
KINGDOM OF BELGIUM



NATIONAL REPORT

MAY 2006

## Kingdom of Belgium

Second meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

May 2006

## National Report

This report is produced by the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control on behalf of Belgium. Contributions to the report were also made by ONDRAF/NIRAS, Electrabel, Association Vinçotte Nuclear and the SCK•CEN.

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### **1** Section A: Introduction

### 1.1 General context

On 8 December 1997 Belgium has signed the Joint Convention. The Belgian legislator has expressed its consent with the obligations resulting from the Convention via the Law of 2 August 2002. The ratification was obtained on 5 September 2002. The Convention became effective on 4 December 2002, or 90 days after the Ratification Act had been deposited.

Belgium belongs to the group of Contracting Parties having at least one operational nuclear generating unit on their territory. Belgium has indeed developed an important nuclear energy programme, which includes at present 7 operational nuclear power plants producing a joint electric potential of approx. 6 051 MWe. The political authorities have regularly assessed the future of this nuclear energy programme, for instance according to the progress made in the management of the radioactive waste produced by these nuclear power plants. Already in 1975, the Belgian Government has installed an important committee of experts, better known as the "Commissie van Beraad inzake Kernenergie" (deliberation committee on nuclear energy). One of the recommendations of this committee was to assess the continuation of the nuclear energy programme once every ten years.

Since then, these assessments have been organised on several occasions, for instance during the Parliamentary Energy Debate in the period 1982-1984 and by the 'Parlementaire Commissie van Informatie en Onderzoek inzake Nucleaire Veiligheid' (Parliamentary Information and Investigation Commission in the field of Nuclear Safety) between 1988-1990. Through its approval - in October 1990 - of the undermentioned recommendation, the Senate has clearly expressed the wish to pursue these continuous assessments:

## "Once every ten years the waste issue should be thoroughly assessed. This assessment will be contributory to the future of the nuclear programmes."

This tradition of assessing the nuclear energy programme was extended through the establishment of a "parlementaire onderzoekscommissie naar de opportuniteit van de opwerking van de bestraalde splijtstof en het gebruik van MOX-splijtstof" (Parliamentary Investigation Commission on the Opportunity of the Reprocessing of Irradiated Fissile Materials and the Use of MOX fuel), which has deposited its conclusions in December 1993. Finally, the activities of the 'Commission for the Analysis of the Means of Producing Electricity and the Re-evaluation of Energy Vectors', better known as the Commission AMPERE have to be mentioned. This Commission was installed by the Government in April 1999; its final report - containing a new assessment of the future of the nuclear electricity production – was published in October 2000.

By means of the Law of 31 January 2003, the Political Authorities have finally chosen to abandon the use of fission nuclear energy for industrial electricity production; this was done by prohibiting the building of new nuclear power plants and by limiting the operational period of the existing nuclear power plants to 40 years. This law will indeed have considerable consequences for the future of the nuclear sector in Belgium, but, in the short term, it will not have any implications for the radioactive waste management sector.

Belgium is a member of IAEA and NEA. Its representatives take an active part in the activities regarding the radioactive waste management, such as the Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC) of the NEA and the Waste Safety Standards Committee (WASSC) of the IAEA.

### 1.2 Structure and content of the report

This national report, submitted to the second review meeting of the contracting parties to the Joint Convention, is elaborated pursuant article 32 of the Convention. It is based on its first edition. Particular emphasis has been put to clearly include relevant elements related to the questions which were raised during the first review meeting by other contracting parties, facts and events that occurred during the last two and a half years and that characterize the evolution in that period of time, as well as updates of the action devoted to the improvement of safety, related to section K of the report.

The following nuclear actors have participated in its edition:

- ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, in charge of the management of radioactive waste,
- FANC, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, the safety authority,
- AVN (Association Vincotte Nuclear), authorised inspection organisation (AIO),
- Electrabel, the operator of the seven nuclear power plants and responsible for the interim storage on site of the spent fuel
- Synatom, the owner of the nuclear fuel from its fabrication to its transfer to ONDRAF/NIRAS when declared as radioactive waste.
- SCK•CEN, the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre, operating research reactors and dismantling a former PWR research reactor.

Together the above mentioned organisations gather the legal and practical competencies necessary to collect and structure the information required to elaborate the national report.

The report is structured according to the guidelines adopted at the preparatory meeting of the contracting parties held from 10 to 12 December 2001, INFCIRC/604.

Although not required by the Convention, the report is available on different Belgian Web sites, such as <u>www.fanc.fgov.be</u>, <u>www.nirond.be</u>, <u>www.avn.be</u>.

### 2 Section B: Policies and Practices

### 2.1 Spent fuel management policy

Seven commercial nuclear reactors of the PWR type are operated in Belgium, leading to a total installed capacity of 6.051 GWe and approximately to 5 000  $t_{HM}$  spent fuel to be unloaded during 40 years of operation. Until the mid-nineties the Belgian strategy for the management of the back end of the fuel cycle was the reprocessing of spent fuel from all commercial nuclear power reactors. This policy led to the reprocessing of 670  $t_{HM}$  of the spent uranium-oxide fuel type by COGEMA at La Hague: the very last Belgian fuel elements sent to La Hague have been reprocessed in late 2001.

Due to the changing international context, and especially the collapse of the uranium prices from the mid-eighties onwards, a parliamentary debate was launched in 1993, focussing on spent fuel management and plutonium recycling. This lead to a parliamentary resolution on 22 December 1993 urging the government to take action in order to temporarily prevent the implementation of new reprocessing contracts for a five-year period and to take profit of that time to make a thorough comparison of the back-end strategies, namely direct disposal and reprocessing of spent fuel. The Council of Ministers implemented this resolution by its decision of 24 December 1993. To give effect to this decision, an overview report was produced in 1998 by the Administration for Energy, in which the two management options were compared.

In 1998 the Council of Ministers specified in its session of 4 December 1998 that the data available at that time and presented in the above-mentioned report were not sufficient to make a global evaluation of the benefits of both options. Therefore they decided that the moratorium on the conclusion of any new reprocessing contract should be confirmed until new data were available and reported to them, allowing them to make this global evaluation. They also urged Synatom to cancel a reprocessing contract concluded in 1991. The global evaluation has not been finalised up to now.

Besides spent fuel from commercial power reactors, there is also a small amount of spent fuel resulting from research reactors at SCK•CEN (Nuclear Research Centre at Mol) and at the University of Ghent. The back-end policies for the spent fuel from these research reactors differ. For the spent fuel from the high-flux-test-reactor BR2 at SCK•CEN, using highly enriched U (HEU) as fuel, reprocessing is the current back-end option. For the spent fuel from the 10 MWe PWR BR3 reactor at SCK•CEN, in decommissioning since 1987, a dry interim storage in CASTOR casks is applied. Finally, for the spent fuel resulting from the other research reactors (the graphite moderated BR1 reactor using natural uranium and the zero power Venus reactor using UO<sub>2</sub> and MOX both at SCK•CEN and the pool type Thetis reactor at the University of Gent, using UO<sub>2</sub>) no final back-end strategy has yet been defined.

### 2.2 Spent fuel management practices

The reprocessing of 670  $t_{HM}$  spent fuel was executed in accordance with four contracts concluded by Synatom (Belgium) and COGEMA (France) during the period 1976-1978. These foresaw the gradual sending back of the resulting waste to Belgium. The sending back of the following quantities of different waste types is presently foreseen:

- 420 canisters of vitrified high level waste;
- 600 canisters of compacted technological and structural (hulls and end pieces) waste;
- 1100 drums of bituminised residues.

By May 2005, seven nuclear shipments between France and Belgium have been undertaken, sending already 196 canisters of vitrified high-level waste back. These canisters are stored in a specially designed surface storage building at Belgoprocess in Dessel, pending their future final disposal. Belgoprocess is ONDRAF/NIRAS' industrial daughter company (see also section E).

At the end of 1993, the Belgian parliament voted a five-year moratorium on further reprocessing contracts. After this period and up to now, the government confirmed the ban of reprocessing. As the available storage capacities were becoming short in the existing spent fuel storage pools, interim storage facilities needed to be built. Technical and economical studies were started in order to find the most appropriate solution for every nuclear site. Flexible and reversible solutions for the temporary storage for the spent fuel had to be found. Another condition put forward by Synatom was that the technologies to be implemented needed to be safe, reliable and proven.

Two different solutions have been selected for the nuclear sites in operation: dry storage in metallic dual-purpose casks on the Doel site and a centralised storage pond on the Tihange site.

A detailed description of both installations is provided under section L (appendix 1). On the Doel site construction of the modular storage buildings started in May 1994 and the first cask was loaded in June 1995. The buildings in their present layout are able to house 165 storage casks. Additional modules can be added, if necessary. Metallic casks are periodically ordered by Synatom and loaded by the operators of the power plant in order to allow the transfer of spent fuel elements from the three deactivation pools of the site to the centralised dry casks storage facility. Such casks are designed both for storage and transport purposes.

On the Tihange site the centralised storage pond received its operating licence in May 1997 and the very first fuel elements have been transferred in July 1997. The total capacity of the pond is approximately 3700 spent fuel assemblies divided in eight sections. Six sections are presently equipped with racks. The safe power supply and cooling capacity for the storage pond are provided by the corresponding systems of the neighbouring Tihange 3 reactor unit.

Spent fuel in storage pending a decision regarding its future is at this moment neither regarded nor declared radioactive waste by its owner Synatom. Consequently its management is not included in the scope of responsibility of ONDRAF/NIRAS (see also section E).

Concerning the BR2 fuel, a reduced number of elements was sent to Dounreay (U.K.) for reprocessing. After processing, the fuel is recovered, re-used as HEU (~ 72 % enrichment) or blended down to < 20 % enrichment. Cemented waste will be returned to Belgium, and will be stored for several decades in a dedicated building on the Belgoprocess site and finally disposed of underground. A part of the BR2 fuel is also reprocessed without recovery of nuclear material for further use as HEU or LEU. After processing, the recovered uranium is diluted to 1 % enrichment. The waste is returned to Belgium and stored in an existing building - foreseen for vitrified waste from power plants - on the Belgoprocess site for several decades before final disposal.

A contract has been concluded in this sense with COGEMA, covering the whole remaining life of the BR2 reactor, without a limit in time and in quantities.

All the spent fuel (some 2 tons of HM) from the BR3-reactor is dry-stored in 7 CASTOR BR3 type casks at the Belgoprocess site.

### 2.3 Radioactive waste management policy

The foundation of the 'Organisme national des déchets radioactifs et des matières fissiles / Nationale instelling voor radioactief afval en splijtstoffen' or ONDRAF/NIRAS (Belgian National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Fissile Materials) on 8 August 1980 is the result of a decision of

the Belgian authorities to entrust the management of radioactive waste to one single institution under public control. This was done in order to ensure that the public interest would play a crucial part in all decisions on the subject. This law was modified by the law of 11 January 1991, which also slightly changed the name of the institution towards 'Belgian National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials'.

The tasks and modalities of operation of ONDRAF/NIRAS were laid down by the Royal Decree of 30 March 1981 and supplemented in the Royal Decree of 16 October 1991.

In general terms, ONDRAF/NIRAS is responsible for the management of all radioactive waste on the Belgian territory. The task laid down for it by law is to outline a policy for the coherent and safe management of radioactive waste covering the following aspects:

- 1. Compiling an inventory of radioactive materials (and enriched fissile materials) and of all sites containing radioactive materials, and assessing the decommissioning and remediation costs of all sites containing radioactive materials (inventory of nuclear liabilities);
- 2. Compiling an inventory of all radioactive waste streams;
- 3. Collection and transport of the waste;
- 4. Processing and conditioning of the waste;
- 5. Interim storage of all conditioned waste;
- 6. Long-term management (disposal as the option under investigation);
- 7. Tasks relating to the management of enriched fissile materials.

ONDRAF/NIRAS has a centralised waste management policy, by making use of processing and conditioning facilities and interim storage facilities centralised on the site of Belgoprocess in Dessel and Mol. Some waste producers have their own processing and conditioning facilities and they transfer conditioned waste to Belgoprocess site for interim storage.

More specific tasks assigned to ONDRAF/NIRAS are the following.

- In the Royal Decree of 16 October 1991 one of the missions entrusted to ONDRAF/NIRAS was the qualification of installations for treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste. Some issues of practical implementation of the qualification of treatment and conditioning installations, but also storage buildings, are laid down in a recent Royal Decree of 18 November 2002.
- Another mission of ONDRAF/NIRAS laid down in the law of 16 October 1991 was the establishment of acceptance criteria for conditioned and unconditioned radioactive waste based on General Rules to be approved by the safety authority. The set of General Rules was established by ONDRAF/NIRAS, approved by its Board and by the competent minister, and came into force by ministerial letter from 10 February 1999.
- Some aspects concerning the decommissioning of nuclear installations were also entrusted to ONDRAF/NIRAS by the law of 16 October 1991. These concerned the collection and evaluation of decommissioning data in order to establish programmes for the waste that will result from it, the approval of the decommissioning programme and the execution of the decommissioning programme if the operator asks for it or in case of incapacity of the operator. With the law of 12 December 1997 this mission of ONDRAF/NIRAS was extended, by entrusting ONDRAF/NIRAS with the establishment of an inventory of all nuclear installations and sites containing radioactive materials, and with the assessment of their decommissioning and remediation costs.

Concerning the policy of long-term management of low and intermediate level short-lived radioactive waste, the decision of the Council of Ministers of 16 January 1998 gave ONDRAF/NIRAS the following mission, which consists of five points:

- Limiting the siting activities to nuclear or non-nuclear volunteering sites;
- Finalising the design studies of surface disposal;
- Finalising the feasibility studies for deep disposal;
- Developing methods of interaction with different local stakeholders;
- Collaboration with the federal safety authorities (FANC) for safety aspects as well as for environmental impact.

For the high-level and long-lived waste, ONDRAF/NIRAS is currently studying the deep disposal in a clay layer as the reference option.

As the responsible agency for radioactive waste management, ONDRAF/NIRAS works for all matters related to the safety of waste management and the protection of the environment in close cooperation with the federal safety authorities (FANC), which is the licensing authority for nuclear installations (see also section E). A formal agreement organising all the legal interfaces between the two agencies has been signed in 2003 by each of the two Boards and is in force since September 2003. A Commission with members of both organisations and with a rotating chair was created; this Commission coordinates all activities and interactions that are covered by this agreement.

### 2.4 Radioactive waste practices

### 2.4.1 Classification: definitions and criteria

For the purpose of its safe management in the short and long term, radioactive waste, which possesses extremely diverse characteristics, is classified according to certain similarities. The internationally recommended classification systems — IAEA and the European Union (EU)—make no distinction between conditioned and non-conditioned radioactive waste. They classify waste according to its activity and half-life.

In Belgium, ONDRAF/NIRAS has adopted a four-level hierarchical classification system for conditioned radioactive waste. This system is compatible with the IAEA and EU international classification systems and can, if necessary, be adapted to take account of changes that may occur in the waste management.

The **groups** of conditioned radioactive waste, two in total, are defined as a function of the possible disposal solutions for the waste in question.

The *geological* group includes the conditioned radioactive waste of which the radiological characteristics (i.e. the activity concentration of the radionuclides it contains and their half-life) make it imperative that it is permanently isolated from the biosphere. Permanent isolation, which is thus the sole conceivable solution for the long-term management of the waste, is currently judged to be achievable by its disposal into deep and stable geological layers.

The *open* group contains the conditioned radioactive waste of which the radiological characteristics are such that alternative solutions to geological isolation can be considered, since its activity will decrease to a sufficiently low level by radioactive decay over a period of time compatible with the period over which control can be exercised, i.e. a maximum of 200 to 300 years.

The three main **categories** (Table 1) of conditioned radioactive waste are defined by a radiological criterion and by a thermal power criterion. Category A belongs to the open group, and categories B and C to the geological group.

*Category A* waste is the one of which the radionuclides present specific activities low enough and half-lives short enough to be compatible with surface disposal, i.e. a maximum of 400 to 4000 Bq/g of long-lived alpha activity according to the generic recommendations of the IAEA and the European Union.

*Category B* waste is waste that does not meet the radiological criterion for belonging to category A, but does not generate enough heat to belong to category C.

*Category C* waste contains very high quantities of alpha and beta emitters and generates a thermal power of over 20 W/m<sup>3</sup>, a figure that marks the limit between categories B and C for disposal into clay. In fact, this relatively low limit takes into account the low thermal conductivity of the reference host rock, i.e. the Boom Clay. It must, therefore, cool down during a period of interim storage (foreseen period of 50 to 70 years), and its residual thermal power at the time of the disposal requires either limiting the number of packages per metre of disposal gallery, or increasing the distance between the galleries, or increasing the time during which such wastes are to cool down in aboveground purpose-built facilities.

The waste categories are further subdivided in waste classes and waste streams.

**Table 1:** Characteristics of the three categories (A, B and C) of radioactive waste used by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

	Low-level	Medium-level	High-level
<b>Short half-life</b> (of the order of 30 years or less)	А	A	С
Long half-life (over 30 years)	В	В	С

### 2.4.2 Practices

1. From the year 1997 onwards, the legislator requires ONDRAF/NIRAS to compile a register of the localisation and the state of all nuclear installations and all sites containing radioactive materials, to assess their decommissioning and remediation costs, to evaluate the existence and adequacy of the provisions in order to finance the operations (current or future), and, finally, to repeat this exercise on a five yearly basis. The official legal name of this new assignment is "inventory of nuclear liabilities". The first inventory was established at the end of 2002 and was presented to the supervising authority (the Secretary of State for Energy and Sustainable Development) on 27 January 2003.

Besides this inventory of nuclear liabilities, ONDRAF/NIRAS compiles also at regular time intervals (typically also about every five years) an inventory of all radioactive waste, covering both the already produced waste and estimates of expected future waste. This waste inventory contains not only the waste volumes, but also the physico-chemical and radiological characteristics.

2. ONDRAF/NIRAS is also responsible for the shipments of conditioned and unconditioned radioactive waste, mainly towards the centralised conditioning and intermediate storage facilities on the Belgoprocess site (Dessel). These transports need to be licensed by the Federal

Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC), as stipulated in the GRR-2001 (General Regulations for the protection of the workers, the population and the environment against the hazards of ionizing radiations, issued in 2001 by Royal Decree of 20 July 2001). These shipments are subcontracted by ONDRAF/NIRAS to specialised transport companies.

- 3. The processing and conditioning of radioactive waste is partly done by the nuclear operators themselves on the sites of the nuclear reactors at Doel and Tihange, and partly in the centralised processing and conditioning facility at the site of Belgoprocess (Dessel).
- 4. The interim storage of the waste constitutes an intermediate level between short-term and long-term radioactive waste management. As already explained above, spent fuel from commercial reactors is stored by Electrabel in thereto especially designed surface storage buildings in Doel and Tihange. Storage of radioactive waste is done in surface storage buildings at the Belgoprocess site. Currently there are seven storage buildings in operation, two buildings for low-level radioactive waste, one for intermediate-level waste, three for high-level waste and one for alpha- contaminated waste and radium-bearing waste (see also section H).
- 5. For the long-term management, a distinction is made between the category A (short-lived waste) programme on one hand, and the category B (long-lived waste) and C (high-level waste) programmes on the other. ONDRAF/NIRAS' category A programme is currently in the preproject phase. In this pre-project phase for category A waste the two technical options 'surface disposal' and 'deep disposal' are studied. In this phase ONDRAF/NIRAS has created partnerships with the municipalities of Dessel, Mol and Fleurus/Farciennes. These partnerships have chosen sites for studying site-specific disposal designs and developing a proposal of integrated pre-project of disposal, containing the technical elements of the disposal facility (site, design, assessments) and the local conditions of acceptance of a repository project. The partnerships of Dessel and Mol have both studied surface disposal and deep disposal in a clay layer (Boom Clay), while the partnership of Fleurus/Farciennes has only studied the option of shallow land burial (near surface disposal), as no suitable geological layer for deep disposal is present underneath the site. The partnerships of Dessel and Mol have both submitted their final report to their municipality council. Both municipality councils have approved the final report. By mid 2005 ONDRAF/NIRAS has issued both the reports containing the municipality decision to the government, who will decide on the project to be further developed. The final report of the partnership of Fleurus/Farciennes and the municipality decision are expected in the second half of 2005.

For the waste from categories B&C, the programme is still in a methodological research and development phase, preceding the pre-project phase. Methodological research and development prime aim is to establish if it is feasible, both technically and financially, to design and build on the Belgian territory a deep disposal solution for category B and C waste that is safe, without prejudging the site where such a solution would actually be implemented. With its SAFIR-2 report – Safety Assessment and Feasibility Interim Report 2 –, ONDRAF/NIRAS presented to the Government and all other stakeholders an overview of the conducted research and development work during the period 1990-2000.

The reported R&D work focussed (and continues to do so) on ONDRAF/NIRAS reference solution for the long-term management of category B&C waste, i.e. geological disposal in the Boom Clay, a poorly indurated sedimentary layer which is present under North-East Belgium. It should however be noted that Belgium has never taken a formal decision neither to go for geological disposal of the category B&C waste, nor to select the Boom Clay as a host formation.

On request of the supervising Minister the SAFIR-2 report was submitted to an international Peer Review by NEA/OECD. The final report of the NEA/OECD Peer Review was published in April 2003.

The SAFIR-2 and the findings of the international Peer Review confirmed that none of the information obtained from the research has so far indicated any obstacle that might prohibit the disposal of the vitrified waste from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel into the Boom Clay. This increases confidence in the studied solution and confirms that disposal in a poorly-inducated clay remains a viable option for the types of waste considered in the SAFIR-2 report.

The knowledge that has been accumulated makes it possible to confirm the qualities of the Boom Clay as a natural barrier. The work carried out has demonstrated the feasibility of constructing the underground facilities needed for disposal at depths of 200 to 250 metres. ONDRAF/NIRAS has also expanded its confidence in its methodology of long-term safety assessments and in its ability to design a disposal facility capable of protecting humans and the environment from the potentially harmful effects of radioactive waste for as long as is necessary.

Though the basic choice of the Boom Clay is not in question, the confidence that can now be placed in the proposed disposal system, which is based primarily on the qualities of the host formation as a barrier, is still not sufficient to give a final answer on the technical feasibility and long-term safety of a repository in this formation. The retention of the radionuclides by the natural barrier, the performance of the engineered barriers, and certain aspects of design and of compatibility of the waste are all factors that are still surrounded by uncertainties. These uncertainties must be either eliminated or further reduced.

In the current phase of the R&D programme (phase 2004 - 2008) the focus is on the design of the disposal facility and on the performance of the engineered barrier system (EBS), in order to enhance the confidence in the feasibility of repository EBS, before practical implementation can be undertaken. Moreover, the operational safety of such a facility, and its compliance with environmental standards (chemotoxicity, etc.), have so far only been studied on a preliminary basis. In parallel, there is a continued research effort on the confinement properties and on the long-term stability of the Boom Clay.

The international Peer Review pointed to the need for regulatory guidance on a series of issues related to deep disposal of high level category B&C waste in order to focus further R&D work (treatment of human intrusion, protection of water resources, importance of monitoring and retrievability and the role of alternative host rocks,...).

The integration of the well advanced technical dimension of the programme and the missing societal aspects (dialogue with all stakeholders) was identified by ONDRAF/NIRAS and the International Peer Review as one of the major challenges for the next phase of the programme (2004 - 2008). The SAFIR 2 report and its International Peer review also identified a lack of policy for deep disposal of high-level and long-lived waste. Therefore ONDRAF/NIRAS asked to and obtained from its supervising Minister (letter of the Minister dated November 2004) an approval to start a broad consultation and dialogue process on the long-term management of high-level and long-lived waste in Belgium. This process should lead to the elaboration of a Strategic Environmental Assessment type of exercise and, consequently, to a generic comparison of long-term management options. It should then lead to a decision in principle by the federal government on the reference option for the long-term management of this waste and to a proposal for a siting and decision-making process. So, with the decision in principle ONDRAF/NIRAS aims to obtain clarification on the policy level. Finally, a lack of regulatory guidance was identified in the International Peer Review. Therefore, the FANC and ONDRAF/NIRAS regularly interact, since 2003, to discuss the safety related aspects of the disposal programme and the themes and elements of regulatory guidance to be developed.

6. The tasks of ONDRAF/NIRAS relating to the management of enriched fissile materials are currently limited to studies relating to the possibilities of direct disposal of spent fuel and to the

estimation of management costs. The sites and storage facilities containing the spent fuel are part of ONDRAF/NIRAS' inventory of radioactive materials and sites.

- 7. For the different research and development, short term management and long term management activities, different financing mechanisms have been developed, each based on the same basic principle of 'polluter pays'. ONDRAF/NIRAS is a non-profit company; its financing has to cover the actual costs made or foreseen.
  - a. The research and development programmes on disposal are financed by specific agreements between the main waste producers and ONDRAF/NIRAS. For the disposal programme of high-level and long-lived waste the current contractual agreement covers the period 2004 2008. The R&D programme has benefited from its inception from EC contributions, especially regarding the construction of the HADES URL and the performance of in situ experiments. Currently, ONDRAF/NIRAS is actively participating in the EC framework programme 6.
  - b. Short-term management of radioactive waste is financed by two kinds of five-year-long contracts for waste processing and conditioning on the one hand, and for intermediate storage on the other hand. Since 1996, a system of capacity reservation is applied, in which each waste producer makes a reservation of the capacity of the facility, and subsequently pays a part of the fixed costs of the installation. Besides, the variable operation costs of the installation are paid according to the actual amount of waste that is transferred to the installation.
  - c. Long-term management (disposal) will only be established in the future, but in order to respect the principle of intergenerational equity, current generations should not only guarantee technical means to future generations for a safe management of radioactive waste, but also financial means. On request of ONDRAF/NIRAS, the waste producers have started to pay provisions from 1985 onwards. Since 1999 a long-term fund of ONDRAF/NIRAS is operational and gradually takes over the provisions set aside by the waste producers since 1985. The fundamental ideas from the financing scheme of short-term waste management are retained in this fund-system, i.e. capacity reservation and the payment of variable costs with the transfer of waste to ONDRAF/NIRAS.

In 1992 an insolvency fund has been set up, in order to be able to mitigate the consequences of bankruptcy or insolvency of a waste producer. This fund is fed through a levy of 5% on the sums that waste producers deposit for the management of their waste production (with the exclusion of the R&D work, which is financed by the waste producers by separate agreements).

The relevant aspects of the decommissioning funds are dealt with under Article 22.

### **3** Section C: Scope of Application.

Belgium has concluded several reprocessing contracts for its spent fuel (see Section B: policies). The waste arising from this reprocessing (vitrified high-level waste, bituminised waste and structural waste) repatriated to Belgium falls within the scope of the Convention. Currently, both options (direct disposal of the spent fuel or reprocessing) remain open and under study (see also section B: policies).

The protection of the population, the workers and the environment against the hazards of radiation emitted by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) is regulated by several laws and regulations. Currently, these materials are considered as radioactive waste only if they are used for their radioactive characteristics in a professional activity. In this case, these materials are regulated by the waste management rules, as described in this report. The scope of the work activities which involve radioactive materials was broadened by the GRR-2001. It also entrusted the competent authorities with the task of adapting the conditions required for activities using NORM (see section E 5.2.1.3.1 and E 5.3.3).

The armed forces have no nuclear fuel, either fresh or spent. The radioactive waste produced by the armed forces is managed according to the laws and regulations for civilian radioactive waste.

### 4 Section D: Inventories and lists

## 4.1 Spent and reprocessed fuel coming from nuclear power plant: management facilities and inventories.

### 4.1.1 Reprocessed fuel

In total, Belgium has reprocessed 670  $t_{HM}$  spent fuel. The reprocessing contracts stipulate that conditioned vitrified waste is repatriated to Belgium (as well as hulls and end pieces, technological waste, and bituminised waste). By May 2005, 196 canisters containing on the average 150 litre glass – amounting to an average mass of 494 kg per canister and a total volume of 35 m<sup>3</sup> of vitrified high-level waste (fission products are immobilised in a borosilicate glass matrix) - had been returned to Belgium (seven shipments of 28 canisters each were organised).

The average activity of the canisters produced in the COGEMA plant in La Hague, determined at the time of the glass casting, is  $1.4 \ 10^{16}$  Bq for beta-gamma emitters and amounts to  $1.7 \ 10^{14}$  Bq for alpha emitters. Radioactive materials (mainly fission products oxides and actinide oxides) represent about 17% of the glass mass in the canister.

These canisters are temporarily stored in building 136 (see also section H), which was specially designed to that purpose on the Belgoprocess site in Dessel until a solution for the final disposal is operational.

The number of canisters that must still be repatriated is estimated at 224 units, representing a volume of about  $40 \text{ m}^3$ .

### 4.1.2 Non-reprocessed irradiated fuel

The irradiated fuel which is not reprocessed is currently stored on the sites of the two nuclear power plants in Belgium operated by Electrabel SA, namely the Tihange nuclear power plant (pool storage) and the Doel nuclear power plant (dry storage).

As far as spent fuel storage is concerned, the dry storage building at Doel contained (on 31 December 2004) 47 containers in which 1337 fuel assemblies are stored, i.e. about a quarter of the current storage capacity.

The wet storage building at Tihange contained (on 31 December 2004) 1331 fuel assemblies, i.e. about one third of the total capacity.

## 4.2 Spent and reprocessed fuel coming from research reactors: management facilities and inventories.

Beside the seven power reactors, Belgium also possesses research reactors:

Reactors BR1, BR2, BR3 and VENUS, all located on the SCK•CEN site in Mol.

- a) Reactors BR1 (natural uranium) and VENUS (enriched UO<sub>2</sub> and MOX) still working with their initial fuel load, this report does not consider these reactors.
- b) The BR2 reactor fuel –uranium enriched to more than 90% is considered by this report. A part of its spent fuel is stored in the pool next to the reactor; another part of

the spent fuel is transferred to the plant in La Hague to be reprocessed. Spent fuel elements were also sent to Dounreay.

c) As the BR3 reactor (PWR type) is currently being decommissioned, its fuel (175 assemblies stored in 'CASTOR' containers, having very different enrichments up to 11%), is stored in building 156 at Belgoprocess.

The THETIS reactor on the site of the University of Ghent. Both options (dry storage or reprocessing) are still open and are under investigation. The THETIS reactor was permanently shut down on 31 December 2003. The final decommissioning plan is in elaboration.

### 4.3 Radioactive waste: management facilities and inventories.

Processing & conditioning and storage facilities in Belgium are spread over several sites:

- Belgoprocess Sites 1 and 2 in Dessel and Mol respectively
- Tihange and Doel nuclear power plants Sites
- Umicore site in Olen
- Institut des Radioéléments (IRE in Fleurus), universities, hospitals, research centres, laboratories.

### 4.3.1 The Belgoprocess sites 1 and 2 respectively in Dessel and Mol

ONDRAF/NIRAS has subcontracted the industrial aspects of the management to its 100% subsidiary company, Belgoprocess. In that respect, Belgoprocess operates in Mol and Dessel radioactive waste processing & conditioning and storage installations.

These installations make it possible to process and condition most of the radioactive waste produced and to be produced in Belgium (solid or liquid, low, intermediate or high level waste).

These processing and conditioning facilities are:

- 1. **EUROBITUM**, started up in 1978, on site 1 of Belgoprocess for the processing and the conditioning into bitumen of low and intermediate level sludge and evaporator concentrates coming from the processing of liquid waste.
- 2. **BRE**, started up in 1980 on site 2 of Belgoprocess to process and condition high and intermediate level liquid waste.
- 3. **MUMMIE** (site 2) does the same for low-level waste effluents only. It was constructed in the late 60's.
- 4. **CILVA** (site 1) is the infrastructure for the processing and conditioning of solid and liquid low-level waste. This installation was started up in 1994 and is composed of five units:
  - The reception and pre-storage unit for unprocessed radioactive waste (weighting, control of radiation levels and external contamination).

- The pre-processing unit (waste sorting, cutting, and pre-compaction).
- The supercompaction unit with a 2000 ton press to compact the 200 litre carbon steel drums containing the unconditioned radioactive waste into 15 to 40 cm<sup>3</sup> thick compaction disks (compaction capacity: 8 000 drums/year).
- The incineration unit has a capacity of 7.5 ton solid waste per week. Organic and aqueous liquids containing a lot of organic compounds or complexing agents are incinerated together with the solid waste.
- The conditioning unit to immobilise with cement the supercompacted disks inside the 400 litre drums (capacity: 2 000 drums/year).
- 5. **Pyrolysis installation** (site 2) for the thermal decomposition of alpha contaminated organic effluents coming from the former Eurochemic reprocessing plant. The remaining solid waste is then cemented. This installation was started up in 1999.
- 6. **PAMELA** (site 1) was put into service in 1985 and was used until 1991 for vitrifying the 860 m<sup>3</sup> liquid high-level waste coming from the Eurochemic reprocessing plant. Afterwards, the PAMELA cementation unit conditioned into cement solid intermediate-level waste arising from its own operation and the waste arising from the dismantling of its vitrification unit as well as solid intermediate and high-level waste coming from the refurbishment of the BR2 reactor and the dismantling of the BR3 reactor. Currently, the facility is being modified for the conditioning of alpha-contaminated waste streams. The licensing and testing process is on-going and the facility will become operational in 2006.
- 7. ALPHA-KAMER (site 2) for the treatment of low Ra-contaminated waste.
- 8. **HRA-Solarium** (Building 280x, site 2) for the processing and conditioning of alpha and beta-gamma waste and radium-bearing waste. This solid and liquid historical waste results from former SCK•CEN research programmes, from Electrabel, from the IRE and from the dismantling of the Union Minière plant (now UMICORE) in Olen.
- 9. **Building 110X** (site 1) for the sorting and separation, in operation since 2005, of alphacontaminated solid low-level waste coming mainly from the nuclear fuel fabrication (mainly Belgonucleaire, in Dessel), in view of its conditioning in the PAMELA facility from 2006 on.

The conditioned waste (listed in table 2 hereafter) is stored in different appropriate buildings on sites 1 and 2 (see also section H and appendix 3).

- 1. **Building 150**, started up in 1986, for the storage of low-level waste (mainly category A). It is now filled with packages of different volumes (400, 500, 1000, 1200, 1500, 1600, and 2200 litre). It has 25 cm thick reinforced concrete walls. This building has a storage capacity of 2 000 m<sup>3</sup> and is divided in three areas: the North hall, the South hall and the central hall. The stored waste arises from the Doel and Tihange nuclear power plants (filters, concentrates, resin ...) and from the former SCK•CEN Waste department (waste arising from the Belgoprocess site 2).
- 2. **Building 151**, put into service in 1988, to store the waste of the same types and origins as in building 150. However, its capacity is larger (14 000 m<sup>3</sup>).

- 3. **Building 127**, has a capacity of 5 000 m<sup>3</sup> for the storage of bituminised and cemented intermediate-level waste (mainly category B 220 and 400 litre packages) coming mainly (76 %) from the operational Eurochemic reprocessing pilot plant. It has 80 cm thick reinforced concrete walls.
- 4. **Building 129** for the storage of high-level waste (category C). It contains 195 m<sup>3</sup> of conditioned high-level waste (60 and 150 litre packages) arising from the vitrification, in the PAMELA installation, of the 860 m<sup>3</sup> Eurochemic liquid waste, the waste coming from the partial dismantling of this vitrification installation and the cemented high and intermediate-level waste coming from the reactors BR2 and BR3.
- 5. **Building 136**, modularly designed, for the storage of high and intermediate-level waste coming from the reprocessing by COGEMA of spent irradiated fuel. It can currently contain 590 canisters of vitrified waste, about 820 canisters with compacted hulls and end pieces mixed with technological waste and up to 2 000 containers (210 l) of bituminised waste (sludge).
- 6. **Buildings 155 et 156**, for the storage of conditioned alpha- and radium- contaminated waste (building 155) and the irradiated fuel coming from the BR3 reactor (building 156).
- 7. **Building 270**, is not a storage facility, but a buffer containing packages which have to be transferred to building 155 immediately or after having been reconditioned. The packages in this building are mainly filled with radium-bearing waste conditioned in the MUMMIE installation or arising from the Umicore plant in Olen. A large number of different waste packages (under characterisation) coming from the passive of the former SCK•CEN Waste department is also temporarily stored in this building.

	Waste	Number Capacity (#) / filling		Activity <sup>1</sup> (Bq)	
Buildings	categories	packages (#) / volume (m <sup>3</sup> )	rate (%)	Alpha	Beta- gamma
127	A + mainly B	16110 / 3959	18393 / 88 %	$4 \ 10^{14}$	$410^{16}$
129	С	2335 / 215	2572 / 91 %	$2 \ 10^{15}$	5 10 <sup>17</sup>
136	С	196 <sup>2</sup> / 29	590 / 33 % (vitrified) $\approx 820 / 0 \%$ (hulls and end pieces/technological waste) $\approx 2000 / 0 \%$ (bituminised)	3 10 <sup>16</sup>	2.8 10 <sup>18</sup>
150	A + B	3316 / 1913	3424 / 97 %	$2 \ 10^{12}$	$2 \ 10^{14}$
151	A + B	27021 / 10711	37267 / 73 %	5 10 <sup>13</sup>	$310^{14}$
155	B + R	0 / 0	0 %	/	/
156	С	7 castors	8 / 88 %	$2 \ 10^{15}$	$110^{17}$
270	A + B + R	1381 / 544	4899 / 28 %	5 10 <sup>12</sup>	$210^{13}$

Table 2: volume and activity per storage building as of December 31, 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> As of 31 March 2004 (while volumes in storage as of 31 December 2004)


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Up to now, it contains only canisters filled with vitrified waste.

### **4.3.2** The sites of the Doel and Tihange nuclear power plants

The Tihange and Doel nuclear power plants have their own processing and conditioning facilities qualified by ONDRAF/NIRAS. The waste processed and conditioned on the production site is composed of the waste (ion-exchange resin, filters and other diverse waste) with a dose rate higher than 2 mSv/h and the evaporator concentrates. Non-conditioned waste with a dose rate lower than this limit is sent to Belgoprocess where it is conditioned in the CILVA.

The storage on the nuclear power plants sites is only temporary until ONDRAF/NIRAS removes the waste and transfers it to Belgoprocess.

Waste conditioned (in the NPP or in the CILVA installation) is stored in buildings 151 or 127



### Power generation of the Belgian nuclear power plants

### 4.3.3 The Umicore site in Olen

A production unit for radium was started in Olen in 1922 by Union Minière (now UMICORE). Radium was extracted from rich uranium ores from the former Belgian colony Congo, where "Union Minière du Haut Katanga" operated a mine in Shinkolobwe, Katanga. Because of the development of nuclear reactors, starting in the 1950's other radioactive substances, with shorter half-lives, could be produced, which gradually reduced the use of radium. In Olen, a stock of pure radium remained behind in the "use packaging". The production process for radium and the various purification stages gave rise to a dispersed pollution inside and outside the walls of the plant. In the middle of the 1950's, a central storehouse was built for all final products, intermediate products and wastes. In the 1970's, this activity was stopped and the production installations were dismantled. However, the storehouse and the local contamination on the plant grounds and outside the plant remained.

Today, the "Olen radioactivity file" consists of 3 subfiles as schematically presented below.

• The UMTRAP file relates to the authorized class II storage facility built on the plant grounds for radioactive waste from the production activity. This storage facility has a covered storage area for radium sources, contaminated materials and soils. This storage area is composed of concrete bunkers with a copper confinement for radium-bearing waste and sources and of silos for low-radium waste. The contaminated soils fill the gaps between the silos and the bunkers. All this is covered with clay, sand and gravel multilayer. It has a total <sup>226</sup>Ra inventory of 3 10<sup>13</sup> Bq.

The principle applied for the multilayer covering is generally used in the USA (Uranium Milling and Tailing Remediation action) and was accepted by the involved national ministries as affording better protection for human beings and the environment. The existing permits from the production period were converted by the government into a permit with special conditions for this storage of radioactive waste. One of these conditions is to perform a long term safety evaluation. This study is still going on, and the final report will be submitted to the FANC, accompanied with the advice of ONDRAF/NIRAS.

- The BRAEM file relates to the radioactive pollution scattered outside the plant grounds, above all in and around the Bankloop brook and at the D1 dump site north of the canal. Studies commissioned by the federal government and performed in the early nineties have shown that the present-day risks are very limited. However, the authorities asked Umicore to proceed to a cleanup "not because there is any danger at present for public health, but rather in order to substantially improve the isolation of the contaminated materials from the environment, which will keep the dose impact for the local population very limited in the future as well." In May 2000, Umicore was entrusted with this concrete mission.
- The SIM file deals with the residual pollution within the plant grounds. Due to the many years of activities there are (besides the UMTRAP installation) other contaminations present within the plant enclosure as well. During the decommissioning and cleanup of the old radium factory, not all pollution on the plant grounds could be removed. However, there are no radiation risks for the personnel or the environment.

This file has three major components, namely

- The old dump site in the NE corner of the plant, with a limited quantity of radioactive material;
- The local contamination of the subsoil;
- A former measurement lab.

### Global view of regulator FANC and radioactive waste management agency ONDRAF/NIRAS

In November 2001, a common statement of the FANC and ONDRAF/NIRAS concerning the radiological aspects<sup>3</sup> of the clean up of the radioactive contamination on the Umicore sites at Olen and in the vicinity, has been issued. This document highlights the general approach for the remediation of the Olen site and presents an approach for long term management of the resulting radioactive waste, coherent with other waste categories dealt with by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

The general approach to be followed when considering remediation comprises:

- establishing the inventory,
- identifying the remediation options,
- selection of an option,
- development and approval of the remediation project,
- authorization,
- remediation,
- surveillance and control.

Logically, in this strategy the principle that any clean up should be justified from a radioprotection point of view is of prime importance. In the common statement, the principle of looking for a local long term solution for waste resulting from remedial actions has even so been accepted. The "polluter pays" principle will also apply on remediation as it is stated that any transfer of radioactive materials to ONDRAF/NIRAS should be accompanied by the necessary financial resources covering the prescribed monitoring and remaining risks (loss of structural stability, ...). Finally, it has been recommended that an appropriate structure be set up to co-ordinate the decontamination projects, in which the local authorities and the local population are involved.

To deal with large volumes of very low level long-lived waste resulting from remediation, a new category of waste, very low level waste was introduced in the global view of FANC and ONDRAF/NIRAS, with the aim to construct a surface disposal facility on the remediation site to receive this waste. By only accepting very low level long-lived waste in such a final disposal and thus placing restrictions on the stored activity (in Bq) and activity concentration (in Bq/g), the long term monitoring and control programme (more than a few decades) would not be necessary. Instead, a permanent and passive institutional inspection, such as restriction on the land use becomes an additional element of long term safety. The consequence of this position is that during remediation, and before emplacement of the waste in the disposal facility, measurements will be required with a two-fold purpose:

1) verification of the inventory and

2) removal of "hot spots" which represent a too high risk for a surface disposal of very low level long-lived waste.

The indicative limit of 40 Bq/g as proposed in the global view of FANC and ONDRAF/NIRAS will have to be confirmed by a site specific and design specific safety assessment.

#### Situation mid 2005

After the publication of the common statement, different actions have been taken. For the UMTRAP file, there is a status quo of the situation. For the SIM file, Umicore has proceeded with a thorough characterisation. The BRAEM file however, has been the subject of many actions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In Belgium, the regional authorities are responsible for all non-radiological aspects of waste management.

### The BRAEM file

After the publication of the common statement by the FANC and ONDRAF/NIRAS, Umicore has developed a project plan to clean up the radiologically polluted grounds outside of the Umicore plant at Olen and to build a final disposal facility for the very low level but long-lived waste generated by the cleanup works with the aim of transferring this disposal to ONDRAF/NIRAS. For this reason, ONDRAF/NIRAS participated already in the project planning phase. Clearly, the role of ONDRAF/NIRAS is not the role of the project manager, but being an important stakeholder ONDRAF/NIRAS will actively advise Umicore during the different stages of the realisation of the disposal facility.

In the execution of the project plan, the question was raised by Umicore, whether the solution envisaged for the BRAEM file, was indeed the optimal solution from a cost-benefit point of view. Does the benefit in dose reduction justify the cost, both economical and in terms of dose, installing a disposal site including an intensive measurement campaign to separate the hot spots? A BRAEM-bis project has then been proposed by Umicore.

In this BRAEM-bis project, Umicore proposes to delay those actions that do not require immediate countermeasures. Priority will be given to the remediation of the Bankloop brook. The execution of this remediation is planned for 2006-07, and will be followed-up by both the regional environmental authorities and the FANC. The resulting contaminated materials will be temporally stored on the Umicore premises. Disposal of these materials is not foreseen before the remediation of the D1 dump site.

### 4.3.4 Others

Some universities (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Université de Liège), hospitals and other important companies (pharmaceutical research) have their own buildings to temporarily store non-conditioned waste. When practicable, waste is stored until its radioactivity decays under the clearance level and is the released as 'conventional waste'. If not practicable, waste is transferred to Belgoprocess. The Catholic Universities of Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve centralise in their buildings the radioactive waste coming from neighbouring companies and hospitals.

The Institut des Radioéléments (IRE in Fleurus) is involved in the collection, pre-conditioning and temporary storage of sealed sources. These pre-conditioned sources will be transferred to Belgoprocess as soon as it has defined a conditioning technique specific to sealed sources. There were some 63 500 sealed sources on 1 January 2000 on the Belgian territory, of which about 40 000 ionising smoke detectors, according to the ONDRAF/NIRAS inventory. ONDRAF/NIRAS and the FANC are studying the most efficient way to collect these sealed sources once they become unused. A new inventory of sealed sources on the Belgian territory is in preparation.

### 4.4 Nuclear facilities being decommissioned.

Three main facilities are concerned:

- the reactor BR3 of SCK•CEN is being decommissioned (the reactor and its building should be completely dismantled in 2009) and serves as a pilot project for this activity;
- the spent fuel reprocessing pilot plant, EUROCHEMIC, should be dismantled in 2007;

• the dismantling of the former SCK•CEN Waste department (site 2 of Belgoprocess) started in 1998 and should end in 2020.

Moreover, some buildings of the SCK•CEN, namely those transferred to VITO (Vlaams Instituut voor Technologisch Onderzoek) due to the splitting in 1991, were decontaminated and decommissioned.

### 5 Section E: Legislative and Regulatory System

### 5.1 Article 18: implementing measures

On 8 December 1997 Belgium has signed the Joint Convention. With the Law of 2 August 2002 the Belgian legislator has expressed its consent with the obligations resulting from this Convention. The ratification process was completed on 5 September 2002 by the deposition of the instrument of ratification to the IAEA. The Convention became effective 90 days later on 4 December 2002.

The national legislator considered the legislative and regulatory framework existing at that time, as sufficiently developed to ratify the Convention, no adaptations nor completions were deemed necessary. Nevertheless the regulations are permanently evaluated by the public bodies involved and they will be altered if necessary, in order to take into account the scientific, technological and social evolutions or in order to comply with obligations resulting from other international conventions. Since the signing of the Convention in 1997 the legislative and regulatory framework has undergone important modifications, mainly as a consequence of the operational start up of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (see art. 19, section 5.2.1.2), the adoption of the Law of 31 January 2003 concerning the phasing-out of nuclear power and the Law of 11 April 2003 on the financial provisions for the decommissioning of the nuclear power plants and for the management of the fissile materials irradiated in these plants.

### 5.2 Article 19: legislative and regulatory framework

Belgium has participated in the first Review Meeting of the Joint Convention, which took place from 3 to 14 November 2003 at the IAEA headquarters. At this occasion it has presented its first National Report.

Belgium is also a contracting party to the *Convention on Nuclear Safety* of 1994. The ruling legislative and regulatory framework concerning nuclear safety was described in extenso in the three National Reports, which were elaborated as a result of the three Review Conferences, organised respectively in April 1999, April 2002 and April 2005. Below, attention is paid exclusively to those regulatory aspects relevant for the management of radioactive waste and irradiated nuclear fuel.

### 5.2.1 Identification and location of the competent authorities

### **5.2.1.1** The federal nature of the competent authorities

Belgium is a federal state, which means that certain competences are exercised on a centralised (federal) policy level, while others are exercised on a decentralised (regional) policy level, constituted by the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital Region. Since the State Reform of 1980 (see the Special Law of 8 August 1980 on the Institutional Reforms, completed with the reforms of 1988 and 1993) the competences in the field of environmental protection are exercised by the Regions, such as the surveillance of all industrial activities which may be harmful to man and environment and the waste management policy. However, the regulation of the nuclear industrial activities can be considered as an exception to this regional competence. In fact, the protection of the population and of the environment against the hazards of

ionising radiation has remained exclusively a federal matter. In the same line, the management of radioactive waste on the Belgian territory, of whatever origin, is organised on a federal level.

The Regions are also involved in some aspects of the energy policy and in the management of the energy infrastructure. However, the decisions concerning the nuclear fuel cycle, inclusively all activities upstream as well as downstream of the nuclear power plants, explicitly remained a federal competence. Consequently, the management of irradiated and non-irradiated nuclear fuel is in Belgium an exclusively federal policy matter. The federal competence with regard to the management of radioactive waste generated by the nuclear fuel cycle follows from the repartition of the competences within the field of the environmental policy, and more precisely the radiation protection policy (Special law of 8 August 1980).

The involvement of the regional authorities in the regulation of nuclear activities remains limited to consultation (for instance in the framework of the licensing of clearance) and exchange of information, with the aim to ensure a coordinated treatment of the nuclear and non-nuclear environmental aspects. To this end, the Regions are represented in some of the federally competent public bodies (the board of directors of ONDRAF/NIRAS, see sections 5.2.1.2 and 5.2.1.3.). Another way to ensure this coordination is by the conclusion of cooperation agreements, as is the case for the clearance of radioactive waste.

### 5.2.1.2 Safety Authority

Belgium is a member of the European Union and of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) since the foundation of these institutions in 1957. The Belgian rules and regulations in the field of radiological protection have been developed in implementation of and in agreement with the European Treaties and directives concerned. The development of the Euratom Treaty has triggered, in parallel with the construction of national nuclear facilities, the necessary development of national laws and regulations in different nuclear areas not covered by the Treaty or not subject to mandatory provisions under the Treaty.

Since 1 September 2001 the control of nuclear activities is performed by the *Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC)*. The Agency may call upon the assistance of specialised inspection organisations, such as **AVN** and **AVC**, for the execution of certain tasks, like routine inspections in the nuclear facilities. The association of the FANC on one side, and these inspection organisations on the other, ensures together all the regulatory functions as stipulated in article 20 of the Convention. With the creation of the FANC, the legislator aimed to redefine the mutual relations between the nuclear operators, the specialised inspection organisations and the nuclear regulator. This part of the reform is not yet completely finalised. During the actual transition period, the former relationships continue to be applied, by which the inspection organisations receive their missions directly from the operators. Further information is given in the section of the present Report devoted to article 20 of the Convention.

Simultaneously with the operational start up of the FANC on 1 September 2001, the regulations concerning nuclear safety and radiological protection have been modified thoroughly. Up to this date, the regulations were governed by the law of 29 March 1958, and the accompanying Royal Decree of 28 February 1963, known as the "General Regulations for the Radiological protection of the Workers, the Population and the Environment" (GRR-1963). These regulatory texts are abolished since 1 September 2001 and have been replaced by the Law of 15 April 1994 and the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001. In the table below, the distinction between the old and new regulations is presented schematically.

	Former regulation (till 31 August 2001)	New regulation (as of 1 September 2001)
Law	Law of 29 March 1958	Law of 15 April 1994
General	Royal Decree of 28 February 1963	Royal Decree of 20 July 2001
Radioprotection	(GRR-1963)	(GRR-2001)
Regulation		

The texts of the regulations in force at present, can be consulted on the website of the FANC (www.fanc.fgov.be).

The GRR-2001 comprises all the licensing procedures for the different practices and activities involving ionising radiation or radioactive substances, it specifies the safety measures the licensee has to take into account to protect workers and the public, and it organises the way by which control operations must be set up. This regulation transposes the ruling European legislation into Belgian Law, such as the Basic Safety Standards directive 1996/29/Euratom, the directive 1985/337/EEC on the environmental impact assessment of projects, the directive 1992/3/Euratom on the transboundary movements of radioactive waste, the obligations resulting from the Euratom Treaty (e.g. article 37), etc.

The GRR-2001 contains general provisions with regard to the radioactive waste management in the licensed facilities, including the characteristics of gaseous, liquid and solid radioactive substances which, for reasons of radiological protection, are not allowed to be discharged into the environment, and which have to be managed as radioactive waste. A more detailed description of the provisions concerned is given further in this report (see article 19, section 5.3). The General Regulations are modified regularly in order to take account of the evolution of the scientific, technical and social insights.

Emergency planning is a competence belonging to the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs and his administrative services (Federal Public Service Internal Affairs - FOD Binnenlandse Zaken, General Directorate Civil Security - Algemene Directie Civiele Veiligheid and General Directorate Crisis Centre - Algemene Directie Crisiscentrum). For a nuclear or radiological crisis, its organisation and the role of the various intervening instances is prescribed in the Royal Decree of 17 October 2003. For each nuclear site, the measures to be taken are elaborated further in a nuclear emergency plan, which is approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs and which is regularly tested. The nuclear expertise within the framework of the emergency planning is ensured by the FANC and by some organisations (SCK•CEN, AVN and IRE) having concluded agreements with the competent Minister. Belgium is a contracting party of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, both done in 1986 under the auspices of the IAEA. Further information is given in section 6.5 of the present document devoted to article 25 of the Convention.

### 5.2.1.3 Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ONDRAF/NIRAS)

In addition to the safety regulations mentioned above, the management of radioactive waste and excess fissile materials is subject to a specific legal framework, specifying the competences and the tasks of the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials (ONDRAF/NIRAS). ONDRAF/NIRAS was created by the law of 8th August 1980. The Belgian authorities, thus, took the decision to entrust the management of radioactive waste to a single body under public control to ensure that the public interest prevails in all the decisions taken in this field. The mission and functioning of ONDRAF/NIRAS were first laid down by the Royal Decree of 30th March 1981. This has been amended and supplemented by the Royal Decree of 16th October 1991

passed in execution of the law of 11th January 1991, itself amended and supplemented by the law of 12th December 1997. The 1991 law also amended the name of ONDRAF/NIRAS to "Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials". In the table below, the legal framework is summarised.

	Main legal texts governing ONDRAF/NIRAS		
Law	the Law of 8 August 1980 on the budgetary proposals for 1979-1980, art. 179 §2 and §3, as modified and completed by:		
Luw	<ul><li>the Law of 11 January 1991</li><li>the Law of 12 December 1997</li></ul>		
Royal Decrees	Royal Decree of 30 March 1981 on the missions and tasks of ONDRAF/NIRAS, as modified by the Royal Decree of 16 October 1991		
Other legal elements	<ul> <li>ministerial letter of 10 February 1999 concerning General Rules for the establishment of acceptance criteria by ONDRAF/NIRAS for conditioned and non-conditioned waste</li> <li>Royal Decree of 18 November 2002 regarding the qualification of installations for the storage, processing and conditioning of radioactive waste.</li> </ul>		

The legal framework concerning ONDRAF/NIRAS imposes obligations on the producers (or owners) of radioactive waste and excess fissile materials. It establishes the relations between ONDRAF/NIRAS and the waste producers on the one side and between ONDRAF/NIRAS and the Safety Authorities on the other side. The legal missions of ONDRAF/NIRAS are explained below, starting with a short description of the nature of the radioactive materials subject to its management (section 5.2.1.3.1). It is followed by an explanation of the different tasks of ONDRAF/NIRAS with regard to the management of radioactive waste and excess fissile materials: the disposal (section 5.2.1.3.2) and the predisposal activities (section 5.2.1.3.3).

# 5.2.1.3.1 Nature and origin of the waste and fissile materials to be managed by ONDRAF/NIRAS

The legislator has charged ONDRAF/NIRAS with the management of all the radioactive waste, of whatever origin, present on the Belgian national territory. Consequently, ONDRAF/NIRAS is not only competent for the management of the waste generated in the nuclear fuel cycle (nuclear power plants, fuel fabrication plants), but also for the waste produced by the medical, industrial and scientific research sector. The residues originating from industrial activities using natural radioactive materials (indicated with the acronyms NORM and TENORM) belongs to the competences of ONDRAF/NIRAS, once the FANC has classified them for reasons of harmfulness for public health as radioactive waste.

According to the ONDRAF/NIRAS legal framework, a substance can only be considered as radioactive waste if the contamination with radionuclides exceeds a determined level, namely if the concentration of radionuclides exceeds the "values which the Safety Authorities (FANC) consider acceptable for substances permitted to be used or released unsupervised". These values are published in the GRR-2001 (see further section 5.3.1.2).

The possibility to manage in Belgium waste from foreign countries, under the supervision of ONDRAF/NIRAS, was not excluded in principle by the legislator, but was made subject to the prior consent of the responsible minister. The Belgian government has exceptionally, and due to the

small quantities, accepted to treat the radioactive waste coming from the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and from Spain. The political authorities are reluctant to the treatment of foreign waste in Belgian installations, although the degree of utilised capacity of certain installations is particularly low.

Radioactive waste, just as other categories of waste, are by definition substances for which no further use is intended. The assessment of the possibility to re-use certain materials or not, should normally be done by the owner/producer.

Both ONDRAF/NIRAS and the FANC regulations oblige the waste producer (or owner) to establish inventories and prospects concerning the generation of radioactive waste, the quantities of waste in storage and to be disposed of. The gathered information must be available for ONDRAF/NIRAS. These declarations are essential in order to enable ONDRAF/NIRAS to fulfil its missions. As long as a substance has not been declared as radioactive waste by the owner/producer, the ONDRAF/NIRAS regulations do not apply to it. However, the possible accumulation of radioactive waste on a particular site, as a consequence of a non-declaration, can be prevented by the Safety Authorities. For this purpose, the inventory mission of ONDRAF/NIRAS (see further section 5.2.1.5) is also an important complementary instrument to inform the responsible minister about potential unwanted accumulations of radioactive substances.

According to the ONDRAF/NIRAS regulations, irradiated fissile materials are not regarded as radioactive waste. Consequently their management is not automatically subject to the competence of ONDRAF/NIRAS, as long as it is not declared as in excess by the owner/producer. This aspect will be treated in section 5.2.1.4. The exceptions to this are ONDRAF/NIRAS' tasks related to the inventory of nuclear liabilities and to the R&D programmes on the long-term management of spent fuel. The latter task is based on the Parliamentary Resolution of December 1993 as endorsed by the Federal Government.

## 5.2.1.3.2 The central mission of ONDRAF/NIRAS: the final disposal of radioactive waste and excess fissile materials

The creation of ONDRAF/NIRAS has to be seen in relationship with the moral obligation for every country to establish within its borders a safe long term solution for the radioactive waste and excess fissile materials generated by the installations operating under its jurisdiction (cf. point xi of the preamble of the Convention). This approach will normally lead to the construction, on the national territory, of one or more repositories, dedicated to the disposal of radioactive waste or fissile materials without the intention of retrieving the waste in the future. The national legislator decided that the final disposal of radioactive waste should be entrusted to a public institution, given the long term commitment that will be necessary for the development, the design and the construction of a repository, as well as for its operational phase and for the institutional control after its closure. The intervention of a public organisation was considered as a guarantee for the present and future populations that this kind of waste would be managed with the utmost care and in optimal conditions.

Seen from this perspective, the legislator has granted to ONDRAF/NIRAS a "monopoly" for the disposal of all the radioactive waste on the Belgian territory. ONDRAF/NIRAS is entrusted with all the radioactive waste (or all the fissile material) that needs to be disposed of in the future, in exchange of full financial guarantees from the waste producers with the aim to cover the costs of its future management (cf. the Long Term Fund, see below). ). The waste producers have to bear the complete cost of the long-term management. By this formula, the waste producers obtain a guaranteed discharge of their waste, but also after the transfer of the waste to ONDRAF/NIRAS

they remain accountable for the total cost of the long-term management. This is guaranteed by a contractual tariff system that is re-evaluated every ten years in order to determine the remaining cost of the long-term management and by a clause of hidden defects, for which the waste producers remain accountable during 50 years. With this system the population gets the guarantee that the management of the public interest will prevail over private interest.

ONDRAF/NIRAS is endowed with an extensive autonomy with regard to the technological choices and solutions it wants to use to implement its nuclear waste management. The legislation does not impose any obligations on ONDRAF/NIRAS, neither with regard to how the waste or fissile materials should be disposed of, nor with regard to the applied conditions (surface disposal, disposal in deep geological formations, reprocessed or non-reprocessed, ...). In fact, these issues are or will be subject of policy decisions and, in a latter phase, of the licence application.

As a Party to the "Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter", generally known as the London Dumping Convention of 1972, Belgium has abandoned the dumping of radioactive waste into the sea as a disposal route for some waste categories, first temporarily (since 1983) and afterwards permanently (since 1993). Consequently, ONDRAF/NIRAS has to resort to a solution on land.

ONDRAF/NIRAS focuses its efforts on the development of proper national systems. Besides that international developments with respect to a disposal system on a broader regional scale are followed, i.e. in the frame of EU research programmes (SAPPIER project).

The final solutions considered will - at the proper time - be submitted for approval to the political and the safety authorities. The governmental decision of 16 January 1998 on the long-term management of short-lived waste, forms an excellent illustration of such a decision. It limited the corresponding ONDRAF/NIRAS programme for this waste to surface or deep disposal on the existing nuclear sites.

Regarding the dimensioning of the disposal and storage infrastructures and considering the estimate of the necessary financial means, ONDRAF/NIRAS departs from a reference programme based on the following elements:

- operating of nuclear power plants for 40 years, in agreement with the law on the phase-out of nuclear energy;
- complete or partial reprocessing of spent fuel discharged from the nuclear power plants, in agreement with the parliamentary resolution of December 1993 on the use of MOX and the reprocessing of spent fuel.

ONDRAF/NIRAS uses a classification system for the radioactive waste; this is in first instance based on a potential final destination, also called reference final destination. This classification system (see section B) is in agreement with the international recommendations, such as the Recommendation of the European Commission, dated 15 September 1999 and the IAEA Safety Guide nr. 111-G-1.1 'Classification of Radioactive Waste' (1994).

The research and development activities within the framework of the disposal is for the greater part subcontracted to the SCK•CEN, university teams and industrial study centres. An important instrument in this respect is the underground laboratory in Mol, run by ESV EURIDICE, an economic interest grouping of ONDRAF/NIRAS and the SCK•CEN.

### 5.2.1.3.3 Missions of ONDRAF/NIRAS with regard to operations prior to the disposal

As explained in section 5.2.1.3.2, an important mission of ONDRAF/NIRAS is in the first place the subsequent disposal of the radioactive waste. Its legal missions are, however, not limited to the final disposal, but extend to the complete chain of operations preceding the disposal, such as the waste inventory, the collection, the transport, the processing, the conditioning and the storage of nuclear waste. ONDRAF/NIRAS has to have the guarantee that the nuclear waste has been processed and conditioned according to techniques that are compatible with the future disposal. The legislator has therefore endowed ONDRAF/NIRAS with the competence of issuing *acceptance criteria*, which have to be met by the conditioned waste to be accepted. Given the fact that the characteristics of the real disposal site are not yet known, ONDRAF/NIRAS uses a reference final destination while elaborating these acceptance criteria. These criteria are elaborated based on *general rules* that have been approved by the Safety Authority. The general rules provide a regular follow-up of the conduct of the packages in the storage facilities through time in order to detect possible deficiencies and in order to regularly verify the conformity with the reference final destination of the waste.

Some waste producers either have their own installation for processing, conditioning and temporary storage of their waste or they have their waste processed in national or foreign installations. The legislator has endowed ONDRAF/NIRAS with the competence of assessing the suitability of these installations, i.e. to verify whether these installations are capable of producing waste packages, that comply with the acceptance criteria. This assessment is formally finalised with the qualification issued for a limited period. This qualification procedure is described in the Royal Decree of 18 November 2002. The processing, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste in non-qualified installations should be regarded as forbidden by the ONDRAF/NIRAS regulations, because it might generate waste packages which are by definition not in conformity with the waste acceptance criteria. Contracts concluded with foreign processors of radioactive waste have to be submitted for approval to ONDRAF/NIRAS in order to enable it to have an involvement analogous to that regarding the processing in domestic facilities.

Waste producers not disposing of equipment considered appropriate by ONDRAF/NIRAS, may entrust the processing of their waste to ONDRAF/NIRAS. The processing or conditioning of radioactive waste on behalf of producers which do not dispose of adequate (which means qualified) equipment, is a legal task (mission) of ONDRAF/NIRAS. This waste is entrusted to ONDRAF/NIRAS in raw or unconditioned form, on the basis of the waste *acceptance criteria* for unconditioned waste. In order to fulfil its legal task, ONDRAF/NIRAS has its own installations for processing, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste; these are operated by its industrial subsidiary Belgoprocess. ONDRAF/NIRAS may also have resort to external processors (a.o. IRE). The collection of this type of waste at the producers' place as well as the transport of the waste, is part of the monopoly of ONDRAF/NIRAS. This task is contracted out to specialised transport companies.

And, finally, ONDRAF/NIRAS is competent for the collection and assessment of all information necessary to carry out its missions, including the quantities and characteristics of the waste to be processed, conditioned, stored or disposed of.

The involvement of ONDRAF/NIRAS in the different waste operations is clearly part of its waste disposal task. The qualification of waste processing equipments and the establishment of acceptance criteria for conditioned and non-conditioned waste aim at making the processing and conditioning in conformity with unequivocal norms to obtain thus a quality guarantee of the waste management up to the disposal stage (see article 23 of the Convention).

ONDRAF/NIRAS is a service provider for the waste producers. An integrated waste management exceeds indeed the possibilities of the individual waste producers. In order to obtain a technological and financial implementation of the waste management, a solitary approach of all of the waste producers is required; achieving this is "pre-eminently" the role of a public body. All the costs linked to the activities of the Agency are at the expense of the waste producers, according to distribution keys based on objective criteria.

### 5.2.1.4 Management of fissile materials

The management of irradiated or non-irradiated fissile materials is subject to a legislation similar to that of the management of radioactive waste, insofar these fissile materials are declared in excess by the owner/producer. As long as these fissile materials are not declared in excess, its management remains the exclusive responsibility of the owner/producer. This situation is completely comparable to that of radioactive materials that are not - or not yet - declared waste by the owner/producer. The ONDRAF/NIRAS legislation makes an explicit distinction between its missions with regard to nuclear waste on the one hand, and to excess amounts of non-irradiated and irradiated fissile material on the other. The aim of the legislator was to endow ONDRAF/NIRAS with specific missions regarding the management of irradiated fissile material but not with the complete management responsibility; this remains the responsibility of the owner/producer.

### a. Irradiated fissile material from *power reactors*

The most important owner/producer of irradiated fissile materials is plc Synatom. This private company is the owner of the fissile materials loaded and unloaded in the Belgian nuclear power plants. The Belgian State has recognised the exclusivity of this company with regard to the management of the nuclear fuel cycle including the management of the irradiated fissile materials (Protocol B.K.B./B.C.N. of 24 August 1981). The fact that, simultaneously with the establishment of ONDRAF/NIRAS, Synatom was transformed into a mixed society (50% State and 50% electricity producers), is a historic explanation of the repartition of the competences between Synatom and ONDRAF/NIRAS in the field of the management of irradiated fissile materials. When, in 1994 the participation of the Belgian State was reduced to a 'golden share' to which specific rights were linked, the exclusivity rights of Synatom with regard to the management of fissile materials from nuclear power plants remained unchanged. Up to the present, the irradiated fissile materials subject to the management of Synatom have not been declared in excess, and consequently cannot be considered to be entrusted to ONDRAF/NIRAS with the accompanying transfer of financial means. The law of 11 April 2003 has introduced (more) specific rules for the management of the provisions created by Synatom and dedicated to ensure the financing of the future management of the irradiated fissile materials, particularly in the context of the liberalisation of the European electricity market. For more information see also section 6.2.2.2. This law also determines the management of provisions by Synatom for the decommissioning of the nuclear power plants (see section 5.2.1.5).

Due to the gradual *phasing-out of nuclear energy*, after 40 year of operation of the nuclear power plants, the amount of irradiated fissile material to be managed in the future, is estimated to 4.300  $t_{\rm HM}$  produced by the existing nuclear power plants (after subtraction of the 670  $t_{\rm HM}$  which was already reprocessed). The management of these fissile materials, either through reprocessing and disposal of the waste produced, or through conditioning and disposal of the non-reprocessed fissile materials, has been the subject of a Parliamentary debate which has led in December 1993 to the acceptance of a resolution text, underwritten by the government. Since then there is a factual moratorium on the reprocessing of spent fuel, in anticipation of a new parliamentary assessment.

Until then, both management scenarios - with or without reprocessing – will have to be developed in parallel.

b. Irradiated fissile materials from research reactors

The fissile material resulting from the operation of research reactors (BR1, BR2, Venus and BR3 of SCK•CEN and of the Thetis reactor of the University of Ghent) continue to be managed by the scientific institutes operating these installations or by their supervisory entities, and this until they are declared in excess. Up to the present, only the irradiated fissile material of reactor BR3 has been declared as waste and has been transferred to a storage facility at the BP1 site (building 156). The irradiated fissile material of reactor BR2 has been transported for reprocessing purposes, partly to Dounreay (UK) and partly to the COGEMA reprocessing facilities of La Hague. The moratorium on the reprocessing process does not apply to the fissile material unloaded from the research reactors, so that in future the BR2 fissile material will continue to be shipped to La Hague.

### 5.2.1.5 Management of the decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities

Every owner or operator of a nuclear installation is responsible for the future dismantling of his installations, once they are definitely decommissioned. ONDRAF/NIRAS verifies that the owner/operator takes timely the necessary steps in order to carry out the dismantling programme; the owner/operator has to submit his decommissioning programme to ONDRAF/NIRAS for approval. The radioactive waste resulting from the dismantling is subject to the management of ONDRAF/NIRAS according to the same principles as the waste due to another origin. Furthermore, it is part of the missions of ONDRAF/NIRAS to follow up the evolution of the methodologies and technologies concerning dismantling.

From the regulatory point of view, the FANC requires early guarantees that appropriate measures are taken for proper management of waste. Indeed, the operation licence application must include an estimate of the waste quantities that will be produced during the dismantling of the installations. It also requests information on the management of that waste before being transferred to ONDRAF/NIRAS.

At the time the installation is to cease its activities and is to be dismantled, the full procedure (described in 5.3.1.4) to obtain the required licences is applicable.

If the owner/operator chooses to renounce the dismantling he can ask ONDRAF/NIRAS to perform these works for his account. To this end, ONDRAF/NIRAS legislation have been adapted in 1991. At present, ONDRAF/NIRAS is commissioned by the Belgian State with the dismantling of some important installations, such as the former reprocessing plant Eurochemic (known as "BP1 liability"), the former waste treatment installations of SCK•CEN ("BP2 liability"), some decommissioned installations of SCK•CEN, such as the research reactor BR3 (technical SCK•CEN liability) and some of the IRE buildings ("IRE liability"). The dismantling operations on the BP1 and BP2 sites have been entrusted by ONDRAF/NIRAS to its industrial subsidiary Belgoprocess. The financing of these activities was guaranteed till the end of the year 2000 by the Belgian State and the electricity sector. The Law of 24 March 2003 creates the legal framework for a structural financing mechanism of these dismantling activities on the BP1 and BP2 sites until their completion by a levy on the transported kWh. For each period of five years, ONDRAF/NIRAS has to present a financing plan to its supervising minister.

ONDRAF/NIRAS sees to it that the owners/operators create the necessary provisions for the financing of the future dismantling programme. In 1985, the nuclear electricity producers (now unified in Electrabel) have concluded a convention with the Belgian State introducing a special

arrangement for the creation of provisions for dismantling 7 nuclear power plants. With the liberation of the electricity market these arrangements had to be and were strengthened. The Law of 11 April 2003 has introduced a new management system for the dismantling provisions, controlled by a follow up committee, composed of experts appointed by law. For the conclusions of the follow-up committee with respect to the sufficiency of financial provisions a unanimous advice of ONDRAF/NIRAS is needed. Synatom, a 100% affiliate of Electrabel, has been transformed into a society managing all the provisions for the nuclear liabilities: the dismantling of the nuclear power plants and the management of the irradiated fuel (see section 6.2.2.2. for more details).

In 1997, the legal missions of ONDRAF/NIRAS were extended to the creation of an inventory of all nuclear installations and sites where radioactive substances are present. The purpose of this inventory is the mapping of all potential nuclear liabilities with the aim to detect the creation of such liabilities in time and – if possible – to prevent them. The first inventory, created in January 2003, contained 951 operators of nuclear installations, spread over 1064 sites and regulated by 3510 licences. This inventory will, in future, be updated every 5 years.

## 5.3 Regulations regarding the management of radioactive waste and irradiated fissile materials

## 5.3.1 The regulations applying to the facilities dedicated to the production, processing, conditioning, storage or disposal of radioactive waste or irradiated fissile materials

## 5.3.1.1 The licensing system for the creation and operation of the respective nuclear facilities.

Every facility in which an action is performed, that involves the use of radioactive substances or ionising radiation, is subject to a prior creation and operation licence (authorisation) issued by the Safety Authority. The licensing procedure to be followed, is described in the GRR-2001 and varies with the class of the facility, ranging from I tot IV. Class IV facilities are exempted from any notification nor authorisation. Facilities holding radioactive substances in quantities or concentrations that do not exceed the exemption levels set in GRR-2001, are class IV facilities.

The licence application is submitted to and investigated by the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control. Depending on the class, it is forwarded for advise to certain authorities, such as the local authorities, the Scientific Council of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control and the European Commission. AVN performs a safety review of the licence application which is submitted to the FANC. The creation and operation licence (authorisation) is issued by the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, with the exception of class I facilities. Those are licensed by Royal Decree. The procedure to be followed is described in detail on the following page.


The licence application for class 1 facilities has to be accompanied by an environmental impact assessment, drawn up in agreement with the European Directive 1985/337/EEG (as modified) and the Recommendation of the European Commission 1999/829/Euratom concerning the application of article 37 of the Euratom Treaty.

The licence stipulates - among other things – that the safety of class 1 facilities must be re-assessed with an interval of ten years(see section G, article 5).

The facility can only be put into operation following the verification of the conformity with the licence granted. This verification may be performed by an AIO (AVN) delegated by the FANC. With regard to the Class I facilities, the positive result of this verification is validated by Royal Decree, called "confirmation decree".

From the point of view of radioactive waste management, a distinction can be made between several types of facilities.

#### Procedure for Class 1 Autorisation



### A. Facilities dedicated to processing, conditioning, storage and disposal of radioactive waste

Facilities for radioactive waste disposal are classified into class I facilities, as well as facilities for radioactive waste processing, conditioning or storage, provided these activities are the main activities of the company. In case the waste processing or storage installation is part of a nuclear facility, it is subject to the licensing procedure for this type of facility.

The most important waste processing and storage facility is that of Belgoprocess, with two sites BP1 en BP2, respectively in Dessel and Mol. Repositories for radioactive waste are still in a conceptual phase. The licensing procedure for repositories actually is the same as for other class 1 facilities, but work is going to make the procedure more facility-specific.

## B. Facilities dedicated to production, storage, treatment of irradiated fissile material or to the conditioning or disposal of in-excess fissile material

All facilities producing, treating or storing irradiated fissile material, are classified into the highest risk class (class I); these are: nuclear reactors, facilities where the amount of fissile material used or stored is higher than half of the minimal critical mass, facilities for reprocessing of enriched or non-enriched irradiated fissile material.

The most important operational facilities of this type are:

- The nuclear power reactors of Electrabel;
- The nuclear research reactors of SCK•CEN;
- The storage pools for fissile materials on the nuclear power plant sites;
- The facilities for interim storage of irradiated fissile materials on the sites of nuclear power plants (wet and dry storage);
- The facilities for the processing of irradiated fissile materials (hot cells of SCK•CEN, IRE, ex-Eurochemic).

#### C. Facilities generating radioactive waste

With the exception of facilities using exclusively X-rays devices, all nuclear facilities that are legally subject to a licence (authorisation), and classified into class I, II or III according to the GRR-2001, are considered potential producers of radioactive waste.

For class I and II facilities, the licence application has to comprise information on the expected production of radioactive waste (gaseous, liquid and solid), including the waste generated by the future decommissioning and dismantling of the installations. The licence application also includes information on the treatment techniques applied and the temporary storage before discharge into the environment or transfer to ONDRAF/NIRAS.

The application of a creation and operation licence for any facility considered as a potential waste producer, has to comprise a written declaration in which the future operator commits himself to register with ONDRAF/NIRAS and to conclude an agreement with this Agency concerning the management of the radioactive waste.

ONDRAF/NIRAS receives systematically a copy of every licence issued. This way, ONDRAF/NIRAS is informed of the identity of the potential waste producers.

If the FANC grants a licence exemption for the use of type approved devices containing small quantities of radioactive material but exceeding the exemption levels determined, it will determine the conditions for the removal of these devices. The intention is to prevent that these devices contaminate the non-radioactive waste streams.

## **5.3.1.2** Operating conditions for nuclear facilities

The discharge of radioactively contaminated waste into the environment, be it in the form of gaseous or liquid effluents or in the form of solid material to be treated in future as non-radioactive waste (incineration, dumping) or to be re-used, is subject to very strict conditions and limitations (GRR-2001). Waste that cannot be discharged as such, has to be collected and treated as radioactive waste and is subject to the management of ONDRAF/NIRAS.

The radioactive material thus discharged into the environment, has to be kept as low as reasonably achievable (see GRR-2001, art. 34.5 with regard to liquid discharges, art. 36.3 for gaseous effluents and art. 18.3 for solid waste).

The concentration of radionuclides present in the discharges of gaseous effluents into the atmosphere and of liquid waste into the surface waters and the sewerage, is limited in a generic manner:

- up to one thousand of the limit (calculated according to the method prescribed in the GRR-2001) of the annual intake through ingestion by an adult belonging to the public in liquid radioactive discharge;
- up to the derived limit (calculated according to the method prescribed in the GRR-2001) of the concentration in the air for persons belonging to the public, in gaseous radioactive waste.

For most radionuclides, the corresponding limit values are published in the GRR-2001 (in Bq/l for liquid waste and in Bq/m<sup>3</sup> for gaseous effluents).

The licences for class I and II nuclear facilities can deviate from these generically determined values. In those cases the discharge limits for the facilities are determined by means of exposure scenarios, taking into account a dose constraint (a fraction of 1 mSv/year, the dose limit for members of the public). The operators of the licensed facilities of Class I and II had to propose, before 1 September 2002, a modification of the discharge limits with the aim to bring them in line with the new dose limits for the members of the public (1 mSv/year). These proposals are nowadays being studied by the FANC.

The evacuation of solid radioactive waste originating from a licensed facility of class I, II and III with the aim to its recycling or re-use or its management as non-radioactive waste (incineration, landfill disposal) is permitted if it complies with the generically determined clearance levels and conditions stipulated in the GRR-2001. These clearance levels are expressed in kBq/kg. Deviations from these generic clearance levels may be granted by the FANC, provided the operator demonstrates that the radiological protection criteria are met, namely an individual dose of 10  $\mu$ Sv/year and either a collective dose of 1man.Sv per year or optimised protection. These specific shall not exceed the exemption levels.

The operator of a nuclear facility has to establish and keep an updated inventory of the gaseous and liquid radioactive discharges and of the solid radioactive waste stored on the site and of the cleared materials. This inventory is at the disposition of the Safety Authority and of ONDRAF/NIRAS.

The cooperation agreement of 17 October 2002 between the federal State and the regions obliges the FANC to inform the regional authorities responsible for the non-radioactive waste management, of the clearances granted and of the cleared quantities. To this end the operators are obliged to transfer this information to the FANC every year.

## 5.3.1.3 Relations between the waste producers and ONDRAF/NIRAS

According to the ONDRAF/NIRAS legislation, every person possessing radioactive waste, operating installations producing radioactive waste or any person who has the intention of building such installations has to submit to ONDRAF/NIRAS all the information required for the execution of its missions. ONDRAF/NIRAS concludes agreements with the most important waste producers concerning the general radioactive waste management programme and the collection of the waste with a view to its transport, conditioning, storage and disposal.

These obligations are also stipulated in the GRR-2001 with regard to every operator of a licensed facility who is also a potential producer of radioactive waste. The operator has to register with ONDRAF/NIRAS and has to conclude an agreement with ONDRAF/NIRAS with regard to the management of all the radioactive waste. The commitment of the future operator to register with ONDRAF/NIRAS is an element of the license application file. Even though the regulations of FANC and ONDRAF/NIRAS are complementary, there are differences. While the GRR-2001 only applies to operators of a licensed nuclear facility, the ONDRAF/NIRAS regulation also applies to the legal owners of radioactive waste (e.g. Synatom). Finally, the GRR-2001 provides for sanctions in case of non compliance (see also section 5.4.1.).

The relations between ONDRAF/NIRAS and the most important waste producers have been conceived by the legislator as being of a contractual nature. The agreements between the ONDRAF/NIRAS and the producers are written down in long-term conventions guaranteeing a certain continuity and price stability. With regard to the processing of non-conditioned waste, the contracts are concluded for a 5-year period. With regard to the storage of conditioned waste and later disposal, the contracts are concluded for a 10-year period; the current contracts expire in 2005. The waste producers or waste owners remain accountable for the costs of the waste management activities, also after transfer of the waste to ONDRAF/ NIRAS. This is guaranteed by a contractual tariff system that is re-evaluated every ten years in order to determine the remaining cost of the long-term management to be financed by the then existing waste producers, and also by a clause of hidden defects, for which the waste producers remain accountable during 50 years.

The financing of the activities of ONDRAF/NIRAS is largely based on a consensus between the parties involved. The Law of ONDRAF/NIRAS provides the possibility to regulate its financing by Royal Decree, in case no agreement can be reached with the waste producers. This possibility has not yet been used.

## **5.3.1.4** Decommissioning and dismantling of a nuclear facility

According to the ONDRAF/NIRAS legislation, the operators/owners have to submit their programmes for the future decommissioning of their radioactively contaminated installations to ONDRAF/NIRAS for approval. The decommissioning of important licensed facilities (class I and some of class II) is subject to a prior licence granted by the FANC and requiring in certain cases also an environmental impact assessment. The licence application has to be accompanied by the advice of ONDRAF/NIRAS. For less important facilities a notification to the FANC is sufficient.

Special attention needs to be paid to the management of the waste and of re-usable materials generated during decommissioning. ONDRAF/NIRAS is charged with the gathering and assessment of all the information enabling it to manage the waste generated during decommissioning. The application for a creation and operation licence for a class I or class II facility has to contain information about the expected amount of decommissioning waste.

The clearance of materials originating from the decommissioning of class I facilities and of certain class II facilities is, considering the important volumes at issue, always subject to a licence issued by the FANC, regardless of the possible residual contamination level. The licensing procedure to be followed is described in the GRR-2001.

# **5.3.2** Regulations for the transport, import and export of radioactive waste and irradiated fissile materials

The transport and transboundary movement of radioactive waste and irradiated fissile materials is performed according to the European and international regulations concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by road, rail, ship, and airplane.

The provisions that apply to the transport of radioactive substances in general and of radioactive waste and irradiated fissile material in particular, are laid down in chapter VII of the GRR-2001. This chapter requires that every transport must be licensed in advance. This licence is only granted if it can be proven that the stipulations of the international conventions and agreements with regard to the transport of dangerous goods<sup>4</sup> are observed.

With regard to the transboundary shipments of radioactive waste and irradiated fissile materials, the provisions of chapter IV of the GRR-2001 are applicable. This chapter transposes the European Council Directive 92/3/EURATOM of 3 February 1992 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of the Community. The procedure prescribes that the advice of ONDRAF/NIRAS with regard to the import and export of radioactive waste has to be obtained.

## **5.3.3** Regulation applicable to the activities implying exposures to natural radiation sources

In accordance with the current European directives in force, the application of the GRR-2001 also covers activities using natural radiation sources. Activities implying a risk of exposure of persons above the dose limit for members of the public, have to be notified to the FANC. Because of enrichment of the radionuclides during processing of raw materials, residues or waste generated, may need, from the point of view of radiological protection, special attention. The FANC can decide that such activities be subject to specific provisions the generated waste to the management principles of ONDRAF/NIRAS.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>ADR: European agreement on the transport of dangerous goods by road.

RID: the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail, appendix I to the Convention concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (COTIF).

ICAO: Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods, of the International Air Transport Organisation.

IMDG: The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

ADNR: European Regulation concerning the Carriage of Dangerous Goods on the Rhine.

## 5.4 Article 20: Regulatory Body

As enunciated in the National Report elaborated within the framework of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the surveillance of the nuclear activities in Belgium is structured in 3 consecutive levels: the operator, an independent control organisation recognised by the FANC and, finally, the FANC itself.

The criteria and obligations that have to be observed by the control organisations in order to obtain and keep their qualification are mentioned in art. 74 of the GRR-2001. Furthermore, the inspections in nuclear installations have to be entrusted by the control organisations to experts having obtained an individual qualification from the FANC, on the basis of art. 73 of the GRR-2001. AVN (Association Vincotte Nuclear) is the only control organisation which is recognised by the FANC to perform inspections in the nuclear power reactors and in the waste processing installations (Belgoprocess and IRE).

Hereunder, the statute of the FANC, AVN and ONDRAF/NIRAS are specified in more detail. The mutual relationships between these organisations and their relations with the most important companies (such as Electrabel, Synatom, Belgoprocess,...) are schematically represented on an organizational schema (see chart on page 46).

## 5.4.1 The statute of the FANC

The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) is an autonomous government agency with corporate personality. The Agency is directed by a 14-headed Board; its members are appointed by the Federal Government on the basis of their particular scientific or professional qualities. In order to guarantee the independence of these directors, their mandate is incompatible with certain other responsibilities within the nuclear sector and within the public sector. The Agency is supervised by the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs via a government Commissioner who attends the meetings of the Board of Directors.

In order to perform its tasks, the Agency is assisted by a Scientific Council; the composition and the competences of this Council are determined by Royal Decree. The Council consists of experts within the field of nuclear safety, radiological protection and safeguards.

The Agency exercises its authority with regard to the nuclear operators through one-sided administrative legal acts (the consent of the persons involved is not required) such as the granting, refusal, modification, suspension and withdrawal of licences, recognitions or approvals. It organises inspections to verify the compliance with the conditions stipulated in these licences, recognitions and approvals. The Agency can claim all of these documents in whatever form, from the facilities and companies under its supervision. Infractions with regard to the decisions of the Agency can be sanctioned.

According to article 9 of the law of 15 April 2001, the members of the inspection and surveillance department of the FANC are nominated by the King and they are considered as judiciary police officers, auxiliaries of the King's Attorney. They search for non-compliances with the law and establish them by official entry. They can give a warning accompanied by a period (of maximum 6 months) in which the infractions must be resolved.

The operation of the Agency is entirely financed by the companies, organisations or persons it renders services to. In practice this is done through non-recurrent or annual fees at the expense of

the holders or applicants of licences, recognitions or approvals; the tariffs are set by Royal Decree. The receipts and expenditures of the Agency have to be in equilibrium.

The above-mentioned statute attributes to the Agency the independence to enable it to impartially exercise its responsibilities as a regulator of the nuclear activities - as required by art. 20, 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph of the Joint Convention.

More information is available on the website: <u>www.fanc.fgov.be</u>

## 5.4.2 The statute of AVN and its relations with the FANC

Being an authorised inspection organisation, AVN (Association Vincotte Nuclear) meets the requirements of Article 74 of the GRR-2001. These requirements include, among others that:

- It has the status of a non-profit organisation possessing corporate personality according to the law of 27 June 1921;
- It reports of its activities every quarter to a "Surveillance Commission" (i.e. a watchdog) chaired by a representative of the FANC and composed of representatives of the employers' organisations and of the workers' organisations (trade unions);
- only recognized experts perform inspections (Article 73 of the GRR-2001);
- it is covered by civil liability for all matters that do not fall within the scope of the law of 18 July 1966 on nuclear civil liability.

AVN's General Management reports to a Board of directors, mainly composed of Belgian University professors, independent from the licensees inspected by AVN. Furthermore, AVN took the initiative to set up a "Scientific and Technical Committee" composed of representatives of Nuclear Safety Authorities of other European countries and International Organisations (IAEA, OECD/NEA, EC), as well as of Belgian University professors active in the nuclear field. An annual activity report is prepared for this Committee, and is discussed at its annual meeting. The Committee assesses AVN's work and formulates recommendations. It exists since 1991 and is an application of the peer-review principle.

AVN's technical personnel comprises some 50 university graduates (engineers and physicists), and recruitment is consistent with the foreseeable workload. The workload relating to inspection of installations is more or less constant; more variable is the time load regarding the progress of the applicants' projects and the number of studies to be examined, and also regarding the assessment of incidents or specific safety problems in the installations.

The relations between the FANC and AVN are actually being reshaped, in accordance with the legal obligations.

AVN being a non-profit organization, its financial resources are used to pay for its personnel (including training), to participate in national or international working groups, for research and development activities, for keeping technical and regulatory documentation.

More information on AVN, the organisation and its duties is available on its web site: http://www.avn.be.

## 5.4.3 Relations between ONDRAF/NIRAS and the FANC

The Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials (ONDRAF/NIRAS) is a public body governed by a board of directors, whose members are appointed by the federal government. ONDRAF/NIRAS is supervised by the federal Minister who is responsible for the energy policy; he is represented at the board by a Commissioner. The Federal Minister for Internal Affairs also has a Commissioner in the Board of Directors of the ONDRAF/NIRAS. ONDRAF/NIRAS submits annually an activity report to Parliament.

With regard to the management of radioactive waste, the FANC and ONDRAF/NIRAS have been entrusted by the legislator with a legal objective, that is mostly identical, namely the protection of the public and the environment against the hazards of ionizing radiation, in particularly resulting from the presence of radioactive waste. However, the instruments used by those agencies in order to achieve this objective, are different.

The role of ONDRAF/NIRAS should not be confused with that of the FANC. Both Agencies have a complementary role to play. The FANC is the regulator, who sets the operation conditions in the licenses, issued formally by the political Authorities. ONDRAF/NIRAS as a waste management agency qualifies the waste storage, processing and conditioning facilities, only from a perspective of the quality of the conditioned waste in view of its safe long-term management.


ONDRAF/NIRAS is the owner of large amounts of radioactive waste. Through its 100% owned daughter company NV Belgoprocess SA, who is operator of two nuclear sites, ONDRAF/NIRAS is also involved in the treatment, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste. It is responsible for the construction of new installations on these sites, which needs to be licensed by the FANC. ONDRAF/NIRAS is responsible for the decommissioning of installations on these sites, which ceased their activities. It is charged with the development of final repositories for the waste. Even though ONDRAF/NIRAS is currently neither an operator of nuclear installations, nor a holder of nuclear licenses, the missions subcontracted by this Agency are performed by the operators (e.g. Belgoprocess) under its responsibility and supervision. None of the missions exercised by ONDRAF/NIRAS can be regarded as missions belonging to the regulator (in conformity with art. 20, 2<sup>nd</sup> article, of the Convention).

The distinction between the competences and responsibilities of the FANC and ONDRAF/NIRAS are formalized, because the supervision and political responsibility of these public institutions is exercised by different members of the federal government. This does not prevent both public institutions from concluding privileged relations with one another. In implementation of the GRR-2001, both institutions have concluded an agreement in view of the mutual exchange of information and mutual consultation concerning the aspects of radioactive waste management. For more information: www.nirond.be

Belgoprocess is a company of which all the shares are held by ONDRAF/NIRAS. The members of the Board of Belgoprocess are appointed by the Board of ONDRAF/NIRAS. A government Commissioner, appointed by the federal Minister responsible for the energy policy, attends the meetings of the Board.

Belgoprocess is the industrial arm of ONDRAF/NIRAS. The ONDRAF/NIRAS installations for processing, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste are operated by Belgoprocess; these are located on two sites, BP1 and BP2. Belgoprocess is holder of the establishment and operating licenses. The agreements between ONDRAF/NIRAS and Belgoprocess are laid down in long-term agreements. For more information: www.belgoprocess.be

Organizational Structure of the Relationships between the Waste management Authorities and the Safety Authorities



## 6 Section F: other general safety provisions

### 6.1 Article 21: Responsibility of the licensee

Radioactive materials can not be brought into or processed in a class I facility until they have been licensed by Royal Decree. For class II and III facilities, the licenses are issued by the FANC.

The Royal Decree of 20 July 2001 (GRR-2001) stipulates (art. 5.2) that the operators of the facilities are to comply with the conditions set in the licences.

For class I facilities, one of the licensing conditions is the conformity with the 'safety analysis report' handed in with the application and regularly updated.

The license also requires that the installation is in conformity with the general data to be provided by virtue of article 37 of the Euratom Treaty (if applicable). This article 37 requires that each Member State is to provide the European Commission with general data relating to any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form in order to make it possible to determine whether the implementation of this plan is likely to result in the radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State.

Note that the Commission recommendation of 6 December 1999 stipulates that the 'disposal of radioactive waste' covers any planned disposal or accidental release of radioactive substance associated with the operations listed below, in gaseous, liquid or solid form. It also enumerates activities such as: the operation of nuclear reactors, fuel reprocessing, mining, fuel fabrication, fuel storage, waste processing and storage, dismantling, the emplacement above or under the ground of radioactive wastes, etc.

The operator is to organise a Health Physics Department. In accordance with article 23 of the GRR-2001, this department is entrusted with the task of organising "health physics control", that includes amongst others:

- 1) delimitating and signalling the controlled areas
- 2) investigating and inspecting the existing protection means and proposals
- 3) suggesting extra protection means and appropriate procedures in order to optimise the protection
- 4) verifying the operation and the correct use of the measuring devices
- 5) investigating the proposals for the transport of radioactive or fissile materials inside or outside the facility
- 6) supervising the conditioning, loading and unloading of radioactive or fissile materials inside the facility
- 7) the measurement of dose rate and of radioactive contamination
- 8) updating the inventory
- 9) investigating discharge proposals

and the verification of compliance with the other provisions of the GRR-2001 and the operation license.

The Health Physics Department is directed by an expert recognized by the Agency. Article 73 of the GRR-2001 regulates the recognition of the experts. There are two classes of experts. Class 1 experts must be physical engineer, engineer in nuclear sciences or must have another education complemented by a specialisation considered suitable by the Scientific Council of the Agency. Class 2 experts must have successfully followed a dedicated course (120 hours).

In class I facilities, the head of the Health Physics Department must be a class 1 expert and is also head of the Safety and Health department.

In class II and class III facilities, the head of the Health Physics Department must be a class 1 or a class 2 expert. If there is no in-house expert, the health physics is entrusted to the Agency, which can delegate these tasks to an AIO.

The operator has also to subscribe an insurance policy covering his civil liability resulting from his nuclear activities. The Law of 22 July 1985, which integrates the Paris Convention and the follow-up Convention of Brussels and their additional protocols, and the Law of 11 July 2000 set the maximum amount of the operator's civil liability for damages caused by a nuclear accident to about 300 million euros (per accident and per site).

Some operators have obtained a derogation that limits their civil liability to about 75 million euros. Belgoprocess obtained this derogation on 30 January 2001.

The GRR-2001 sets other obligations for the operator. He is required to inform the workers likely to be exposed to ionising radiation before they are affected to a work station (article 25) and he has to keep the individual and collective doses as low as reasonably achievable and below appropriate limits (article 20).

In the licence applications, the operator must commit himself to registering with ONDRAF/NIRAS and to concluding with this organisation an agreement on radioactive waste management.

As far as the release of solid waste is concerned, the Health Physics Department of the operator must agree each release individually and the release must be performed according to the written procedures worked out by this department. The authorised inspection organisation is to confirm this agreement if such a clearance for the same materials and according to the same procedures has not been agreed previously, in accordance with the GRR-2001.

## 6.2 Article 22: Human and financial resources

## 6.2.1 Human resources

## 6.2.1.1 ONDRAF/NIRAS – Belgoprocess

As of 31 December 2004, ONDRAF/NIRAS had 52 permanent full-time employees. The permanent workforce was made up of 30.5 employees with a university degree, 10 with a higher-education degree and 11.5 educated to secondary school standard. The temporary workforce comprised 10 employees with a fixed-term contract. Belgoprocess, which is in charge of the industrial management of the processing/conditioning and storage of radioactive waste, whereas ONDRAF/NIRAS is responsible for the overall and administrative management and research, employs 253 people - 240 permanent workers, 3 on secondment and 10 temporary workers.

ONDRAF/NIRAS stimulates its workforce to match or to go beyond the required level by attending regular training in specific technical fields (radiological protection, waste conditioning techniques, disposal of radioactive waste,...) as well as in general fields (languages, quality management, information technology,...). About 4 percent of the working hours and of the "personnel" budget is dedicated to this training

Belgoprocess organises the legal training required by the relevant Royal Decrees as a minimum.

ONDRAF/NIRAS and Belgoprocess are also largely involved in the working groups set up by international organisations (IAEA, NEA, European Commission, ...) in the field of radioactive waste management.

## 6.2.1.2 About NPP's - Electrabel

The Doel and Tihange nuclear power stations are operated by the "Société Anonyme ELECTRABEL" which itself is part of the TRACTEBEL SUEZ group (SUEZ). ELECTRABEL generates about 85% of the electric energy consumed in Belgium; this utility also distributes heat (via cogeneration units), gas and television signals (cable television). It is the owner of the units 1 and 2 of Doel, of 96% of the units 3 and 4 of Doel, of the units 2 and 3 of Tihange (4% being held by the "Société Publique d'Electricité"), and of 50% of Tihange 1 (France's EdF holding the remaining 50%). The installed power of Belgium's nuclear generating units accounts for some 40 % of all installed power in Belgium. Nuclear electricity accounts for some 60% of the electricity consumed in Belgium.

About 1 600 people are devoted to nuclear power station operation among the 3 100 personnel working for electricity generation as a whole, of ELECTRABEL's total Belgian workforce of 12 000. The TRACTEBEL SUEZ group, of which ELECTRABEL is a part, also has an Engineering division (TRACTEBEL) which is the Architect-Engineer of the Belgian nuclear power stations (and of most of the fossil fuel fired plants) and which houses the know-how of over forty years of nuclear technology, which started with the construction of the research reactors at the Mol Research Centre.

## 6.2.1.2.1 Organisation - training

The Safety Analysis Report (chapter 13) deals particularly with personnel qualification, training and re-training. Qualification of the personnel is inspired from the ANS 3.1 standard, though adapted to the Belgian educational system. The Safety Analysis Report defines the level of qualification corresponding to each of the safety related functions. It does not state the individual qualifications of each person in the organisational chart. However, demonstration of qualification of all the operating personnel is available to AVN and the FANC.

The training programmes are defined in the Safety Analysis Report, which includes a "functionprogramme" correlation chart. Chapter 13 of the Safety Analysis Report exhaustively lists all posts for which a licence is required. This licence is granted on the basis of the positive opinion expressed by an Assessment Committee - AVN being member of this Committee, with veto power - which assesses the operator's knowledge. This qualification is reviewed every two years or, if an operator has ceased during four months or more performing the function for which he was qualified. It is renewed conditionally to, amongst others, a favourable advice of the Assessment Committee on the basis of the individual's training and activity file.

A knowledge re-training programme for all qualified personnel is set up in function of the occupied position. The content of this programme is discussed with AVN, is essentially operation-focused and includes, amongst others, a refresher course regarding the theoretical and practical knowledge (two weeks per year), training on the full-scope simulator (two weeks every two years) and, in teams, a review of the descriptions of the different systems (two weeks per year).

Similar attention is given to the maintenance personnel (cluster "Servicing", see next section).

For all the personnel of the plant, there are training and retraining programmes which are adapted according to the duties of the personnel. Note that the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001 requires an annual retraining of the whole personnel on the basic rules of radiological protection, including the good practices for an efficient protection and a reminder of the emergency procedures at the work site.

The instructors that give the training are qualified for the particular subjects that they teach, and possess a formal instructor certification.

Subcontractors are responsible for the training of their own personnel; more over training in radiological protection is legally required and is made specific to the site where they will work. They must pass an examination at the site before they are allowed to the work site.

In addition to the individual training, great care is given to master the knowledge existing in the nuclear domain.

The design bases of the plants, i.e. the knowledge of the design of the plants and the reasons of the choices made are an important part of the knowledge.

ELECTRABEL is member of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) whose objective is to reach higher standards for the safety and reliability of the operating nuclear units through permanent information exchange, peer reviews, good practice programmes, mutual assistance ...

## 6.2.1.2.2 NUC21 organisation

At the end of 2000, Electrabel, which operates the two Belgian nuclear sites, decided a reengineering as a matrix structure more in conformity with the main professions and the collaborative relationship between the different actors in the operation and the management of a nuclear power plant.

This new organisation is of the matrix type: vertical per plant and horizontal per profession (that horizontal structure is called "cluster").

The different clusters are: "Operations", "Servicing", "Fuel", "Care" and "Assets".

The profession of the "Operations" cluster is the operation of the installations. The one of "Servicing" is the maintenance of equipments and installations. The "Fuel" cluster is in charge of all the fuel handling operations, as well as the follow-up of the cycles, while Synatom remains in charge of all aspects concerning procurement of new fuel and the back-end of the cycle. "Care" is in

charge of all controls (including Health Physics in the sense of the GRR-2001), measurements, protection of the workers (classical safety including fire protection) and safety of the installations (including the setting up and the management of the emergency plans). "Assets" manages the production installations and all the goods attached (as "owner" of the installations).

Each of the last three clusters (Fuel, Care and Assets) has a local organisation per nuclear site (Doel and Tihange) and a centralised organisation for both sites.

Chapter 13 of the Safety Analysis Report describes the structure of that organisation which has been approved by the Belgian Safety Authorities.

## 6.2.2 Financial resources

## 6.2.2.1 General information

The mission and competences of ONDRAF/NIRAS are defined by the Royal Decree of 30 March 1981, as extended and modified by the Royal Decree of 18 October 1991.

The Royal Decree defining the mission and competences of ONDRAF/NIRAS states with respect to waste management financing:

- All the costs related to the activities of ONDRAF/NIRAS will be charged to those who benefit from the performed services ("polluter pays principle")
- Those charges, evaluated at cost price, will be distributed among the beneficiaries of the services in accordance with objective criteria set by the Board of ONDRAF /NIRAS.
- ONDRAF/NIRAS may, following agreement by the Minister of Economic Affairs, manage a fund in order to finance long term duties, in particular the disposal of the waste. This fund is fed by contributions from the waste producers, according to rules approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs.
- A special fund has been built to cover any contingent costs associated with failed producers. This fund is fed by an additional charge on all the waste producers. The use of this fund is submitted for regular auditing by a special surveillance committee.
- For the financing of the decommissioning activities of other facilities than the nuclear power plants, ONDRAF/NIRAS will establish and/or qualify, in agreement with the producers concerned, the arrangements aiming at guaranteeing the financing of those operations.
- The financial arrangements, for the waste management, for the "regular" waste producers will be fixed in an agreement to be concluded between ONDRAF/NIRAS and the producer.
- The contribution to waste management costs for "occasional" producers is decided upon by the Board of ONDRAF/NIRAS.
- The tasks of ONDRAF/NIRAS set by the law of 12 December 1997, extending the agency's mission to drawing up an inventory of nuclear liabilities include the following:
  - 1. Drawing up a register specifying the location and condition of all nuclear facilities and all sites containing radioactive substances on Belgian territory
  - 2. Estimating the cost of decommissioning and cleaning up these facilities and sites;
  - 3. Evaluation of the availability of sufficient funds to carry out these future or ongoing operations;
  - 4. Updating the inventory every five years.

In line with the above, ONDRAF/NIRAS works at cost price, with complete financial transparency with respect to the producer. For that purpose, it has established a financing mechanism based on

fees per volume unit of waste delivered, in order to ensure complete financing of all the operations to be performed. The acceptance of the waste and the transfer of property implies also the transfer of financial means from the waste producer to ONDRAF/NIRAS for the short and long term management of the waste (storage and disposal). Good assessment of the waste management system is therefore required to determine accurate fees which limit the risk of insufficient financing becoming a burden for the community in the future.

For storage and disposal operations the fees are paid into the "long-term fund", which is interest bearing. ONDRAF/NIRAS has the responsibility for managing the fund. Each accounting year the financial performance of the fund is reassessed.

According to the Royal Decree of 4 April 2003 the Agency's funds available in the medium and the long term must be invested in financial instruments issued by the Federal State. As a result, the board of ONDRAF/NIRAS has decided to invest the assets of the "Long-term fund" into Belgian governmental bonds which will be passively managed.

In 1996 the financial mechanism was changed. Before that date, there were no guarantees with regard to fixed costs, and tariffs were based on simple net present value calculations. A new mechanism was put in place in 1996 by ONDRAF/NIRAS which aims to reduce risk while satisfying the fundamental principles of financing. The new financing approach uses two part tariffs, specific to each waste category, which are charged to the waste producer for waste delivered to ONDRAF/NIRAS.

The tariffs are based on the following principles:

- A distinction is made between "fixed costs", independent (within certain limits) of the quantities emplaced, and "variable costs", proportional to the quantities expected to be emplaced in the future.
- The fixed costs are charged to producers according to committed volumes. In the case of storage and disposal payments, producers receive in return "reservations of capacity". Each producer makes a binding minimum commitment to cover its share, regardless of the future fluctuations of its programme. This commitment takes the form of an irrevocable guarantee on behalf of the producer.
- Variable costs are charged to producers according to volumes delivered and accepted.

The aim of the calculation of these fees is to ensure that costs are covered to a confidence level of at least 90%. To help to achieve this, a global uncertainty factor, assigned to the fixed and variable costs of each operation, is derived by the combination of basic uncertainties.

The contractual relationships which underpin this new mechanism are fundamentally different in timing and in scope from the traditional relationship. The contract stipulates in detail the precise requirements of the producer regarding waste management, such as waste types, quantities and operations to be performed. In exchange, ONDRAF/NIRAS quotes a price valid for a minimum time period of 10 years (or 5 years for treatment and conditioning).

To take into account the time value of money and the opportunity cost of capital, the fees escalate each year, beyond inflation, by a constant risk-free interest rate of 2% (real terms).

The parts of the payments which relate to fixed costs are offset against the guaranteed sum and hence the size of the producer's guarantee reduces with time. Should the producer exceed the

originally planned volume, the guaranteed sum is increased accordingly (and other producers' guarantees are correspondingly decreased), taking account of interest at 2%. At the end of the contractually agreed period, the waste producer may decide to renew or to terminate the relationship with ONDRAF/NIRAS. Under the latter option, the waste producer then pays in full its outstanding share of the fixed costs, i.e. that part of the guaranteed sum which remains unpaid.

From the above the following conclusions can be drawn about the new approach: the fees are stabilised; waste programme uncertainties are reduced; cost uncertainties and different scenarios are taken into account in the fee calculation; the fixed costs of the full capacity are completely accounted for; and the financial returns decrease the risk carried by the waste management organisation.

The quoted fees are paid by the producers whenever the property of wastes is transferred to ONDRAF/NIRAS. The tariffs to be applied are fixed by contractual arrangements ; they are specific for each waste category and the fees paid are proportional to the volume of the wastes transferred to ONDRAF/NIRAS. The amount of the fees to be paid is then deducted of the producer's provisions and transferred to the so-called "long-term fund" managed by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

Financial decommissioning provisions not treated within this article are dealt with under article 26.

## 6.2.2.2 About NPP's

## 6.2.2.2.1 Belgian legal context

Since 1985, the nuclear electric power generators have set up provisions for the dismantling and decontamination of the Doel and Tihange nuclear power stations (including the installations for waste and spent fuel management).

The new legal basis regulating the responsibility for the dismantling of the nuclear power plants and the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is the law of 11 April 2003. This law stipulates that Synatom is responsible for establishing nuclear provisions on behalf of Electrabel and SPE (Public Electricity Society). The law addresses, among others, the following topics :

- the installation of a Follow-up Committee and its responsibilities;
- the development of a new methodology for the calculation of nuclear provisions;
- the transfer of existing provisions from Electrabel/SPE to Synatom;

- the percentage of the provisions that can be lent to Electrabel and SPE - the management of the funds.

Electrabel and SPE remain liable for all costs regarding the future dismantling of the nuclear power plants, including cost overruns.

## 6.2.2.2.2 Dismantling provisions

The main characteristics of the applied methodology are the following :

- the provision must be accrued over the life expectancy of the nuclear power plants (as defined by the law of 31 January 2003, i.e. 40 calendar years), the current scenario is a dismantling approach based on the dismantling of each unit separately, but in series, and the decommissioning of the common facilities well after the decommissioning of the last unit on each site.

- the initial provision is equal to the net present value of all future decommissioning expenses (based on a study performed by an independent engineering company and the engineering office Tractebel).

The new law stipulates a three-year review and a formal approval by the Follow-up Committee of any changes in methodology, funding or investment policy. For the conclusions of the follow-up committee with respect to the sufficiency of financial provisions a unanimous advice of ONDRAF/NIRAS is needed.

## **6.2.2.2.3** Provisions for the management of irradiated fissile materials

The new methodology ensures that appropriate provisions are made to cover the costs associated with the management of used nuclear fuel and its nuclear waste, up to and including their final disposal.

The main assumptions are as follows:

- the new methodology (after studying several scenarios for reprocessing or direct disposal) has been based on the deferred reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels without recycling of the recovered fissile materials.
- the estimate has been based on the future costs for all spent nuclear fuel during the total lifetime of the 7 nuclear power plants in Belgium as from 1986 onwards (the spent fuel used before 1986 has been reprocessed and the corresponding future costs have also been provisioned). Those costs cover, but are not limited to the intermediate spent fuel storage until a solution for its treatment is defined (reprocessing or conditioning in view of direct disposal), spent fuel reprocessing or spent fuel conditioning, waste storage and final disposal.

In order to limit the risks associated with the future availability of sufficient financial means, the overall cost of each identified technical scenario has been duly evaluated following the same methodology. The amount of the provisions is determined by the most expensive identified scenario.

## 6.3 ARTICLE 23: QUALITY ASSURANCE

The qualification of the waste treatment and conditioning (including radiological characterization), as well as storage facilities are imposed at national level by the Royal Decree of 18 November 2002, which is an important element of the quality assurance system of the Belgian waste management regime.

## 6.3.1 Provisions for the qualification of storage, processing and conditioning installations for radioactive waste.

Every Belgian installation for the storage, processing or conditioning of (Belgian) radioactive waste (conditioned and unconditioned waste), including its radiological characterisation equipment, has to be qualified by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

In the technical conditions required for obtaining a qualification, it is stipulated that the equipment has to enable the conformity control of the waste compared to the applicable acceptance criteria and that the radiological characterisation, including the uncertainty margin, has to be sufficiently reproducible. In view of this, the operator needs to dispose of a clear and efficient quality system, containing, among other things, an appropriate description of 1) the applicable acceptance criteria; 2) the organisation chart, including the responsibilities and competences; 3) the applied procedures and techniques with regard to the conformity control; 4) the research, samplings and tests on raw materials, intermediary and final products; 5) the means used in order to control the accomplishment of the conformity and the effectiveness of the quality system.

ONDRAF/NIRAS exercises on-the-spot inspections on a regular or occasional basis in order to verify if the qualification requirements have been met.

Before issuing a qualification, the supervising authority of ONDRAF/NIRAS (Minister or State Secretary of State competent for Energy) can request that the conditioning equipment offers the possibility to take an active sample.

A qualification issued according to the arrangements stipulated by ONDRAF/NIRAS and, among other things, based on a qualification file, together with the commitments required, is limited to a maximum period of 5 years; the qualification can not be delivered on trial and is not transferable. A qualification can be prolonged. An appeal procedure is foreseen.

If the installation is modified, and with that the information linked thereto, and if the applicable waste acceptance criteria are changed, the qualification needs to be re-evaluated.

Foreign operators are submitted to distinct processing, conditioning and storage procedures.

#### 6.3.2 Acceptance procedure for conditioned radioactive waste packages

Conditioned radioactive waste packages are accepted in the sequence outlined below. A procedure APG – 4 DC 'General Procedure for the Acceptance of Conditioned Radioactive Waste' has been drafted in accordance with ISO 9001, 2000 edition.

- 1. Production of the packages during a 'campaign' according to a process qualified by ONDRAF/NIRAS.
- 2. Submission to ONDRAF/NIRAS of the production documentation including a request for acceptance, supported by radiological data for each individual package as determined following a physical inspection by the producer or an authorised inspection organisation and using a radiological characterisation method approved by ONDRAF/NIRAS. The request for acceptance must be supported by a declaration of conformity with the acceptance criteria ruling at the time of production.
- 3. ONDRAF/NIRAS examines the production documentation and the acceptance request: this is the administrative check. ONDRAF/NIRAS then writes a letter to the producer with any comments resulting from the administrative check.
- 4. ONDRAF/NIRAS carries out a physical examination of the packages that form part of an 'effective request for physical transfer'. These packages may have been produced during several conditioning campaigns whose production documentation has previously undergone administrative inspection.
- 5. For each batch to be transported ONDRAF/NIRAS issues a 'clearance for removal report' setting out the results of the physical inspection and any administrative or technical reservations.

This clearance report is signed before removal by the producer who returns it to ONDRAF/NIRAS.

- 6. ONDRAF/NIRAS finalises the inspection memo related to the production documentation files, including comments made during the physical inspection; these will serve as a technical reference for the final acceptance report.
- 7. Planning of the transport of the primary packages of conditioned radioactive waste in one or more campaigns of which the production documentation has been successfully examined by ONDRAF/NIRAS.
- 8. Simultaneous issuance of an acceptance report and of a transfer report for the packages to be transferred; these two reports are first signed by the producer and then by ONDRAF/NIRAS. The producer receives a copy of the reports signed by ONDRAF/NIRAS not later than the date of removal.
- 9. The packages of conditioned waste are physically removed from the producer's site and taken to a facility for storage designated by ONDRAF/NIRAS.
- 10. On arrival at the facility, the transferred conditioned radioactive waste packages are physically inspected for storage and a storage report is issued.
- 11. According to article 17 of the General Rules for the acceptance of conditioned radioactive waste, and as part of the producer's liability for hidden defects for a period of 50 years, the packages of conditioned waste will be regularly checked for conformity with the relevant acceptance criteria and for their compatibility with their disposal. The results of the physical inspections are recorded in reports that are issued by ONDRAF/NIRAS and signed jointly by the producer and ONDRAF/NIRAS.

This procedure is illustrated below for the vitrified waste from the reprocessing of Belgian spent fuel in the COGEMA facilities at the La Hague facility (Plant UP3).

An important first step in the waste acceptance procedure is the approval of the processes and installations involved. This element is explained below.

The COGEMA vitrification process and the facility (R7/T7 glass) were officially approved by ONDRAF/NIRAS in February 2001, following the favourable evaluation of the following conditional provisions:

1. Ability of the process to meet the acceptance criteria decreed by ONDRAF/NIRAS

ONDRAF/NIRAS has been able to verify - on the basis of the data and information put down in the technical file of the vitrification process - that COGEMA has the technical and administrative means at its disposal to meet each of the acceptance criteria during the approval stage of the process and, subject to verification of the conformity of the residues produced, during the waste package production stage.

2. Favourable evaluation of the quality system introduced by COGEMA in its vitrification facilities

The technical and administrative provisions applied by COGEMA in the vitrification facilities, are subject to periodical audits conducted by BUREAU VERITAS. The audit reports testify to the ability of the quality system to ensure that the residues are produced in accordance with the applicable technical reference frame.

3. Compliance with the residue acceptance criterion, relating to the qualification of the vitrification process and facility

This criterion consists in checking the equivalence between, on the one hand, the conditions defined in Belgium by ONDRAF/NIRAS for the qualification (approval) of the conditioning processes and facilities and, on the other hand, the procedure adopted by the French authorities and applied to the COGEMA processes and facilities.

This equivalence is ensured by:

- the drawing up, by COGEMA, of a technical file for the process, following the instructions defined by ONDRAF/NIRAS,
- the commitment of ANDRA to co-operate with ONDRAF/NIRAS, especially regarding the follow-up of the modifications of the R7/T7 process and facilities, the transmission of the results of the audits conducted in the vitrification facilities by ANDRA, and the accessibility of information on the quality of the residues.

This commitment of ANDRA has been formalised by a draft agreement containing the provisions defined above. So far, this agreement has been scrupulously observed.

The next steps in this specific waste acceptance procedure are as follows.

Upon SYNATOM's request for acceptance of a batch of maximum 28 canisters and 3 spare canisters, ONDRAF/NIRAS performs an administrative verification of the documentation and provides assistance during the physical inspection of the canisters.

The inspection modes are described in an inspection manual. Before ONDRAF/NIRAS can accept the batch of vitrified waste, each canister must meet the applicable acceptance criteria.

During the whole acceptance procedure, ONDRAF/NIRAS draws up the necessary reports. Each step must be satisfactorily concluded before the next verification or inspection can be performed. Non-conformities may lead to the non-acceptance of the canisters submitted.

Before performing the administrative verification of the documents, the inspection of these documents and the physical inspection of the canisters, the validity of the approval granted by ONDRAF/NIRAS is verified.

## Administrative verification of the delivery documents

First, ONDRAF/NIRAS checks the coherence and comprehensiveness of the individual quality documents of the canisters, prepared by COGEMA. BUREAU VERITAS issues a certificate of conformity for each canister and ONDRAF/NIRAS checks the compliance of the acceptance criteria.

#### Administrative verification of the production documents at COGEMA

The production documents contain the documents that are common to the vitrified waste. This verification is performed to check whether the documents are coherent and complete and the raw materials used are in accordance with the specifications.

#### Administrative verification of the documentation at BUREAU VERITAS

After a positive evaluation of the verification of the correct application of the quality system of COGEMA, BUREAU VERITAS draws up certificates. ONDRAF/NIRAS checks the traceability of the documents and the satisfactory character of the evaluation, in order to ensure the validity of the certificates.

#### Physical inspection of the canisters at COGEMA

ONDRAF/NIRAS assists in the physical inspections performed by COGEMA in order to check the integrity of the canisters, the surface contamination and the dose rate.

## Administrative verification of the COGEMA documentation after taking the canisters from stock

After taking the canisters from stock, COGEMA draws up the necessary documents with the parameters obtained from the physical inspection. ONDRAF/NIRAS checks the coherence and comprehensiveness of these documents.

## Administrative verification of the BUREAU VERITAS documentation after taking the canisters from stock

BUREAU VERITAS issues a certificate after taking the canisters from stock. ONDRAF/NIRAS checks the traceability of the documents and the satisfactory character of the evaluation, in order to ensure the validity of the certificates.

#### Administrative verification of the complete documentation file

Before transporting the batch of 28 canisters, ONDRAF/NIRAS checks the coherence and comprehensiveness of the complete documentation file.

#### Physical inspection of the canisters at BELGOPROCESS

On receipt of the canisters, ONDRAF/NIRAS attends the physical inspections performed by BELGOPROCESS before storing the canisters in building 136.

#### Administrative verification of the BELGOPROCESS documentation

After verifying the documentation on receipt of the canisters at BELGOPROCESS, ONDRAF/NIRAS can proceed to the acceptance of the canisters.

#### Drawing up of the Reception, Acceptance and Transfer reports

The receipt of the 28 canisters is formalised by drawing up a Reception report.

ONDRAF/NIRAS also issues an Acceptance and a Transfer report to indicate its acceptance of the batch of 28 canisters. ONDRAF/NIRAS thus certifies that the transferred vitrified waste is in accordance with the applicable acceptance criteria. The finally accepted documentation file contains all documents and reports resulting from the verifications and/or inspections described above.

#### 6.3.3 Quality Management certification of ONDRAF/NIRAS and Belgoprocess

The "Acceptance system" of ONDRAF/NIRAS obtained the ISO 9001:2000 certificate in June 2002.

Only the paragraphs 7.3 "Design and Development" and 7.6 "Control of Measuring and Monitoring devices" were kept out of the certification scope.

The Acceptance System constitutes the central point around which most activities of ONDRAF/NIRAS revolve. This is of course the main reason why it has been certified first.

ONDRAF/NIRAS installed a Quality Management System after many years of experience in the field of Quality. From the very beginning, the agents have followed a "Quality Control" logic (very close to the products that it managed). This logic evolved towards "Quality assurance", which

guarantees also the control of the service performed. Lastly, the Quality Management System aims at improving the management of the operations.

The efforts to extend the Quality Management System follow the same path:

- The ISO 'logic' is progressively applied for the 'upstream' and 'downstream' processes (i.e. entities of the ONDRAF/NIRAS organisation) of the Acceptance System (suppliers and internal customers).
- Most of the ONDRAF/NIRAS processes will be integrated in the scope of the ISO 9001 certificate. This field will progressively extend to form a coherent whole which will bring the whole organisation together.

The aim is to obtain the ISO 9001 certification for the whole organisation by the end 2006 - early 2007.

ONDRAF/NIRAS's subsidiary company Belgoprocess, responsible for the management of the radioactive waste on its industrial site (including waste treatment and conditioning, waste storage, decommissioning and site restoration) has implemented a quality management system which complies with the ISO-9001 standard, and with the IAEA code (Safety Series 50-C/SG-Q). Belgoprocess received the ISO-9001 certificate in 1995 for radioactive waste treatment and conditioning in the CILVA installation, and early 1996 for decommissioning and decontamination. These certificates were successfully prolonged in December 1998, 2001 and 2003 and are now applicable for the following activities:

- The management of solid low-level radioactive waste;
- The decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the decontamination of contaminated materials.

Since safety and environmental protection are an imperious condition for nuclear activities, Belgoprocess is working continuously towards a total integration of quality, safety and environmental protection issues into one management system. This global certification ISO-9001, ISO-14001 en OHSAS-18001 is planned for 2006.

## 6.3.4 Quality Management system of ELECTRABEL / SYNATOM

As the US safety rules were applied for the 4 most recent Belgian nuclear units as early as at their design stage, the 10 CFR50 Appendix B requirements were adopted for these units, as well as the ASME code quality-assurance stipulations for pressure vessels. Also taken into account were the 50-C-QA codes and the resulting safety guides (including 50-SG-QA5) developed in the scope of the IAEA's NUSS programme.

At the time of putting into service the Doel 1 and 2 and Tihange 1 units, in 1974-1975, that level of quality-assurance formalism was not yet required. However, during the first ten-yearly safety reviews of these units, it was requested to apply to them the same quality assurance rules as to the more recent units. Accordingly, any new installation, modification, repair and replacement at the earlier units were made consistent with the formal QA requirements from 1985 on.

The responsibility for applying the quality assurance programme is assumed by the operator, who subcontracts the related tasks to his Architect-Engineer during the design and construction phases of the power stations, up to and including the commissioning tests.

The QA programme is described in chapter 17 of the Safety Analysis Report which deals with the design and construction phases, followed by the operation period. As there is no unit under construction at present in Belgium, emphasis is put on how the quality assurance programme is applied during operation; the Tihange site is considered below to illustrate this point, but the organisation is nearly identical at the Doel site.

## 6.3.4.1 Equipment and activities concerned

The quality assurance programme applies to any safety-related equipment and components as well as to any activities that may affect their Quality. It also applies to the safety-related activities, e.g. radiological protection, radioactive waste management, fire detection and protection, environmental monitoring, nuclear fuel management and emergency intervention. These equipment, components and activities are known as Quality Monitored (Q.M.)

Quality Monitored items are identified in the Safety Analysis Report of each unit.

## 6.3.4.2 Quality Assurance programme

The quality assurance programme is based on a three-level system of provisions, consisting in:

- . a description of the quality assurance programme (i.e. chapter 17 of the Safety Analysis Report + the Manual),
- administrative procedures,
- written instructions.

The description of the quality assurance programme establishes the conformity of that programme to the requirements of the reference code (10 CFR 50 Appendix B of USNRC and 50-C-QA of IAEA).

Chapter 17.2 of the Safety Analysis Report describes the key-principles of the quality assurance programme during the operational phase. On this base, the Manual defines the requirements regarding establishment and implementation of the quality assurance programme.

The administrative procedures specify for each kind of activity the policy and objectives that are defined in the quality assurance programme description.

These administrative procedures detail the functions, the authority and the responsibilities of the departments and individuals within each unit. For the individuals, this is done through job descriptions, and for the departments through internal organisation procedures.

These define the responsibilities and the internal and external interfaces in each unit and in each department per activity domain, e.g. the management of modifications, or the feedback of operational experience.

They specify in which way or by what means the regulatory or contractual requirements will be implemented, and they determine the quality level of the Quality Monitored items.

The written instructions constitute a considerable number of documents established by the departments of the units; if necessary these are standardised or harmonised at site level, especially

as regards nuclear safety, classical safety, radiological protection and protection of the environment. These documents set in detail the duties or tasks of individual agents or agents groups.

## 6.3.4.3 Delegation and subcontracting

The objectives of the quality assurance programme remain fully applicable in case of delegation or subcontracting.

## 6.3.4.4 Training regarding quality assurance objectives

A general training is given regarding the quality assurance objectives and the means for achieving these to all personnel who in the various services perform quality-related activities. This training is maintained and updated regularly.

## 6.3.4.5 Periodic evaluation

The Safety Evaluation Committee and the Site Operation Committee perform a half-yearly assessment of the quality assurance effectiveness, the way it is implemented, the possible improvements to be brought to the programme,..... The written report of this assessment is presented to the Site Director for comments and possible approval of the recommended improvements, etc.

As far as the regulatory control activities are concerned, AVN examined in the frame of the licensing process of each unit the quality assurance programme to be implemented during the design, construction and operational phases (chapter 17 of the Safety Analysis Report, quality assurance manuals,...) and verified the practical implementation of the various regulations (10 CFR50 Appendix B, ASME code,...) throughout these phases.

As regards pressure vessels for which the ASME code or the conventional Belgian regulations (RGPT) are in force, an independent inspection by a authorised inspection agency is required.

During the operational phase of the power station, AVN performs systematic inspections, including some dedicated to the assessment of quality assurance programmes during the operation. The quality assurance aspects are also reviewed during investigation of modifications to the installations, incident reports, etc.

## 6.4 Article 24: Operational Radiation Protection

## 6.4.1 Regulations

Chapter III "General Protection" of the GRR-2001 introduces in the Belgian law the radiological protection and ALARA-policy concepts.

Article 20 of this Royal Decree sets among others the basic radiological protection principles: justification of the practice, optimisation of protection and individual dose limits..

Article 23 of this Royal Decree describes the key role of the Health Physics Department (HPD). This department is, in a general way and amongst other duties, responsible for the organisation and the supervision of the necessary means for operational radiation protection. The head of the HPD for the installations in the scope of the Joint Convention has to be a

qualified expert of class 1 and recognized by the FANC. The specifications and the conditions for recognition are specified in Article 73 of GRR-2001.

## 6.4.2 Design

The safety analysis reports for the recently designed buildings or installations for the storage of radioactive waste include the following topics:

- general safety philosophy
- fundamental design criteria and specifications (systems, components, casks, etc...), with a quality concern during design, construction and operation
- multiple barriers concept (confinement of radioactive materials, ventilation (depression cascade, rate of air renewal, etc..)); ventilation during normal conditions and emergencies
- criticality safety
- shielding and radiological protection
- long term behaviour (internal and external influences) of storage
- thermal analyses for storage conditions (heat removal)
- fire protection
- industrial safety
- radiation protection programme (organisation, equipment, monitoring, procedures)
- normal operating conditions (atmospheric releases, radiological impact of workers and members of the public, etc..)
- abnormal operating conditions and design basis accidents (detection, consequences, corrective actions, interventions, etc..)
- procedures during start-up (components tests, functional and global tests), operation (equipment maintenance, periodic tests, etc...) and alarms (process, fire, radiation, security)
- specifications of operating conditions and limits (source limitation (activity, dose rate), fissile materials, radionuclides, surface contamination, radon concentration, etc....), with a programme for the surveillance and control of these limits and the corrective actions.

The licence application is accompanied with an environmental impact assessment where beside the radiological impact, non-radiological aspects have to be evaluated for the construction and the operation.

## 6.4.3 Operation

## 6.4.3.1 ALARA policy

Different means are used for the ALARA-evaluation (related dose and cost evaluations): implementation of a good working plan; optimisation of working methodology during the receipt, transfer and storage operations; use of software tools (e.g. 3 D-models) for the visualisation of the up-to-date state of storage and for the evaluation of the individual and collective doses, before the operations are performed.

There is an initial dosimetric estimate by the work supervisor and the radiological protection agent in order to jointly agree on the protective means to be used, a new dosimetric estimate that takes into account the decided protective means, a dosimetric monitoring of the work, with check points or hold points of the estimated dosimetry, and a feedback of operating experience. During the receipt, transfer and storage operations the workers are equipped with individual neutron (bubble type detectors and/or electronic dose meters) and gamma dose rate meters for a strict follow-up of the dose.

For substantial or unusual works, there is a specific safety/radiological protection preparation of the work, through consultation between the Head of the Safety and the Health Physics Department and the work supervisor, well ahead of the planned date of the work.

If and where possible, the operations are performed remotely (use of manipulators or use of automatic sequences, etc...).

### 6.4.4 Follow-up in situ

### 6.4.4.1 Dose

During the design, radiation zones are defined with the limitation of the dose rate in function of the exposure time.

For the waste storage buildings at Belgoprocess the dose rate outside the recent buildings (in contact with the walls) is limited to 10  $\mu$ Sv/h. For the storage building of the used steam generators of the Tihange plant, this limit is set at 7.5  $\mu$ Sv/h. In practice the measured dose rate values are far below these limits. The dose rate limits guarantees that the doses received by the workers from the storage activities are minor. The areas which can be accessed by the public are several hundreds of meters from the storage buildings. The design of these buildings is such that the impact for the public (including sky shine effects) is only a small fraction of 1 mSv/year (for a recent new storage building of Belgoprocess an occupation factor of 1 has been chosen for this impact evaluation).

Various measures have been taken over the years during operation to reduce further the annual collective dose. For example at Belgoprocess: the value has been reduced by a factor of about 2.4 during the 1997-2001 period, with a collective dose of about 112 man.mSv (an important part being due to dismantling projects). For the period 2002-2004, about the same values have been recorded (as compared to 2001).

Shielding is systematically installed at various locations during operations. Specific shields are also installed when dictated by the size of the work (e.g. detecting hot spots). Signals indicating the hot spots and the ambient dose rates informs the workers about the ambient radiological conditions in which they will carry out the work; access to certain locations is only allowed with specific authorisation of the Health Physics Department; specific ALARA signals forbid to the worker to remain stationary; signals indicate to the worker where the very low dose rate areas ("green" area) are, and may be used as falling-back station. On a voluntary basis there is implementation of a dose constraint for the individual dose. In practice for all the nuclear installations, this is about the half of the dose limit (20 mSv per 12 consecutive months, in accordance with the GRR-2001); the mentioned doses are the total doses (sum of external dose and committed dose)).

Conform Article 23.2 of GRR-2001, the assessments and stipulations of the Health Physics Department must be recorded, including the dose registration. The individual doses, including doses due to the internal contaminations and accidents are reported to the medical service. Each year the licensee has to send a copy to the Ministry of Labour and the FANC. The registers of the licensee are stored during 30 years.

The intervals of the medical surveillance of the exposed workers are fixed by the medical officer, and depends on the risks at the installations. The medical control (routine) is at least once a year (6 months for the most exposed workers).

## 6.4.4.2 Contaminations

The contaminations are limited or excluded by the multiple barriers (confinement of radioactive materials, ventilation (depression cascade, rate of air renewal, etc..)).

Systematic measurements are performed periodically for the surface and air contamination (continuous air monitoring is also foreseen if required) in representative locations. Immediate action is taken should a problem be detected (decontamination of the surfaces).

The degree of the contamination has to be below about 4 and 0.4 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup> for respectively betagamma and alpha contamination during dry storage of spent fuel.

## 6.4.4.3 Discharges

Discharges are defined as authorised and controlled releases into the environment, within limits set by the Authority. In addition there are operational release limits (limiting the release on time based assumptions), linked with a scheme to notify the operators, the HPD, AVN, and the FANC. The results of the continuous monitoring of the atmospheric releases and the liquid discharges (routine releases) are periodically sent to AVN and the FANC for an additional check.

The Euratom 96/29 Directive has been implemented in the Belgian legislation and as required by Article 81.2 of the GRR-2001 the present authorised discharge limits (gaseous and liquid releases) are to be reviewed/revised. This revision is still going on, and has to take account of a dose constraint, that implements the ALARA principle and also takes the contribution of other sources of exposure into account.

For the storage of spent fuel, and of non-conditioned and conditioned radioactive waste, the atmospheric releases at the stack are a very small fraction of the authorised limits, and the impact for the critical exposed member of the public is a few nSv/year (based on a conservative approach for the dose calculations).

Storage facilities in Belgium involve pool storage and dry storage of intact fuel elements (at the NPPs, the SCK•CEN, Belgoprocess) and the storage of vitrified high level waste (at Belgoprocess).

For the dry storage of spent fuel there is a continuous monitoring of the leak tightness of the casks.

At the NPPs and at Belgoprocess, the liquid effluents are released via a single pipe which is continuously monitored and isolated in case an instantaneous limit is exceeded.

Environmental monitoring programmes (e.g. at SCK•CEN and Belgoprocess: emission, immission, dose rate, contamination, etc...) are established in agreement with the AVN and the FANC in order to follow the impact on the environment. These results are periodically evaluated by the HPD and AVN.

The data received through Belgium's Telerad automatic radiological monitoring network can also be used. Telerad is a network with principal aim to measure routinely the immissions and make measurements in case of an accident occurring in a Belgian nuclear site or abroad : in total, 183 measurements, from 183 detectors, of ambient radioactivity in air and water are collected, treated and sent to the computer server located at the FANC

## 6.4.5 International exchanges

The regulatory body and the Belgian licensees participate actively since 1991 in the ISOE (Information System on Occupational Exposure) programme of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).

Belgian representatives participate in the WENRA working group on Waste & Decommissioning. The main goal of this working group is the harmonisation of safety approaches for waste management and decommissioning. Several topics are dealt with, e.g.:

- management of very low level waste
- sharing experiences during cross inspections (exchange of practices)
- decommissioning policies

Belgium also participates in the relevant working groups set up by the European Commission, the NEA, UNSCEAR and the IAEA.

Finally, bilateral contacts have been established with neighbouring countries.

## 6.5 Article 25: Emergency preparedness

## 6.5.1 Regulatory framework

The emergency preparedness is primarily the responsibility of the Minister in charge of internal affairs. The law of 31 December 1963 defines the notion of Civil Protection, and the Royal Decree of 23 June 1971 organises the civil protection missions and the co-ordination of operations during calamities, catastrophes or disasters. The provisions to be applied in case of radiological accidents are described in the Royal decree of 17 October 2003 laying down the national emergency plan.

This national emergency plan sets the tasks of each of the involved parties. The relevant infrastructure is being provided accordingly.

This emergency plan for addressing nuclear risks on the Belgian territory aims at co-ordinating the measures to protect the population and the environment in the event of a nuclear accident or any other radiological emergency situation in which radioactive substances could be released and dispersed outside the nuclear installation.

This document is to serve as a guide for the protective measures to be implemented in the event of a necessity. It establishes the tasks that the various departments and organisations would have to accomplish if the case arises, each within their legal and regulatory competence.

The provisions of the emergency plan apply in the cases where the risk exists that the population could be exposed to significant radiological doses in any of the following ways:

- external irradiation due to air contamination and/or deposited radioactive substances;
- internal irradiation by inhalation of contaminated air and/or ingestion of contaminated water or food.

This plan has been designed essentially for:

- nuclear accidents or any other radiological emergency situations arising at the Belgian nuclear power plants of Doel or Tihange or in the other main Belgian nuclear installations such as the Nuclear Research Centre (SCK•CEN) at Mol, the "Institut des Radioéléments" (IRE) at Fleurus, Belgoprocess and Belgonucléaire at Dessel;
- the cases of detection of abnormal radioactivity on the Belgian territory or outside it.

It therefore covers all installations managing spent fuel or radioactive wastes.

This plan can also be activated in radiological emergency situations arising form accidents during transport of nuclear fuel, isotopes or radioactive waste, following re-entry of spacecraft containing

radioactive material, following accidents or situations involving military equipment or in military facilities, or during accidents at Belgian nuclear installations other than those referred to above (Thetis reactor in Ghent, FBFC in Dessel, IRMM in Geel,...). It also applies to terrorist actions using radiological dispersion devices.

The off-site operations are directed by the "Governmental Co-ordination and Crisis Centre" (CGCCR), under the authority of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The implementation of the actions decided at the federal level and the management of the intervention teams are conducted by the Governor of the Province concerned.

In addition to the duties defined in the Royal Decree of 17 October 2003, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) is a main actor within this emergency plan. Its role is defined in articles 15, 21 and 22 of the law of 15 April 1994, creating the FANC, and in articles 70, 71 and 72 of the GRR-2001. These articles stipulate that the FANC is responsible to survey, to control and to monitor the radioactivity on the territory and to deliver technical assistance to set up the emergency plan. It is also in charge of participating and/or organising operational cells (i.e. evaluation cell and measurements cell).

## 6.5.2 Implementation of emergency response organisation

## 6.5.2.1 Classification of emergencies

The Royal Decree of 17 October 2003 defines three levels for notification of emergencies, which are in ascending order of seriousness  $N_1$  to  $N_3$ , which the operator must use when warning the "Centre Gouvernemental de Coordination et de Crise - CGCCR" (i.e. the Governmental Centre for Co-ordination and Emergencies) which is composed of several units, called "cells", under the authority of the Minister of Internal Affairs. To cope with accidents characterized by a rapid kinetic, a fourth notification level ('reflex' level or  $N_R$ ) has been considered. This 'reflex' level is activated only when an accidental release of radioactive material could lead within 4 hours to a dose of the population in excess of one of the intervention levels set for sheltering, iodine prophylaxis and general evacuation. In such case the governor of the province hosting the nuclear site is immediately notified in parallel to the warning message to the CGCCR. For each of these 4 notification levels ( $N_1$  to  $N_3 + N_R$ ) the notification criteria are set in the Royal Decree of 17 October 2003. In addition, for each nuclear installation concerned, a set of particular types of events is established for each of the notification levels.


For example, the criterion associated with the  $N_1$  level is defined as follows: "Event which implies a potential or real degradation of the safety level of the installation and which could further degenerate with important radiological consequences for the surrounding area of the site. Radioactive releases are still small and there is thus no danger for the surrounding area of the site. (no action required to protect the population, the food chain or drinking-water). Actions to protect workers and visitors on site might be necessary."

Each of these 4 notification levels  $(N_1 \text{ to } N_3 + N_R)$  activates the federal emergency response plan. In addition to these four levels, a "N<sub>0</sub>" level is defined for notifying the Authorities in case of an operational anomaly. This last level does not activate the emergency response plan.

All emergencies  $(N_1 \text{ to } N_3 + N_R)$  have to be notified to the Governmental Centre for Co-ordination and Emergencies (CGCCR). This centre is permanently manned, alerts the cells involved in the crisis management at the federal level (Emergency and Co-ordinating Committee, evaluation cell, measurement cell, information cell, economico-social cell) and houses these cells during the crisis situation as well. The staffing of the crisis management cells is supposed to be operational at the CGCCR at least within two hours after the initial notification. The implementation of protective measures at the provincial level is expected to be performed within approximately three hours. The "Emergency Director" of the Authorities transforms the notification level into an alarm level  $(U_1 \text{ to } U_3)$ , putting into action the corresponding phase of the National Emergency Plan. In the case of N<sub>R</sub>, the governor of the province hosting the nuclear site immediately transforms the notification level into an U<sub>R</sub> alarm level. While the federal emergency response plan is being activated and without further information, he takes conservative remedial actions (limited to warning the population, advising to shelter and advising to listen to the radio and other media) in a pre-defined 'reflex' perimeter around the affected site. When the emergency cells are gathered and operational, the "Emergency Director" of the Authorities takes over the management of the crisis and transforms the alarm level  $U_R$  into an alarm level  $(U_1 \text{ to } U_3)$  according to the evaluation of the situation and possible consequences.

## 6.5.2.2 General overview of the organisation in the event of nuclear or radiological emergencies

The "Governmental Co-ordination and Crisis Centre" (CGCCR) is composed of the "Co-ordination and crisis Committee" chaired by the Emergency Director of the Authorities, the "Evaluation cell", the "Measurement cell" chaired by the FANC and the Information cell", as indicated in the figure below.



In case of an accident abroad, the information is channelled to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which informs the CGCCR. In addition, the quick exchange of information systems in case of a

nuclear accident developed by the IAEA and by the European Union (Ecurie) notify the CGCCR as National Warning Point (NWP) and the "Emergency Director" of the Authorities as National Competent Authority for accidents Abroad (NCA-A). These two information channels report to the CGCCR acting as the national warning point and are equivalent providing redundancy. Additional specific bilateral agreements, concluded with neighbouring countries and applicable in case of radiological emergencies, provide supplementary channels of alarm.

In case of an emergency in a Belgian nuclear installation, the licensee's "Emergency Director" has to inform the CGCCR and supply all the information that becomes known to him as the situation evolves.

The data received through Belgium's Telerad automatic radiological monitoring network can also be used by the CGCCR. Telerad is a network with principal aim to measure routinely the emissions and make measurements in case of an accident occurring in a Belgian nuclear site or abroad : ambient radioactivity in air and water are collected from a total of 183 measurements sites, treated and sent to the computer server located at the FANC. The monitoring of the Belgian territory consists in a measurement network having a 20 km mesh (76 air dose rate counters, 7 initiating alarms stations measuring  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  activity and iodine in aerosols, 9 meteorological masts). Besides, around the Belgian nuclear sites, the network consists of two rings: the first ring is on the site border and measures ambient radioactivity around the site, the second ring covers the near residential zone, between 3 and 8 km from the site, depending on the direction.

In addition, there are measurements along the Belgian border, in the vicinity of foreign nuclear power plants (Chooz, Gravelines, Borssele).

The Federal Coordination Committee immediately meets when a notification level  $N_R$  is declared or as soon as the Emergency Director decides a U<sub>2</sub> (or higher) alarm level. Based on the information from the evaluation cell the Committee decides whether protection measures for the population and/or the food chain or drinking-water supply are necessary, and manages the (federal and provincial) Authorities intervention during the accident. These decisions are sent to the Provincial Emergency Centre to be implemented by the different intervention teams (fire brigade, police, emergency medical services,...).

The evaluation cell is composed of representatives of the relevant organizations, in particular FANC (chair), the Federal Public Service of Public Health, the Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs (for accidents abroad), the Department of Defence, the Royal Institute of Meteorology, and of experts of the Mol Nuclear Research Centre, the "Institut national des Radioéléments", and of AVN as the AIO that supervises these installations, as well as of a representative of the operator of the installation. This cell has to evaluate the situation in radiological terms and advise the Emergency and Co-ordination Committee about protective measures for the population and the environment. The recommendations about the measures to be taken to protect the population and the environment are elaborated on the basis of pre-established intervention levels. These levels are given in the Decision of the FANC of 17 October 2003. The evaluation cell receives the information from the operator, from the measurement cell and from the institutions that are part of the evaluation cell and which can help to understand the actual situation and its probable evolution. It is responsible for notifying the international organisations (European Commission, IAEA) and threatened neighbouring countries in case of an accident near the Belgian territory and for communicating further relevant information in accordance with the "Early Notification of Accidents Convention" and "Ecurie" convention.

The measurement cell coordinates all the activities aimed at collecting the radiological information, based on ambient radiological measurements depending on the various exposure modes. It rapidly transmits the collected and validated information to the evaluation cell.

The "Information cell" is the CGCCR's communication channel with the public, the media, the international organisations (European Commission, IAEA), and the neighbouring countries.

The economico-social cell advises the Federal Co-ordination Committee on the feasibility and economico-social consequences of their decisions; it informs the Federal Coordination Committee about the follow-up and ensure the management of the post-accidental phase and an as prompt as possible return to normal life.

The "Co-ordination and Crisis Committee" immediately meets as soon as the Emergency Director of the Authorities decides a  $U_2$  (or higher) alarm level. Based on the advice of the evaluation cell the Committee decides about the necessity (and their extents) of protection measures for the population and/or the food chain or drinking water supply, and manages the (federal and provincial) Authorities intervention during the accident. The decisions are then transmitted to the Provincial Crisis Centre to be implemented by the different emergency services (fire brigade, police, emergency medical services,...).

The Royal Decree of 17 October 2003 sets the emergency planning zones relative to the direct measures to protect the population (evacuation, sheltering, iodine prophylaxis). These evacuation and sheltering zones vary from 4 to 10 km radius depending on the nuclear plant concerned; the stable iodine tablets pre-distribution zones extend to 20 km around the nuclear plants.

The National Emergency Plan is under continuous improvement as concerns the organisation and the infrastructures: stable iodine tablets distributed around the nuclear sites (last campaign 04/2002), the working procedures developed, investments made at local level, Telerad put into service, sirens installed around the nuclear installations, etc. The web site address of Telerad is : www.telerad.fgov.be.

# 6.5.2.3 Internal and external emergency plans for nuclear installations, training and exercises, international agreements

Each licensee of a nuclear installation has to establish an on-site emergency response plan to be approved by the regulatory body. This on-site emergency plan details the responsibilities, the roles and functions of all actors and the dedicated infrastructure, such as the On Site Technical Centre or the Emergency Operations Facility. This on-site emergency plan is regularly tested, as required in the Royal Decree of 17 October 2003.

The General Directorate of the Civil Protection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs organises once a year and for each nuclear site concerned an emergency response exercise. According to the intended objectives aimed at, the Ministry includes different topics in these annual exercises (fire rescue, health care, police services, field measurements teams,...). The operator is then put in charge of building an appropriate scenario.

During the exercises, the information corresponding to the scenario is gradually forwarded to the various participants; the Training Centre simulator may in certain cases also be used as a source of information.

Information exchange at international level is performed through the Governmental Co-ordination and Crisis Centre (CGCCR), which has contacts with the competent Authorities of the neighbouring countries, and which is the "national contact point" for Nuclear Accident Early Notification Convention (IAEA) for the similar European Union system (ECURIE).

Agreements also exist at local and provincial level. The protocol Agreement between the province of "Noord Brabant" (The Netherlands) and the province of Antwerp (Belgium) provides for a direct

line between the alarm station of Roosendaal (The Netherlands) and that of Antwerp, informing it as soon as the alert level  $U_2$  notification is decided. This direct line is also used when certain accidents occur in the chemical industry (installations subject to the European post-Seveso Directive). A direct information exchange can also take place between the alarm station of Vlissingen (The Netherlands) and that of Ghent should an accident occur at the Borssele nuclear power plant. For the Chooz and Tihange nuclear power plants, there are agreements between the Prefecture of the Ardennes department (France) and the province of Namur (Belgium).

In the frame of the agreement between the Government of France and the Government of Belgium about the Chooz nuclear power plant and the exchange of information during incidents or accidents, a mutual alarm is foreseen between the two countries in case of an accident occurring in the nuclear power plants at Tihange, Chooz or Gravelines. This alarm takes place between the CGCCR on the Belgian side and the "COGIC", "Centre opérationnel de gestion interministérielle des crises") on the French side.

During the exercises of Chooz (June 2000, May 2003) and of Gravelines (May 2001) that transborder collaboration was actually tested at the local and national levels. In addition a direct exchange of technical and radiological information took place between the organisations in charge of the expertise (IRSN on the French side, AVN on the Belgian side) and of the advice (Nuclear Safety Authority in France, Evaluation Cell of CGCCR in Belgium) and was quite successful. As regards independent evaluation in the event of an emergency, AVN which oversees the affected installation sends a representative to that site, a representative to the evaluation cell of the CGCCR, and activates its own headquarters emergency centre. This emergency centre has its own infrastructure (dedicated telephone and facsimile lines, computer means, ...). Based on the technical information available at its head office, AVN proceeds with a technical analysis of the situation and evaluates the radiological consequences from the expected releases. These evaluations of the consequences to the environment are performed with specific tools available in the AVN emergency centre.

## 6.5.2.4 Information of the public

The GRR-2001 specifies in its Article 72 all the obligations regarding training and information of the public pursuant to the Euratom 89/618 Directive. During the accident itself, information is supplied to the media by the information cell of the CGCCR. At local level the provincial emergency plan includes the ways to inform the population (sirens, police equipped with megaphones, radio and television) and following-up the instructions given to the population (iodine tablets, sheltering, evacuation, etc.).

## 6.6 Article 26: Decommissioning

#### 6.6.1 Legal framework related to decommissioning and liability management.

Legal assignments regarding the *management* of decommissioning and related liabilities have been entrusted since 1991 by Royal Decree to ONDRAF/NIRAS. The responsibilities involve:

- the approval of decommissioning plans,
- the elaboration of mechanisms for building up financial provisions for the execution of programmes, in agreement with the operator or the owner of the facilities,

• the execution of decommissioning programmes as requested by the owner or in case of failure.

These legal assignments have been extended by law in December 1997 to all nuclear installations and sites containing radioactive substances. ONDRAF/NIRAS is in charge of elaborating and reviewing every five years a national inventory comprising a database of all nuclear installations and sites concerned, and of assessing their decommissioning and remediation costs. ONDRAF/NIRAS is also responsible for verifying the existence of sufficient financial provisions to cover the execution of the programmes. A report on the situation must be submitted to its supervising Minister which may constrain the responsible body to take the necessary actions to avoid further uncovered "nuclear liabilities".

The results of the first national inventory exercise were submitted to the State Secretary for Energy and Sustainable Development in January 2003. The second national inventory is in preparation and will be submitted in 2008.

## 6.6.2 Implementation of the legal requirements

## 6.6.2.1 Decommissioning planning

To fulfil its legal assignments related to the collection and evaluation of decommissioning programmes of nuclear plants in Belgium, ONDRAF/NIRAS defined and implemented the structure of the *decommissioning plans*, based on the recommendations of the IAEA.

An initial decommissioning plan is set up by the licensees for new facilities and facilities in operation for which the ending of activities is not planned in the short term. This plan needs to be reviewed every five years or more frequently in the case of major modifications to the nuclear facility. The final decommissioning plan is submitted to ONDRAF/NIRAS three years before the foreseen final shutdown of the facility or part of the facility.

In 2004, ONDRAF/NIRAS has communicated to Belgonucléaire the approval final decommissioning plan of the Belgonucléaire production facility: this plan had been submitted to ONDRAF/NIRAS in 2003.

## 6.6.2.2 Decommissioning programmes

The operator or the owner of a nuclear facility can call upon ONDRAF/NIRAS for the execution of his decommissioning programme. In this case, ONDRAF/NIRAS has to conclude a convention with the operator or owner covering the technical and financial aspects of the decommissioning.

Up to now, the Belgian government has entrusted ONDRAF/NIRAS by conventions with the management of the nuclear liability funds SCK•CEN, Belgoprocess 1 (BP1), Belgoprocess 2 (BP2) and IRE.

# 6.6.2.2.1 Liability fund SCK•CEN

The SCK•CEN nuclear liability fund was raised in 1990 and aims at financing the decommissioning of all nuclear facilities existing before 1989 on the Nuclear Research Centre SCK•CEN site in Mol, as well as the management of all the historical waste present on the site. These facilities cover:

- the BR1 complex with a graphite moderated research reactor and the VENUS zero-power reactor. Both reactors are still in operation;
- the BR2 complex, a material testing reactor which was restarted in 1997 after two years of refurbishment;
- the BR3 reactor, a pilot PWR shut down in 1987 and currently being decommissioned;
- the laboratory buildings containing mainly hot-cells and glove boxes,
- a farm and pastures.

Beside the nuclear installations, the fund also covers the management of spent fuel from these reactors as well as the management of other "exotic" fissile materials and specific special waste which are still stored on the site.

The decommissioning activities are executed mainly by the SCK•CEN staff following annual programmes and budgets which have to be approved by ONDRAF/NIRAS. These activities are in line with the decommissioning plans which were elaborated by SCK•CEN for these installations and were approved by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

# 6.6.2.2.2 Liability funds BP1 & BP2

The BP1 & BP2 liability funds were raised in 1989 to finance the decommissioning and the remediation of respectively the former EUROCHEMIC reprocessing plant and its associated activities in Dessel (site BP1), and the former waste processing sites of the Nuclear Research Centre SCK•CEN in Mol (site BP2). All these facilities are located on the two BELGOPROCESS nuclear sites in Mol and Dessel.

The former EUROCHEMIC facilities cover:

- the reprocessing plant which is being decommissioned since 1986;
- the vitrification plant PAMELA. As the last vitrification operation took place in September 1991, this installation is being adapted for the treatment and conditioning of alpha bearing waste and medium active waste.
- the bituminisation plant EUROBITUMEN which is in operational stand-by;
- waste storage buildings containing medium- and high-level waste conditioned during and after the reprocessing activities.

The former waste processing installations of the BP2 site cover:

- waste processing installations;
- waste storage and processing facilities containing special waste.

The decommissioning activities are executed by the BELGOPROCESS staff following annual programs and budgets which have to be approved by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

# 6.6.2.2.3 Liability fund IRE

The IRE liability fund was raised in 1997 to finance the management of waste and irradiated uranium respectively produced and used during the operation of the *Institut National des Radioéléments* (IRE), a nuclear facility producing mainly radioisotopes for nuclear medicine.

#### 6.6.3 The financing of decommissioning programmes

Financial provisions not treated in this article are dealt with in article 22.

#### 6.6.3.1 Programmes without financial provisioning during operation

For the moment, the clearly identified nuclear facilities in Belgium for which no financial provisions were raised, are owned or were owned in the past directly or indirectly (via the public sector) by the Belgian State. For these facilities, decommissioning and site remediation or, in one specific case, waste and spent fuel management, are financed by a levy mechanism on the transported kWh, as determined in the law of 24 March 2003. This Law guarantees the financing of the BP1 and BP1 passives till the completion of the corresponding dismantling and waste conditioning activities.

#### 6.6.3.1.1 Liability fund SCK•CEN

Annual endowments for decommissioning all nuclear facilities existing on the SCK•CEN site in Mol before 1989 are spread over the period 1989 - 2019.

#### 6.6.3.1.2 Liability funds BP1 & BP2

The BP1 & BP2 liability funds were raised in 1989 to finance respectively the former EUROCHEMIC reprocessing facilities in Dessel (BP1) and the former waste processing activities of the Nuclear Research Centre SCK•CEN in Mol (BP2). Financing of these activities are guaranteed by a Royal Decree via an annual federal contribution fixed until the year 2008.

#### 6.6.3.1.3 Liability fund IRE

The liability fund was raised in 1997 and will last until the activities covered by the fund are over, namely the management of waste and irradiated uranium respectively produced and used during the operation of the *Institut National des Radioéléments* (IRE). The cost of the decommissioning activities will be covered by a separate agreement with the Belgian State through an additional fund, which is currently still in negotiation.

# 6.6.3.2 Settlement of provisions during plant operation

One of the main tasks of ONDRAF/NIRAS is to avoid lack of financial means for the execution of future decommissioning programmes (article 9 of the Program Law of 12 December 1997). Therefore, ONDRAF/NIRAS has to control the existence and the sufficiency of provisions to be set up by the operator or the owner of nuclear facilities and sites contaminated by radioisotopes. Nevertheless, the legal responsibility for building up sufficient provisions remains with the operator or the owner.

Decommissioning and remediation costs as well as the annual financial provisions are re-evaluated periodically.

The annual provisions are calculated on the basis of the best estimates of the decommissioning and remediation costs for the year of the evaluation. The final objective is to constitute the total amount of financial means at the final shutdown of the facility. This way, the provisions are raised during the operational lifetime while the facility is still providing benefits.

# 7 Section G: Safety of Spent fuel Management

# 7.1 Article 4: General safety provisions

# 7.1.1 Sites at Doel and Tihange

The installations are described in appendix 1.

The residual heat generated during the spent fuel management is removed, depending on the storage mode. Three storage modes are used:

- in fuel-cooling pools in the units;
- in containers in building SCG (Doel);
- in pools in building DE (Tihange).

# 7.1.1.1 Fuel-cooling pools in the units.

The fuel-cooling pools are located in the buildings "GNH" (Doel 1/2), "SPG" (Doel 3/4), "BAN" (Tihange 1) and "D" (Tihange 2/3).

The residual heat is removed by the fuel pool purification system of each unit (PL at Doel and CTP at Tihange); these systems are designed to remove the residual power generated by the spent fuel assemblies, even if the external power supply is down.

Calculation codes recognised by the safety authorities were used to verify that the  $K_{eff}$  (neutron multiplication rate) does not exceed the criteria in normal and accidental conditions. The calculations have not taken into account a potential presence of boric acid in the system (what is conservative). Burn-up credit is involved in the criticality analyses, with the approval of the Safety Authorities, on a case-by-case basis.

# 7.1.1.2 Containers in building SCG (Doel)

#### Containers:

The storage containers are designed in such a way that the residual decay heat is removed passively by convection and radiation. The thermal power removed by the container is determined to reduce as much as possible the maximum temperature of the fuel can in normal storage conditions (300 to 400°C depending on the container model), in order to guarantee in the long term the fuel integrity. The data used for the design of these containers are penalising with regard to the power history of fuel assemblies and their cooling time before being loaded in containers.

It has been verified that the containers meet the IAEA requirements for the analysis of the subcriticality. In particular, we obtain a  $K_{eff}$  lower than 0.95 by taking penalising hypotheses as regards the size and the nuclear characteristics of the fuel assemblies plunged into pure water.

# Building SCG:

The spent fuel storage building (SCG) has been designed to remove through natural circulation the calories produced by all the storage containers stored in the building.

The equivalent dose rates due to neutron and gamma-radiation have been calculated inside and outside the storage building when it is completely filled with the number of containers planned during the design phase. In order to make a conservative calculation of the dose rate, it was supposed that each container emits the accepted dose rate limit at 2 meters and that the containers were all stored at the same time.

In these extremely penalising conditions, it was demonstrated that the dose rate at the site limit remains far below the accepted maximum dose.

# 7.1.1.3 Pool building DE (Tihange).

The heat generated by the spent fuel assemblies is removed by three systems operating in cascade. These systems – which are physically separated – are permanently operating in the normal operational conditions of the installations.

The first system, named 'STP', is composed of a heat exchanger that transfers the heat emitted in the pool water to the second system.

This second system, called 'intermediary cooling system' (SRI), is part of the intermediate cooling system (CRI) of the Tihange 3 nuclear facilities. Via an exchanger, this CRI system transfers the heat extracted from the STP system to the third circuit.

This last, named 'raw water system' (CEB), cools down the heat in the CRI system with water pumped from the river Meuse. After having flowed through the exchangers between the CRI and CEB systems, this water is released in the river Meuse.

The CEB system constitutes the normal cold source in building DE.

If the raw water supply is unavailable (in accidental conditions), the groundwater of the Tihange nuclear power plant site is used as an alternative cold source.

Calculation codes licensed by the regulatory body were used to verify that the  $K_{eff}$  (neutron multiplication rate) does not exceed the criteria in normal and accidental conditions. The calculations have not taken into account a potential presence of boric acid in the system (what is conservative).

The fuel management has been designed to minimise the number of fuel assemblies used in the reactor core and to comply with the limitations regarding the discharged fuel radiation rate. This management policy keeps intrinsically the production of radioactive waste at the lowest level possible.

The mechanical features of the fuel cans, especially corrosion resistance, have been improved by using new alloys.

The coherence of the measurements described in the previous paragraphs has been verified at every step of the spent fuel management.

# 7.1.1.4 Specificity of the Tihange site

# 7.1.1.4.1 Intermediary storage in buildings «BAN» (Tihange 1) and «D» (Tihange 2/3)

The intermediary storage buildings as well as the installations and systems integrated in these buildings have been designed and built according to the safety principles, the general design criteria, the building standards in force at the time when the nuclear power generating units were designed and built.

These safety principles and general criteria, approved by the Belgian Safety Authorities, are mainly those in force in the American regulation accepted on international level.

The design of these buildings complies with the provisions set out in the GRR-1963, now replaced by the GRR-2001.

#### 7.1.1.4.2 Intermediary storage building DE

The design requirements for the safety of building DE are the same as for building D of unit 3. They are mentioned in the Safety Analysis Report of this unit:

- Building DE is designed to resist earthquakes and other natural phenomena like violent wind, tornado and flood.
- The building is also designed to cope with external accidents such as an airplane crash, an explosion accompanied by a shock wave and projectiles and to avoid the seepage of explosive gas inside the installations.
- The entrance is controlled.
- The mechanical and electrical systems and the instrumentation are qualified for their specific use.
- The shields and other measures (i.e. pipe arrangement, pool water purification) make it possible to meet the requirements of the regulations on radiological protection.
- The design also includes considering the particular recommendations set out in the American and international regulations for this kind of installations.
- This building is located within the perimeter of the Tihange 3 site, and is therefore an integral part of the Tihange 3 installations.
- The different services of the Tihange nuclear power plant cover, each for its own field, all the activities related to this building. More specifically:
  - Radiological surveillance activities and surveillance of the installations;
  - Fuel handling;
  - Fuel transport from buildings BAN to building DE.

#### 7.1.1.5 Specificity of the Doel site

#### 7.1.1.5.1 Intermediary storage in the buildings "GNH" (Doel 1/2) and "SPG" (Doel 3/4)

The intermediate storage buildings as well as the installations and systems that are integrated in these buildings have been designed and constructed according to the safety principles, the general design criteria, the building standards in force at the time when the nuclear power generating units were designed and built.

These safety principles and general criteria, approved by the Belgian Safety Authorities, are mainly those in force in the American regulations.

The design of these buildings complies with the provisions of GRR-2001.

# 7.1.1.5.2 Intermediate storage building SCG

At Doel, the intermediate storage safety functions are fulfilled mainly by the storage containers. The storage container models are approved by the FANC for transport, and comply therefore with the IAEA transport regulations.

The storage configuration of the containers is a bit different from the transport configuration and the regulation in force on the site is applied.

The design of the intermediary storage - i.e. the containers configured for the storage and the storage building - complies with the provisions of GRR-1963 which was replaced later by GRR-2001.

In general, the design requirements for the intermediate storage are the same as those in force for the generating units on the site:

- The containers must resist seismic loads and the consequences of other natural phenomena like violent wind and tornado.
- The containers have been designed to cope with external accidents such as an airplane crash, an explosion accompanied by a shock wave and projectiles.
- The entrance into the building is controlled.
- The shields of the containers and of the storage building make it possible to meet the requirements set out in the regulations on radiological protection.
- This building is located within the perimeter of the Doel nuclear power plant. It is independent from the generating units. The management of this building is connected with the management of the waste processing installations (WAB).
- The different services of the Doel nuclear power plant cover, each for its own field, all the activities related to this building. More specifically:
  - Radiological surveillance activities
  - Surveillance of the installations;
  - Fuel handling;
  - Control of the tightness;
  - Accountancy of the assemblies and controls in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The general safety provisions consider the biological, chemical and other risks resulting from the management of the spent fuel.

During the operation and in the frame of the ten-yearly reviews, the operator takes the appropriate measures to comply with the regulations in force, including recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the International Atomic Energy Agency. From now on, financial provisions are accumulated for the future execution of the spent fuel management programme.

# 7.1.2 SCK•CEN site: BR2

Additional information may be found in appendix 4

#### 7.1.2.1 Spent fuel storage

The spent fuel and radioactive materials stored under water in Side-pools are cooled by the pool water circuit.

BR2 standard fuel elements are stored under water, mainly for shielding reasons. Storing this kind of fuel is foreseen in the containment building and in the storage canal in the machine hall. The transfer of BR2 fuel elements can only take place 100 days after their last irradiation considering the 131I content and the residual power.

Irradiated standard fuel elements are manipulated in the reactor pool or in the storage canal either single or in a transfer basket, which can contain up to 9 standard fuel elements in an annular configuration. In case the fuel elements have the most reactive state, they cannot reach the criticality level, even if they fall out of the basket. The fuel elements are locked in their baskets during handling operations.

A single fuel element could approach a storage rack with other standard fuel elements. The distance between axes, however, is still larger than 120 mm (> 44.5 mm between surfaces), corresponding to a k<sub>eff</sub> value of 0.9 for an infinite array in square lattice of this distance. As regards the wet-sipping rack, the minimum distance may be 121.5mm between axes, but the other fuel elements are more distant from each other, and a critical assembly cannot be formed in this way.

As far as the racks for 200 mm type fuel elements are concerned, these fuel elements are neutronically nearly uncoupled. The distance between surfaces (75mm) is sufficient to avoid criticality, taking into account that the 200 mm type fuel element contains a cadmium screen. The tight tubes used for the transfer are stored with a protective cover.

# 7.1.2.2 Criticality considerations

A maximum admissible limit of  $k_{eff} < 0.90$  has been fixed for every storage place.

The different types of standard fuel element (alloy A, cermet C, G or E) did not have to be considered individually, as the experimental evidence shows that the most reactive state of any BR2 standard fuel element is the state of a fresh alloy fuel element. Criticality calculations of standard BR2 fuel assemblies are therefore conservative, if they concern fresh alloy fuel elements of the type VIn A 244 g<sup>235</sup>U.

Generic studies were carried out on the storage of several kinds of fuel and to find simple rules that encompass some cases of fuel arrangements. Other fuel elements or experimental fuel rods have to comply with the preceding criteria.

# 7.1.2.3 Cooling

*The pool water circuit* transfers the heat produced in the reactor pool (870 m<sup>3</sup>) and the side-pools to the secondary cooling circuit through two heat exchangers having a total capacity of 2.9 MW. This circuit consists of the following loops:

- cooling,
- purification,
- auxiliary.

The circulation in the cooling line of the reactor pool is maintained by 2 pumps, each with a flow of 420 m<sup>3</sup>/h (one in service and the other in standby). A third one of 90 m<sup>3</sup>/h is used when the reactor is stopped. The flow in the side-pools is ensured by 2 pumps of 85 m<sup>3</sup>/h (one in service and the other in standby).

Before entering the reactor pool, the cooling water flows through the reactor shroud to ensure the cooling of the outside wall of the reactor vessel and of the beam-tube walls in the vicinity of the vessel.

Part of the flow of this line also cools down the beam-ports in the pool wall in order to evacuate the heat generated by the gamma heating.

When the pumps stop, the shutdown pump with a flow of 90 m<sup>3</sup>/h starts automatically to evacuate the residual heat.

In case of loss of integrity of the dam, the water in the side-pools is kept at a minimum level of 2.2 m, enough to keep the fuel elements under water.

The *main secondary water circuit* evacuates into the air the heat removed from the reactor by the primary circuit and the pool circuit; afterwards, it cools down the gas condenser of the primary degasifier. This circuit consists of the following loops:

- cooling,
- purification,
- auxiliaries.

The circulation in the cooling loop is maintained by 4 pumps each with a flow of  $39.2 \text{ m}^3/\text{min}$  and a pressure head of 4 kg/cm<sup>2</sup>. Each pump is driven in direct coupling by an electric motor of 500 HP.

When the reactor is operating, there are 2 or 3 pumps in service, depending on the power of the reactor, and one pump in stand-by.

The fourth pump in stand-by is equipped with a progressive opening which is used when restarting the secondary circuit. This avoids shocks in the piping.

# 7.2 Article 5: Existing Installations

# 7.2.1 Sites in Doel and Tihange

The installations are described in appendix 1.

The measures to investigate and improve the safety of the spent fuel management installations are addressed below.

# 7.2.1.1 Ten-yearly safety reviews

The Licence of each Belgian nuclear power plant makes it mandatory to conduct ten-yearly safety reviews starting from the inspection acceptance (granted during the first operation at full power). As a result, the operator and AVN compare together, on the one hand, the conditions of the installations and the implementation of the procedures that apply to them, and, on the other hand, the regulations, codes and practices in force in the United States and in the European Union.

A joint report is established highlighting the differences found, the necessity and possibility of remedial actions and, as the case may be, the improvements that can be made and the time schedule for their implementation. The report is transmitted to the FANC.

The objectives of a ten-yearly review have been defined as follows:

- show that the unit has at least the same level of safety as it had when the licence was granted to operate it at full power;
- inspect the condition of the unit, devoting more particular attention to ageing and wear and to the other factors which may affect its safe operation during the next ten years;
- justify the unit's current level of safety, taking into account the most recent safety regulations and practices and, if necessary, propose appropriate improvements.

# 7.2.1.2 Safety assessments

During the operation of the installations, experience feedback leads the operator to consider some modifications to the installations.

The proposals for modifications to the installations are examined by the Health Physics Department of the operator, and AVN is informed. The procedure is described in article 14 of the National Report established for the second meeting of the Contracting Parties in the framework of the Nuclear Safety Convention. In short, the proposal is classified into one of the three following categories:

- major modifications changing the basic characteristics of the unit. These modifications are subject to a licence under the provisions of Article 12 of the GRR-2001. The safety analysis performed by AVN is presented to the FANC, and a rider will be established to the Licence Decree (Royal Decree). The implementation of that modification will be authorised by the unit's HPD and by AVN.
- minor modifications having a potential impact on safety. The modification file is established by the requesting department, possibly with outside help, such as Tractebel Engineering, is presented for approval to the Unit or Site Operation Committee and is examined by the Health Physics Department. After this, it is examined by AVN, which may result in amendments being ordered to the modification file. When AVN is of the opinion that the file is acceptable, it approves the modification application, and the implementation may start. Commissioning the completed modification is subject to a positive acceptance report, issued after validation of the modification and requalification of the portion of the installation that was modified and the updating of the operation documents. AVN issues a final acceptance report (operating licence) when all the files, procedures and the Safety Analysis Report have been adequately updated. This process is followed up by the FANC, which may intervene if deemed necessary.
- modifications without impact on safety, that usually do not imply modification of the Safety Analysis Report and which comply with all the safety rules applicable to the installation. These modifications have to be approved only by the Health Physics Department of the unit, without formal involvement of AVN.

Based on operational feedback, a number of modifications have been made, such as (not exhaustive):

- o modifications of the overhead handling cranes;
- o modifications to the access doors;
- o replacement of certain neutron-absorbing materials (boraflex) by steel sheets containing boron;

o modifications to the handling and transfer systems of spent fuel shipping containers.

# 7.2.1.3 Surveillance programmes

The technical specifications (chapter 16 of the Safety Analysis Report) prescribe for each status of the unit the operational limits and conditions, specifying also the actions to be taken if limits are exceeded. They also list the controls and tests to be performed and their frequency.

Specific programmes are established, in particular for:

- inspections and controls
- tests

Each safety-related equipment has a qualification file that contains all the qualification test requirements and results. In this file are also recorded the results of ageing tests (based on IEEE 323 and the Arrhénius law) or experience feedback of similar equipment, defining the qualified life of the equipment. The qualified life determines the frequency of replacement of that equipment, which can be re-assessed depending on the real operation conditions and location of that equipment.

# 7.2.2 SCK•CEN site: BR2

Additional information may be found in appendix 4

The steps to investigate and improve the safety of the spent fuel management installations are dealt with below.

# 7.2.2.1 Ten-yearly reviews

The Royal Decree granting the licence N.0024 of 30 June 1986 for the operation of SCK•CEN makes it mandatory to conduct ten-yearly safety reviews starting from the inspection acceptance (granted during the first operation at full power). This general delay is reduced to five years for the BR2.

As a result, the licensee must compare, on the one hand, the conditions of the installations and the implementation of the procedures that apply to them, and, on the other hand, the regulations, codes and practices.

Like for nuclear power installations, a joint report is established with AVN highlighting the differences found, the necessity and possibility of remedial action and, as the case may be, the improvements that can be made and the time schedule for their implementation. The report is transmitted to the FANC.

The objectives of a ten-yearly review have been defined as follows:

- demonstrate that the installation has at least the same level of safety as it had when the licence was granted to operate it;
- inspect the condition of the installations, devoting more particular attention to ageing and wear and to the other factors which may affect its safe operation during the next ten years;
- justify the current safety level of the installations, taking into account the most recent safety regulations and practices and, if necessary, propose appropriate improvements.

# 7.2.2.2 Safety assessments

Operation experience might bring the operator to consider performing certain modifications to the installations.

In order to guarantee a safe and reliable operation of BR2, it is necessary to observe specific prescriptions with regard to the modifications of materials and/or installations. The aim is:

- To guarantee that the quality of the systems and components is not lost due to the modifications;
- To guarantee the compliance with the description in the licence documents;
- To guarantee a safe and reliable operation.

A standard application and modification form with regard to the installations is presented.

#### Overview

#### Committee on the Modification of Installations (CWI/CMI):

After receipt of the application, an investigation and assessment are performed by the Committee. It is only after its advice is obtained, that the application will be submitted to the Internal Office for Prevention and Protection at Work (IDPBW/SIPPT) & the HPD. The modifications need to be:

• Either sufficiently small (GRR-2001 art. 12);

• Or having no negative effect on the safety in case they are considerable; (RD N°0024 art. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4).

A preliminary investigation of this modification is also necessary in order to verify if it fits within the framework of the special licence conditions, implying that no additional licence is needed.

Modifications having an important impact on safety and on the reactor need to be approved by the "Committee COP-RVC", in addition to the approval by the recognized inspection organisation. The final approval has to be given by the Head of the Department BR2.

# 7.2.2.3 Surveillance programmes

A surveillance programme is established in order to guarantee the quality of all safety-related activities in the company, in case of a shutdown, as well as during maintenance works.

The general surveillance programme is applicable to all BR2 systems and is based on the legal provisions, standards, the internal safety and quality programme and the procedures and instructions of the manufacturer.

The periodicity of the checks needs to be guaranteed, depending on the safety, the possibility of failure and the above-mentioned documents. In the absence of these documents, reference is made to the constructor's or own experience. A decrease of the frequency is only permitted if regulations or licence conditions allow so.

# 7.2.2.3.1 Types of inspection

# Periodical inspections

Almost all of the inspections belong to this category. Nevertheless, the definition of periodicity can take on many forms, e.g. time interval, number of effective working hours, as a result of an incident, at the start of a new cycle...etc.

These inspections consist mainly of the following activities:

Inspection of structures, systems and components;

Operational checking (quality);

calibrations (quantity).

OVERVIEW OF PERIODICAL INSPECTIONS					
Safety	CLASSICAL/NUCLEAR				
Frequency	≥ 3 months followed by an internal supervision programme	-< 3 months -Cyclic -Daily			
Legal	RGPT / AREI / R.D. N.0024				
Voluntary	Risk reducing / Q.A. manuals / Standards / IAEA Safety Standards				

# Occasional inspections

Non-periodical inspections are also possible, e.g. on demand of AVN or FANC, or on the initiative of the HPD.

# Inspections before operation

The company ensures that the products, machines, devices, installations, equipments, etc.. supplied, are not being used or processed before it is verified that they meet the safety requirements prescribed;

The entrance inspection can range from an ordinary identity control of the product supplied, based on the accompanying delivery note or order form to an extensive inspection of the observance of the safety requirements prescribed.

# 7.3 Article 6: Siting of proposed facilities

The installations are described in appendix 1.

The current spent fuel management installations have been sited after evaluation and consideration of the relevant factors related to the sites.

# 7.3.1 Sites in Doel and Tihange

# 7.3.1.1 Siting

# Characteristics taken into account for the selection of the sites

The Doel and Tihange nuclear power sites were originally evaluated according to the requirements set by the US rules (Chapter 2 of the Safety Analysis Report, Standard Review Plan, 10 CFR 100). These requirements apply to the phenomena of natural origin (earthquakes, floods, extreme temperatures,...) and to the phenomena of human origin (industrial environment, transports,...). With regard to the natural phenomena:

- The geological and seismic characteristics of the sites and their surrounding area were specifically investigated in order to identify the soil characteristics and the earthquake spectrums that must be considered when designing the structures and systems.
- The hydrological characteristics of the rivers Meuse and Scheldt were investigated, not only to quantify the risk of floods and possible loss of the heat sink, but also in order to develop the river flow models in order to evaluate the impact on dilution of released liquid effluent.
- Meteorological and climatic surveys made it possible to define the atmospheric diffusion and dispersion models to be used when assessing the short-term and long-term environmental impacts of atmospheric releases considering the local characteristics. These studies were complemented with demographic surveys in the vicinity of these sites.
- Concerning the population density around the sites, no specific criterion was set originally. But the design of the installations made allowance for the existing situation: the "low population zone" of the USNRC rules is in fact within the site. Consequently the radiological consequences of incidents or accidents are calculated for the critical group living at the site border or in any other location outside the site where the calculated consequences are the most important.

With regard to the external events of human origin:

• Due to the population density in the vicinity of the sites, and also considering the impact that the local industrial activities may have on the power stations, specific requirements were adopted: protection against external accidents such as civil or military airplane crash, gas explosion, toxic gas cloud, major fire.

#### Periodic reassessment of the sites characteristics

These reassessments are systematically performed in the frame of the ten-yearly safety reviews of each unit.

For the Tihange site, the safe shutdown earthquake considered originally (early seventies) for Tihange 1 was of 0.1 g acceleration. This value was increased to 0.17 g following the Tihange 2 safety analysis (end of the seventies). As a consequence, the latter value was adopted for the site as a whole; it did not need to be modified following the analysis of the earthquake that occurred in Liège in 1983.

The seismic reassessment of Tihange 1 was performed during its first ten-yearly safety review in 1985.

This resulted in a considerable number of reinforcements being made in certain buildings, and in the seismic qualification of the equipment being re-examined (using the methodology developed by the US Seismic Qualification Utility Group).

During the ten-yearly safety reviews of each unit, studies are performed and, where necessary, measures are implemented to ensure that the residual risk following external accidents remains acceptable considering the surrounding area of the site with respect to the risks resulting from transport, aircraft or industrial activities.

#### International agreements

Informing neighbouring countries when planning a nuclear installation is required by Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, and as a consequence is mandatory in Belgium (cf. the GRR-2001). The reports drawn up to meet this requirement have been submitted to the European Commission as part of the licensing procedure for the Belgian power stations. Having consulted the "Article 37" group of experts, the Commission issued a favourable advice for the sites of Doel and Tihange. Direct information of the neighbouring countries which might undergo notable consequences on their territory is an obligation deriving from the Euratom 85/337 Directive about the assessment of the environmental impact of some private or public projects.

# 7.3.1.2 Measures

The appropriate measures to ensure that such facilities have not unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties are listed in article 4 (see above).

# 7.3.2 SCK•CEN Site: BR2

Additional information may be found in appendix 4.

# 7.3.2.1 Siting

The SCK•CEN installations were sited in 1953. The selection had to comply with the regulations in force at that time for the construction and operation of the installations.

# **7.3.2.1.1** Periodic review of the sites characteristics

# Seismic analysis

During the design and construction of BR2, seismic loads were not taken into account, although the risk of earthquakes was considered, as the original safety report<sup>i</sup> indicates:

# 11.2.7 Earthquakes

- *The seismic index for Belgium is 0.2. This means that the average number of earthquakes per year and per 100,000 km<sup>2</sup> is 0.2. The last appreciable earthquake occurred in 1938 and was of class 7, which means that the acceleration was approximately of 100 cm/sec<sup>2</sup>.*
- 11.4.7.2 Earthquakes
- Information received from Belgian sources indicates that earthquakes are not taken into account in building design. The last appreciable earthquake (see Section 11) occurred in 1938 and was of Class 7, which is defined as producing an acceleration of 100 cm/sec<sup>2</sup>. No special provisions have to be taken for earthquakes in the reactor building or control design.

The earthquake mentioned occurred on 11 June 1938, in the massif of Brabant. The epicentre was located in Zulzeke-Nukerke (geographical co-ordinates: Lat 50.783N; Lon 3.58E). The magnitude

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>i</sup> Belgian Engineering Test Reactor BR2 - Safety and Design - Final Report - Report CEN - Blg 59 - R.1996 - May 1, 1961.

was 5.9 and the depth of the hypocenter 24 km. The intensity in the epicentre was VII (MSK) with a macro seismic region of 340 km<sup>2</sup>. In the region of Mol, an intensity of IV was observed.

In the operating licence, issued after the safety review of 1986, a study of the protection against earthquakes was requested. The definition of the reference earthquake had to be done according to the procedures of 10 CFR 100, Appendix A, though with the exception that the horizontal acceleration could be lower than 0.1 g.

For the restart of BR2 in 1997, following the replacement of the beryllium matrix, a seismic qualification was asked by the authorities. A dynamic calculation of the main structures of the reactor building was made.

The study concluded that the fuel storage canal would provide adequate resistance to the reference 0.1g seismic event with a minimum safety factor of 1.4.

#### Other External events

All barriers can be damaged due to external events. The effect of an aeroplane impact, explosions, etc. is discussed in a report by Belgatom dated January 1988 "Réévalutation de la sûreté des installations du SCK•CEN - Etude des agressions d'origine externe".

# 7.4 Article 7: Design and construction of facilities

# 7.4.1 Doel and Tihange Installations

The design of the facilities is described in Appendix 1

# 7.4.1.1 Appropriate measures to reduce the radiological effects

# 7.4.1.1.1 Fuel cooling pools in buildings "GNH" (Doel 1/2), "SPG" (Doel 3/4), "BAN" (Tihange 1) and "DE" (Tihange 2/3)

On each site, the spent fuel assemblies discharged from the reactors are stored in the cooling ponds of the units for radioactive decay.

The intermediate storage capacity of spent fuel assemblies had to be substantially improved to cope with the stopping of the transfer of spent fuel to the reprocessing plants. A storage building was constructed on each site. These buildings are designed to receive and store discharged spent fuel coming from the units under water (building DE-Tihange; see section 7.4.1.1.2. below) or in shielded container ('dry storage' -building SCG-Doel; see section 7.4.1.1.3 below).

The function of biological protection of the personnel handling the assemblies and operating the pools is guaranteed in the different operation modes.

During the storage, the biological protection consists of an 8 meter-thick layer of water above the plan of the subassembly heads stored in the racks.

During the transfer operations between the pools and the transit operations in the transfer canal, the layer of water above the assembly heads is at least 3-meter thick.

To avoid emptying the pools and uncovering the spent fuel elements, all penetrations through the pool surface occur 3 meter above the upper level of the racks.

A small hole in the pipes going down to the bottom of the pools avoids creating a siphon effect in case of rupture of these pipes outside the pools.

The ALARA principle, which consists in keeping the exposure of the workers as low as reasonably achievable, is applied.

The GRR-2001 requirements are complied with.

As already mentioned, this regulation imposes the following limits:

- the annual dose of occupationally exposed workers must not exceed 20 mSv;
- the annual dose of members of the public must not exceed 1mSv;

The following measures have been taken during the design of the buildings to meet these requirements:

- use of materials avoiding the accumulation of activation and fission products.
- reduction of the length of the pipes carrying radioactive fluids in the frequently accessed areas;
- use of remote-controlled valves and fittings;
- installation of removable or fixed biological shields;
- limitation of the surface and air contamination in the areas;
- accessibility to the equipments that must be regularly inspected in order to reduce the exposure time.

The spent fuel storage ponds are designed in such a way that the fuel is only handled under water so that the shielding is sufficient to limit the dose rate at the level of the working desk.

The external wall of the building is designed to protect the external staff and the public against the radiation of the sources present in the building in normal as well as in accidental conditions.

# 7.4.1.1.2 Building DE (Tihange)

# 7.4.1.1.2.1 Protection against radiation

Functionally, building DE is an extension of the spent fuel storage building in unit 3 (building D). It is located within the technical perimeter of unit 3.

It is designed to handle and store under water irradiated fuel assemblies coming from units 1, 2 and 3.

The fuel is transferred from the three units to building DE by means of transfer containers complying with the international regulations for the transport of radioactive material.

The function of biological protection of the staff handling the assemblies and operating the pools of building DE is the same as in the above-mentioned section 7.4.1.1.1.

The design of building DE also meets the requirements of the European Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 1996 laying down the basic safety standards for health protection of the workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation.

# 7.4.1.1.2.2 Radiation control in the areas

Inside building DE, the activity in the pool hall is permanently controlled by a gas chain and an ambient radiation monitoring.

The objective of both chains is to:

- monitor the background radiation level around the storage pools and check indirectly if the layer of water separating the radioactive fuel from the handling areas is thick enough;
- monitor the radioactive noble gas concentration in the air of the pool hall and, therefore, control indirectly the integrity of the fuel rods; moreover, it is possible to take manually a gas sample in order to measure the aerosols and, if necessary, the radioactive iodine.

These functions (except the sampling) are performed continuously. If the limits established are exceeded, the alarms are set off, but there is no automatic action.

# 7.4.1.1.2.3 Ventilating building DE

The VDE ventilation system is composed of 6 different circuits and is designed to fulfil in the first place the safety functions during the operation of the spent fuel storage installations. The tasks include:

- Keeping building DE under a slightly negative air pressure with respect to the outside air;
- Releasing the air extracted in building DE trough the chimney of unit 3;
- Evacuate the heat generated by the pump for water flow in the pools

The other classical functions fulfilled by the VDE system allow to:

- Keep the ambient temperature and the humidity in building DE at a level allowing good operation of the material and permanent accessibility to the personnel;
- Limit the radioactive gas or aerosols concentration in the air of building DE in order to permit access to the personnel;
- Prevent the potential contamination limited to a room from spreading to other noncontaminated or low contaminated areas.

In normal operational conditions, the ventilation system of building DE allows the flow of air from potentially low contaminated zones to potentially more contaminated zones.

As a result, all the areas are ventilated.

"Normal operational conditions" relates to the situation when the radioactive contamination rate of building DE is not too high and when the normal operation of the building is not disturbed by an internal or external event.

#### 7.4.1.1.2.4 Release of effluents in the environment

#### Radioactive release in the air in normal operational conditions

In normal operational conditions, <sup>3</sup>H - that occurs at trace levels in the humidity of the air extracted from the pool hall - is the only isotope that can be released in the air through the ventilation system of building DE. This air is filtered continuously by packed bed filters before it is released in the air through the chimney of the Tihange unit 3. The gaseous effluents of building DE are monitored by the existing control chains in unit 3.

#### Release of radioactive liquid effluents in normal operational conditions

Fuel handling operations generate no liquid effluents.

The feedback of operational experience of fuel cooling pools shows that these installations generate very few effluents. The liquid effluents generated by the operation of building DE are first transferred to unit 3 to be controlled a first time and to be temporarily stored. Afterwards, they are transferred to unit 2 to be treated by evaporation.

The pool water of building DE is mainly contaminated by activation products (<sup>54</sup>Mn, <sup>58</sup>Co and <sup>60</sup>Co) that can be set free from the external surface of the cans during the handling of the assemblies under water. This contamination is (at a factor of 10) lower than the water contamination of the fuel-cooling pools of the three units in Tihange. Indeed, the assemblies must be stored at least 2 years before being transferred to buildings DE. This results in a substantial reduction of the activity of the

residual deposits arising from the activation products (almost complete radiological decay for <sup>54</sup>Mn and <sup>58</sup>Co) on the cans. Moreover, the permanent purification of the water in the pools of building DE keeps the contamination at a very low level.

#### Storage of solid radioactive waste

The solid waste that is produced during the operation of the building DE spent fuel storage ponds are:

- Spent filters and spent ion exchange resins arising from the pools water treatment systems
- Low contaminated dry active waste produced by the DE installations and systems maintenance and by the replacement of the pre-filters and HEPA filters from the building DE exhaust ventilation system.

The operation of the intermediate storage building does not create other categories of radioactive waste than these that have already been treated in the context of the operation of the energy generating units.

# 7.4.1.1.2.5 Incidental releases of radioactive effluents

Incidental releases of radioactive effluents in the environment results mainly from accidental situations that can occur during the operation.

The accidents considered during the design of nuclear installations can be divided in two categories:

1° The accidents of external origin (AEO), can be classified in two subgroups:

- the AEO resulting from natural phenomena: earthquake, violent wind and tornado, including the projectiles and flood.
- the AEO resulting from human activities: airplane crash, explosions and toxic gas.

2° **The accidents of internal origin** (AIO) are considered as particular operational situations. These situations are grouped per category according to their probability of occurrence:

- Loss of electric power
- Loss of the pool cooling
- Loss of pool water
- Fire in building DE
- Criticality accident
- Accident of a falling container
- Falling spent fuel assembly; in the American regulations, this accident is considered as a design accident. Indeed, the nuclear experience shows that the probability is very low for such an accident to occur. This conclusion also prevails for the accident of a spent fuel assembly falling in building DE due to the many controls and the mechanical and physical safety measures imposed on the handling operations.

However, the safety assessment considers the drop of a fuel assembly being handled, leading to the rupture of every fuel rod.

This accident leads to a release of the gaseous and volatile fission products contained in the space pellet–can. A part of these fission products is absorbed by the pool water. The activity that is not absorbed by the water passes through the air of building DE and arrives in the Tihange unit 3 chimney through the ventilating system.

The accident of a falling spent fuel assembly constitutes the reference accident, which is the most serious foreseeable accident for building DE.

Considering the different kinds of fuel that can be stored in building DE, the radiological consequences of the fuel handling accident have been assessed for MOX and UO<sub>2</sub> fuels having the highest burn-up fraction and the shortest pool residence time before being transferred to building DE (2 years).

Given the above-mentioned residence time, <sup>85</sup>Kr and <sup>129</sup>I are the only volatile isotopes remaining in the pellet-can space that can be released during the accident.

The radiological consequences of the fuel handling accident remain for the most exposed population groups far below the routine discharge limits.

# 7.4.1.1.3 Building SCG (Doel)

# 7.4.1.1.3.1 Protection against radiation

Building SCG is an isolated building used only for intermediate storage. It consists of a dry storage in containers qualified for transport. The containers are filled with spent fuel assemblies and are conditioned and tested in the fuel building of the units before being transferred. There is no operation leading to discharge performed in building SCG. The potential incidents do not lead to radioactive release either. Therefore the design of the building does not take account of the occurrence of discharge.

Building SCG is composed of a preparation hall and a storage hall. The latter is divided in two parts and has a total capacity of 165 storage casks. The majority of the operations are performed in the preparation hall in order to limit the exposure of the workers. After it has been prepared, the container is transferred to its storage place in the storage hall by means of a remotely controlled bridge.

The design of the containers ensures the appropriate biological protection of the staff. The containers comply with the dose rate limits set in the international transport regulation (IAEA TS-R-1), i.e. 2 mSv/h at the external surface, 0.1 mSv/h at 2 meter.

A redundant barrier has been designed in the primary lid of the container in order to prevent leaks. The leak tightness of this barrier is continuously monitored. As regards exposure of the personnel and the population, only external radiation must be taken into account since there is no discharge. The ALARA principle is implemented.

Building SCG is part of the WAB controlled area; the requirements set out in the GRR-2001 are followed.

As already mentioned, this regulation imposes the following annual limits:

- 20 mSv for occupationally exposed workers;
- 1mSv for members of the public.

The following measures have been taken during the design of the buildings to meet these requirements:

• Use of a remotely controlled bridge in the storage hall.

- Use of concrete shielding
- Control of the contamination on the external faces of the containers before transfer
- accessibility of the container to reduce the residence time during the inspections.

The external walls of the building are designed in such a way as to protect the external personnel and the general public against the radiation of the sources held in the building in normal operational conditions.

The design of building SCG also meets the requirements of the EU Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation, fully transposed in the GRR-2001.

# 7.4.1.1.3.2 Radioactive discharges in the air

#### Normal operation

Every container is equipped with two metal seals. The overpressure between the seals is monitored.

# Incident/Accident

The accidents of internal or external origin are grouped per category following the probability of occurrence.

For an accident of category 1 or 2, it is checked whether the monitoring system of the container is working correctly. There is no discharge.

Category 3 includes the following accidents:

- Loss of electric power during a long period
- impact of a projectile on the container
- fall of the container during the (un)loading on (from) the trailer
- drop of a container on another container.

Category 4 includes the following accidents:

- airplane crash on building SCG
- fire resulting from the transport
- fire resulting from an airplane crash
- wreckage of the building on the container.

In any case, the metal seals integrity is intact and the discharge is minor. Radiological consequences of accidents have been assessed. The criteria set in the national and international regulations dealing with the protection of the population are largely met.

# 7.4.1.2 Decommissioning

Regarding the decommissioning aspects of the spent fuel management installations, note that the decommissioning phase should not raise any particular technical problem given the preliminary decommissioning plans already examined and the experience feedback (cf. art 9, section 7.6.1.7);

# 7.4.1.3 Technologies used

The technologies used for the design and construction of the spent fuel management installations are based on the experience, the tests and the investigations. See appendix 1.

# 7.4.2 Installations of SCK•CEN: BR2

Additional information may be found in appendix 4

# 7.4.2.1 Discharge of liquid waste into the environment

The water of the secondary circuit is checked in order to detect possible contamination through leaks in the heat exchangers. Also the secondary water, after the heat exchanger, is checked. Different measuring chains are installed on different locations, monitoring the <sup>16</sup>N activity and the  $\gamma$ -activity.

Samples of the secondary water are regularly taken to be analysed by means of spectrometry.

Pools

Two measuring chains are installed to monitor the activity of the water in the storage canal.

The water of the pools in the reactor building is monitored by these chains ( $\gamma$ -activity measurement).

Samples of the water in the pools are regularly taken to be analysed by means of spectrometry.

# 7.5 Article 8: Assessment of safety of facilities

#### 7.5.1 Doel and Tihange installations

The installations are described in appendix 1.

The construction and the commissioning of any installation, and in particular a spent fuel management installation, are subject to a licensing process that includes a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment. These assessments cover its lifetime.

The applicant supplies the information required by the GRR-2001 and by article 18 of the National Report established for the second meeting of the Contracting Parties in the framework of the Nuclear Safety Convention.

These documents, together with the numerous technical supporting documents are examined by the Regulatory Body and give rise to an intense exchange of questions and answers. The resulting information and data is used to update the Safety Analysis Report until it eventually becomes the "Final Safety Analysis Report" (FSAR).

It is planned to:

- have the possibility to modify the installations if those have no adverse impact on safety,
- update the FSAR, which throughout the life of the installation has to exactly reflect its actual situation,
- perform ten-yearly safety reviews,
- follow up all the recommendations made in the "Safety Evaluation Report" established by AVN and which gives a synthesis of the performed safety analysis. AVN is responsible for assessing the satisfactory nature of the responses given by the operator to those recommendations.

The conformity investigation and the commissioning tests are conducted under the acceptance inspection procedures of the installations by the Regulatory Body.

# 7.5.2 Installations of SCK•CEN: BR2

See articles 4 to 7

# 7.6 Article 9: Operation of facilities

#### 7.6.1 Doel and Tihange installations

The installations are described in Appendix 1.

#### 7.6.1.1 Initial licence and commissioning

The licensing process and the related safety analysis have been described in Article 7 of the National Report established for the second meeting of the Contracting Parties in the framework of the Nuclear Safety Convention. The licence is signed by the King after it has been investigated in detail by the Regulatory Body and its Scientific Council.

The commissioning test programme is discussed and approved by AVN, which follows-up the tests, evaluates the test results, verifies the conformity to the design and issues the successive operating licences that allow to proceed with the next step of the test programme. The FANC is informed and can intervene if it deems it necessary.

This process is complete when the final acceptance report is delivered by AVN and sanctioned by a Royal Decree granting an operation licence (cf. Section E, art. 19, section 5.3.1.1).

# 7.6.1.2 Operational limits and conditions

As described above, the Technical Specifications are approved in the licence (chapter 16 of the Safety Analysis Report). They specify the operational limits and conditions, the requirements with respect to the availability of the systems, the test and control conditions, and the actions to be taken if the acceptance criteria are not met.

This applies to any status of the installation.

There are procedures related to the compliance with the Technical Specifications (T.S.) for maintenance activities during plant outage and plant operation. Each maintenance procedure has its own paragraph dedicated to T.S. requirements and limitations. During plant outages, some safety engineers monitor the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

Each modification that may have an impact on the safety must be approved by the regulatory body before it can be implemented. In this respect, modifications to procedures, to the Technical Specifications and to the Safety Analysis Report are identified and discussed.

#### 7.6.1.3 Operation in accordance with the approved procedures

A general description of the procedures in force in the power plant is given in section 13.5 of the Safety Analysis Report.

The completeness (form and contents) of the procedures has been investigated on the basis of the USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.33 which lists the subjects for which procedures must be established. This investigation was conducted as part of the licensing process and the acceptance of the installations by AVN. During the commissioning tests, the relevant procedures that were used by the operators were verified for adequacy.

# 7.6.1.4 Engineering and technology support

The organisation and know-how of the operator, dealt with in chapter 13 of the Safety Analysis Report, must be maintained throughout the useful life of the power station, and even after its definitive shutdown as long as this new status is not covered by a new licence.

From an engineering point of view, the licensee gets the help of Tractebel Engineering (TE). TE has indeed an excellent knowledge of the installations as it was the Architect-Engineer during their construction. Moreover TE has been in charge of the investigations and their implementation during the ten-yearly safety reviews, of the steam generators replacement projects and of a large part of minor modifications projects, which allowed keeping up the competence and knowledge of the installations. TE is also consulted by the licensee when the latter wants to proceed to a minor modification of its installation. TE is also in charge of the follow-up of the provisioning of fuel reloads and of core management. Through its R&D projects, training actions and technological surveys, TE maintains a high competence in conformity to the state of the art. In order to reach these goals, TE is involved in many international research projects and is a member of various networks (or competence centres).

The design bases of the plants, i.e. the knowledge of the design of the plants and the reasons of the choices made in this design are an important part of the knowledge.

The operator - with the support of the Architect-Engineer - has developed a complete set of procedures to be able to cope with incidents ('I' procedures) or accidents ('A' procedures). These procedures are simulated, validated and used for the operators' training.

# 7.6.1.5 Notification of significant incidents

Section 16.6 of the Safety Analysis Report lists the events that must be notified to AVN and/or the FANC, indicating for each notification the delay within it must be notified.

The same section also specifies the cases where incident reports must be supplied to the Regulatory Body, and within which delay.

For each incident, a classification with reference to the INES international scale is proposed by the operator discussed with AVN, and decided by the FANC.

The IRS reports are established by AVN for the incidents that this body deems interesting and transferred for commentary to the operator and to the FANC before it is distributed abroad.

# 7.6.1.6 Operational experience feedback

Operational experience feedback has always been considered essential to plant safety, both by the operators and the regulatory body.

The licences impose that experience feedback from the Belgian and foreign units are considered. Incident analysis includes an evaluation of the root cause, the lessons learnt and the corrective actions taken.

Databases have been developed, in particular by AVN, to systematise experience feedback and facilitate the link with the safety analysis.

No incident, even a minor one, took place in the spent fuel intermediate storage installations in Belgium.

# 7.6.1.7 Decommissioning plans

The operator entrusted TE with the follow-up of the decommissioning issue for the spent fuel management installations.

In particular, initial decommissioning plans for generating units have been established, including the spent fuel storage installations; these decommissioning plans are reviewed regularly.

In concrete terms, a set of provisions have been taken to facilitate the dismantling:

- Considering every dismantling aspects when modifying the storage installations, in order to
  facilitate these operations and to reduce as much as possible the activity level during the
  dismantling;
- Giving access to the information relating to the storage buildings in order to improve the organisation of the future dismantling operations;
- Implementing an efficient waste management policy throughout the normal operation.

# 7.6.2 SCK•CEN installations: BR2

A description of the BR2 may be found in appendix 4

# 7.6.2.1 Initial licence and commissioning

see Section E, article 19

# 7.6.2.2 Operating limits and conditions

As described before, the Technical Specifications are approved in the licence. They specify the operational limits and conditions, the requirements with respect to the availability of the systems, the test and control conditions, and the actions to be taken if the acceptance criteria are not met. This applies to any status of the installation.

# **7.6.2.3** Operation in accordance with the approved procedures

A general description of the operation procedures is given in the Safety Analysis Report approved by AVN.

# 7.6.2.4 Engineering and technology support

The organisation and know-how of the operator must be maintained throughout the useful life of the power station, and even after its definitive shutdown as long as this new status is not covered by a new licence.

# 7.6.2.5 Notification of significant incidents

Each reactor cycle is preceded by a note called "start-up" justifying the operational safety on the basis of the observations made during the previous period. In particular, these notes report the operational incidents that occurred and form a first available database.

Since 1994, an analysis is carried out for each operational incident according to a standard format. The new database set up was completed up to 1986 thanks to the data filed in the notes "start-up".

A « significant event » is in fact an event/incident that, on its own or in correlation with other events/incidents, could put the operational safety of the installations at risk.

During the summer of 1994, the water of the channel became turbid. The hydraulic channel at BR2 is the storage place of set ups for irradiation experiments and irradiated fuel awaiting their decommissioning or evacuation.

The original purification did not seem sufficient. Consequently, after having decontaminated the water, a more intensive purification was decided to prevent any future contamination.

After consideration, it was decided to modernise (automate) the present installation and to increase the rate up to 40 m<sup>3</sup>/h (20 m<sup>3</sup>/h for pools and 20 m<sup>3</sup>/h for the canal) and not to build a new purification installation. The study performed still remains valid. An extra advantage is the fact that the overflow eliminates the floating particles by means of the existing filters of 20  $\mu$ m (washed down if  $\Delta P > 0.9$  kg/cm<sup>2</sup> with air and water).

The number of events in direct or indirect link with human errors increased substantially during these last ten years, but not related to the spent fuel management. For this reason, precise actions were taken to improve qualitatively the operation and its control. These measures can only improve the management of the spent fuel:

- Revision of every operational procedure: every procedure in force has been and is still reexamined periodically. Any modification of the installations requires automatically an adaptation of these procedures.
- Motivation of the personnel to comply strictly with the operational procedures.
- Training of the reactor operators: initial training and permanent training programmes have been set up. During the shutdown for refurbishment, each reactor operators has followed a theoretical and practical retraining. Since the reactor was started up again in 1997, 2X5 days sessions have been organised for every driving agent (level reactor operator). These training sessions include both theoretical and practical aspects, but also general information (e.g. modifications of the installations). Before starting up each cycle, a specific practical training is organised in the reactor - as far as possible – for the learning of some procedures.
- Improvement of the man-machine interface: specific actions have been taken remote control of the valves and are still taken new control board in the reactor control room, new regulation of the primary temperature, emergency panel in the reactor control room during the refurbishment.

These measures, together with the maintenance of a stable and uniform operating team for the years to come, constitute the best way to guarantee and optimise a safe operation.

# 7.6.2.6 Decommissioning plans

A fund - financed by the State – has been set up to cover obligations resulting from the denuclearisation of the installations as regards the nuclear activities of the Centre before 31 December 1988. This fund is called "Technical Liability Fund" (Fond du Passif technique). The objective is to obtain the *green field*. Nevertheless, if other installations or parts of the installations should be re-used for purposes other than the initial ones, the decommissioning would be limited to modifying the installations or installation parts so that they can be re-used and to planning the disposal and the future of the existing waste. Decommissioning of BR2 is covered by this fund.

An initial decommissioning plan was worked out for BR2 and approved by ONDRAF/NIRAS and the Technical Passive Fund administrators. See also article 26

#### 7.7 Article 10 :

All issues related to spent fuel disposal are treated in section H.

# 8 Section H: Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Section H of this report provides comprehensive information on safety objectives and how they are or will be met for the following installations:

- Future disposal facilities for radioactive waste
- Future disposal facilities for spent fuel if considered as waste, at that time,

• Existing facilities for temporary storage of radioactive waste and conditioning of radioactive waste.

As mentioned in section B of this report, Belgium is currently considering two options for the back-end of the fuel cycle, reprocessing and direct disposal of spent fuel.

ONDRAF/NIRAS is studying the technical feasibility and safety of a disposal facility for highlevel and long-lived waste and spent fuel in a clay host rock (Boom Clay). A detailed overview of all the results obtained in this R&D programme for the period 1990 - 2000 was published in 2002 (Safety assessment and feasibility interim report 2, SAFIR 2, NIROND 2001-06 E, December 2001). This report was issued on request of the Belgian Government and was submitted to an international Peer Review by NEA/OECD in 2002. The final report of the International Review Team was published in April 2003. In the current planning for disposal of this waste, the construction of a disposal facility will not start before 2025. All high-level and long-lived waste and spent fuel will remain in surface storage facilities until then.

For the low-level and short-lived waste the national disposal programme, under the responsibility of ONDRAF/NIRAS, is in a pre-project phase, and the construction and operation of a disposal facility (at the surface or in deep geological layers) could be planned around 2015 - 2020, depending on the technical option chosen, i.e. surface or deep disposal, by the Federal Government. The decision could be taken in 2006 - 2007.

The gaseous, liquid and solid radioactive waste treatment facilities of the NPP's are shortly described in appendix 2

# 8.1 Article 11: General safety requirements

# 8.1.1 Safety objectives<sup>5</sup> applicable for a disposal facility

A disposal facility for radioactive waste has to ensure a dual safety objective:

- 1. First, to concentrate and isolate the waste from Man and his environment for as long as this is necessary, or equivalently, to afford Man and his environment adequate **protection** from the risks which this waste can pose;
- 2. Second, to provide protection which can, over time, become independent of active measures to be taken by future generations, such as maintenance, controls and supervision. This is the concept of **passive isolation and containment** or passive safety.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> IAEA Safety Series No. 99, Safety principles and technical criteria for the underground disposal of high-level radioactive wastes – Safety Guide, Vienna 1989.

The protection of Man has to be assessed for the operational phase and for the period after repository closure by providing all the arguments that the expected radiological impact is lower than the dose constraint (0.1 to 0.3 mSv/year) imposed by the regulator or lower than other complementary safety indicators the regulator might define or impose (see also section E, Article 19) and that all reasonable efforts have been done to optimise protection (ALARA principle).

On a more technical level, a series of design requirements have been set. For a reference disposal system for high-level and long-lived waste and spent fuel in a deep geological clay formation, these design requirements affect different aspects of the disposal solution:

- Design requirements related to long-term radiological safety: providing long-term safety by a multi-barrier concept (with a series of natural and man-made barriers) and by implementing the long-term safety functions of the disposal system, i.e. "physical containment", "delaying and spreading the releases" and "limitation of access".
- Design requirements related to long-term radiological safety assessment: by enhancing the robustness of the disposal system (as a whole or of its components), the ability to assess the long-term safety of the disposal system is also enhanced;
- Design requirements related to safety during the operational phase;
- Design requirements related to minimising the potential for criticality;
- Design requirements related to minimising the non-radiological impact on the environment, including e.g. the chemotoxic and thermal impact on the environment;
- Design requirements related to maintaining the flexibility of the solution, i.e. in the stepwise approach to disposal, technical and managerial decisions can easily be reversed if needed, or new knowledge can be integrated in the solution;
- Design requirements related to other choices which society must or can make, such as retrievability.

These design requirements are an integral part of the safety strategy which, in turn, has a dual aspect:

- The strategy for **ensuring** a safe solution, both during the operational phase and during the period after the repository is closed;
- The strategy for **assessing** the safety of the solution.

ONDRAF/NIRAS has developed and implemented for the different types of waste a system of waste acceptance criteria to ensure that the treatment and conditioning of the waste is coherent with the interim storage facility and with the reference disposal solutions studied. These acceptance criteria - based on the General Rules - set out the minimum requirements (mechanical, physical, radiological, chemical or others) which primary packages of conditioned radioactive waste must meet before they can be accepted by ONDRAF/NIRAS within its terms of reference.

Irrespective of the requirements of Article 14 (which sets procedures for dealing with nonconformities) and Article 15 (exemptions from the acceptance criteria) of the General Rules, each primary package of conditioned radioactive waste which ONDRAF/NIRAS accepts must comply with the relevant statutes and regulations, including the terms of the operating licences of the nuclear installations concerned (mainly interim storage facilities), the General Rules and ONDRAF/NIRAS's own acceptance criteria. The conformity of the accepted waste packages with the reference disposal solutions being developed is periodically re-assessed, by control and inspection campaigns of the stored waste packages, the first time three years after acceptance and then every ten years.

# 8.1.2 Existing installations (Belgoprocess)

The storage facilities are described in appendix 3.

A set of measures are taken in order to ensure the highest level of protection of the population, the workers and the environment during those radioactive waste processing/conditioning and storage operations:

- The category C waste storage buildings are designed and laid out to allow the removal, by natural convection and radiation, of the heat produced by this waste. Moreover, the mass of some critical U and Pu isotopes is kept at values low enough to avoid any criticality risk.
- The processing/conditioning techniques are implemented to reduce as much as possible the quantity of radioactive waste resulting from those operations,
- The protection and safety methods applied to the construction and operation of the processing/conditioning and storage installations and any other equipment (containers, etc.) meet the regulations enacted by the competent national authorities (see next articles) in accordance with the international rules and recommendations.
- Compliance with the safety regulations takes into account the radiological, biological, chemical and other risks that can be linked with radioactive waste management.
- Some obligations must be complied with during the operation of the installations so that the future generations will not find themselves faced with too heavy constraints in terms of safety and financial means. That's why, from the operational phase of the installation onwards, provisions are set up to finance the future decommissioning operations.

# 8.2 Article 12: Existing facilities and past practices

The storage facilities at the Belgoprocess site are described in appendix 3.

# 8.2.1 Regulatory framework

As the Joint Convention came into force in Belgium on 5 December 2002, every processing/conditioning and storage installation in operation on the Belgoprocess site is concerned by article 12.

Prior to the construction and the operation of the installations, the operator must first comply with all legal rules to guarantee the safety of the installations. Indeed, in accordance with the regulation<sup>6</sup> in force at that time, the operator had to submit a construction and operating licence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Royal Decree of 28 February 1963 (GRR-1963) providing the General Regulations regarding protection of the population and workers against the dangers of ionizing radiation (or one of the modifications). As mentioned in section E, this regulation has been replaced by the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001 (GRR-2001).

application. A safety analysis report<sup>7</sup> describing a set of applicable measures had to be annexed to the licence application.

The most important safety-related information that had to be mentioned in this report concerns:

- a. The purpose and the nature of the facility,
- b. A plan of the installations,
- c. A cadastral plan and a topographic survey of the region (500 m around the installations),
- d. Demographic, topographic, geologic, seismologic, hydrologic and meteorological characteristics of the region (15 km around the installation) and information on the lay-out of the site,
- e. An exhaustive description of the radioactive materials, with special attention to fissile material,
- f. A report describing the most important accidents likely to occur in the installations and assessing the probability and the consequences for the population and the workers (accidental scenarios: explosion, fire, airplane crash, failure of the ventilating system, etc.),
- g. A description of the systems for the storage, purification and discharge of gaseous and liquid waste; a description of the maximum daily and monthly standards and quantities (in terms of volume and activities) of discharged liquid and gaseous waste, the nature of the discharge, a plan of the areas showing the discharge points, the description of the local sewer system, the flow rate of the rivers where liquid waste are discharged, the temperatures at the chimney outlet for the release of gaseous waste, the monitoring stations to measure the radioactivity levels in air; a description of the volumes and masses of solid waste to store.
- h. Protective measures for the personnel working in direct contact with radioactive materials,
- i. Staff qualification and competencies.

Before the licences are granted, this safety analysis report is analysed by the competent authorities and by the Scientific Council which may consult national and international experts.

For some waste processing and conditioning installations and some storage buildings, the operating licences are granted for a limited period. At the end of this period, a new operating licence application must be submitted, in accordance with the regulation in force at that time. A new licence is also necessary for any major modification or extension of the installation.

The revision of the regulations in 1994 has obliged the operator, from this date onwards, to add a more detailed environmental impact assessment (in comparison with the assessments mentioned in f and g) to the licence application. According to the date of the licence application, only building 155 and the HRA-Solarium processing and conditioning installation were to comply with this obligation to add a detailed environmental impact assessment to the licence application.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The building license can be granted on the basis of a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) whereas the operating license is granted on the basis of a Final Safety Analysis Report. However, this report is updated during the operational phase of the installation.

For any modification of an existing installation having an impact on the environment, a new environmental impact assessment must also be added to the new licence application.

# 8.2.2 Regulation enforcement

AVN performs the acceptance inspection of the installations, including verification if the rules and the cold tests are complied with. According to the acceptance report, the starting-up is authorised or not.

The above-mentioned Royal Decrees set out the obligation of organising an internal Health Physics Department. This department is entrusted with the task of organising the surveillance of the measures necessary to comply with the regulations on workplace safety and health and with the rules on neighbourhood safety and health. It can be assisted in its mission by experts from AIO. During the operation, an AIO must also verify the compliance with the rules, in accordance with the regulations in force. It can propose any modification to improve the safety of the installations.

Belgoprocess is implementing a wide programme to monitor the liquid and gaseous discharge in the environment and the water quality of river Molse Nete where the discharged liquid waste is released:

- a. flow rate and volume of discharged water
- b. chemical and radiological control of discharged water before and after being discharged
- c. chemical and radiological control of the river water and the river bed sediment, upstream and downstream from the discharge point
- d. radiation on the river banks, on and around the industrial sites
- e. radiological control of air and ground water samples from the vicinity
- f. radiological control of the chimney emissions

These controls are performed twice a year and are reported each year in the annual environmental report.

Moreover, the regulatory body also takes some control samples.

In 2003, Belgoprocess discharged 30 119 m<sup>3</sup> purified waste water, that is about 25 % of the authorised volume. The total weighted radioactivity of this discharge amounted to 1.08 GBq (99.9 % of the total activity arose from <sup>3</sup>H), that is 0.72 % of the authorised value whereas the impact of the dose per inhabitant was assessed to be less than 0.1  $\mu$ Sv/year. The biological indexes show that the discharge has no impact on the biological quality of the water of the river Molse Nete.

If necessary, installations where radioactive waste is stored or processed and conditioned are kept in underpressure by a ventilating system. Ventilation air and industrial gas (smoke gas arising from the burning of solid waste and from the evaporation of liquid waste) are purified. The activity of the Belgoprocess discharge in 2003 amounted to about 3% (1.81 MBq alpha emitters and 1.63 MBq beta emitters - <sup>3</sup>H not included) of the authorised limit. For <sup>3</sup>H, the activity of the discharge amounted to 0.104 GBq (0.01 % of the authorised limit). A mathematical model is also used for assessing the exposure of the inhabitants living around the

Belgoprocess sites. It represents a value of 0.005  $\mu$ Sv/year for the critical individual (fictive person standing 500 meters from the most exposed place of the Belgoprocess site 2).

Lastly, since the waste is processed and stored in adapted and shielded buildings, radiation measurements taken at 50 different places around both Belgoprocess sites showed values up to 60 nanosievert/hour for site 1 and 200 nanosievert/hour for site 2. For the latter actions are planned that will result in moving waste to other buildings offering additional shielding and therefore even smaller radiation level). The measured radiation level has no impact on the population.

# 8.2.3 Storage buildings for conditioned waste on the Belgoprocess site

The storage buildings for conditioned waste on site 1 of BELGOPROCESS are briefly described below. It concerns the buildings 127, 129, 136, 150, 151 and 155 (further abbreviated as B127, B129, etc.). This description focuses on the waste acceptance criteria that are directly relevant for storage.

The current storage conditions are presented in the acceptance criteria mentioned below, in the safety files and in the IPA (Internal Project Application of Belgoprocess).

**Table 1** summarizes the conditions (with regard to the radioactivity) applicable for the storage of the packages in the different buildings while **Table 2** is directly taken from the applicable safety reports of the buildings.

# Table 3: Acceptance criteria/conditions with regard to radioactivity

# B 127 1. The dose rate at the external surface of the package has to remain below the limit of 2 Sv/h. A package with localized surface dose rate exceeding the (maximum) limit value may, in close consultation with the Health Physics Department and possibly with the AIO, be accepted on

- the condition that the criterion regarding the dose rate at 1 meter is observed (< 0.2 Sv/h).
- 2. The volume-activity concentration in the primary package is limited to 50 GBq/m3 for alpha emitters and to 37 TBq/m<sup>3</sup> for beta-gamma emitters.
- 3. the removable surface contamination of the primary package needs to be below 0.4 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup> for alpha emitters; 4 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup> for beta-gamma emitters.
- 4. <sup>226</sup>Ra and <sup>232</sup>Th in the primary package are only allowed in mass-activity concentrations which do not exceed the natural radioactivity of these isotopes.

# B 129

Storage building already filled.

#### B 136

Building foreseen for Synatom waste coming from COGEMA. See specific acceptance criteria for more details about the radiological conditions.

#### B 150

Storage building already filled

# B 151

- 1. the dose rate at the external surface of the package has to remain below the limit of 5 mSv/h. A package with localised surface dose rate exceeding the limit value may, in close consultation with the Health Physics Department and possibly with the AIO, be accepted on the condition that the criterion regarding the dose rate on a 1 meter distance is observed (< 0.5 mSv/h).
- 2. the mass-activity concentration of alpha emitters in the primary package is limited to 4 GBq per ton.
- 3. the removable alpha surface contamination has to be below 0.04 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup>; that of beta/gamma surface contamination below 0.4 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup>.
- 4. <sup>226</sup>Ra and <sup>232</sup>Th in the primary package are only allowed in mass-activity concentrations, which do not exceed the natural radioactivity of these isotopes.

# B155 LAGAL

- 1. the dose rate at the external surface of the package has to be below or equal to 5 mSv/h. If the surface dose rate exceeds 5 mSv/h, the radiation on a 1 meter distance has to be below 0.5 mSv/h.
- 2. The <sup>241</sup>Pu quantity has to be below 112 g per package. The Pu-239 quantity has to be below 219 g per package. The <sup>235</sup>U quantity has to be below 326 g per primary package. The sum of the proportions of the quantities of these 3 radionuclides compared to the maximum quantities of each of these radionuclides has to be below 1.
- 3. The beta activity concentration, with the exception of that of <sup>241</sup>Pu, has to be below 40 GBq per primary package.
- 4. The removable alpha surface contamination needs to be below 0.04 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup>; that of beta/gamma below 0.4 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup>.
- 5. <sup>226</sup>Ra en <sup>232</sup>Th should not exceed their natural concentrations.

#### B 155 RAGAL

- 1. The dose rate at the external surface of the package must be below or equal to 5 mSv/h. If above 5 mSv/h, the radiation at 1 m must be below 0.5 mSv/h.
- 2. The removable alpha surface contamination must be below 0.04 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup> while the removable beta/gamma surface contamination must be below 0.4 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup>.
- 3. The alpha activity concentration must be below 4 GBq/t. The maximum alpha Radium concentration must be below 740 GBq/package

B 156

4. Storage of BR3 fuel assemblies.

# B 127

Maximum dose rate on outer walls of the building. 25  $\mu$ Sv/h. Mean activity <3.7 E10 Bq, mainly beta; alpha activity negligible

# B 129

Maximum dose rate on outer walls of building:  $25 \ \mu$ Sv/h. Per package maximum alpha activity up to 1.37E12 Bq and maximum beta activity up to 3.2E14 Bq, depending on the type of waste.

# B 136

Maximum dose rate on ou	ter walls of building	;: 20 μSv/h.		
	Vitrified waste	Cemented waste <sup>8</sup>		Bituminized
	High active solutions	Hulls and end pieces	Technological waste	Process
Dose rate (Sv/h)				
D (contact)	1.4 E4	< 75	<4 E-2	< 10
D (1 meter)	420	< 4.6	<1 E-2	0.45
Activity per primary package (TBq)				
Beta/Gamma	2.8 E4	800	0.74	19
Alpha	141	< 0.89	< 0.74	< 0.15
Removable surface contamination (Bq/cm <sup>2</sup> )				
Beta/Gamma	< 4	< 4	< 4	< 4
Alpha		0.4	< 0.4	0.4

# B 150

Maximum dose rate in contact with vessel: 5 mSv/h, exceptionally, 10 mSv/h. Per package maximum alpha activity up to 2E9 Bq and maximum beta activity up to 3E12 Bq, depending on the type of waste.

# B 151

Maximum dose rate in contact with vessel: 5 mSv/h, exceptionally, higher if value at 1 m is below 0,5 mSv/h is. Maximum alpha activity 4GBq/t, except for 160 vessels from historical production,< 75GBq/t. Maximum beta activity up to 3E12 Bq/vessel, dependent on type of waste.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> As the Cogema has changed the processing and conditioning mode for these waste streams, the implications of the new waste form (compacted hulls and end pieces, mixed with technological waste) is being analysed and discussed between the parties involved (Cogema, Synatom, ONDRAF/NIRAS, FANC and Belgoprocess).

B 155	
Maximum dose rate on outer walls of building: 10 µSv/h. Other conditions as in the acceptance files	
B 156	
The dose rate limits outside the building are:	
• surface of the storage building	10 µSv/h
• 300 m distance from the storage building	0.1 mSv/y

#### 8.2.4 CILVA: Central Installation for Low-level Solid Waste (site 1 Belgoprocess)

The **CILVA** installation (Central installation for low-level solid waste) is designed for the processing/conditioning of low-level solid waste, mainly produced in Belgium. This low-level solid waste contains mainly beta-gamma waste, but also very low-level contaminated alpha waste.

With regard to the radiological characteristics of the waste that can be processed and conditioned in these installations, the following limits apply:

- <u>Maximum dose rate</u> at the surface of the primary package and of the transport package: 2 mSv/h.
- Level of <u>removable surface contamination</u> of primary package must not exceed 4 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup> for beta-gamma emitters and low-toxic alpha emitters and 0.4 Bq/cm<sup>2</sup> for other alpha emitters.
- Regarding solid beta-gamma waste, the activity must not exceed 40 GBq/m<sup>3</sup> (average over volume of every primary package). No traces of alpha activity may be present up to 40 MBq/m<sup>3</sup>.
- Regarding solid waste, the beta-gamma activity must not exceed 40 GBq/m<sup>3</sup>. The alphaactivity may not exceed 10 GBq/m<sup>3</sup>.

The waste contaminated with pathogenic substances is collected and packed for transportation separately.

In the installations, the following activities are performed:

- Waste reception;
- Pre-treatment of waste (sorting out, pre-compression, reduction);
- Compaction of waste drums;
- Incineration;
- Immobilisation;
- Inspection and transport of the conditioned waste to the storage facilities.

#### 8.2.5 General description of the building

The building has a surface of 100 m x 65 m and is built on a foundation plate resting on compact, mainly sandy ground, at about 0.75 m depth.

The building is composed of a structure in reinforced concrete.

Its height is about 10 m with the exception of an area of 1000 m<sup>2</sup> which is 16 m high. The lower part contains areas on one or two levels, depending on the activity, while the higher parts have a variable number (two to five) of levels.

The roof is composed of lightweight concrete arches, covered with isolating materials and a sealing film. The floors are made of full plates of reinforced concrete.

In the areas requiring a biological shield for the roof, the roof is made of a full concrete plate.

The walls are made of reinforced concrete or of stonework, depending on the biological shield required and on the supporting capacity.

#### 8.2.6 Radiological protection

The storage of unconditioned and of conditioned waste as well as the treatment and processing of this waste in CILVA is performed in shielded areas. Access to these areas is strictly limited to the necessary operations, provided that the general and specific radiation protection procedures are observed. These areas are defined as "processing areas ".

The areas surrounding these areas are, depending on their protection level according to the regulations which apply to the BELGOPROCESS site, classified as follows:

Radiation	Description	Maximum dose
area		rate
		(µSv/h)
Ι	Adjacent processing premise	250
II	Intervention area	75
III	Working area not permanently occupied	25
IV	Working area permanently occupied	5

It must be noted that these maxima are "project rates" used for the calculation of the protection shields. During the operation, the ALARA principle is applied, implying that the doses for the personnel are only a fraction of those estimated on the basis of the project rates.

#### Processing areas (Area 0)

The processing areas are areas in which conditioned or non-conditioned waste is stored or in which the waste is not treated or processed manually.

The walls of these areas shield sufficiently to ensure that the radiation conditions in the adjacent areas are observed.

#### <u>Area I</u>

Between the adjacent processing areas, the necessary shielding is foreseen to ensure that in case of an intervention, the dose rate in the area in which the intervention takes place, will not exceed the conditions with regard to area I. In normal working conditions, there are no areas belonging to area I.

#### Area II

Area II includes the areas, which, in normal working conditions, are not entered, but are used in the case of interventions in processing areas.

#### Area III

The areas in which the personnel is not permanently present, but during an important fraction of the working time, belong to this area. These are e.g. the areas where the waste is manually treated, processed and sorted out. Most of the technical areas and passageways are also classified into this area.

#### Area IV

Areas in which the personnel is normally permanently present, belong to this area (e.g. control rooms, offices, ...).

#### 8.2.7 Confinement

In order to prevent dispersion of radioactive substances, the ventilation is designed such that a pressure gradient provides an air current from the areas with a small probability of contamination to those with a large probability of contamination.

Radioactive liquids are stored either in 30 l flasks, in storage containers, or in transport containers. All of these recipients are stored in areas equipped with retention tanks or leaktight reservoirs, which, in case of a leak, collect all of the liquids stored;

The transport packages are opened under an exhaust hood to extract the aerosols and depositing them then onto filters.

The opening of the primary package and the manipulations of the waste are performed either in glove boxes or in accommodated areas.

The standard 400 l drums in which the waste is conditioned are, in their super compact unit as well as in their final package, filled through a lock in order to prevent any contamination of the outer surface of the drum. This lock is kept in underpressure by means of a specific ventilation system with a prefilter and an absolute filter.

#### 8.2.8 Decontamination

The form and the surface finishing of the material in the controlled area are - as far as possible - designed to facilitate decontamination.

The apparatus in the controlled are covered with a protective and easy-to-decontaminate layer (epoxy or equivalent).

The floors, and in some cases also the walls, are covered with an easy-to-decontaminate layer.

#### 8.2.9 Waste produced

#### Conditioned solid waste

The conditioned solid waste produced in CILVA as a final product during the normal operation of the installation, is low-level waste comparable to the waste received at the entry of the installation. This waste consists mainly of packages, equipment, ventilation filters, clothing for the personnel and secondary waste generated by the combustion installation.

#### Liquid waste

There is no direct discharge of liquid radioactive waste. All the liquid waste produced in the controlled area of the CILVA unit is collected in containers.

#### Gaseous waste

The gaseous waste produced in the CILVA installations is, after treatment, evacuated through a chimney to the location of BELGOPROCESS where a permanent monitoring is performed.

#### 8.2.10 Radiation monitoring devices

In CILVA radiation monitoring equipment is installed. This gives the necessary information concerning the radioactivity levels in different parts of the building and in the gaseous effluents in the chimney, enabling the operating personnel to take the necessary measures in order to keep the activity level as low as reasonably achievable.

A distinction can be made between:

- dose rate monitoring in the areas;
- air contamination monitoring;
- monitoring of air evacuated through the chimney;

- surface contamination monitoring;
- monitoring of exposure of personnel.

#### 8.2.11 Workers' dose

As indicated, the protection shield between the areas was calculated on the basis of the radiation area to which these areas belong and, accordingly, based upon the occupation and the presence of radioactive sources. In this regard it needs to be stipulated that the activity of the waste treated, the dose rate at the surface of the package, as well as the radioactive contamination of the package are limited.

Moreover, appropriate measures are taken in order to keep the workers' dose, resulting from external radiation and the committed dose due to the intake of radioactive substances, as low as reasonably achievable and below the regulatory limits.

#### 8.2.12 Fire protection

Around the building a fire strip of more than 15 m has been deforested. The protection system is designed to detect the start of a fire and to extinguish a fire, or to limit it maximally.

#### 8.2.13 Accidents considered

In the safety assessments, the following accidents were considered:

#### Accidents of internal origin

- fall of a package;
- interruption of electric power supply;
- explosion;
- fire.

#### accidents of external origin

- earthquake;
- airplane crash;
- heavy wind;
- flood;
- explosion

#### 8.3 Article 13: Siting of proposed facilities

#### 8.3.1 Existing facilities

Almost all processing/conditioning installations and storage buildings in Belgium are currently located on the Belgoprocess sites, which were formerly the SCK•CEN WASTE Department

(started up in 1956) and the EUROCHEMIC fuel reprocessing pilot plant (started up in 1966). All facilities were to comply with the regulations in force at that time. In addition to the licence for the dismantling of these former installations, changing the use of both sites required new licences as well (see article 12).

#### 8.3.2 Future disposal facilities

The current disposal programme of ONDRAF/NIRAS for high-level and long-lived waste and spent fuel is a programme of *methodological* research and development. Its prime aim is to investigate whether it is feasible, both technically and financially, to design and build on Belgian territory one deep geological disposal facility for the considered waste that is safe, without prejudgment on the site where such a solution would actually be implemented. The actual siting of such a disposal facility will become a central element of the next phase of the disposal programme. Proposed disposal facilities for these kinds of waste are thus in a R&D stage of development, and not yet in siting nor licensing phase.

For low and intermediate level short-lived waste (LILW-SL) – category A in the Belgian waste classification system – the disposal programme is currently in a pre-project phase: sites have been designated for studying site specific disposal designs with active participation of the local municipalities via local partnerships. In this pre-project phase for category A waste, the two technical options 'surface disposal' and 'deep disposal' are studied in parallel. The relevant siterelated factors for surface disposal are in line with the required site characteristics in the IAEA Safety Requirements for Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste<sup>9</sup> and in the IAEA Safety Guide on Siting of Near Surface Disposal Facilities<sup>10</sup>. For geological or deep disposal, the required site characteristics are in line with those in the IAEA Safety Guide on Siting of Geological Disposal Facilities<sup>11</sup>. The different site specific disposal designs and the sites are studied and evaluated in an integrated way in the safety and environmental assessments that have been performed; these assessments have been discussed with the safety and environmental protection authorities (FANC and the regional authorities responsible for environmental protection). The safety assessments are part of the file that ONDRAF/NIRAS will submit to its supervising Minister in order to obtain a decision on the next phase of the programme (i.e. which of the integrated projects should be continued in view of obtaining the required authorisations for construction and operation (see Article 15). So, in the subsequent project phase after a favourable governmental decision, the required safety and environmental evaluations for a licence application will be performed.

Since 2000, France and Belgium have developed a specific cooperation in the field of the safety approach to geological disposal. A working group was set up with representatives of the regulatory bodies and the implementers, which produced a document entitled "Geological disposal of radioactive waste: Elements of a safety approach". Two European Seminars organized on November 5<sup>th</sup>, 2004 and on May, 20<sup>th</sup>, 2005 under the co-chairmanship of the French and Belgian regulators (ASN, FANC) and gathering 8 European countries and 3 international organizations acknowledged the progress toward common views and understanding brought by the Franco-Belgian document. It was recognized that the momentum created by this group should not be lost and that these trends to develop common views in the European Union should be enlarged to other interested countries active in this field. It was thus agreed to launch a pilot study which will be devoted to the regulatory review of a safety case for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> IAEA Safety Standard Series No. WS-R-1, Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste – Safety Requirements, Vienna 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> IAEA Safety Series No. 111-G-3.1, Siting of Near Surface Disposal Facilities – Safety Guide, Vienna 1994.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> IAEA Safety Series No. 111-G-4.1, Siting of Geological Disposal Facilities – Safety Guide, Vienna 1994.

geological disposal of radioactive waste. The participation in the pilot study is on a voluntary basis and gathers several European regulatory bodies and international organisations.

#### 8.4 Article 14: Design and construction of facilities

The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report describes how the following points have to be implemented:

- protection against potential criticality (very low acceptable U and Pu quantities in the containers),
- protection against contamination (i.e. casks in corrosion-resistant materials),
- protection against irradiation (thickness of the cell walls calculated to remain below the dose rate limits, installation of permanent dosimeters, use of portable dosimeters during a handling or maintenance operation),
- expected levels of radioactivity released in normal and accidental situations and operational limits,
- consideration of accidental scenarios (cask fall, airplane crash, radiolysis, failure of the cooling or electric system, floods, explosion) and their impact on radiological safety,
- Probability Safety Analyses available at the time of the application.

The levels of details of the above-mentioned points, namely the accidental scenarios considered, depend on the type of installations.

The environmental impact is described in a report on the environmental impact assessment of the facility concerned. This study describes the direct and indirect environmental effects in the short, intermediate and long term of the installation. This environmental impact assessment covers at least:

- data similar to the general data as they are set out in the Commission Recommendation of 6 December 1999 on the application of article 37 of the Euratom Treaty,
- data necessary to identify and assess the main environmental impact of installation,
- a draft of the main alternative solutions investigated and an indication of the main reasons to justify the choice made.

A preliminary decommissioning plan must be established during the design of the installations. The objective of this decommissioning plan is to:

- assess the dismantling strategies which depend on factors such as the protection of the operators, the public and the environment, the planning and the organisation,
- evaluate the dismantling techniques specific to the installations,
- list the waste produced during the dismantling,

- assess the costs generated by those operations,
- analyse the financial provisions that will be available to ensure that the safety conditions are met when those operations are performed and to avoid a too heavy financial burden on future generations.

The decommissioning plan can be established during the operation of the installation. It includes the points described above, but also:

- the description of the installations and their 'history',
- the description of the quality system,
- the description of the safe maintenance,
- the destination of all the waste,
- the available scientific and technical knowledge.

Finally, the techniques considered during the design of the processing/conditioning and storage installations and used during their construction are based on the industrial experience, on tests and on analyses.

#### 8.5 Article 15: Assessment of safety of facilities

#### 8.5.1 Future disposal facilities

Before a disposal facility can be constructed, an authorisation for construction has to be granted by the FANC. A safety assessment as well as an environmental impact assessment has to be conducted and submitted to the FANC as a basis for its decision to grant an authorisation for the construction.

As the disposal programme for high-level and long-lived waste is not in a licensing phase yet, it is so far impossible to implement it. However, for the methodological R&D phase (see article 6), preliminary safety and environmental assessments, covering both the *period before and after closure*, are used at a regular basis for reporting and analysing the status of the programme (see e.g. SAFIR 2 report). These preliminary safety and environmental assessments that will be established during the licensing phase. A first safety and feasibility case for deep disposal of high-level and long-lived waste is currently in preparation and its publication is planned in 2012.

The disposal programme for low- and intermediate level short-lived waste is also not yet in a licensing phase, but safety and environmental assessments have been undertaken in the preproject phase in order to assess the safety of the proposed integrated site-specific repository designs for surface and deep disposal. These assessments have been discussed with the nuclear safety authorities (FANC) and with the regional authorities responsible for environmental protection. These safety assessments together with the comments and recommendations from the safety authorities are also used as a basis for preparing the safety and environmental assessments that will have to be carried out during the project phase that requires a licence application. They will encompass the *period before closure* as well as the *period after closure*. The general approach of the safety assessments is *systematic* and iterative (e.g. the IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Assessment for Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste<sup>12</sup>).

#### 8.5.2 Existing facilities

For the existing Belgoprocess installations, articles 12, 13 and 14 mention and describe the content of the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports and of the environmental impact assessment which are elements of the construction and operating licence applications.

AVN analyses the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and the related technical notes and it expresses comments and remarks, which are taken into account to adapt the Safety Analysis Report and get the final version.

The FANC also follows up the drawing up of the safety analysis report; the final version will be submitted to the Scientific Council of the FANC for approval (see also approval procedures, section E, 5.3.1.1.).

#### 8.6 Article 16: Operation of facilities

When the construction is finished, the installation must be inspected by an AIO with regard to compliance with the regulations and the particular operational conditions set in the licence and to verification of the cold tests. The operating licence is granted if the final acceptance report issued by this organisation is positive.

Throughout the operation, the safety analysis report is updated so that it reflects the real state of the installation.

The operation, maintenance, surveillance, inspection and test conditions are described in the safety analysis report. The internal Health Physics Department is entrusted with the task of implementing the procedures necessary for complying with these conditions. These procedures will then be controlled by a AIO. Following the experience feedback of any other observation, it proposes - if necessary - the appropriate modifications in order to improve safety.

In accordance with the regulations in force, the incidents must be notified to the AIO and classified with reference to the INES international scale after approval by AVN and the FANC, which assess if it is useful to establish an IRS report.

The know-how of the different parties involved in the construction or in the modification of the installations must remain available throughout the operational phase of the installations for any safety-related problem.

As mentioned in article 14, the preliminary decommissioning plan established during the design phase is updated throughout the lifetime of the installations. This updating takes into account:

- The evolution of the technologies related to decontamination and dismantling,
- The evolution of the regulatory aspects such as the release limits resulting in modifications for the estimation of waste quantities,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> IAEA Safety Standard Series No. WS-G-1.1, Safety Assessment for Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste – Safety Guide, Vienna 1999.

- the destination of the waste,
- the "historical review" of the installation (maintenance, intervention, incidents, accidents, ...),
- the modification of the "quality" policy,

In accordance with the Royal Decrees of 16 October 1991 and 12 December 1997, ONDRAF/NIRAS concludes an agreement with the installation's operator to set which information related to the dismantling must be provided to the authorities.

#### 8.7 Article 17: Institutional measures after closure

This is not yet applicable for disposal facilities, since no specific regulatory measures have been imposed so far, and since the long-term management programme is not yet in a detailed design phase for disposal facilities. These measures for disposal facilities will be developed in due time.

## 9 Section I: : Transboundary movements

#### 9.1 Article 27: Transboundary movements

The provisions related to the transboundary movements of irradiated fissile materials and waste are described in chapter VII of the *GRR-2001*. This chapter stipulates that a prior license is required for every shipment. This license is only granted if it can be proven that the requirements of the international Conventions and agreements with regard to the transport of dangerous goods<sup>13</sup> are observed.

With regard to the transboundary movements of radioactive waste, the provisions of chapter IV of this same GRR are applicable. This chapter contains the transposition of Directive 92/3/EURATOM of the Council of 3 February 1992 on the supervision and control of the shipments of radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of the Community. In the procedure the advice of ONDRAF/NIRAS in case of import and export of waste is foreseen.

Currently, there are very few transboundary shipments of irradiated fuel and waste. Licenses have been granted for:

- Transfer of irradiated fuel from the Dutch nuclear power plant of Borsele to COGEMA La Hague in France;
- Export of the irradiated MTR fuel assemblies of reactor BR2 from Mol to La Hague;
- Import of vitrified high-level radioactive waste from COGEMA La Hague to Belgoprocess Dessel. This waste is the result of the reprocessing of irradiated fuel of the nuclear plants of Doel 1-2 and Tihange 1 which was transferred previously from Belgium to France;
- Import of waste, generated either through the decontamination of materials (e.g. pumps) or as a consequence of melting of radioactively contaminated metal;
- Import of used sources from Luxemburg within the framework of the existing convention between Luxemburg and Belgium.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> ADR : European agreement on the transport of dangerous goods by road.

RID: the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail, appendix I to the Convention concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (COTIF).

ICAO: Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods, of the International Air Transport Organisation.

IMDG: The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

ADNR: European Regulation concerning the Carriage of Dangerous Goods on the Rhine.

#### **10** Section J: Disused sealed sources

#### 10.1 Article 28: Disused sealed sources

Belgium has no specific regulation with regard to decommissioned sealed sources. The same conditions and licenses are applicable to these decommissioned sealed sources as those regarding new sources: operation licenses, transport licenses for the carriers and import licenses are required as well as the application of the ruling European regulation 1493/93 on shipments of radioactive substances between Member States.

The user/holder can either transport these sources to ONDRAF/NIRAS as declared radioactive waste or, if it is stipulated in the contract, he can return them to the deliverer/producer.

In case a Belgian producer takes back the sources, they are subject to the same regulatory requirements as those regarding the import of new sources, including the application of the regulation 1493/93. The producer has to take these used sources in "decay storage" or has to transfer them to ONDRAF/NIRAS.

Aware of the risks associated with the use of sealed radioactive sources and, in particular, of "orphan sources", the European Union has promulgated a directive on the control of these sources. This initiative finds its justification in the significant number of accidents that happened worldwide during these recent years.

The purpose of this directive is to prevent the public and the workers from being exposed to ionising radiation resulting from an inadequate control of sealed sources. Its provisions will cover all sources emitting, at the time of its production, a dose flow equal or greater than 1 mSv/h at 1 meter, and all orphan sources. This directive completes the Directive 96/29/EURATOM laying down basic safety standards for the health protection of the general public and workers against the hazards of ionising radiation, already integrated in the Belgian Law.

The Directive sets out the obligation for each Member State to set up a system requiring prior licence for the holder of a sealed source. The licence will only be granted if the competent authorities have taken appropriate measures for the safe use of the source, including when it becomes disused. A financial guarantee will have to be set up for the disposal and storage of the source when it becomes disused, or arrangement to return the source to the supplier or to a recognised storage installation will have to be made.

The licence must cover different fields: responsibilities of the holders, staff competencies, information and training requirements for workers and people working in the vicinity of the sources, minimum equipment and packaging performance criteria, procedures to be followed in case of an accident, transfer modalities ...

Each source will be identified by a standard record sheet indicating, among others, the name of the holder, the location, the transfers, the nature of the radio-isotopes and the results of regular integrity tests. The packaging and, if possible, the sources will be marked by a unique identification number. The competent authorities receive regularly updated copy of these sheets.

The holder has the obligation to check regularly the location and the good state of the sources in his possession and to warn immediately the competent authority of any disappearance or accidents having led to an exposure. The competent authority can perform any useful control to check that the directive is correctly applied. The holder is also to transfer forthwith every disused source to a recognised installation or to the supplier, according to the arrangements made.

The competent authorities must establish appropriate provisions in order to recover orphan sources and to deal with radiological emergencies resulting from any misuse of these sources. The Member States are encouraged to develop controls aimed at detecting orphan sources in places where orphan sources may be encountered such as metal scrap recycling installations. Campaigns for recovering the orphan sources shall be organised.

A fund financed by guarantees shall be established to cover the costs for recovering the orphan sources when the liabilities can not be identified or when the liable person is insolvent.

Work to transpose this Directive in the Belgian regulations is still going on.

## **11** Section K: Planned activities to improve safety

At national level, as presented in this report, Belgium has developed a framework to cope with the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Nevertheless, the FANC plans to revise the GRR-2001, in particular with respect to the long-term management of radioactive waste (more specific licensing procedure for repositories, standard format for safety analysis reports and environmental impact assessments...), taking the relevant recommendations of international organisations into account.

Most of the issues related to the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste are dealt with at international level in different groups where expert are gathered. Belgium is and will continue to be active in these groups, such as the Waste Safety Standards Committee (WASSC) of the IAEA, the Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC) of the NEA, and in European Union initiatives. Belgium will also continue to support initiatives like the COWAM project (Community WAste Management) which addresses the decision making process related to the waste disposal or activities taking place within the WENRA association or at bilateral level. On the latter for instance, as stated in section 8.3.2, a French/Belgian initiative, later joined by other countries active in the field of disposal of radioactive waste, was launched in order to develop a common view on the subject of a safety strategy for disposal of radioactive waste. A pilot study will be devoted to the regulatory review of a safety case for geological disposal.

Specific actions, on-going or planned, are listed and explained below:

The necessary authorisations have been obtained and project investments made to start the processing and conditioning of two important waste streams on the site of Belgoprocess:

- the historical alpha contaminated and radium-bearing waste on site Belgoprocess 2 will be processed and conditioned in the HRA-Solarium facility; the conditioned waste will be send for storage in the new interim storage building 155 on site BP1. The conditioning of this waste and the transfer to site 1 for storage, which will take several years, will significantly improve the safety on the Belgoprocess site and reduce the dose rates in the immediate surroundings of site 2, without noticeably increasing dose rates around site 1;
- Alpha-contaminated waste from MOX fuel fabrication. This waste will be processed and conditioned in the PAMELA facility; storage will also be in the storage building 155 on Belgoprocess site 1. For the definition of the appropriate processing and conditioning mode the question of compatibility of the conditioned waste with the eventual disposal in a deep clay layer was systematically taken into account. As this waste is now stored in unconditioned form, the project will lead to a significant improvement in terms of radiological risks.

As installations for storage, processing and conditioning of radioactive waste are only qualified for a limited period of time and in order to accept waste complying with the waste acceptance criteria, it is the aim and the duty of ONDRAF/NIRAS to continue the on-going process of qualification of the installations for storage, processing and conditioning of radioactive waste. The advancing rate of this process however depends largely on the waste producers who need to introduce the demand and the documents for qualification to ONDRAF/NRAS. However, it is clear that ONDRAF/NIRAS only accepts conditioned waste if it is produced and characterised in installations qualified by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

In conformity with its legally defined tasks ONDRAF/NIRAS will prepare a national plan for the long-term management of all radioactive waste types. This plan will integrate ONDRAF/NIRAS'

various waste management programmes (short-lived waste programme, high level and long-lived waste programme, management of radioactive waste originating from site remediation activities or work activities, ...). The coherence of the short-term management activities (processing and conditioning, and interim storage) and the envisaged reference option(s) for the long-term management will be addressed. It is ONDRAF/NIRAS' intention to develop the national radioactive waste management plan in close collaboration and dialogue with all the institutional and non-institutional stakeholders.

An important part of the site remediation at the UMICORE site in Olen and surroundings will be executed during the next years, i.e. the remediation of the Bankloop brook. The resulting contaminated materials (chemically and radiologically) will be put in storage on the UMICORE premises. The clean-up of a landfill contaminated with radium will be integrated in a coherent programme for the remediation of all radium-contaminated areas and the long-term management of all radium-bearing waste.

Since this radium-bearing waste also contains other (non-radioactive) heavy metals, the regional authorities are also involved in this remediation. Negotiations with the regional authorities will be continued in order to conclude a comprehensive cooperation agreement.

The regulatory framework for the radiological aspects of site remediation activities will be issued in due time in order to prepare and start the remediation activities of the D1 waste dump.

With its decision of July 8, 2005 the Council of Ministers asks ONDRAF/NIRAS', under the supervision of the general directory Energy, to create a structure of consultation on the question of the adequate characterisation of the conditioned radioactive waste in view of its safe final disposal. A first interim report to the supervising minister is requested by the end of 2005.

Progress on those issues will be reported in the 3<sup>nd</sup> national report edited within the scope of the Joint Convention.

## 12 Section L: Appendixes

See attached document.

## 13 List of abbreviations

AIO:	Authorised Inspection Organisation
ANS:	American Nuclear Standards.
ANDRA:	Agence Nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs (National Agency for
	the Management of Radioactive Waste).
AVN:	Association Vincotte Nuclear.
SCK•CEN:	Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie/Centre d'Etudes de l'Energie Nucléaire/,
	Nuclear Research Centre, situated at Mol, Belgium.
<b>BP1/2:</b>	Belgoprocess site 1/2.
BS:	Basic Safety Standards.
CGCCR:	Comité Gouvernemental de Coordination et de Crise (the Governmental Centre
	for Coordination and Emergencies).
CSDC:	Conteneur Standard Déchets Compactés (Standard Container for Compacted
	Waste).
CSDV:	Conteneur Standard Déchets Vitrifiés (Standard Container for Vitrified Waste).
EU:	European Union.
FANC:	Federal Agency for Nuclear Control.
FBFC:	Franco-Belge de Fabrication de Combustible (Franco-Belgian Company for
	Fuel Manufacturing).
GRR-2001:	General Regulations for the protection of workers, the population and the
	environment against the hazards of ionizing Radiation, laid down by Royal
	Decree of 20 July 2001.
GRR-1963:	General Regulations for the protection of the workers, the population and the
	environment against the hazards of ionizing Radiation, laid down by Royal
	Decree of 28 February 1963.
HPD:	Health Physics Department.
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency.
INES:	International Nuclear Event Scale (IAEA).
IRE :	Institut national des Radio-éléments.
IRS:	Incident Reporting System (NEA/OECD-IAEA).
KCD:	Kerncentrale Doel (Doel Nuclear Power Station).
MOX:	Mixed-oxide U0 <sub>2</sub> -Pu0 <sub>2</sub>
NDA:	Non Destructive Analyse.
NEA (OECD):	Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD).
NORM:	Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material.
NUSS:	Nuclear Safety Standards programme (IAEA).
NUSSC:	Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (IAEA).
<b>ONDRAF/NIRAS:</b>	
	Enrichies/ Nationale Instelling voor Radioactieve Afval en verrijkte Splijtstoffen (Belgian Agency for the management of Radioactive Waste and
ом.	Enriched Fissile Materials). Quality Monitored.
Q.M.: R.D.:	
RGPT:	Royal Decree. Règlement Général pour la Protection du Travail (Occupational Health and
NUI I.	Règlement Général pour la Protection du Travail (Occupational Health and Safety Regulations).
SAFIR-2:	Safety Assessment and Feasibility Interim Report 2.
USNRC:	United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
TE:	Tractebel Engineering.
1 12.	macteoer Engineering.

<b>TENORM:</b>	Technologically-Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material.
WASSC:	Waste Safety Standards Committee (AIEA).
WENRA:	Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association.

## **SECTION L : APPENDIX**

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# 1 APPENDIX 1: Description of the spent fuel storage plants at the nuclear sites at Doel and Tihange

## 1.1 Introduction

The aim of this document is to provide both a general overview of and an enumeration of the principal characteristics of the arrangements for the interim storage of spent fuel originating at all the nuclear energy production units in Belgium, i.e. the sites at Doel and Tihange.

The technically-proven methods for the interim storage of spent fuel are: storage in underwater racks in the storage pools at the production units (Tihange and Doel), storage in underwater racks in the storage pools of the DE building (Tihange), and dry storage in shielded containers (Doel).

## **1.2** Belgian policy on the interim storage of spent fuel

At each site, the spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactors are fed for the purpose of radioactive cooling into the deactivation ponds located at each of the production units.

Following the moratorium decreed by the Belgian Parliament in December 1993 on the conclusion and implementation of any new reprocessing, a significant increase in interim storage capacity for spent fuel assemblies proved necessary. A storage building was therefore constructed at each site. These buildings have been designed to receive and store the spent fuel elements from the units, either in underwater storage (as at Tihange) or in dry storage in shielded containers (Doel).


## 1.3 The sites

## **1.3.1** The site at Doel




The site at Doel, which is located on the banks of the Escaut (Schelde river) 15 kilometres downstream from Antwerp, comprises the following installations:

- The twin nuclear plants Doel 1 and 2 (A);
- The nuclear plant Doel 3 (B);
- The nuclear plant Doel 4 (C);
- The centralised liquid effluent and radioactive waste treatment unit (D);
- The spent fuel dry-storage building (for container storage) (E).



The total storage capacity at the Doel site will enable the spent fuel from all the units at the site to be stored for a period of 40 years.

## **1.3.2** The site at Tihange



The site at Tihange, located near Huy on the banks of the Meuse 30 kilometres upstream from Liège, comprises the following installations:

- The nuclear plant Tihange 1 (A);
- The nuclear plant Tihange 2 (B);
- The nuclear plant Tihange 3 (C);
- The spent fuel wet-storage building (for storage in tanks (D)).



#### **1.4** Spent fuel storage systems

#### **1.4.1** Deactivation ponds at each unit

The spent fuel assemblies removed from each unit's reactor core are temporarily stored in the deactivation ponds of the corresponding unit before being transported and stored in the interim storage building of the same site (Doel or Tihange).

The deactivation ponds are located in buildings 'GNH' (Doel 1/2), 'SPG' (Doel 3/4), 'BAN' (Tihange 1) and 'D' (Tihange 2/3).

The water treatment circuit of the deactivation ponds at each unit (PL in Doel and CTP in Tihange) consists of two identical but independent lines. The circuit is designed to evacuate, in both normal and emergency situations, the residual power released by the spent fuel assemblies and ensure an acceptable environment for the personnel working in the vicinity of

the tank. It also makes it possible to maintain an appropriate level of water in the ponds so as to ensure adequate biological protection. Another function of this circuit is to allow the water from the ponds to be decontaminated and treated.

When the water from the decay tank is being cooled and decontaminated, the spent fuel assemblies are placed in an upright position in the storage cells.

The storage capacities of the deactivation ponds make it possible to store at least one complete core plus the core already present in the reactor.

## 1.4.2 Interim storage building at each site

The purpose of the spent fuel interim storage building at each site is to increase the storage capacity of the site as a whole.

## **1.4.2.1** Interim storage unit at Doel (SCG building)

The spent fuel elements from the 4 units at Doel are placed in sealed containers similar to those approved for their transportation off-site.

The exterior of the filled containers is decontaminated before the containers are loaded onto a semitrailer for transfer to the SCG building. There they are unloaded onto their storage location by a roller bridge.

The outer casing of the containers consists of a massive steel wall. This casing guarantees the structural integrity of the elements throughout their transportation on-site, their interim storage and their transfer to ONDRAF/NIRAS facilities. It also ensures a satisfactory level of biological protection. The dose rate limit of a container in the interim storage building is 2 mSv/h in direct contact and 0.1 mSv/h at a 2-metre distance.

The leaktightness of the container is ensured by a cover fitted with a double sealing system. The volume between the gaskets of each container is pressurised and connected to a helium system to make leak-detection possible.

The containers are cooled by natural convection. They are designed to withstand external temperatures between -10°C and +45°C. Their present capacity varies from 24 to 37 fuel assemblies.

The interim storage building consists of a loading hall and two storage halls (with a total capacity of 165 storage casks). Several types of containers are available so as to make due allowance for the differing lengths of the fuel elements and the different types of assembly originating at the 4 units on the site.

## 1.4.2.2 Interim storage cell at Tihange (DE building)

The purpose of the spent fuel interim storage cell of the power station at Tihange (again known as the DE building) is to increase the storage capacity of the site at Tihange as a whole.

The fuel from the 3 units is transported to the DE building in transfer containers.

The ponds and related equipment have been designed to accommodate spent fuel assemblies of different lengths and to allow different kinds of transport containers to be manipulated.

The DE building is designed to store a total of 3720 assemblies distributed over 8 identical storage pools with a unit capacity of 465 assemblies and a design similar to that of unit 3.

The container-unloading pond is also equipped with a storage module consisting of 30 cells in which the assemblies extracted from the container are temporarily placed - immersed in the tank - during unloading operations.

The ponds' cooling and water treatment circuit (STP) is designed to evacuate the residual power released by the spent fuel assemblies while they are undergoing interim storage in the storage pools and to maintain in those ponds a temperature below 60°C under all circumstances.

The racks in which the spent fuel assemblies are stored can accommodate without difficulty assemblies from all 3 units at the Tihange site.

The DE building is an extension of the existing spent fuel storage building (building D) of unit 3. It has been erected parallel to the cask storage building within the technical perimeter of unit 3.

## 2 APPENDIX 2: Description of Belgian Nuclear Power Plant Radioactive Waste Management Facilities

## 2.1 Radioactive waste management principles

The radioactive wastes generated at the Doel and Tihange Nuclear Power Plants are gaseous, liquid or solid radioactive waste. Corresponding treatment/conditioning systems and systems for release to the environment are provided in order to process the waste in a safe, reliable and controlled manner and to maintain the level of radiation exposure to the public and plant personnel that is as low as is reasonably achievable, in compliance with the authorised limits for plant discharge to the environment and the applicable regulations. In particular, the solid waste treatment and conditioning systems ensure that the resulting waste-form meets the requirements for off-site transport, interim storage and future disposal. A small number of large items of superseded equipment is stored on both sites in dedicated storage buildings awaiting later treatment/conditioning, possibly at the same time as the plants' decommissioning.

## 2.1.1 Gaseous waste

The hydrogenated gaseous effluents produced by the Chemical and Volume Control System, the Pressuriser of the Reactor Coolant System and the Boron Recycle Hold-up Tanks are accumulated in deactivation ponds located at each unit. Hydrogenated effluents are transported by compressors to pressurised storage pools. After filling, the storage pool is isolated for a period of several weeks, which allows the radioactivity of the fission gases to decay. After that decay period, samples are taken and analysed to check if the tank content meets the release conditions. If it does, the content is then released into the atmosphere via a filtration system or a ventilation exhaust system that is either specific to each building or shared by all of them.

## 2.1.2 Liquid waste

Liquid waste is collected by category: hydrogenated or aerated effluents of Reactor Coolant quality, chemical effluents, laundry and changing-room effluents, floor drains and (in the case of Doel) polishing effluents. This waste is collected in various dedicated tanks located at the different units of each site. Where necessary, pretreatment is performed in the unit before the effluents are transferred, at each site, into the centralised Liquid Waste Treatment Systems. These systems consist of treatment equipment, such as filters, ion exchangers, gas-strippers and evaporators. After treatment, measurements are performed to verify that the purified effluents comply with the radiological, physical and chemical release limits. Continuous redundant radioactivity monitoring is performed during effluent release.

Secondary Solid wastes generated by the Liquid Waste Treatment Systems are conditioned (see below), while the boric acid recovered from the Reactor Coolant quality effluents is generally recycled.

## 2.1.3 Operational solid waste

Two main categories of operational radioactive solid waste are distinguished:

the 'wet' solid waste that is treated/conditioned at the Doel and Tihange sites and the resulting conditioned waste being sent for interim storage at Belgoprocess;

the 'dry' active waste (DAW) that is pre-treated at the Doel and Tihange sites and then sent for treatment/conditioning at Belgoprocess in the CILVA Facility.

## 2.1.3.1 Waste conditioned at the NPPs

The wet solid waste from the auxiliary systems and the liquid effluent treatment systems (spent ion exchange resins, spent filters, evaporator concentrates) as well as various solid wastes with a contact dose rate higher than 2 mSv/h are conditioned in metallic 400  $\ell$  casks in the Solid Waste Conditioning Facility at each site. A qualification file has been submitted for approval by ONDRAF/NIRAS regarding the use of the 400  $\ell$  cask for the conditioning of waste at the Belgian NPPs.

The treatment and conditioning facilities of the NPPs are certified by ONDRAF/NIRAS. The treatment and conditioning of the solid waste is performed within the framework of a Quality Assurance Programme established by the utility company. Inspections and control of these operations are performed by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

After checking and acceptance by ONDRAF/NIRAS of the conditioned waste at the conditioning site, the waste is transported to BELGOPROCESS for interim storage in Buildings 151 or 127.

## 2.1.3.2 Waste not conditioned at the NPPs

Dry active solid waste (paper, clothes, plastics, wood, ventilation filters, etc.) is collected selectively at the NPPs.

The burnable fraction of this waste is subjected to a pretreatment in the centralised waste treatment facilities of the two NPPs. This pretreatment consists of sorting, shredding and compaction before wrapping in plastic bags and the subsequent packaging of these bags in transport containers.

The compressible fraction of these wastes is generally precompacted before being packed in metallic casks suitable for further supercompaction at Belgoprocess.

The different kinds of waste are packaged and transported to Belgoprocess site in adequate standardised packages (210  $\ell$  casks, 1 m<sup>3</sup> stainless steel containers, etc.) in accordance with ONDRAF/NIRAS specifications. In particular, the dose rate of the transport packages must be below 2 mSv/h.

## 2.1.4 Non-routine solid waste

The old Steam Generators of various units and the Reactor Vessel Head of Tihange 1 which have now been replaced are presently stored in dedicated facilities at the Doel and Tihange sites.

## 2.2 Radioactive Waste Management Facilities at Doel NPP

## 2.2.1 Gaseous waste treatment systems

The Gaseous waste treatment systems (called GW systems) are located in the Nuclear Auxiliary Building GNH of each unit. They comprise the following equipment:

For Doel 1-2, in the twin units' shared building GNH: 3 compressors, 5 storage/deactivation ponds;

For Doel 3 and for Doel 4, in the GNH of each unit: 2 compressors, 10 storage pools and 2 catalytic recombiners.

## 2.2.2 Liquid waste treatment systems

The liquid waste produced by the different units at the Doel site is treated in the WAB, the centralised waste treatment building.

After their collection, the Reactor coolant quality-type effluents are pretreated by means of filters, ion exchange columns and gas strippers in the GNH of the unit at which they are produced before being sent to the WAB. Some other effluents also require a filtration in the unit where they are produced before being sent to the WAB.

In the WAB, the waste is received in dedicated buffer/storage pools, maintaining the upstream segregation. The secondary waste produced in the WAB itself is collected according to the same categories.

Apart from filters and ion exchange columns, five evaporator units (evaporation capacity =  $5 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$ ) are available. Three of them process the reactor coolant quality-type effluents, allowing boric acid recovery. The other two are dedicated to the other types of liquid effluents and generate evaporator concentrates that have to be further immobilised with cement.

Various control tanks are provided, allowing for effluent control before release to the River Schelde through a unique release collector.

## 2.2.3 Solid Waste Systems

## 2.2.3.1 Waste conditioned at Doel

The Solid Waste System (SW) comprises 2 buffer tanks for Ion Exchange Resins and 4 buffer tanks for evaporator concentrates (plus 3 spare tanks).

The conditioning process is based on the incorporation of waste with cement using a batch radioactive mixer.

Evaporator concentrates or Ion Exchange Resins (IER) are mixed with cement (two types of cements in the case of IER), various aggregates and, in the case of IER, chemical additive, in carefully controlled proportions according to recipes certified according to Waste Acceptance Criteria.

Spent Filter Cartridges and/or various radioactive (possibly compacted) solid wastes are immobilised with non-radioactive concrete or with concrete plus evaporator concentrates.

One batch mixer with an associated concrete and aggregate silo is therefore used (the WAB also houses one spare system). An automatic magnetic guided carriage is provided for the cask transportation. After filling, a cover is put on the cask and automatically fixed by a crimping device.

Buffer storage is provided for the casks awaiting transportation to the Belgoprocess site for interim storage.

## 2.2.3.2 Waste not conditioned at Doel

A shredder-compactor is installed in the WAB, enabling combustible waste shredding, slight compaction and packaging in small plastic bags of a unit mass of 15-20 kg. Compressible waste may be compacted by an in-cask 16-ton press.

## 2.2.4 Non-routine solid waste

Old steam generators replaced at Doel 2, 3 and Doel 4 are stored as 'closed sources' (i.e. all fittings/openings are sealed) in 3 dedicated storage buildings called GSG.

## 2.3 Radioactive Waste Management Facilities at Tihange NPP

## 2.3.1 Gaseous waste treatment systems

The Gaseous waste treatment systems (called TEG systems) are located in one of the Nuclear Auxiliary Buildings of each unit. They comprise the following equipment:

For Tihange 1: in the BAN-EST 2 compressors, 3 storage/decay tanks and in the building extension called TEG: 2 storage/decay tanks

For Tihange 2 and 3: in Building D of each unit 2 compressors, 8 and 7 storage pools respectively and 2 catalytic recombiners.

In each unit a specific filtration system, comprising HEPA, charcoal and HEPA filters in series, is provided on the decayed gas release line. This line is connected to a building ventilation exhaust duct, allowing the discharge of the gaseous effluents into the atmosphere via the Unit Stack.

#### 2.3.2 Liquid waste treatment systems

Liquid waste treatment systems are installed in the Nuclear Auxiliary Building of Tihange 1. The treatment parts of these systems are no longer in service, except for some filters. For all the radioactive effluents produced on-site, the liquid waste treatment is performed in the Auxiliary Nuclear Building N of unit 2. Collection tanks are provided in unit 3 together with some filters. The waste categories are the same in all three units, and segregation between the different waste categories is maintained from collection as far as treatment.

The non-aerated reactor coolant quality-type effluents are treated by filters, ion exchange columns and gas strippers before buffer storage and then evaporation, allowing for boric acid recovery. One evaporator package (evaporation capacity =  $5 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$ ) is dedicated to this task.

Other effluents are treated by filtration and/or evaporation and/or passage through ion exchange columns. A flocculation system is also installed. Two evaporator packages (evaporation capacity =  $5 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$ ) are available to process these effluents, producing evaporator concentrates that have to be further immobilised with cement.

Various control tanks are provided, allowing for effluent control before release to the River Meuse through 2 large 'transfer' tanks installed in each of the three units.

## 2.3.3 Solid Waste Systems

## 2.3.3.1 Waste conditioned at Tihange

## 2.3.3.1.1 Wet solid waste systems at Tihange 1

Tihange 1 is equipped with:

1 buffer storage tank for Evaporator Concentrates and 2 buffer storage tanks for Spent Ion Exchange Resins

a facility allowing for the casking of spent filters and of various solid waste, which is then transported to Unit 2 for conditioning

a conditioning facility (no longer in use).

Evaporator concentrates are no longer produced at Tihange 1. Spent ion exchange resins are transported, using a shielded cask, to Tihange 3 for conditioning.

2.3.3.1.2 Wet solid waste systems at Tihange 2

The Solid Waste System (TES) of Tihange 2 comprises, among other things:

2 buffer storage tanks for evaporator concentrates, 2 buffer storage tanks for IER

a facility allowing for the casking of spent filters and of various solid wastes

a conditioning facility for evaporator concentrates based on an in-cask mixer

an immobilisation facility for casked spent filters and various solid wastes

a large buffer storage for conditioned waste casks awaiting transportation to Belgoprocess.

2.3.3.1.3 Wet solid waste systems at Tihange 3

Two Spent Ion Exchange Resins Storage tanks are installed, as well as a facility for the casking of spent filters and various solid wastes.

Spent Ion Exchange Resins, produced by all the units on-site, are conditioned by an outside company by means of a mobile unit using a polymer-binding agent. This task is performed within the framework of a Process Qualification File approved by ONDRAF/NIRAS.

## 2.3.3.2 Waste not conditioned at Tihange

The pre-treatment and packaging of the 'dry' active waste are performed in Building  $\ddot{O}_2$  of Tihange 2.

A shredder-compactor is installed, allowing for combustible waste-shredding, slight compaction and packaging in small plastic bags of a unit mass of 15-20 kg.

Non-combustible compressible waste is pre-treated in a unit comprising hydraulic shears, a metallic scrap press and, for the cut and/or compacted waste, a 200  $\ell$  cask-filling station.

Filled transport container monitoring systems are provided upstream of a dedicated buffer storage.

## 2.3.3.3 Non-routine solid waste

The 9 old Steam Generators replaced at Tihange 1, 2 and 3 are stored as 'closed sources' (i.e. all the fittings/openings are sealed) in a dedicated storage building. The superseded Tihange 1 Reactor Vessel Head is also stored in the same building.

## **3 APPENDIX 3: description of the storage buildings at the Belgoprocess site**

## **3.1 Building 127**

Figure 1 shows the layout of this building, while figure 2 is an exterior view.




Figure 1: Layout of building 127



Figure 2: Exterior view of building 127

Building 127 consists primarily of four bunkers and has been in use since 1976. Each of the bunkers has the following dimensions:

length = 
$$64 \text{ m}$$
,  
width =  $12 \text{ m}$ ,  
height =  $8.2 \text{ m}$ .

Most of the walls in this concrete structure are 80 cm thick and the roof is 75 cm thick, which ensures a dose rate outside the building of less than 25  $\mu$ Sv/h.

Originally there were only two bunkers. Over the course of time a further two bunkers have been added. The design allows for a modular extension of the building to 8 bunkers. Bunkers '1' to '3' are equipped for  $220\ell$  drums, while bunker '4' accommodates  $400\ell$  drums.

Waste from building 126 (bituminised waste) is transported unshielded on a trolley from room 101 through corridor 103. A gantry with a 2-ton capacity raises the drums and places them in the bunker. Waste of a different origin enters lock 104 on a truck. The covers of the transport shielding are removed. A gantry places the drums on the trolley in room 102.

The drums are stacked 4-high, which gives a capacity of  $5000 \ge 220\ell$  drums in each of the bunkers '1' to '3'. Bunker '4' can accommodate up to  $3370 \ge 400\ell$  drums in 4 layers. Each layer consists of a square pattern with a radial shift in each direction. It can be necessary to lift 29 drums to reach a particular drum. In this case the space above the 4 layers offers sufficient room for an interim storage of the 29 drums. Figure 3 is an interior view of a bunker.



Figure 3: Interior view of a bunker in building 127

When a bunker is full the gantry is moved to the next bunker. For this purpose there are two gantries in corridor 103. The bunker is sealed with sand-filled boxes and concrete blocks. A small opening allows ventilation (1.5 air changes per day, filtered discharge by chimney stack on building 126).

Figures 4 and 5 show the layout of this building, while figure 6 is an exterior view.





Figure 4: Layout of building 129



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Figure 5: Layout of building 129



Figure 6: Exterior view of building 129

Building 129 consists primarily of two shielded bunkers with a hall on the top. Since 1985 it has served for the storage of high-level vitrified Pamela waste from the former pilot reprocessing plant eurochemic. Each of the bunkers has the following dimensions:

length = 18 m, width = 12.2 m, height = 20 m, including the hall.

It originally consisted of only one bunker (no. 110). This was constructed in such a way as to allow for extension. Later, a second bunker (no. 111) was taken into service. Bunker 110 can accommodate  $50\ell$  Pamela containers, while bunker 111 is suitable for the larger  $150\ell$  containers.

The bunker walls in this concrete structure are 120 cm thick, which ensures a dose rate outside the building of less than  $25 \,\mu Sv/h$ .

The shielded waste is transported on a small railway truck into a lock (101). A gantry with a 40-ton lifting capacity places a flask on top of the transport shielding and pulls the container into the flask. The gantry lifts up the flask and moves it into the hall (310) located above the storage zones of the bunkers (figure 7). The flask is placed on top of a stop on the medium floor and the stop is removed. After that the container sinks into a cylindrical basket and the stop returns to its position. This protection mechanism guarantees the safety of the personnel throughout the whole handling procedure.

Bunker 110 contains 252 baskets in which 6 containers are placed on top of each other (i.e. a total of 1512 containers). Bunker 111 contains 20 baskets for 5 containers and 160 baskets for 6 containers placed on top of each other (a total of 1060 containers). It can be necessary to manipulate 5 containers to reach a particular container. In that case the removed containers must be placed in another basket.

A forced ventilation is provided to cool the containers. A ventilation of approximately 10 air changes through the bunkers per hour is provided for this purpose. The extracted air passes through a filter before being discharged through the 5-metre chimneystack on top of building 129.



Figure 7: Hall above the storage bunkers

The layout of this building is shown in figures 10-13. Figures 14 and 15 are exterior and interior views.





Figure 8: Layout of building 136



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Figure 9: Layout of building 136





Figure 10: Cross-section through building 136



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# Figure 11: Cross-section through building 136



Figure 12: Exterior view of building 136



Figure 13: Interior view of building 136

Building 136 (partially in use from 2000 onwards) has a radically different design to the other storage buildings on the site. Not only is it intended for storage, it can also be used as a dispatch and reception station for the site.

The Synatom waste from the reprocessing of Belgian spent fuel by COGEMA (France) will be housed in building 136. Synatom waste means:

vitrified high-level waste, compacted hulls and ends and technological waste, bituminised medium-level waste,

The storage capacity is distributed over two bunkers. The capacity is shown in Table 3.

Table 3:	Storage ca	pacity of	building 136.

	Vitrified high-level	Compacted	Bituminized
	waste	waste	sludges
Primary	180 & CSDV	180 ℓ CSDC	210 l
packaging			
Capacity	590 pcs	820 pcs	2042 pcs

Since the design and construction of the building 136 COGEMA is making the necessary steps to change the way of conditioning of the hulls and end pieces and of the technological waste. Only one type of standard canister with compacted hulls and end pieces together with

technological waste is actually foreseen by COGEMA. The storage capacity of building 136 for these new waste forms is being reassessed.

# Receiving Hall (101)

In the Receiving Hall are handled the transport packages or containers that have arrived at the site or which are due to leave it; these transport packages and containers are fastened to a special semi-trailer pulled by a tractor.

The hall is equipped with a gantry of 1300 kN to lift the transport packages or containers and place them on an unloading wagon on rails. The wagon can receive the various transport packages and containers vertically. The 1300 kN gantry of the receiving hall is equipped with grippers with which all the types of transport packages and containers encountered can be manipulated.

# Lock (110)

The lock is located between the receiving hall and the unloading cell. It contains the equipment necessary for checking the transport packages before these are opened for unloading and before the transport packages are sent abroad. The lock also contains the equipment needed to perform any decontamination of a transport packaging that may be required. The lock is equipped with a gantry with a capacity of 200 kN.

### Unloading cell (130)

The unloading cell is designed so that the transport containers for primary packages of vitrified waste, compacted waste and bituminised waste and technological alpha waste. The unloading cell is equipped to send these primary packages, to the appropriate storage hall. The equipment is also suitable for the loading of a transport container of primary packages containing vitrified Pamela waste.

The bottom of the unloading cell has two different floors: one at 0 m that is level of the receiving hall, and one at 4 m that is level with the floor of the transfer corridor, along which the primary packages of hulls and end-parts, bituminised waste and medium-level technological alpha-waste are transferred.

The unloading cell contains two cell gantries that are controlled from the control room. The gangway of the upper gantry is equipped with a lifting system with a capacity of 200 kN; this serves for the handling of the covers of the transport containers, as well as for the handling of the baskets for the primary packages of bituminised waste. The gangway of the lower gantry is equipped with two lifting systems: the first has a capacity of 10 kN and serves for the handling of the primary packages containing vitrified waste; the second has a capacity of 50 kN and serves for the handling of the other types of primary packages.

The lift, which is controlled from the control room, brings the primary packages of vitrified waste from the upper level of the transport packaging to below the ceiling of the cell, from which the primary package is removed by the loading machine of the storage cell.

The transfer cart for the packages is intended to transfer the primary packages of hulls and end-pieces, bituminised waste and medium-level technological alpha waste from the unloading cell to the storage bunker.

### Transfer hall for vitrified waste

The packages of vitrified waste are transferred from the unloading cell to the storage cell with the help of a loading machine located in the transfer hall. This loading machine consists of a shielded casing which is manipulated by a gantry to which it is connected. This operation is performed with the 650 kN gantry.

# Bunkers 140/141

The storage cell has a capacity of 590 primary packages. This cell is subdivided into 2 modules, which are separated from each other by a wall that serves as a biological shield. Each module consists of three rows of 10vertical pits. Each pit consists of a tube which is fixed into a metal frame in which are stacked, from bottom to top, a shock absorber, ten waste packages and an isolation stop.

The internal dimensions of the 140/141 room are:

length = 15.1 m, width = 11.2 m,

The wall thickness of the storage modules is determined in the light of the radiological regulations, and makes due allowance for an aircraft crash. This thickness is 140 cm, with a further interior wall that is 40 cm thick. The partition between the two bunkers is 60 cm thick. This and the other exterior walls are sufficient to guarantee a dose rate outside the building of less than 20  $\mu$ Sv/h.

### Transfer corridor

The transfer corridor connects the unloading cell to the storage bunker for the primary packages of casings and end-parts, bituminised waste and medium-level technological alphawaste. The storage bunker stands perpendicular to the axis of the transfer corridor. The primary packages are transported to the storage bunker on a transfer cart.

### Storage bunker for non-vitrified waste (170)

Here the storage of 820 packages of hulls and end-parts was planned. As a consequence of the changes in conditioning mode of the hulls and endpieces and the technological waste by Cogema this is being reassessed.

The packages of bituminised waste, roughly 2000 in total, are stacked across four levels, with each package resting on four packages of the underlying layer. The packages of bituminised waste are stacked at the entrance to the storage bunker.

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The internal dimensions of this bunker are:

length = 
$$60 \text{ m}$$
,  
width =  $15 \text{ m}$ ,  
height =  $12 \text{ m}$ .

The thickness of the walls is 2 m, which is sufficient to limit the dose rate outside to 25  $\mu Sv/h.$ 

# Ventilation

The building is equipped with a complex ventilation system. The most important characteristics of this system are: a refreshment factor for the unloading cell of 2-6/hours, a refreshment factor for storage bunkers 140/141 of 4-33/hours and a refreshment factor for storage bunker 170 of  $\geq 0.5$ /hours.

The extracted air is filtered and discharged through two chimneystacks (30 m and 6 m in height).

Figure 14 shows the layout of this building while figure 15 is an exterior view.




Figure 14: Layout of building 150



Figure 15: Exterior view of building 150

<u>Building 150</u> has been in use since 1986 and is already full of low-level vitrified waste and low-level vitrified technological waste. This has a maximum contact dose rate of 5 mSv/h. The following types of packages are stored there:

Packages	Material	Matrix	
220 ℓ	Steel	Bitumen, concrete,	
		cement	
400 l	Steel	Bitumen, concrete,	
		cement	
600 l	Steel	Concrete, cement	
1000 ℓ	Haematite	Cement	
	concrete		
1500 l	Concrete	Cement+polystyrene	
1600 l	Concrete	Cement+polystyrene	
1800 l	Steel	Concrete	

#### Table 4 Packages stored in building 150

The external dimensions of the building are:

length = 
$$60.5 \text{ m}$$
,  
width =  $19.7 \text{ m}$ ,  
height =  $7.9 \text{ m}$ .

<u>Building 150</u>: This is a fully prefabricated building made of reinforced concrete, with 25-cm thick walls. This form of construction and the stacking method used guarantee a dose rate of less than 25  $\mu$ Sv/h outside the building. The floor and interior walls have a smooth concrete finish. The walls are windowless.

The waste is brought in on trucks. The packages are unloaded and stacked with two forklift trucks, one of 3 tons and one of 10 tons capacity. These forklifts are also used for the stacking. The packages are stacked vertically with the apertures at the top, with each package resting on two packages of the underlying layer. The various packages are stacked in the manner shown in table 5.

### Table 5 Packages stored in building 150

Packages	Number layers	of	Total (m)	height
220 <i>l</i>	5		4.40	

400 l	4	4.40
600 l	3	3.75
1000 l	2	2.50
1500 l	3	3.90
1600 l	3	3.90
1800 l	2	2.73

Around the stacks is a passage that is sufficiently wide to allow for checking and inspection. The stacking is conceived and executed in such a way that the packages for which the dose rate is proportionately the lowest are placed on the outside, while the most radioactive ones are stacked in the middle.

No forced ventilation is provided.

Figure 16 shows the layout of this building, while figure 17 is an exterior view.




Figure 16: Layout of building 151



Figure 17: Exterior view of building 151

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Building 151 consists primarily of four halls, and has been used for the storage of low-level bituminised waste and low-level cemented technological waste since 1988.

The following types of packages are stored there:

Packages	Material	Matrix
220 l	Steel	Bitumen, concrete,
		cement
400 l	Steel	Bitumen, concrete,
		cement
600 l	Steel	Concrete, cement
665 l	Asbestos	Cement
	cement	
1000 l	Haematite	Cement
	concrete	
1200 ℓ	Asbestos	Cement
	cement	
1500 ℓ	Concrete	Cement+polystyrene
1600 l	Concrete	Cement+polystyrene
2200 <i>l</i>	Steel	Concrete

# Table 6 Packages stored in building 151

Building 151 is laid out in two 'phases'. Phase 1 (length: 72.5m) consists of two parallel and adjacent halls (A and B). Hall A, with a width of 17.2 m, is preferred for packages of 220, 600, 665, 1000, 1200, 1500, 1600 and 2200  $\ell$ . Hall B, with a width of 21.2 m, is preferred for 400  $\ell$  drums. The two halls are separated by a continuous wall. Phase 2 is similar but has a length of 84.5m. Figure 18 shows an interior view of a hall.



Figure 18: Interior view of a hall in building 151.

The last compartment of hall B and the last two compartments of hall A form a corridor that is reserved for unloading actions. The ends of this corridor are closed off with metal overhead doors of a sufficient height to enable trucks to pass beneath them. Each hall (108=A, 109=B, 111=C, 112=D) has a chicane to protect workers from receiving radiation from the stacks. These do not extend all the way upwards, in order to allow a roller bridge to pass through. Halls A and C are equipped with a manually-operated 10 t roller bridge. Packages can be delivered with a shielded forklift truck, so that all types of packages can be accommodated. Halls B and D are equipped with an automatic roller bridge and are reserved for 400 $\ell$  drums. Halls A and B are now full. Given that the future delivery will consist exclusively of 400 $\ell$  drums, the 10 t roller bridge in hall C will also have to have a 2 t device or, alternatively, the building will have to be expanded.

The stacking of the 400 $\ell$  drums is in a triangular pattern, with a radial shift between the layers. The stacking of the other drums can differ. The capacity of the halls is 1900m3 (A), 3900m3 (B), 3000m3 (C), and 5200m3 (D).

No forced ventilation is provided.

The wall thickness is 25 cm.

Figures 19 and 20 show the layout of building 155.




Figure 19: Layout of building 155




Figure 20: Layout of building 155

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Building 155 is in operation since 2005. It is primarily intended for the storage of low-level long-lived waste (Pu-contaminated) and long-lived waste containing radium in two separate halls.

The various types of packages that will be stored in the building are shown below (the last four OV packages are non-standard packages).

Table 7: Packages that are considered suitable for storage in building	155
--	-----

200ℓ
<b>400ℓ</b>
400ℓ BL
600 <i>l</i>
OV900
OV900BL
OVSP
OV30

Given the similarity of the planning and of the envisaged final destination of the waste concerned (i.e. geological storage), a decision was made to design a building with two separate storage bunkers. The capacity of the bunker for low-level vitrified long-lived waste is  $\sim$ 2000 m3 by 1200 m2, while that of the bunker for vitrified long-lived waste containing radium is  $\sim$ 2450 m3 by 1200 m2.

# Layout description

The most important parts of building 155 are:

- an unloading hall (101) where the packages are unloaded from a truck onto a small railway truck (one per bunker) using a 100 kN gantry (an electrically-driven pallet is provided for the SP packages),
- a lock (102) between the unloading hall and the storage bunkers,
- two separated storage bunkers (105 for low-level vitrified long-lived waste, 106 for vitrified long-lived waste containing radium), each equipped with a 30 kN gantry and an interim storage facility on rollers (103, 104); each of the bunkers has the following dimensions:

length = $67 \text{ m}$ ,
width = $19 \text{ m}$ ,
height = $12 \text{ m}$ .

a storage bunker (no. 115: 7.5 m long; 7.5 m wide and  $\sim$ 2.5 m high) for the SP waste (especially poison rods).

# Stacking and manipulation of the packages

Preference is shown for a stacking method in a triangular pattern in which the upper row of drums rests on the lower row of drums, which are stacked in a trapezium shape in two groups of five (like the dots on a dice), in order to maximise stability. The number of stacking levels is limited to:

- 4 for 400ℓ packages
- 4 for 200ℓ packages
- $\sim 3$  for 600 $\ell$  drums
- 1 for all non-standard packages

The different types of packages will not be mixed. The stacking will allow for interventions that might have to be made in the bunkers in the event of an incident (e.g.: a falling package) or for maintenance. No special corridors are provided for the inspection of individual packages. It should be possible to remove any cask from the stack at any time. To be able to access a particular cask, free space is provided in each storage bunker where the removed drums can be stacked (maximum of 40 for a stack 4 levels high). Between the packages there is a distance of  $\sim$ 5 cm. Taking this into account, the storage surface in each bunker is 1200 m2.

The standard packages are manipulated with a gantry, while non-standard packages are handled with a forklift.

# Radiation and contamination aspects

The more radioactive packages are, if possible, placed on the inside of the stack. The thickness of the bunker walls is 45 cm, which will give a dose rate on the outside of less than  $10 \,\mu$ Sv/h.

The building has two separate ventilation circuits: for low-level vitrified long-lived waste and for vitrified long-lived waste containing radium. These circuits force the extraction air (if necessary after filtering) into a common chimneystack. Under normal circumstances the extraction air is not filtered, but the filters are switched on when waste is being manipulated. The ventilation system in the bunker for vitrified long-lived waste containing radium can be expanded to ensure that sufficient amounts of radon are always discharged.

The air refreshment factors are 0.5/hour

Building 156 (see Figure 21) is the storage building for the CASTOR BR3<sup>®</sup> casks.

The storage building (L x W x H: 23.5 x 8.8 x 8.5 m) consists of a storage area with 8 cask positions and a receiving area. A radiation trap separates the storage area from the receiving area. Access to the storage area is via a metal sliding door equipped with a personnel entrance. Handling and maintenance of the casks is performed in the receiving area, which consists of the maintenance station, a storage room to house related equipment and a sliding entrance door for cask and material transports by truck. This entrance door is equipped with a personnel entrance. The handling of the casks in the storage building is performed by a 320 kN crane.

The dose rate limits outside the building are:

- surface of the storage building  $10 \,\mu$ Sv/h
- 300 m distance from the storage building 0.1 mSv/y
- •

The decay heat is removed by natural convection.




Figure 21: View of the storage building

The leak-tightness during storage is guaranteed by the primary cover as the first barrier and by the secondary cover as the second barrier. For both covers, the long-term sealing is guaranteed by metal seals. For the continuous and permanent surveillance of the leak-tightness of the cask, a well-established monitoring system is present which uses a pressure sensor as a signal transmitter.

As mentioned above, the basket structure is enclosed and is designed to be handled when loaded. Furthermore, as only seven casks are loaded, the eighth CASTOR BR3® cask can be used as a 'spare' cask; this suggested transferring the basket from the defective cask (containing the spent fuel) into the spare cask. This operation can be performed in the hot cell of the existing storage building for high level waste at the Belgoprocess site, situated some 50 metres from the storage building. After this intervention, the newly-loaded cask can be re-transferred to the storage building and the defective cask checked for the cause of failure.

# 4 **APPENDIX 4 : Description of the installations of SCK**•CEN : **BR2**

The BR2 reactor, in service since 1963, is a test reactor with a high neutron flux for the irradiation of materials. Its main purpose is the irradiation of materials under high neutron flux (maximum thermal neutron flux of the order of  $10^{15}$  n. cm<sup>-2</sup> s<sup>-1</sup>). These materials are irradiated in experimental rigs, the complexity of which depends on the nature of the irradiation and the intended objectives. The reactor loading is defined (fuel elements, control rods) in the light of the experimental specifications, and is adjusted for each cycle. It is cooled by pressurised water (nominal value: 1.235 Map or 12.6 kg/cm<sup>2</sup> at the entrance of the reactor), which also serves as a moderator. The beryllium matrix is composed of 79 cylindrical channels and contains fuel elements, control rods, experimental set-ups or reflector stops made of beryllium.

The reactor operation regime consists of successive cycles, each cycle consisting of a period of shutdown and a period of operation (21 days).

The fuel elements are composed of six (sometimes fewer) concentric pipes, which are composed of a combination of uranium and aluminium and which are made according the technique of powder metallurgy. The plates produced in this way are covered on both sides with an aluminium alloy cladding.

The uranium used is highly enriched (90 to 93 %) with the isotope  $^{235}$ U; in the future, weaker enrichments can be used, preferably with an increased density of the uranium in the nuclear fuel plates. Most of the elements contain burnable neutron absorbers (B<sub>4</sub>C<sub>2</sub>, Sm<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub>) in the nuclear fuel plates.

There are two types of control rods, one type for compensation and safety and another for regulation; their absorbent part is made of cadmium, covered with aluminium.

The compensation and safety rods can be dropped into the reactor to cause a quick stop ('scram'); the regulation rods are permanently attached to their replacement mechanism and are therefore unable to cooperate in a scram action. Each rod moves inside a guide tube with cooling gaps.

The nuclear instrumentation consists of neutron monitors and radiation detectors, partly around and close to the reactor, partly at the reactor exit in the neighbourhood of the primary circuit.

These can trigger alarms and can also automatically reduce the power of the reactor. The speed of this power reduction depends on the seriousness of the recorded deviation. Similar actions can be commanded by instrument channels that monitor the cooling flow, the pressure and the temperature of the cooling water, the activity level of the radiation in water circuits or the radiation level in the buildings caused by malfunctions or faults of the electricity distribution network or the compressed air system, or during experiments.

The beryllium matrix, already twice renewed (in 1980 and 1996), contains a large number of rods in the form of hexagonal prisms with cylindrical drillings (these form the reactor channels), which together form a cylindrical structure. It is placed into the central part of the reactor vessel. This vessel, made of aluminium alloy, contains an upper part and a lower part in the form of truncated cones, connected at both ends with a central cylinder. Stainless steel covers seal the vessel at each end. The upper cover has 79 round openings, which correspond to the 79 channels of the central part made of beryllium. Each opening is connected to one of these channels by a guide tube; the openings are sealed off with plugs during the operation of the reactor. In the lower cover there are only 18 round openings, which are normally sealed off with plugs and are also connected to the reactor channels. They allow experimental set-ups to be moved to a shielded room situated underneath the reactor.

Fuel elements, control and safety rods, regulation rods, irradiation experiments or plugs made of beryllium can be loaded into the channels of the beryllium matrix; the reactor load configuration depends on the experimental requirements and the criteria that have to be fulfilled to guarantee safety during operation.

The reactor is cooled by the forced circulation of the water that enters the reactor vessel at the top and leaves the vessel at the bottom.

This primary water is sent through heat exchangers; the heat is transferred to a closed secondary circuit equipped with cooling towers. These cooling towers allow the operation of the reactor up to 125 MW.

The reactor is placed in a pool (the reactor pool) with a water level more than 7 m above the upper cover. This offers sufficient shielding to the personnel during the operation of the reactor. During reactor shutdown, the water level can be lowered to allow access to the reactor cover. Two adjacent pools are used to store the irradiated equipment and fuel elements unloaded from the reactor and for gamma irradiations.

The reactor, the three pools and the reactor control room are situated in a metallic cylindrical building, which is regularly inspected.

In an adjacent building (the 'machine building') there are several auxiliary installations: a storage channel connected to the reactor pool through a transfer tube, dismantling cells connected to the storage channel, the pumps and heat exchangers of the primary circuit of the reactor, purification circuits, etc.

Other buildings house the ventilation fans (blowers), air filters, the electrical emergency groups, air compressors, the experiment hall, etc.

The solid and liquid waste is collected and sent to the waste treatment installations at Belgoprocess. The gaseous effluents are released, after filtration, through a 60-metre chimneystack.

It is possible to purify the atmosphere of the reactor building and the cells by means of active coal filters.

An elaborate system monitors the activity levels of the primary and secondary circuits, the activity of the pools and the storage channel in the machine building, the activity of the atmosphere of the reactor building, the activity of the air released through the chimneystack, etc.

