EXPO overview and introduction to the IAEA's safeguards system

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Verification and Security Policy Coordination Section

Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination

Office reporting to the Director General

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The IAEA today

DIRECTOR GENERAL
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei

- Secretariat Policy-Making Organs
- Office of Ext. Rel. and Policy Coordination
- Office of Internal Oversight Services
- Office of Legal Affairs
- Dept. of Technical Co-operation
- Dept. of Nuclear Energy
- Dept. of Nuclear Safety & Security
- Dept. of Safeguards
- Dept. of Nuclear Sciences & Applications
- Dept. of Manage-ment

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EXPO overview

External Relations and Policy Coordination

Objective:
to assist in the development, coordination and implementation of Agency policy

➔ daily contact with DG's office;
with other offices reporting to the DG;
and with the Departments

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EXPO overview

External Relations

Membership; protocol; correspondence instructions; liaison with Member States, UN and other international organizations and civil society; internal briefings and external presentations about the IAEA; negotiation of safeguards agreements and protocols; safeguards visa and inspector designation matters; *etc*.

Policy Coordination

Interface between DG and Departments; focal points in EXPO for each Department; “translation “ from technical level to policy level and vice versa; coordination between Departments; coordination of house-wide products; clearance of Board/GC documents; clearance of sensitive correspondence; *etc*.

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EXPO overview



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EXPO overview

Verification and Security Policy Coordination Section (VSPC)

Nuclear verification, safeguards, nuclear non-proliferation, NPT, nuclear-weapon-free zones, disarmament, nuclear security, assurances of supply.

Technology and Safety Policy Coordination, Interagency Affairs and Protocol Section (TSIP)

Technical cooperation, nuclear safety, nuclear energy, nuclear applications, interagency affairs, protocol

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Activities of the IAEA



Activities can be described in terms of 3 pillars:

(1) Technology

(2) Safety/Security

(3) Verification

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Nuclear energy supports development…

… but nuclear energy can also be used to make weapons

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Key Challenge

How to disseminate the benefits of nuclear energy while ensuring against its destructive capabilities

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Treaty verification

Verifying compliance with international undertakings:

Political and legal **undertaking** by the State



Verification, *e.g.* by a multilateral organisation



Conclusion that the State has honoured (or not) its undertaking

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Treaty verification

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings:



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IAEA safeguards



The NPT requires NNWS States to conclude with the IAEA an agreement ('safeguards agreement') allowing the IAEA to verify the States' nuclear non-proliferation undertaking.

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IAEA safeguards

Apply safeguards to *all* nuclear material in *all* peaceful nuclear activities

Each NNWS to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA

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IAEA safeguards

Objective of comprehensive safeguards = application of safeguards to *all* nuclear material in *all* peaceful nuclear activities

verify that State declarations about their nuclear material holdings are correct and complete

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IAEA safeguards

Correct = no declared nuclear material has been diverted

Complete = there is no undeclared nuclear material and activities

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IAEA safeguards

CSAs require *inter alia* that the IAEA be provided with information (e.g. reports on nuclear material) and access (e.g. inspections)

Safeguards Measures

Nuclear material accountancy



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Safeguards Measures

Inspections

Safeguards Measures

Containment and surveillance



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IAEA safeguards

But the safeguards system has been designed in a way that *the intensity of these requirements varies in accordance with the level of nuclear activities of the State*.

➔ **Since the early 1970s, the IAEA began making available "small quantities protocols" (SQPs) to States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility.**

This SQP holds in abeyance most of the detailed provisions of CSAs (including those relevant to reporting and inspections).

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IAEA safeguards

Comprehensive safeguards agreement ..... **Small quantities protocol**

IAEA safeguards

But limitations were found in the safeguards system (especially with regard to the verification of completeness) that needed to be addressed…

IAEA safeguards - APs

Set of strengthening measures culminated in the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Model Additional Protocol in May 1997.

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IAEA safeguards - APs



Provides better tools for implementing safeguards, and in particular for verifying completeness (enhanced access and information)

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IAEA safeguards - APs



How to conclude an additional protocol

1. The State notifies the Agency of its decision to conclude an additional protocol and the draft protocol is approved by the IAEA Board and open for signature.
2. The protocol is signed by the IAEA Director General and a representative of the State.
3. The protocol enters into force (either upon signature or upon receipt, by the Agency, of notification that constitutional and statutory requirements for entry into force have been met).

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IAEA Safeguards – revised SQP

Second strengthening measure:
the revision of the SQP text

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IAEA safeguards - APs



IAEA safeguards - SQPs

In 2005 the IAEA Secretariat raised the fact that the basis for drawing safeguards conclusions in States with SQPs was limited…

- the Board decided to revise the text of the SQP and to change the SQP eligibility criteria.
- the Board authorized the Director General to conclude exchanges of letters amending or rescinding existing SQPs, in order to give effect to the revised text and changed criteria.

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IAEA safeguards - SQPs

- The revised SQP still holds in abeyance many of the provisions of CSAs but *inter alia* requires States to
  (1) provide an initial report on any nuclear material;
  (2) allow for inspections; and
  (3) inform the IAEA once a decision to build a nuclear facility is taken
- The Board also decided that SQPs would not be made available to States with planned or existing nuclear facilities.

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IAEA safeguards - SQPs

How does a State amend its SQP?

- The IAEA writes to the State, proposing the new SQP text (done in 2005 and 2006)
- The State writes back accepting this proposal

IAEA safeguards - SQPs



IAEA safeguards

- For States with **both a CSA and an AP** (and an amended SQP, as appropriate), the IAEA can draw the "broader conclusion" that *all* nuclear material remained in peaceful activities (*non-diversion of declared nuclear material and absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities*).
- For States **with a CSA but no AP**, the IAEA can draw the conclusion that *declared* nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
- For States that have **not yet fulfilled their NPT Article III requirement to bring into force a CSA** with the IAEA, the IAEA cannot draw any safeguards conclusions.

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IAEA Safeguards System

As of 28 May 2009,

167 States have safeguards agreements in force, of which 159 are comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to the NPT (26 still outstanding)

91 States have additional protocols in force (120 signed and 131 approved by the Board)

31 States have accepted the revised SQP text

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Status of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

(as of 30 April 2009)



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States with CSAs in force

NWS

Non-NPT States

Conclusion of Additional Protocols

1998- 30 April 2009 (cumulative)



“In order for the Agency to be able to give the required assurance to the international community, we must be given the authority.”

IAEA Director General,
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei

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Thank you