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TWENTY-EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION: 24-28 SEPTEMBER 1984

RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,
on Tuesday, 25 September 1984, at 10.25 a.m.

President: Mr. BARREDA DELGADO (Peru)

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*/ A provisional version of this document was issued on 28 September 1984.

**/ GC(XXVIII)/711.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXVIII)/INF/223/Rev.4.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION (GC(XXVIII)/711)

1. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee, at its meeting the previous day, had authorized him to report on the result of its consideration of the agenda and the allocation of items for initial discussion. The General Committee recommended that the agenda consist of all the items listed in the provisional agenda as set out in document GC(XXVIII)/711.

2. The General Committee further recommended that those items be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in document GC(XXVIII)/711.

3. Finally, the General Committee recommended that, subject to any changes which might appear desirable in order to make the best use of the time available, the items listed in document GC(XXVIII)/711 be taken in the order in which they appeared there.

4. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

5. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee had authorized him to report that it recommended fixing Friday, 28 September 1984, as the closing date of the twenty-eighth regular session and Monday, 23 September 1985, as the opening date of the twenty-ninth regular session of the General Conference, to be held in Vienna.

6. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1983 (GC(XXVIII)/713 and Add.1 and 2)

7. Mr. HENDERSON (United Kingdom) said that reconciling the aspirations of many countries to acquire nuclear technology and the normal enthusiasm of all countries to expand trade with the world's concern that the dissemination of nuclear technology might cause proliferation of nuclear weapons was a fundamental

dilemma for the Agency, which had been established as a means of achieving such reconciliation and which had developed for itslf a standing in the world which was second to none amongst international agencies. Sadly, however, the search for complete resolution of that fundamental dilemma had not yet been successful.

8. At a time when the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were engaged in preparations for the Third NPT Review Conference it might perhaps be appropriate to give some thought to the interlocking problems of non-proliferation and nuclear trade and their impact on the work of the Agency. The concept of "dual-use" technology was not new. The first viable cutting edge, made by flaking flint many thousands of years ago, had given rise to both tools and weapons. What was new was the scale of the problems now that man had a source of power which was both capable of providing immense benefits and of destroying civilization and possibly even life itself. To meet that challenge, it had been necessary to re-examine and sometimes to modify or discard long-held concepts relating to commercial privacy, military secrecy and even national sovereignty.

9. It was clear that a technology of such potential must be used to the benefit of all nations. Equally clearly no Government could permit the transfer of nuclear material, equipment or technology to destinations outside its control unless it had confidence that such items would indeed be put to the stated use and not be diverted or otherwise used to assist the development of a nuclear explosive capability. Such confidence was not something which the supplier State could generate itself, it had to be created by the recipient. The means devised so far for generating confidence had been clear, unambiguous and credible statements of intent backed by adequate transparency of subsequent action, and the principal instrument used for the achievement of such transparency was the Agency's safeguards system.

10. The first safeguards system devised in the early days of the Agency had provided for the application of safeguards to specific projects, usually linked to specific bilateral supplier/recipient agreements. It had become clear that such assurances and safeguards did not give sufficient confidence that the recipient State might not in parallel be carrying out a military nuclear programme which would benefit, if only indirectly, from civil transfers. In order to deal with that possible weakness, the international community had developed the concepts enshrined in the NPT: the clear renunciation of any intention to acquire or develop a nuclear explosive capacity, combined with the acceptance of safeguards on all nuclear materials in all nuclear facilities.

11. For those countries which applied those concepts there was undoubtedly a much higher degree of confidence, thus permitting a much higher rate of technology transfer. The success of those concepts could be seen from the fact that more than three quarters of the world's independent sovereign States had acceded to the NPT and more than 98% of civil nuclear facilities were under safeguards. Thus, the "quantum jump" in power for good or evil represented by the technical discovery of nuclear energy had been matched by a series of very impressive political achievements: first, the creation of an Agency entrusted with the verification of national undertakings, and secondly, the almost universal preparedness of States to make a small cession of sovereignty by accepting safeguards on their activities and giving the undertakings involved in NPT membership.

12. The corollary of the increase in confidence generated by the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and the clear renunciation of a nuclear explosive capability was bound to be a decrease in confidence - particularly among the informed public - in respect of those States which refused to take either, or both, of those steps. Simple statements of peaceful intent could not have the force of a major international treaty, nor could the public be brought

to understand why safeguards should be refused as discriminatory or as unacceptable intrusions on national sovereignty by a small minority of States, when they were accepted by the overwhelming majority of States with different political systems and in all parts of the world. That was why it was his Government's policy to foster and to encourage adherence to the NPT.

13. The Director General, in his opening statement, had suggested setting up radiation protection advisory teams to assist Member States in implementing the Agency's Basic Safety Standards. That approach might be very useful, as it would help to ensure uniformity in the radiation protection systems of Member States. Much would depend on the composition of the teams themselves and the guidance given to them on how to approach their task. His Government would be interested to see more detailed proposals.

14. The Director General had also mentioned that the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material had so far been signed by 38 States and ratified by 10; but that 11 instruments of ratification were still needed for its entry into force. The United Kingdom regarded the Convention as an important legal framework for ensuring the safe transport of nuclear materials and would deposit its instruments of ratification with the Agency, in accordance with its obligations under the EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) Treaty, as soon as the other members of the European Community were ready to take the same step.

15. In July 1982, the United Kingdom nuclear and electricity generating industries had established an executive agency - NIREX - responsible for managing and disposing of their low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes. The development of new disposal facilities for intermediate-level wastes was NIREX's main priority. Formal proposals to develop repositories would be subject to planning legislation and regulatory controls. The Government had conducted a public consultation exercise on the principles to be used in assessing proposals; the draft principles had taken full account of the valuable work carried out in that field by the Agency.

16. In that context, much attention had recently been directed to the levels of discharges from the Sellafield reprocessing plant. His Government appreciated the concerns that had been expressed. The discharge levels had already been considerably reduced, and a new plant nearing completion would be bringing about further very substantial reductions by 1986. His Government fully supported the Paris Commission's recommendation that contracting parties to the Paris Convention should take account of the best available technology at nuclear reprocessing plants in order to minimize radioactive discharges to the marine environment and would be submitting a first report and timetable on further proposed measures by the end of 1984.

17. Two international projects with which the United Kingdom was associated had experienced encouraging developments in the past year. The Joint European Torus (JET) device, which was the world's largest and most versatile fusion experiment, had been opened and was performing well, and the United Kingdom had signed an agreement with Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy for co-operation in the field of fast reactors research and technology. On the national level, good progress was being made with commissioning of three recently completed advanced gas-cooled reactors and with the construction of further such reactors.

18. The Director General was right in regarding safety as one of the most important areas in which the Agency acted as an instrument for the exchange of experience and for the joint elaboration of guidelines. The updating and revision of the regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials was an Agency activity which the United Kingdom certainly welcomed. The recent sinking of the Mont Louis freighter had highlighted the importance of such regulations and of their gaining the widest possible level of international acceptance and implementation. However, although that event had demonstrated that the regulations were clearly effective, that had apparently not been enough from the point of view of public acceptance. Despite the fact that the cargo had carried minimal radiation hazard and that its carriage had conformed to stringent safety standards, the accident had been perceived by many more or

less informed observers as a serious nuclear event and there had been calls for even more regulations relating to the carriage of nuclear materials. On the other hand, the more basic question raised by the event, namely how it had been possible for two large vessels, whatever their cargoes, to collide at all, seemed to have been overlooked by most commentators.

19. Thus, the case of the Mont Louis had highlighted not only the importance of effective regulations, but also the need for a better general understanding by the public of the real hazards from which those regulations were designed to protect the public. The Central Electricity Generating Board in the United Kingdom had recently shown how the message could be got across by arranging a demonstration in which a train travelling at over 100 miles an hour had crashed into a full-sized transport spent-fuel flask. The train had been a spectacular write-off, but the flask, had survived, as expected, bruised but still a fully effective containment. Of course the scope for demonstrations of that kind was limited, and public concern about transport of nuclear materials was just one manifestation of the wider problem of public acceptability. Unless people across the world could be convinced that nuclear energy was something to be embraced rather than feared or rejected, well-organized and vocal opposition in various countries would continue its attempts to slow or actually halt progress. The nuclear community had learned that apart from the prerequisites of technology, safety, economics and fuel supply, a successful nuclear programme needed public acceptance. Nuclear power across the world would be judged by the standards achieved by the world at large in relation to safety, good management, economics, non-proliferation, and waste disposal. Governments must therefore ensure that the public was properly informed and must take a positive lead in relation to nuclear power. The Agency had an essential role to play in the debate and if the nuclear community made common cause it might be possible to remove one entirely unnecessary obstacle in the way of worldwide progress.

20. Mr. CONSTANTINI (Argentina), summarizing the main events since the last General Conference pertaining to the Argentine nuclear programme, said that on 18 November 1983 it had been announced that Argentina had mastered the technology of uranium enrichment by gaseous diffusion after a series of pilot-scale tests, which had rendered possible the design and construction of a medium-sized uranium enrichment plant in the neighbourhood of Pilcaniyeu, Rio Negro Province. A number of modules of a plant designed to produce uranium enriched to 20%, the capacity of which had been determined in such a way as to supply Argentine experimental reactors and the potential market therefore in Latin America, were in operation. By expanding the plant as planned, it would be possible to enrich the amount of uranium needed to supply the Atucha and Embalse nuclear power stations with uranium enriched to 1%. The public announcement had been preceded by official notification from the Argentine Government to the heads of Government and nuclear authorities of various friendly countries, to those of countries providing Argentina with nuclear technology and supplies, to those of all Latin American States and also to the Director General of the IAEA, in which it had been stated that the new technology, developed by Argentine scientists and technicians without any help from outside, was intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. Argentina had been very gratified that the Director General had immediately accepted the invitation to visit the above-mentioned plant, which he had done on 22 November 1983.

21. As regards the generation of nuclear electricity, the first Argentine nuclear power reactor (Atucha I), which had completed ten years of operation, had continued to have an excellent availability factor of 97% during the year. The second power reactor, Embalse, which had been connected to the grid in 1983, had also operated satisfactorily, and its availability factor in the first eight months of 1984 had been 94%. Despite the considerable economic and financial difficulties of the current budgetary year, all the main projects under way had continued to make progress, albeit at a slower rate than planned. Forty-one per cent of the work on the third power reactor

(Atucha II) and 81.5% of that on the pilot heavy-water plant based on Argentine technology had been completed; the figure for the industrial heavy-water plant based on Swiss technology with a rated capacity of 250 tonnes per annum was the same as that of the previous one. It was anticipated that the first phase of the enrichment plant would be finished in 1986 and that the fuel reprocessing plant would come on line in 1987.

22. The previous year had again been a most active one in terms of both multilateral and bilateral international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Where multinational co-operation was concerned, Argentina had intensified its activities under the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme. Aware as it was of the lack of funds for that programme and despite its own serious budgetary difficulties, his Government had increased to the maximum extent possible its assistance in the form of fellowships and training courses and by making Argentine experts available whenever so requested by the Agency on an exclusively non-discriminatory basis in all cases.

23. An interregional training course on radiological protection and nuclear safety had once again been held in Buenos Aires together with the IAEA, which had been attended by eighteen fellows from Latin America and elsewhere. An undertaking had also been given to hold interregional courses in 1985 on quality assurance and on training in energy planning in developing countries with special reference to nuclear power, and also a regional course on training of trainers in data processing for radioimmunoassay, all in co-operation with the Agency.

24. In addition, Argentina undertook to pay in 1985 its voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in Argentine currency.

25. Within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS), Argentina had again offered technical assistance to all member countries of the Organization and had undertaken, among other things, to hold a regional

seminar in October 1984 on applications of nuclear energy in veterinary medicine and animal production. Also, under the auspices of the OAS, a fourth course on metallurgy and technology of materials had been held, as had courses on fuel element technology for research reactors and on radioisotope techniques used in radioimmunoassay, both of which had been held exclusively on the initiative of the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission without any support from an international organization; both the latter courses had been attended by many Latin American professionals with fellowships from the Argentine Government.

26. Argentina had been participating in the group of co-ordinating countries in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear energy of the movement of non-aligned countries. His Government had also been participating in the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

27. Turning to bilateral co-operation, he said that joint action with various friendly nations had borne fruit under sixteen bilateral co-operation agreements which had been in force, including agreements with Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Ecuador, whereby co-operation with the last two countries had been intensified over the past year. Such joint action was the result of mutual confidence and common objectives in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

28. Argentina was prepared to forge and to strengthen links of co-operation with all nations of the world on a basis of equality and mutual respect. It also continued to support world efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, whether horizontal or vertical. Its return to a constitutional regime provided an additional assurance in that connection. The President of Argentina, Dr. Raul Alfonsin, had formally and clearly reaffirmed the exclusively peaceful nature of Argentine nuclear policy and had set up a commission composed of three leading Argentine personalities to draw up a draft act which was currently being submitted to Parliament and which would clearly set forth the peaceful policies and objectives of the Argentine

nuclear plan and the legal arrangements governing all Argentine nuclear activities. His Government not only intended to ensure that its own nuclear development was strictly peaceful but would continue to advocate in all international fora that disarmament be carried out under strict and effective international control, including nuclear disarmament without which the survival of humanity was seriously at risk. Argentina was also convinced that the Agency's safeguards system constituted the appropriate means of ensuring non-proliferation. Any additional requirements imposed unilaterally introduced an undesirable discretionary element which his Government was not prepared to accept.

29. Commenting on the Agency's activities since the last General Conference, he congratulated the Secretariat on the commitment it had shown to the solution of problems relating to technical assistance, and he warmly supported the results achieved. However, certain Member States were still imposing unacceptable and discriminatory conditions in respect of technical assistance from extrabudgetary funds provided by them which went against the spirit of the Statute, as did the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by the Agency; technical assistance could not be universal until such discrimination ceased to exist. The increase in funds available for technical assistance was gratifying. However, a real measure of the growth was given not by comparison with the figures of previous years but by comparing the requirements of Member States with the funds available.

30. Turning to safeguards, he said that it was profoundly gratifying that there had once more been no failure to comply with the undertakings made by Member States. Greater transparency was, however, needed in the safeguards activities of the Secretariat so that Member States could be properly informed and the Board would be able to make the appropriate judgements and to take the relevant decisions. In that way the reasons and motivation behind the conclusions reached by the Secretariat and the action taken by it in the practical implementation of safeguards would become known. In that connection, Argentina had requested that the Secretariat prepare a document showing

a complete list of all consultants, advisers and experts who had worked since 1981, were currently working, or would be likely to work on safeguards-related subjects. It had also requested copies of the documents produced and recommendations made by experts and advisers. Argentina was convinced that the information would be extremely useful for the continuing improvement of methods of measurement, verification and monitoring of the safeguards system, to which his Government had always attached the highest importance. Finally, he noted that a joint programme between Argentina and the IAEA on the testing of the behaviour of a containment and surveillance system for the Embalse nuclear power station was currently fully under way.

31. As regards the work of the Committee on the Assurances of Supply (CAS), Argentina was concerned about the meagre progress achieved in the formulation of principles of international co-operation. It appeared that the spirit of compromise needed in the Committee for a constructive discussion on the various views put forward was lacking. That was because the concepts of "non-proliferation" and "assurances of supply" had not been adequately clarified, and it was necessary to accept that each of those concepts had different meanings for the various parties involved in the discussion. Greater efforts to clarify those concepts could offer a good basis for an understanding to be achieved. On the other hand, laudable efforts had been made in CAS on the topics of emergency and back-up mechanisms and revision mechanisms, and Argentina recognized that the conclusions reached required some reflection.

32. Turning to the subject of international plutonium storage, he reiterated the Argentine position put forward in the Board of Governors to the effect that the information acquired by the existing safeguards system would enable the Agency to determine whether plutonium was being used for peaceful purposes or not, and that it was questionable whether an additional measure of security would be achieved by depositing excess plutonium with the Agency. In any case, if the Agency became able to decide where and how plutonium was deposited, it might be difficult to convince countries which intended to exercise control over the whole of their fuel cycles that the concession

of such a right was one of the obligations entered into upon joining the Agency. Plutonium, whether used or stored, represented an energy source, control over which could not be ceded. Attempts to improve the present safeguards system, which functioned satisfactorily, might jeopardize its acceptability. The possibility of steps being taken, the need for which was not obviously justified and which would be of only dubious value since they would apply to insignificant stocks of excess plutonium under safeguards, might have a negative effect on the acceptability of the system as a whole.

33. Finally, the Director General was to be commended on the Agency's technical programmes, and its nuclear and radiological safety activities deserved special support. Argentina had always maintained that a move in the direction of universally accepted, consistent and quantifiable nuclear safety concepts would represent substantial progress. The proposal to set up a nuclear safety advisory group was thus greatly to be welcomed, since that group would represent a useful international forum independent of existing interests which would provide valuable and necessary services to all countries interested in using nuclear energy for economic and social development. The Agency's activities in nuclear energy as regards physical sciences, life sciences and agriculture and, in particular, the activities of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste, deserved recognition. In view of the Agency's ever more significant achievements, Argentina undertook to give it full support and to participate intensively in all its activities.

34. Ms. DAHL (Sweden) said that the IAEA provided an efficient channel for transfer of technology. The Swedish experience showed that a realistic appreciation of a national nuclear energy programme should be based on a thorough analysis of the total energy situation, taking into account all aspects of safety and reliability.

35. The Agency was also a major channel for co-operation in other fields of nuclear science and its applications in research, medicine and agriculture. Sweden had actively supported the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme, and was pledging its share of the target for voluntary contributions to the fund for that purpose. Her country had been a major donor of extra-budgetary resources, and she noted that agreements had recently been reached on new programmes. It was about to start negotiations with the Agency on a new format of its support in order to facilitate the long-range planning of the Agency's activities.

36. The safety issues connected with nuclear energy programmes had become a source of political controversy in many countries, including her own. After years of thorough studies and intensive political discussions a broad political consensus had been reached in Sweden. The Swedish Parliament had unanimously passed a new nuclear legislation comprising rules for the construction, operation and final decommissioning of all reactors and other nuclear facilities under the current programme.

37. Sweden supported the increased emphasis on reactor safety problems in the Agency's programme. In particular, the Agency could facilitate the evaluation and transmission all over the world of the rapidly accumulating experience of safety-related problems. However, efficient collaboration must be maintained with other international and regional organizations in order to avoid duplication of efforts.

38. Recent events had drawn public attention to the safety aspects of transport of radioactive materials. Such transports must be guided by internationally adopted safety regulations. The Agency had over the years prepared regulations which had subsequently been accepted by all international organizations concerned with transport and by most countries. However, those regulations

needed to be updated from time to time, and she was pleased to note that a revised version was to be issued soon. That would provide an opportunity to re-examine the practical application of those regulations at the national and international level. Her country would be willing to participate in making further improvements in the regulations.

39. The Swedish Government wished to underline the need for effective physical protection of nuclear material from theft, sabotage, extortion and similar acts. Most supplier countries had undertaken to observe some minimum standards, and a convention on the subject had been opened for signature in 1980. She supported the Director General's appeal to all States to sign it so that it could soon come into force.

40. It was now universally accepted that adequate waste management was a prerequisite for the utilization of nuclear energy. Proper attention must be paid to all aspects of health and environmental protection in introducing and using modern technology. However, management of radioactive waste was of special significance in connection with the need to eliminate every risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

41. There was an inherent risk that inadequate waste management in a country could affect areas beyond its own boundaries. Consequently, there was a need for an international agreement on basic principles of waste management and for an open exchange of information between the countries concerned.

42. Since high-level waste was extremely long-lived, it was necessary to formulate the fundamental concepts of our responsibilities towards future generations. The safest methods for waste handling must be found and necessary resources be allocated for the purpose.

43. International collaboration had an important function not only in establishing fundamental principles but also in the acquisition of basic knowledge in all the scientific disciplines involved, and in the development of reliable and economical technology, including industrial co-operation. It would also create the transparency of national activities so that trust and confidence between nations could be maintained. Countries with the most advanced waste management technology had a special responsibility in that regard.

44. Whereas the IAEA had an important role in establishing the basis for regulations and in promoting exchange of information it was the States utilizing nuclear energy which were responsible for the practical aspects of waste management. Every step in the process - from the source of the waste to ultimate disposal - must be pursued with all possible care within the framework of a clearly stated overall concept. It was only on that basis that effective international or regional collaboration could be established.

45. Sweden like many other countries, was concerned at the present practice of dumping radioactive substances at sea, and considered that other methods of disposal should be used so that the wastes could be kept under strict surveillance.

46. The Swedish waste management programmes attached great importance to the problems of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle and to the ultimate disposal of high-level waste. Ambitious research and development programmes had been carried out on all problems connected with the process leading up to final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. Solutions had been suggested with regard to the concepts of reprocessing as well as direct disposal. In 1983, a concept based on direct disposal of spent fuel without reprocessing had been put forward in connection with the loading of the last two reactors in the Swedish 12-reactor programme. The concept had been scrutinized by a number of organizations in Sweden and abroad, including IAEA, which had agreed that the proposed concept satisfied very high requirements. That procedure yielded many valuable recommendations which would be taken into account during further research and development work.

47. The Swedish Government was an advocate of the concept of direct disposal because it would preclude activities which might contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Sweden was favourably situated in that respect in view of the limited size of its future nuclear programme and the existence of good geographical conditions.

48. All Member States agreed that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be safeguarded against diversion for military purposes. Sweden considered that the best way a nation could demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities was by adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It had trust in the Agency's safeguards system, for which adequate resources should be provided. It was also willing to increase its participation in the safeguards support programme.

49. Moreover, her country advocated full-scope safeguards as a supplier and readily accepted them as a customer of nuclear materials and services. It was therefore deeply concerned that some Members of the Agency were not party to NPT. In her opinion, the responsibility lay especially with the nuclear-weapons States party to the Treaty, which had failed to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with their undertaking in NPT. Sweden would continue to urge resumption of negotiations in other forums.

50. However, her Government wished to offer some suggestions about how progress could be made under the auspices of the Agency's safeguards system.

51. All participants in the international nuclear trade must be able to feel confident that material and equipment intended for peaceful uses could, under no circumstances be put to military use. That was one of the main principles reflected in a great number of bilateral and multilateral agreements and in the Agency's safeguards activities.

52. That basic philosophy presupposed that nuclear-weapons States should without exception, clearly separate their civil and military sectors as regards both nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The application of Agency safeguards in some nuclear-weapons States represented a step in the right direction, and she urged all nuclear-weapons States to offer their participation. However, those voluntary and hitherto very limited safeguards activities were far from sufficient. In every Member State, all installations and material in the civil fuel cycle should, without delay,

be placed under Agency safeguards and the Agency should be provided with the resources required to implement the additional task. Noting the Director General's statement that the strengthening of the Department of Safeguards had been accomplished, she stressed that the Agency's machinery should be further strengthened right now so that the Agency could apply equally effective safeguards in the nuclear-weapons States also.

53. Placing the nuclear industries of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapons States on an equal footing would certainly help to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and increase public confidence in that field. However, the Swedish proposal calling for a considerable widening of the scope of the Agency safeguards should obviously be seen in a longer perspective. In order to make the non-proliferation regime really effective and to make the Agency's safeguards system fully credible, the nuclear-weapons States must at long last begin to fulfil their part of the non-proliferation deal. The measures aimed at halting horizontal proliferation must be matched by equally effective steps to curb vertical proliferation.

54. Sweden was a long-time critic of the nuclear arms race and used every possible occasion to support vital disarmament proposals, many of which concerned the Agency. Referring to the United Nations resolution 38/73 E on nuclear-arms freeze, co-sponsored by Sweden, she observed that such a freeze would involve the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The same proposal was also included in resolution 38/188 E. An agreement to that effect would no doubt call for an appropriate system to verify that no transfer had been made from the civilian to the military sector, a task which would be covered by a widened Agency safeguards regime. The Agency would be well suited also to undertake other verification activities under a future "cut-off" agreement.

55. In conclusion, she pointed out that safety in the nuclear field as well as non-proliferation and disarmament ultimately depended on the resolution and good will of government and politicians to take the necessary initiatives and decisions and to ensure their conscientious implementation.

56. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that in spite of hostile attacks against Iraq aimed at slowing down its development in many sectors, including the scientific and technological sectors, which had culminated in the bombing of the Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre and destruction of the Tamuz reactor and associated facilities by the Zionist entity and in the killing and wounding of a number of Iraqi and French personnel, his country had continued its scientific and technological development and provided greater possibilities to its researchers and engineers to utilize nuclear energy in various peaceful programmes. After a comprehensive study it had decided that by the year 2000 nuclear power should account for not less than 10% of Iraq's electricity generating capacity. It had signed the first contract on the siting of the country's first nuclear power plant. The study was to be completed by September 1985, and in the light of its results the decision on the subsequent stages of work would be taken. In the current year laboratories for the fabrication of ceramic fuel had gone into operation and it was hoped that they could be utilized to train the Iraqi staff to participate in the future production of fuel for nuclear power plants. In the case of research and development, the power of the Tamuz reactor had been raised from 2 to 5 MW(th), and a control system had recently been developed for it. Iraq would thus be able to provide better facilities for research in nuclear and solid state physics and for the production of radioisotopes to be used in medicine, agriculture and industry. The country had increased its capacity for the production of medical kits for radioactive labelling so that it was able to meet a major part of its own demands and hoped to supply such lists to neighbouring countries in the near future. A recent report published by the Iraqi nuclear energy organization contained brief descriptions of the scientific activities carried out at the nuclear research centre together with extended abstracts of the scientific papers and reports issued during 1981-1982.

57. It would thus be obvious that his Government attached great importance to the Agency's activities in the field of technical co-operation and assistance and especially to its continued assistance in those activities

which promoted international co-operation in nuclear technology transfer for peaceful nuclear uses in the legitimate interests of Member States which fulfilled their statutory obligations especially those of the developing countries.

58. Commenting on some of the points in the Director General's statement, he stressed Iraq's interest in the International Nuclear Information System, and expressed his support for the proposed workshop to evaluate the system. His Government also strongly endorsed the Agency's programmes on food irradiation and agriculture; Iraq was a member of the International Food Irradiation Project. Its researchers continued to participate in studies in those areas. Iraq had on many occasions expressed its support for the Agency's activities on nuclear safety and radiological production and on the publication of safety guides.

59. While lauding the Director General's efforts to secure additional resources for technical co-operation and assistance projects, he considered that the actual resources fell far short of the requirements of the developing countries. Moreover, those resources were not assured and were subject to changes. He wished to reiterate Iraq's view that technical assistance could not be financed on a fully assured basis unless it was included as part of the Agency's Regular Budget.

60. There was no dispute about the Agency's functions as a technical body to facilitate and accelerate the transfer of nuclear technology and to promote its peaceful uses for the health and prosperity of mankind. However, it was difficult to imagine science and technology completely isolated from political interests which were not necessarily consistent.

61. Technology was affected by political factors, the Agency's effectiveness, too, was influenced by political decisions taken by some industrialized countries, which put impediments in the way of transfer of nuclear technology. The growth of South Africa's nuclear capability threatened Africa, and the Israeli aggression against the Iraqi reactor had dealt a blow to Agency safeguards. Those were political factors which interfered with the functioning

of the Agency and it could not continue and survive if it ignored those events. He wished to emphasize that preserving the technical character of the Agency meant that factors which affected its effectiveness must be dealt with firmly. He regretted that the Director General's statement had not given sufficient attention to the nuclear capability of South Africa nor to Israel's threat to attack safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq.

62. Welcoming the People's Republic of China as a new Member of the Agency, he pointed out that it had been deprived of its right to participate in the Agency for many years under pressure from those very countries which were now calling for universality of international organizations. He hoped that the spirit which had been shown in reaching the decision about China's membership of the Board would also prevail with regard to the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute calling for fair representation of the areas of the Middle East and South Asia and Africa. However, the representation of those areas should not be increased in such a way as would leave the present proportion of seats between the different regions unchanged.

63. Recalling the statement of the Iraqi delegate at the twenty-fourth session of the General Conference in September 1980, he noted that in the four years which had elapsed and one year before the Third NPT Review Conference the arms race was increasing at all levels and might even reach the outer space. At the same time countries which talked so much about the role of the Agency in promoting international co-operation in the nuclear field and about supporting programmes of technical assistance were placing further obstacles in the way of peaceful transfers of nuclear technology and impeding the exercise by States of their right to acquire nuclear technology for their development programmes. It was those countries which were negatively affecting many of the important activities of the Agency such as the work of CAS and the preparatory work for UNCPICPUNE. Furthermore, those measures did not seem to be applied to the racist entities in South Africa and in the Arab region. There was ample proof that Israel and its ally in racism and aggression, South Africa, had acquired nuclear weapons; the co-operation between those two racist entities threatened

peace and security not only in Africa and in the Middle East but also in the whole world. The Iraqi Government had reaffirmed its unequivocal position in the matter on more than one occasion. In his message to the Conference on Peace and Solidarity to Prevent a Nuclear War held in Sofia in October 1983, President Sadam Hussein had also warned the world of the danger which the nuclear arms race and nuclear tests presented to the future of mankind and said that one could not stop and watch the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the racist régimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv.

64. The Israeli attack against the peaceful nuclear installations under Agency safeguards posed the greatest danger to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to the Agency itself and to its safeguards systems, which was acknowledged internationally as had been pointed out in June 1981 by the then Director General in his statement to the Board. That position had been confirmed by the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the Agency's Board of Governors and the General Conference. Nevertheless, political motives and considerations on the part of some countries prevented international forums from punishing so grave a crime. The Zionist leaders had threatened to repeat such an aggression against Iraq or any other country whenever they deemed appropriate. Some Western countries were now trying to exonerate and rehabilitate the aggressor, saying that the Israeli representative's statement that they had no policy of attacking peaceful nuclear installations meant that Israel had withdrawn its previous threats. However, such an assertion was not true, the Zionist entity claimed that it had the right unilaterally to determine the character of the nuclear installations in the various countries of the world and had the right to act accordingly. It was astonishing to note that some countries which claimed to be keen on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the safeguards system of the Agency were trying to convince the Conference that the note contained document GC(XXVIII)/720 signified withdrawal of the threat by Israel to attack nuclear installations and that it complied with the purposes of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/409.

That letter ignored the Iraqi installations which were the target of the Israeli threat, claimed Israel's right to determine the character of peaceful nuclear installations and disregarded the Agency's safeguards system, which was an internationally recognized mechanism for establishing the peaceful utilization of nuclear installations. Those countries were following political policies without regard to their basic duties as Members of the Agency and to the conditions of membership under Article IV of the Statute. He wondered whether political pressure was responsible for the award of three research contracts to Israeli institutes.

65. Israel tried to cover up its threatening of peaceful nuclear installations by various ambiguous phrases and justifications. For example, the Israeli Minister for Scientific Development had said in a statement published in Nucleonics Week in August 1983 that Israel felt compelled to disrupt any project when it became clear beyond doubt that the intention was to produce nuclear weapons.

66. It might be appropriate to ask what the Agency had done in order to make Israel comply with the resolutions adopted by the General Conference and the Board calling on Israel to withdraw its threat to attack Iraqi nuclear installations and to place its own nuclear installations under international supervision and safeguards. He wished to warn against accepting Israeli statements as satisfactory responses to the General Conference resolutions. For that would be taken by the Zionist leaders as acceptance of their justifications for the aggression and they might feel free to repeat such aggression as they saw fit.

67. In conclusion, he appealed to the Conference to take a clear decision to implement resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/409 and reaffirmed his Government's support for all international measures to prevent military attacks on peaceful nuclear installations and particularly those under Agency safeguards.

68. Mr. KNOOPS (Belgium) said his country had always supported the Agency's activities. In the 30 years since his country's electricity producers had decided to utilize nuclear energy, Belgium had acquired a comprehensive knowledge of nuclear power production and the different stages of the fuel cycle. His delegation therefore welcomed the decisions of the Agency in 1983 to elect Belgium to the Board of Governors and to grant it the Vice-Presidency for the current year. Those decisions were due recognition of the expertise and state of development of his country.

69. The Agency and, through it, the international nuclear community had much to gain by co-operating with a small country such as Belgium and by taking advantage of its particular experience. His country did not possess nuclear weapons and had no intention of acquiring them, but nonetheless possessed a full knowledge of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It had made the best choice possible by opting for PWR reactors. Belgium had no international political ambitions in that area other than to provide active support to the work of international organizations concerned with that field. Belgium's very active participation in the last three years might not always have met with the approval of others but in many respects it had been extremely successful and received much support. He wished to thank the country's Resident Representative, Ambassador Ernemann, for the determination and vigour with which he had taken part in the Agency's work and presented his country's position in the Board.

70. With regard to his country's nuclear activities, the current programme of nuclear power plant construction was due to end with the commissioning in 1986 of the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 PWR units, each of which had a capacity of 980 MW(e). At that point, 65% of electricity in Belgium would be produced by nuclear means. The principal feature of the future programme was an agreement signed the previous May by Belgian and French electricity producers which would lead to Belgian participation in the 1390 MW(e) Chooz B1 and B2 nuclear power plants. The construction of a 1300 MW(e) unit in the coming decade was also planned. With that plant, Belgium would have 12 units ranging from 10 to 1390 MW(e). As far as plant operation was concerned, the results to date were very satisfactory. The load factor achieved at Belgian plants

was among the highest in the world. In 1983, the overall load factor of Belgian plants exceeded 79%, while the corresponding figure for PWR units in western countries was 65%. In the first four months of 1984, a figure of more than 88% had been achieved.

71. Turning to nuclear safety, he underlined the stringency of his country's national nuclear safety regulations as being another outstanding feature of its nuclear programme. The main reason was that Belgium had one of the highest population densities in the world. In addition to scrupulously implementing American regulations, Belgium ensured that its own provisions were also observed. A few examples would serve to demonstrate that his country had given more attention to that question than was normally done. First, as soon as an operating licence was granted, a ten-yearly review was scheduled. That review made it possible to take into account new rules and to carry out - at the lowest possible cost - a programme for adapting installations. Secondly, the reactor containment consisted of two superimposed buildings. Thirdly, physical separation and the redundancy of safety systems were highly advanced. Three safety systems had been installed in units constructed recently. Fourthly, in order to provide protection against external accidents (earthquakes, aircraft crashes, explosions and so on), a part of facilities had been installed in a "bunker" in new units. Nonetheless, the experience gained in the development and initial operation of the latest units had raised certain doubts concerning certain options. Consideration should be given in particular to the order of priority of the risks taken into account and to certain excessive precautions which might in fact result in a reduction of the overall level of safety. That would amount to paying more for less safety. His country felt that its experience would enable it, through the Agency, to make a particularly valuable contribution to international co-operation on nuclear safety. Its aim was to help maintain the economic competitiveness of nuclear power and to avoid hasty and unnecessary action of the type which had followed the Three Mile Island accident in the United States.

72. The importance of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle should not be underestimated. The current slowdown in investment in nuclear power plants should provide the opportunity to concentrate on the different stages of the

back-end of the fuel cycle, namely spent fuel reprocessing and the treatment and disposal of radioactive waste. As far as radioactive waste was concerned, the credibility and acceptance of nuclear power depended on three factors. First, the possibility of dumping low-level waste in the sea should be kept open. His delegation still considered that method to be acceptable since it was subject to strict international control and was not harmful to mankind or the marine ecosystem. It was with great interest that he awaited the results of the international re-evaluation of the scientific and technical bases of sea dumping being conducted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) with the support of the Agency. He urged the Agency to ensure that the discussions were clear and of a high standard and that at the end of the work an unequivocal position was adopted on the merits and demerits of dumping. That method of disposal was vital for countries with a high population density and a large nuclear programme and whose geological structure was not suitable for underground disposal of waste. Secondly, there was a need for all countries to set in motion the consultations and procedures necessary before low-, medium- and high-level waste storage and disposal sites could be selected. In the case of high-level waste, underground laboratory experiments should be planned and carried out. In Belgium, construction work on a 220 m deep experimental gallery in clay had been completed and the results would be released soon. Thirdly, substantial resources should be made available to study techniques for reducing the volume of radioactive waste. Without such techniques, too much space would be needed for the handling, transport, storage and final disposal of waste and the costs would be too high.

73. In the field of spent fuel reprocessing, Belgium had - following parliamentary approval - completed an important and detailed study in conjunction with the Federal Republic of Germany and France on the technical, safety and financial requirements for recommencing operation of the Dessel reprocessing plant. The study had produced favourable conclusions regarding the safety of the project and the economic competitiveness of reprocessing. His country intended to offer the capacity not used by Belgian electricity producers to foreign customers, and consultations on that subject were currently under way with various countries. He was convinced that the prospect of opening, in

the 1990s, a reprocessing plant which had international participation and was located in a non-nuclear-weapon State which was a party to the NPT would be of great political and strategic importance.

74. Finally, he appealed for greater international co-operation in the nuclear field not just among developed countries but also between those countries and the developing ones. More specifically, he would like to see nuclear power plants being supplied to developing countries to enable them to supply the energy required by massive population and urban expansion. In view of the size of the financial investments involved, the only way of proceeding would be for the supplier countries to combine their efforts in order to reduce the burden on national finances.

75. Mr. SITZLACK (German Democratic Republic) said that considering the present international situation, attainment of the Agency's objectives as laid down in its Statute had become more urgent than ever. That applied above all to the Agency's safeguards activities aimed at the preservation of peace.

76. There was at present no issue more important and vital than that of strengthening world peace. The deployment of United States first-strike nuclear weapons in Western Europe has resulted in adverse effects on the international situation and in a growing nuclear threat. It was a matter of urgency to halt the arms race and to embark upon arms limitation and disarmament on the basis of equality and equal security. The USSR, the GDR and the other socialist countries had therefore repeatedly made far-reaching proposals for arms limitation and disarmament, especially in the nuclear field. To undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, to stop their deployment and agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons were some of the proposals on the international agenda. His country had repeatedly drawn attention to the necessity for a political dialogue between all forces in the world ready for an understanding aimed at preventing a nuclear war. He welcomed the Joint Declaration by the Six Heads of State and Government of 22 May 1984, since the implementation of the proposals contained in it would lead to an improvement of the world's economic situation and also have a favourable effect on the work of international organizations.

77. The progress that international co-operation had made within the framework of the Agency was gratifying. That such was the case was the most important conclusion to be drawn from the Director General's highly informative statement to the General Conference. It was impressive to learn about the facts and figures outlined in that statement and to see the Agency's achievements in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

78. His Government took a firm stand on the importance of nuclear power in meeting the world's increasing energy needs and his country's own nuclear power was to be expanded by completion of the Greifswald nuclear power station and by construction of a new power station near Stendal. By the first half of the 1990s the total installed capacity for nuclear-produced electricity would amount to nearly 5000 MW. That would be possible through close co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Following a decision taken at the CMEA Summit Conference in June, co-operation in further developing the industrial uses of nuclear power was to be expanded, and programmes for the construction of nuclear power and nuclear heating stations over the period up to the year 2000 would be prepared on a joint basis.

79. Although nuclear power had proved to be an extremely safe and clean energy source, the nuclear power plant safety record did not warrant complacency; efforts were still required to achieve and maintain a high level of safety. That was the basic conclusion to be drawn from the Nuclear Safety Review, which was a highly valuable document. A specific conclusion that his delegation welcomed was that attention to non-power-related areas of nuclear energy and radiation uses would have to be continued, or even intensified, since it was primarily in such areas that radiation exposure from man-made sources originated. Priority had to be given to the protection of man and the environment and he therefore fully supported the Agency's safety-related activities.

80. There was another activity inseparably associated with peaceful nuclear energy users, namely nuclear safeguards, and his delegation strongly supported the Agency's safeguards programme.

81. The experience his country had gained as a party to NPT and a non-nuclear-weapon State, showed that the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities did not impede the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It believed that the regime of international co-operation would be greatly improved if any misuse of nuclear energy could be excluded and an atmosphere of world-wide mutual confidence thereby created. All States should therefore accede to NPT and all non-nuclear-weapon States should accept full-scope safeguards.

82. Considerable effort was still needed to ensure that the Agency's annual safeguards statement would be made with ever increasing objectivity and reliability. The Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) showed that although progress could be made in a number of areas, much remained to be done to overcome existing difficulties; also that in its endeavours to strengthen the non-proliferation regime the Agency had to rely on the constructive co-operation of Member States.

83. A further point on nuclear safeguards concerned physical protection. His delegation wished to stress the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. All States should accede to that Convention as an additional instrument for preventing the misuse of nuclear material.

84. Technical assistance and co-operation had always been a focal point of the Agency's activities. While significant contributions had been made by it in fields of fundamental importance to economic and social development, technical assistance also contributed to the overall technological development. The Agency therefore had to be commended for its continuous and successful efforts to increase the effectiveness of the technical co-operation programme.

85. The year 1983 had again been a very satisfactory year in that respect. The progress achieved showed that, among other things, financing on the basis of indicative planning figures, making full use of all types of currency and implementing multi-year projects, had proved to be an appropriate method of improvement.

86. In supporting the Agency's technical co-operation activities his country duly contributed its share to the target for the voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund and, in addition to the supply of equipment and materials, was providing training for scientists from developing countries.

87. In conclusion, he wished to deal briefly with a matter that the Secretariat considered worthy of incorporating into the Nuclear Safety Review. Referring to the new regulatory bodies, it stated that, increasingly, regulatory functions would be separated from promotional functions. In the interest of further developing and expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind that trend was very welcome. Recognizing the importance of regulatory functions for the protection of man, his Government had introduced a clear-cut division between promotion and control at the very beginning of its nuclear development. Whereas governmental bodies in the areas of industry, science, health and education were vested with the responsibility for promotion, an independent governmental authority had been established to control nuclear energy and the use of ionizing radiation. The objectives of that authority were to control safety and protect man and his environment from detrimental effects. In addition, they included nuclear safeguards and physical protection. The corresponding functions covered legislation, licensing, and monitoring of man, the environment and nuclear facilities, together with education and information. In his country, all those activities fell under the National Board for Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection.

88. Internationally, such a division between regulatory and control functions, on the one hand, and promotional functions and the use of nuclear energy on the other, seemed to be neither adequate nor necessary. That was made clear by the highly commendable achievements of the Agency, which formed an effective link between nuclear activities throughout the world for the benefit of the nuclear community.

89. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea) said that nuclear power was not merely an alternative but an absolute necessity in his country. At present, nine nuclear power plants were either in operation or under construction, and according to a recent long-term energy planning study, nuclear power would account for about 50% of the nation's total installed electrical power capacity by the turn of the century.

90. The current year was the twenty-fifth anniversary of his country's nuclear activities, which had begun with basic nuclear research using a small research reactor. Nuclear power in the form of electricity was now supplied to industry and to homes. Radiation and radioisotopes were also widely used in every aspect of daily life, in agriculture, medicine and industry.

91. Reporting on the major achievements made since the preceding General Conference, he said that the initial fuel loading of the fourth nuclear power unit of the first 900 MW(e)-class reactor was about to start. That reactor was to become critical and produce electricity by the year end.

92. In the area of nuclear safety, every effort was being made to improve the efficiency and performance of power reactors and to prevent possible radiation incidents; preparations were in progress for the handling of emergencies.

93. Inspection and enforcement activities were being continuously emphasized in order to improve the availability and reliability of operating reactors. The Agency had provided significant assistance in enhancing his country's ability to assure operational nuclear safety and regulatory management. The visit of the Operational Safety Review Team was worth mentioning.

94. Welcoming the Director General's suggestion about the establishment of an International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, he pointed out that such a mechanism was timely and necessary for dealing with broad safety issues including dissemination of specific safety information for the benefit of the Member States concerned.

95. The IAEA Incident Reporting System was one practical means of learning more about nuclear plant operational experience, especially about significant abnormal events. His delegation hoped that the system would be further

developed with the active participation of all Member States having nuclear power programmes. By assessing incident information the latter would be able more effectively to prepare for any possible abnormal incidents.

96. In that connection, his Government supported the Agency's idea about facilitating mutual assistance among Member States with operating nuclear plants in the event of a nuclear accident with radiological consequences. Co-operation between neighbouring countries was particularly desirable.

97. Safety research programmes in his country were being encouraged further. His Government had participated in the recent multilateral safety research programme, including the Severe Accident Research Programme initiated by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

98. Another step towards the safety discipline in the Republic of Korea was the localization of nuclear power plant pre-service and in-service inspection capability, which was essential for the improvement of reactor efficiency and performance. He was pleased to note that the local personnel were now able to carry out those activities independently.

99. As for the Agency's annual report on the major safety issues of the Member States, he suggested that the need for appropriate background information should be underlined so that the general public could thoroughly understand the issues involved and could correctly assess the facts.

100. His country was trying to formulate policies and plans based on reasonably acceptable methods of radioactive waste disposal.

101. In view of uncertainty in international nuclear policies relating to the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, it was desirable that an internationally acceptable solution be found without delay. That was an area where the Agency could play a key role so that the nuclear power programmes in developing countries would not be jeopardized.

102. His country was making steady progress in the use of radiation and radio-isotopes, especially in medicine. The third Asia and Oceania Congress of Nuclear Medicine held in Seoul in August had provided a valuable opportunity for exchange of information and experience and for the discussion of the necessary ideas of co-operation.

103. The new cancer research hospital to be opened in October would be concerned with the medical applications of radiation and radioisotopes. It would be equipped with the latest medical instruments such as a medical cyclotron, medical microtrons and so on. He hoped that it would promote medical applications at the regional level, particularly the activities carried out within the RCA framework.

104. The Republic of Korea firmly believed that the RCA provided an important means of intra-regional co-operation under the umbrella of the Agency in further promoting the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. His country was willing to make available the necessary assistance for the successful implementation of the various RCA programmes.

105. The food irradiation project was a tangible example of close collaboration between the RCA members and the Agency. For many years, his Government had been engaged in efforts to promote irradiation for various local food products, in which it had received support from FAO and the IAEA. In his country a commercial irradiator was soon to go into operation and irradiated food would be more readily available.

106. He wished to congratulate FAO on the twentieth anniversary of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Isotope and Radiation Applications of Atomic Energy for Food and Agricultural Development and also to express his sincere appreciation to the Agency and the Federal Republic of Germany for their help in establishing the Radioisotope Laboratory in Cheju University.

107. He hoped that the laboratory would be able to contribute substantially to RCA programmes as a centre of radioisotope applications in agriculture.

108. As regards the staffing of the Agency's Secretariat, he noted the Director General's efforts to recruit more staff from developing Member States. Considering that some Member States including the Republic of Korea were underrepresented on the staff, he hoped that the Director General would take further steps to increase the number of staff from developing regions at all levels, and particularly at the senior grade.

109. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was an extremely important international legal framework for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while preventing destructive proliferation. His delegation hoped that an international consensus on the major issues concerning the peaceful uses and non-proliferation would be reached at the Third NPT Review Conference to be held in 1985.

110. In conclusion, he extended an invitation to all members of the nuclear family to participate in the Fifth Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference to be held in Seoul in May 1985 with the co-operation of the Korean Nuclear Society and the Korea Atomic Industrial Forum.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.