukraine.

²⁸ Including Programme Support Costs.

B.7. Status of safeguards agreements (as of 31 December 2024)

75. This section contains information — presented in the five tables below — on safeguards agreements that provide the basis for the Agency's implementation of safeguards in 2024. It does not include agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended in the light of implementation of safeguards pursuant to another agreement. For full details, see the Agency's website: <https://www.iaea.org>.

Table 1 – States with CSAs and APs in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP (date of entry into force)
Afghanistan	X(A)	257	19 July 2005
Albania		359	3 November 2010
Andorra	X(A)	808	19 December 2011
Angola	X(A)	800	28 April 2010
Antigua and Barbuda	X(A)	528	15 November 2013
Armenia		455	28 June 2004
Australia		217	12 December 1997
Austria		193	30 April 2004
Azerbaijan		580	29 November 2000
Bahrain	X(A)	767	20 July 2011
Bangladesh		301	30 March 2001
Belgium		193	30 April 2004
Benin	X(A)	930	17 September 2019
Bolivia, Plurinational State of		465	7 December 2023
Bosnia and Herzegovina		851	3 July 2013
Botswana		694	24 August 2006
Bulgaria⁽¹⁾		193	1 May 2009
Burkina Faso	X(A)	618	17 April 2003
Burundi	X(A)	719	27 September 2007
Cabo Verde	X(A)	1048	7 September 2022
Cambodia	X(A)	586	24 April 2015
Cameroon	X(A)	641	29 September 2016
Canada		164	8 September 2000
Central African Republic	X(A)	777	7 September 2009
Chad	X(A)	802	13 May 2010
Chile		476	3 November 2003
Colombia		306	5 March 2009
Comoros	X(A)	752	20 January 2009
Congo	X(A)	831	28 October 2011
Costa Rica	X(A)	278	17 June 2011
Côte d'Ivoire		309	5 May 2016
Croatia⁽¹⁾		193	1 April 2017
Cuba		633	3 June 2004
Cyprus⁽¹⁾		193	1 May 2008
Czech Republic⁽¹⁾		193	1 October 2009
Democratic Republic of the Congo		183	9 April 2003

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP (date of entry into force)
Denmark⁽²⁾		193 176	30 April 2004 22 March 2013
Djibouti	X(A)	884	26 May 2015
Dominican Republic	X(A)	201	5 May 2010
Ecuador	X(A)	231	24 October 2001
El Salvador	X(A)	232	24 May 2004
Eritrea	X(A)	960	20 April 2021
Estonia⁽¹⁾		193	1 December 2005
Eswatini	X(A)	227	8 September 2010
Ethiopia	X(A)	261	18 September 2019
Fiji	X(A)	192	14 July 2006
Finland		193	30 April 2004
Gabon	X(A)	792	25 March 2010
Gambia	X(A)	277	18 October 2011
Georgia		617	3 June 2003
Germany		193	30 April 2004
Ghana		226	11 June 2004
Greece		193	30 April 2004
Guatemala	X(A)	299	28 May 2008
Guinea-Bissau	X(A)	1005	23 June 2022
Haiti	X(A)	681	9 March 2006
Holy See	X(A)	187	24 September 1998
Honduras	X(A)	235	17 November 2017
Hungary⁽¹⁾		193	1 July 2007
Iceland	X(A)	215	12 September 2003
Indonesia		283	29 September 1999
Iraq		172	10 October 2012
Ireland		193	30 April 2004
Italy		193	30 April 2004
Jamaica		265	19 March 2003
Japan		255	16 December 1999
Jordan		258	28 July 1998
Kazakhstan		504	9 May 2007
Kenya	X(A)	778	18 September 2009
Korea, Republic of		236	19 February 2004
Kuwait	X(A)	607	2 June 2003
Kyrgyzstan	X	629	10 November 2011
Latvia⁽¹⁾		193	1 October 2008
Lesotho	X(A)	199	26 April 2010
Liberia	X(A)	927	10 December 2018
Libya		282	11 August 2006
Liechtenstein		275	25 November 2015
Lithuania⁽¹⁾		193	1 January 2008
Luxembourg		193	30 April 2004
Madagascar	X(A)	200	18 September 2003

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP (date of entry into force)
Malawi	X(A)	409	26 July 2007
Mali	X(A)	615	12 September 2002
Malta ⁽¹⁾		193	1 July 2007
Marshall Islands		653	3 May 2005
Mauritania	X(A)	788	10 December 2009
Mauritius	X(A)	190	17 December 2007
Mexico		197	4 March 2011
Monaco	X(A)	524	30 September 1999
Mongolia	X(A)	188	12 May 2003
Montenegro	X(A)	814	4 March 2011
Morocco		228	21 April 2011
Mozambique	X(A)	813	1 March 2011
Namibia	X(A)	551	20 February 2012
Netherlands, Kingdom of the ⁽³⁾		193	30 April 2004
New Zealand ⁽⁴⁾	X(A)	185	24 September 1998
Nicaragua	X(A)	246	18 February 2005
Niger		664	2 May 2007
Nigeria		358	4 April 2007
North Macedonia	X(A)	610	11 May 2007
Norway		177	16 May 2000
Palau	X(A)	650	13 May 2005
Panama	X(A)	316	11 December 2001
Paraguay	X(A)	279	15 September 2004
Peru		273	23 July 2001
Philippines		216	26 February 2010
Poland ⁽¹⁾		193	1 March 2007
Portugal		193	30 April 2004
Republic of Moldova	X(A)	690	1 June 2012
Romania ⁽¹⁾		193	1 May 2010
Rwanda	X(A)	801	17 May 2010
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X(A)	514	19 May 2014
Sao Tome and Principe	X(A)	1082	31 March 2023
Senegal	X(A)	276	24 July 2017
Serbia		204	17 September 2018
Seychelles	X(A)	635	13 October 2004
Singapore	X(A)	259	31 March 2008
Slovakia ⁽¹⁾		193	1 December 2005
Slovenia ⁽¹⁾		193	1 September 2006
South Africa		394	13 September 2002
Spain		193	30 April 2004
Sweden		193	30 April 2004
Switzerland		264	1 February 2005
Tajikistan		639	14 December 2004
Thailand		241	17 November 2017
Timor-Leste	X(A)	1254	25 September 2024

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP (date of entry into force)
Togo	X(A)	840	18 July 2012
Türkiye		295	17 July 2001
Turkmenistan		673	3 January 2006
Uganda	X(A)	674	14 February 2006
Ukraine		550	24 January 2006
United Arab Emirates		622	20 December 2010
United Republic of Tanzania	X(A)	643	7 February 2005
Uruguay		157	30 April 2004
Uzbekistan		508	21 December 1998
Vanuatu	X(A)	852	21 May 2013
Viet Nam		376	17 September 2012
Zimbabwe	X(A)	483	21 September 2021
<p>General Notes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In addition, safeguards, including the measures of the <i>Model Additional Protocol</i>, were applied for Taiwan, China. • The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/193 is that concluded between the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), EURATOM and the Agency. • ‘X’ in the ‘SQP’ column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. ‘X(A)’ indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6). <p>Table Notes:</p> <p>(1) The date refers to accession to INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8.</p> <p>(2) The application of safeguards in Denmark under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/176), in force since 1 March 1972, was suspended on 21 February 1977, on which date the safeguards agreement between the non-nuclear-weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the Agency (INFCIRC/193) entered into force for Denmark. Since 21 February 1977, INFCIRC/193 also applies to the Faroe Islands. Upon Greenland’s secession from EURATOM as of 31 January 1985, the agreement between the Agency and Denmark (INFCIRC/176) re-entered into force for Greenland. The AP to this agreement entered into force on 22 March 2013 (INFCIRC/176/Add.1).</p> <p>(3) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/229 with regard to the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten is pursuant to the NPT and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an original SQP to this agreement. No AP is in force for that agreement.</p> <p>(4) The safeguards agreement with an original SQP reproduced in INFCIRC/185 is also applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue. The amended SQP reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Mod.1 and the AP reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Add.1, however, are not applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue.</p>			

Table 2 – States with CSAs but no APs in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP
Algeria		531	Signed: 16 February 2018
Argentina		435	
Bahamas	X(A)	544	
Barbados	X	527	
Belarus		495	Signed: 15 November 2005
Belize	X(A)	532	
Bhutan	X	371	
Brazil		435	
Brunei Darussalam	X(A)	365	
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea⁽¹⁾		403	
Dominica	X	513	
Egypt		302	
Grenada	X	525	

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP
Guyana	X	543	
Iran, Islamic Republic of⁽²⁾		214	Signed: 18 December 2003
Kiribati	X	390	Signed: 9 November 2004
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X(A)	599	Signed: 5 November 2014
Lebanon	X(A)	191	
Malaysia		182	Signed: 22 November 2005
Maldives	X(A)	253	
Micronesia, Federated States of	X(A)	962	
Myanmar	X	477	Signed: 17 September 2013
Nauru	X(A)	317	Signed: 29 July 2024
Nepal	X	186	
Oman	X(A)	691	
Papua New Guinea	X(A)	312	
Qatar	X(A)	747	
Saint Lucia	X(A)	379	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	X	400	
Samoa	X	268	
San Marino	X(A)	575	
Saudi Arabia		746	
Sierra Leone	X(A)	787	Signed: 31 October 2022
Solomon Islands	X	420	
Sri Lanka		320	Approved: 12 September 2018
State of Palestine⁽³⁾	X(A)	1050	
Sudan	X(A)	245	
Suriname	X(A)	269	
Syrian Arab Republic		407	
Tonga	X(A)	426	
Trinidad and Tobago	X	414	
Tunisia		381	Signed: 24 May 2005
Tuvalu	X(A)	391	
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of		300	
Yemen	X	614	
Zambia	X	456	Signed: 13 May 2009

General Notes:

- The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/435 is that concluded between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6).

Table Notes:

- (1) In a letter to the Director General dated 10 January 2003, the DPRK stated that the Government had "decided to lift the moratorium on the effectiveness of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and that "its decision to withdraw from the Treaty will come into effect from 11 January 2003 onwards."
- (2) On 16 January 2016, as notified in its letter to the Director General of 7 January 2016, Iran began to provisionally apply its AP in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force. The AP, which was provisionally applied by Iran as of 16 January 2016, has not been applied since 23 February 2021.
- (3) The designation employed does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

Table 3 – States Parties to the NPT without CSAs in force

States Parties to the NPT	SQP	Safeguards agreement	AP
Equatorial Guinea	X	Approved: 13 June 1986	
Guinea	X(A)	Signed: 13 December 2011	Signed: 13 December 2011
Somalia			
General Note: • ‘X’ in the ‘SQP’ column indicates that the State has an SQP. ‘X(A)’ indicates that the SQP is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6). In both cases, the SQP will come into force at the same time as the safeguards agreement.			

Table 4 – States with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force

State	INFCIRC	AP
India	754	In force: 25 July 2014
Israel	249/Add.1	
Pakistan	34	
	116	
	135	
	239	
	248	
	393	
	418	
	705	
	816	
	920	

Table 5 – States with voluntary offer agreements and APs in force

State	INFCIRC	AP
China	369	In force: 28 March 2002
France⁽¹⁾	290	In force: 30 April 2004
Russian Federation	327	In force: 16 October 2007
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland^{(2), (3), (4)}	951	In force: 31 December 2020
United States of America⁽⁵⁾	288	In force: 6 January 2009

Table Notes:

- (1) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, EURATOM and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. The SQP was amended. No AP to that agreement has been concluded.
- (2) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/175, which remains in force, is an INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the Agency.
- (3) The safeguards agreement between the United Kingdom, EURATOM and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed but has not entered into force. There is an SQP to this agreement. No AP to that agreement has been concluded.
- (4) The voluntary offer safeguards agreement between the United Kingdom and the Agency (reproduced in INFCIRC/951) and the AP thereto (reproduced in INFCIRC/951/Add.1) entered into force on 31 December 2020 at 23:00 GMT.
- (5) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. The SQP was amended. No AP to that agreement has been concluded.



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