Derestricted 25 November 2021

(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 25 November 2021)



GOV/INF/2021/44
Date: 25 October 2021

Original: English

For official use only

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Report by the Director General

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in relation to its enrichment-related activities. It provides an update on developments since the Director General's previous reports. ¹

Activities Related to Enrichment

- 2. Iran informed the Agency, in a letter dated 17 October 2021, that "due to minor modification comprising temporary feeding of uranium enriched up to 20% [U-235] to single machine and intermediate cascades in [research and development (R&D)] line No.2^[2] without any collection of products", the design information questionnaire (DIQ) for the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz had been updated and was available at the facility for examination by the Agency.
- 3. On 19 October 2021, the Agency examined the updated DIQ for PFEP, which described the following new modes of operation in R&D line 2 of PFEP: single centrifuges, intermediate cascades of up to 10 centrifuges and intermediate cascades of up to 20 centrifuges, will be fed with uranium enriched up to 5% U–235 or uranium enriched up to 20% U–235. In both cases, the product and tails streams will be re-combined and no product will be collected. Iran informed the Agency that these changes were

¹ GOV/2021/39, GOV/INF/2021/42 and GOV/INF/2021/43.

² Previously, in R&D line 2 of PFEP, Iran has fed natural UF₆ into small cascades of various centrifuge types to accumulate uranium enriched up to 2% U–235 and fed natural uranium into single centrifuges of various types without accumulating enriched uranium (see GOV/2021/39, para. 35).

temporary. As a consequence of these new modes of operation, the Agency decided to increase the frequency and intensity of its safeguards activities³ at PFEP.

- 4. On 20 October 2021, the Agency conducted a design information verification (DIV) at PFEP and verified that the changes to the facility described in the updated DIQ had not yet been implemented. During another DIV conducted at PFEP on 23 October 2021, the Agency was able to carry out the necessary safeguards activities, including taking baseline environmental samples from the process area of R&D line 2. The Agency then detached the seal from a cylinder of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 to be used as feed material in R&D line 2 of PFEP. The Agency verified that on that date the following centrifuges were installed in R&D line 2: one IR-2m, two IR-4 and two IR-6 single centrifuges; and small and intermediate cascades of six IR-4 centrifuges, five IR-6 centrifuges, ten IR-6 centrifuges and ten IR-s centrifuges.
- 5. On 25 October 2021, the Agency verified that Iran began feeding UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 into a single IR-6 centrifuge in R&D line 2 at PFEP and that the resulting product and tails streams were being re-combined. The other single centrifuges and the small and intermediate cascades were not being fed at that time. The Agency will take environmental samples for analysis from the process area on a regular basis and will be using other standard safeguards measurement techniques.

³ Such activities included additional containment and surveillance measures, and taking environmental samples.