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RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

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President: Mr. BARREDA DELGADO (Peru)

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1983 (GC(XXVIII)/713, Add.1 and Add.2) (continued)

1. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that before the Islamic revolution which had taken place in Iran, the world had resembled a highway stretching from West to East along which Third World countries had sought the protection of one or other of the two superpowers. Today the attitude of those developing countries had completely altered and they had now realized that, supported by God's infinite power and that of their own population, a country could not only be independent but could also represent the interests of oppressed peoples; the Islamic Republic of Iran was now in that position. The oppressed peoples of the world had finally realized that such a position could be reached only with the support of God the Almighty and that it was founded on the morality and principles of Islam.

2. During the past five years, his country had managed to remedy, to a large extent, the disorders inherited from the previous decadent régime. Since the triumph of the revolution, in other words, since the Iranian people had gained the power to decide their own future, the expansionist powers had steadily been increasing their coercion and oppression.

3. One day it was the United States oppressor planning to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran, the next day it was spies affiliated to the East embarking upon some other kind of plot and, finally, it was the East and West joining forces to help the Iraqi régime triumph over Iran. Despite all those conspiracies, however, his country had been able to prove to all peoples that it fervently defended the desire for freedom from the captivity of the superpowers. That was why it had always enjoyed the recognition and support of free peoples.

4. The superpowers, particularly the United States of America, had repeatedly stressed that the Agency was purely a scientific institution and not a political one. That claim raised two questions. Was not the non-peaceful use of nuclear technology by the superpowers, particularly by the United States of America, and the manufacture of nuclear weapons a political issue? Should the scientific nature of an international organization be respected by all Member States or only by the Third World? Were not double standards being applied?

5. His delegation hoped that logical and convincing answers would be given to those two questions by governments which put forward the above argument. As long as Israel remained a Member of the Agency and the superpowers sought to misuse the Agency in their own interests, disregarding the principle of equal rights of Member States, it was impossible to claim that the Agency was an apolitical organization.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which attached great importance to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, remained convinced that all countries had the right to plan, implement and develop peaceful nuclear programmes, having regard to their own resources, needs and priorities, and that they had likewise an absolute and unlimited right of access to supplies, services and know-how in the domain of nuclear science and technology.

7. All States should respect the rights and decisions of others relating to fuel cycle programmes as well as the policies adopted by others for the peaceful use of nuclear energy; the conditions for the transfer of technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of countries wishing to benefit from that technology. As Third World countries were the main source of supply of raw materials for industrialized countries, they should not be subject to any condition or restriction concerning the utilization of technology from industrialized countries.

8. In Islamic culture, science was of particular importance, but knowledge and science which ignored morality was considered worthless and the use of science against mankind was condemned. That was why the Islamic Republic of Iran, founded on the principles and doctrines of Islam, condemned the anti-humanitarian use of nuclear technology.

9. One of the main problems of international organizations was a lack of effort to establish a climate of confidence in international relations. Members of the Agency, more especially those which represented the Third World, had ever in their minds the question why, in the Agency, the great powers always sought to oppose the opinions and suggestions of Third World countries. In view of that fact and in consideration of the importance of

assurances of supply, the Islamic Republic of Iran had actively participated in the meetings of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS); but it had to be pointed out that in fact the industrialized countries had not been in a position to give such assurances to the developing countries. Despite the fuel contract for Iran's 5 MW nuclear research reactor, the United States had refused to supply the fuel to the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization. And that was just one example. That illogical sanction imposed by the United States had seriously disrupted the work of Iranian scientists on the use of radioisotopes in medicine and agriculture.

10. International nuclear trade should, in the long term, be organized in such a way as to be acceptable to the majority of those interested, as well as non-discriminatory, predictable and stable. Moreover, any change in the obligations under a contract should be made only by recourse to the review mechanisms approved by both contracting parties. The transfer of nuclear materials should be uninterrupted and carried out in accordance with the terms stipulated, subject to amendments mutually agreed on. Disagreement on any modification should not in itself, nor insofar as it concerned the existing agreements, be a reason for the establishment of any new rights or obligations.

11. There were at present more than 18 000 strategic thermonuclear weapons and an equivalent number of nuclear triggers, with a total capacity of about 10 000 Megatons, in the American and Soviet strategic arsenals. The total number of nuclear weapons (strategic, theatre and tactical weapons) in those two countries was about 50 000, with an overall capacity of about 15 000 Megatons. The nuclear arsenal in the rest of the world - mainly in England, France and China - amounted to several hundred nuclear war heads, which constituted an additional capacity of a few hundred Megatons. According to the latest estimates, the shock wave from nuclear explosions, initial radiation exposure and fires caused by a nuclear exchange directed at major cities, would result in instantaneous death for between several hundred million and 1.1 thousand million people. It was therefore likely that as a result of the direct consequences of a nuclear conflict, roughly half the earth's population would perish or would suffer serious injury. In short, if only a small part of the total nuclear arsenal were to be used during a strategic war, the conseguences would be the destruction of all forms of life

on earth. Given the present stock of weapons, a catastrophe of that kind was not ruled out, and all that came at a time when the annual budget of the United States Department of Defence was 10 000 times higher than that of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That fact pre-empted all questions related to the effectiveness of that Agency.

12. The threats and force exerted by the superpowers had not only slowed down the rapid progress of the Islamic Republic of Iran in various fields - they also had helped to strengthen its conviction that the only way to survive was to make a substantial effort to avoid all dependence on either the East or the West. During the year that had passed, despite all the hardships of the war that had been imposed on the country by the vassals of the imperialists in the East and the West, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) had continued its activities in the area of nuclear power plants as well as in research and related services.

13. As far as the nuclear power plants were concerned, a major part of the civil construction work and the installation of mechanical and electrical systems at the Bushehr power plant had been completed. In view of all the technical, social and economic factors involved, the IAEO believed it essential to complete that power plant and to put it into operation, in order to ensure Iran's self-sufficiency in that area and in other related industries.

14. In the field of research, emphasis had been placed on the nuclear sciences and their applications in medicine, agriculture and industry. In view of the increasing use of radioactive materials and radiation equipment in medicine, science and industry, the IAEA had been given responsibility for environmental safety and protection of the population against radiation; it was also in charge of establishing programmes on the application of radioisotopes and other related activities. A gamma irradiation centre was being established. At the same time a polymer chemistry laboratory, and laboratories for food irradiation, microbiological control and dosimetry would become operational by the end of the year.

15. His delegation was convinced that the protection of nuclear facilities was of particular importance. It was to be recalled that the usurper régime of Jerusalem (otherwise called Israel) had carried out a military attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tamuz and that the Islamic Republic of Iran had

proposed the expulsion of that régime from the Agency at the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh regular sessions of the General Conference; that request had regrettably led only to the rejection of credentials and the curtailment of technical assistance.

16. Since severe measures had not been adopted against the manifest aggression of Israel, the despicable nature of such military attacks on nuclear facilities had been neutralized; so much so in fact that, in complete violation of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/407 adopted by a majority to protect peaceful nuclear facilities against military attack, the aggressive Iraqi régime had on 24 March 1984 attacked the Bushehr nuclear power plant with an Exocet missile. His Government had made a request, supported by photographic evidence, to the Director General to send a team of experts to the site of the attack. However, no such action had been taken by the Agency. In view of the importance of that incident, his country had requested the inclusion of that issue on the agenda for the meetings of the Board of Governors in June 1984. Since that request had unfortunately not been considered by the Board of Governors, the Islamic Republic of Iran held the Board responsible for all the consequences resulting from that indifference.

17. He was convinced that until such time as international organizations, and in particular the Agency, adopted appropriate sanctions in face of such atrocities, which threatened the peaceful use of nuclear energy, there would be no guarantee that such events would not be repeated in the future, thereby threatening both world peace and the Agency's credibility. The Iranian delegation requested the Director General to inform the General Conference of the progress made towards the implementation of resolutions GC(XXVII)/RES/407 and GC(XXVII)/RES/409, and urged Member States to do their utmost, either individually or through the appropriate international organizations, to ensure the adoption of international regulations prohibiting military attacks on nuclear facilities intended for peaceful purposes.

18. He hoped the Agency would have greater success in the implementation of that resolution, and, in conclusion, quoted the words of Imam Khomeini, who had declared that if the superpowers continued to manufacture nuclear weapons the world was doomed to destruction.

19. Mr. NISIO (Italy) noted that the twenty-eighth session of the General Conference of the Agency was taking place at a time when international relations were characterized by tensions and misgivings and by the unilateral interruption of the most important negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons. The Italian Government was convinced it was just because of that unfavourable situation that there was need to step up efforts to check nuclear proliferation both vertically and horizontally and to broaden the scope of the safeguards system established under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and implemented by the Agency. It was hoped that those efforts would help to create a more favourable climate, gradually reduce tensions and encourage the resumption of a dialogue on the main problems of arms control, particularly in the nuclear field. The Italian Government had always worked towards that aim and would continue to do so.

20. The Agency should be given as much support as possible to enable it to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to ensure compliance with the non-proliferation commitments. His delegation deplored the fact that a certain politicization of the Agency in recent years had caused a great waste of time and resources and prevented it from concentrating entirely on the fulfilment of its mission. Italy was aware of the relevance of the major political problems and was ever ready to assume its responsibilities in safeguarding peace, but believed that the Agency did not have the same role to play as the General Assembly or the United Nations Security Council; its priorities should rather be such tasks as the promotion of peaceful co-operation in the nuclear field, implementation of safeguards and provision of technical assistance. For the sake of fairness and effectiveness there should be an improvement of the policy-making structure of the Agency so as to have a better representation on the basis of geographical balance, technological advancement and financial support. The Agency should likewise persevere in its dedication to universality. The absence or exclusion of States was a negative element for all, since membership of the Agency entailed rights and duties, with the latter often prevailing.

21. Hence his delegation wished to record again its satisfaction at the accession of the People's Republic of China and its participation in the work of the Agency, particularly since admission of that great country to the Board

of Governors had taken place in such a smooth and practical manner. That was a good omen in the matter of arriving at a more equitable representation of Member States in the Board of Governors.

22. The Italian delegation believed that the time had come to review Article VI of the Statute; a re-examination of the present situation should not upset the balance between the various parts of the Article nor create tensions between the various delegations or groups. He was not therefore in favour of any amendment limited to a single part of that Article, since the aim should be not to improve the representative nature of the Board purely in geographical terms, but to take account of the experience of different States in the nuclear field and the technological and financial support which they gave to the Agency. A country which regularly contributed significant resources should be entitled to have a say in the choices made by the Agency's policy-making organs. Italy would certainly continue in the future to make a major contribution to the Agency, chiefly in the form of funds, but it did not feel it could remain indifferent to the decision-making process.

23. The Agency safeguards system was an example of some of the most effective and broad-ranging forms of control that the international community could hope to establish in order to verify compliance with an agreement. It might well be taken as a model for future agreements on disarmament and it proved that the concepts of verification, transparency and on-site inspection, to which part of the international community were opposed, were already an established reality in a sector as crucial as that of nuclear non-proliferation. For that reason Italy was in favour of streamlining the Agency's control system and of making its safeguards as transparent as possible.

24. The safeguards system benefited equally all the members of the international community and aimed at strengthening security throughout the world. All States should therefore contribute, according to their capabilities, to that essential part of the Agency's budget. Obviously, a growth in the number and quality of nuclear facilities required an expansion of control activities, but there were objective budgetary limits which could not be overstepped. Therefore it appeared necessary to rationalize safeguards activities as much as possible by refining the control systems rather than making them stricter, and by selecting the facilities and sectors which required greater surveillance.

25. His country had always maintained that universal accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a prerequisite for checking proliferation. At the same time, however, Italy advocated a realistic approach and was convinced that non-signatory States should be encouraged to reconsider their position in a responsible manner. Moreover, the unjustified discriminatory measures regarding the import of nuclear materials and technology or the measures creating unnecessary obstacles to international nuclear trade might be detrimental to the cause of non-proliferation. It was in the common interest to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons just as it was in the common interest to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in less advanced areas.

26. Towards that end, new mechanisms might be devised within the framework of existing non-proliferation commitments to facilitate the flow of necessary supplies to importing countries, while bearing in mind the nature and state of development of their peaceful nuclear programmes.

27. Italy was convinced that the development of international nuclear co-operation was a vital element in the Agency's activities. In the area of technical assistance, one should not let the spirit of co-operation be afflicted by economic difficulties. The economic interdependence of different countries was such that only a world-wide network of co-operation in all sectors would make it possible to overcome crises in individual areas.

28. The procedures for the provision of technical assistance should aim to satisfy the essential needs of developing countries, taking two fundamental points into account. First, technical assistance should involve consultations with the recipient countries and their participation in it, together with the training of technical staff and experts who were to be responsible for the management of projects initiated with the help of industrialized countries and the Agency. Second, one and the same problem might require different technical solutions in developing countries, as opposed to developed countries, hence in many cases there was need to envisage a number of possible approaches, in a spirit of flexibility and in consideration of the social and cultural characteristics of the countries concerned.

29. In that respect his delegation took a favourable view of the Agency's activities in the area of technical assistance and supported the new policy recently approved by the Board of Governors.

30. Italy was one of the main suppliers of technical assistance and had made more than $18 million available to the Agency for that purpose during the period 1982-86. Furthermore, his country made an annual contribution of $3 million to the International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste. Its contributions to technical assistance in 1983 ($10.7 million out of a total budget of $219 million) placed Italy fourth after the United States ($31.3 million), the Soviet Union ($12.1 million), and Japan ($10.9 million). The International Centre for Theoretical Physics was a good example of co-operation between Member States of the Agency.

31. He also wished to recall that, as in previous years, Italy would be offering, through the Agency, a programme of scholarships and training for developing countries.

32. With regard to the Agency's activities in the matter of assurances of supply, he wished to underscore his Government's interest in and support for the work of CAS. It was hoped that further progress would be achieved in the agreement of a new set of principles governing international co-operation in the nuclear field and aimed at assuring supplies, while at the same time guaranteeing non-proliferation.

33. Safety was another field in which the Agency's work was of great importance. Everything should be done to encourage co-operation in that sector, including the Incident Reporting System, risk evaluation and the application of NUSS codes and standards.

34. The Agency's activities had developed and intensified considerably during the past few years, and its contribution to the establishment of nuclear programmes in various countries had also increased. As a result there had been a growing commitment by a number of Member States to meeting the Agency's technical and financial needs. That fact confirmed his Government's conviction that the representation of Member States in certain bodies could not be based on the same criteria today as when those bodies had been first set up. At the present juncture, the fundamental principle of correlation between financial contributions and representation in the policy-making organs could no longer be disregarded.

35. As for recent developments in nuclear energy in Italy, nuclear power production had been approximately 5800 million kWh in 1983. The Trino Vercellese power plant, with a 270 MW(e) pressurized water reactor, had been

put back into operation at the beginning of April 1984. From 1964 to 1979 it had generated a total of 20 000 million kWh. Construction work on the Montalto di Castro power plant (with two 1000 MW(e) BWR reactors) was proceeding according to schedule. The first unit was due to start up in 1987, and the second in 1988. At the beginning of May 1984, earlier than expected, the Ministry of Industry, ENEA (which acted as Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and the Piedmont region had received the technical reports on two districts singled out by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Economic Planning as suitable for the Piedmont power station, which was to consist of two 1000-MW(e) pressurized water reactors and the construction of which would probably be initiated before the end of the year. The survey of the two sites selected by the Government for the Lombardi power plant (which was to consist of two 1000-MW(e) PWR reactors was also proceeding and construction work was expected to begin in the second half of 1985.

36. In nuclear research, the National Commission for Nuclear and Alternative Energies, had multiple tasks, since it both dealt with thermal and fast-breeder reactors as well as with their fuel cycles. As far as thermal reactors were concerned, ENEA had continued its activities under programmes studied and financed jointly with national industry. In 1983 it had concentrated its efforts on the construction of the PEC plant, which was at present half-finished, on research and development aimed at meeting the needs of the breeder line (in particular Superphénix 1 and Superphénix 2), and on making the best possible use of the PEC for activities in that field at European level.

37. Towards the end of 1983, ENEA and the CEA had extended their collaboration on fast breeder reactors to the fabrication of fuel. Other important activities in the fuel cycle had included the development of improved techniques for uranium prospecting, the continuation of experimental research on advanced methods of uranium enrichment, the completion of implementation of a programme for reprocessing CANDU fuel for the Pickering power plant carried out at the Eurex plant, and continuation of research and development in the field of fuel reprocessing. The purpose was to ensure that Italian technological research would help, either independently or as part of international collaboration, to meet the foreseeable demand for processing services in Italy.

38. In the field of radioactive waste, ENEA had directed its activities to developing advanced processes more economical and more reliable than those currently employed in industry, both for low-level and high-level waste. With regard to final waste disposal, it had concentrated on the geological disposal of wastes with a long half-life and had continued its thermal, geothermal and geochemical studies as well as surveys aimed at selecting better storage sites.

39. With regard to controlled nuclear fusion, it had continued its activities under its contract of association with EURATOM. The aim was to complete, within the next few years, the construction of two high-priority facilities: the FTU (Frascati Tokamak Upgrade), a type of tokamak, and the RFX (Reversed Field Pinch), which was an alternative to the tokamak. Participation by ENEA, since June 1983, in the completion of the JET had also been of great interest, and was an opportunity to make good use of the know-how acquired during the construction of the Frascati tokamak.

40. In conclusion, he pointed out the increasing importance which Italy attached to research activities in the nuclear field in view of the diversification of energy sources and the rising level of industrialization of the country.

41. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan) welcomed the admission of China as a designated Member of the Board of Governors. The full participation of that country in the work of the policy-making organs would strengthen the Agency and serve the cause of world peace and security as well as promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

42. The Agency's future was inescapably interlinked with the future of nuclear energy itself. If peaceful applications did not expand, the promotional activities of the Agency and its influence would diminish, for it would be unable to survive if restricted merely to regulating and controlling the shrinking or stagnating nuclear programmes of Member States.

43. Nuclear energy now faced a very difficult future, mainly because of a dichotomy in the policy pursued for its development. On the one hand, the arms race was continuing at an alarming pace and the horrifying build-up of arsenals had deepened mutual distrust to such an extent that it would be sheer idealism to believe one could refrain from using such weapons indefinitely. For the survival of mankind, it was vital for an end to be put to the arms race and for the two superpowers to resume a serious dialogue.

Only then would the problem of nuclear proliferation be resolved. The example of unrestrained vertical proliferation set by the superpowers was dangerous because, in addition to heightening the risk of mutual destruction, it detracted from their moral capacity to dissuade others from following the same dangerous course. He fully agreed with the statement made by the Director General that tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament would increase the support and understanding among non-nuclear-weapon States for conditions and restrictions designed to prevent horizontal proliferation.

44. While so much was being spent on using nuclear energy for meticulously planned self-destruction, expenditure on peaceful nuclear programmes was being steadily cut back. Nuclear power was experiencing a significant slow-down and, unless support for optimal utilization of that energy source was renewed, the rate of depletion of fossil fuel resources could not help but increase. That could lead to another upsurge in the price of oil which would further burden the debt-ridden economies of Third World countries. In view of the precarious nature of future energy resources, nuclear energy should therefore be developed in a timely and orderly manner. Existing limited supplies of liquid fuels should be conserved and atmospheric pollution caused by burning coal should be avoided. The attitude of the advanced countries in denying developing countries the opportunity to expand their peaceful nuclear technology was self-defeating, both politically and industrially. Such an attitude would not only cost money and adversely affect the economic viability of nuclear energy, but would also make the management of nuclear technology and independent nuclear fuel cycles more complex.

45. The Agency was undoubtedly affected by those developments. It still had no direct role to play in nuclear disarmament and it was not receiving the full backing that it ought to for its promotional activities, which were part of its statutory responsibilities. Its role was consequently limited. Furthermore, the Agency was being pushed towards an ill-advised and restrictive policy of denying Third World countries access to peaceful nuclear technology. Its role was both promotional and regulatory and a balance should be maintained between those two aspects. He could understand how tempting it was for the advanced countries to seek to attain their national political goals through the Agency, but it should resist those attempts and maintain its

credibility, universality and effectiveness by remaining a neutral body and strictly abiding by its Statute. Any measures aimed at changing the fundamental nature of the Agency were therefore to be deplored.

46. His Government was firmly committed to the principle of using nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. It had always opposed vertical proliferation and had spoken out against any horizontal proliferation beyond the existing five nuclear Powers. It had repeatedly advocated the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in its region in order to prevent the introduction and production of nuclear weapons. He welcomed the moves which the ASEAN countries were reportedly making to set up a nuclear-free zone in the region, and called upon all States in South Asia to act positively by declaring their region a nuclear-free zone. That would go a long way towards building confidence at a regional and international level.

47. His delegation reiterated its full support for the safeguards system which had demonstrated its usefulness and effectiveness over the last two decades. The Director General's statement that the Agency's safeguards system was based directly on the Statute was welcomed. That system, which was based on a consensus, had a central role to play in the Agency's efforts to discharge its statutory obligations. Any unilateral attempt to alter the system without following the procedure which had led to its adoption would be viewed with deep concern.

48. The admission of China to the Board would no doubt enhance its effectiveness, but there was room to improve further the composition of the Board, since regions such as Africa and the Middle East and South Asia were still clearly under-represented. The last amendment to the provisions of the Statute which determined the number of elective seats allocated to the various geographical regions had been made more than a decade before. Important developments had occurred since that time and the nuclear programmes of many countries in those regions had advanced considerably. Furthermore, many of those countries were among the principal producers of energy sources such as oil and uranium and had accordingly acquired special importance in the world as far as energy matters were concerned. He therefore urged the General Conference to take the appropriate steps to remedy that situation by amending Article VI.A.2 in line with the principles approved by a majority of Member States at the twenty-second session of the General Conference.

49. His delegation approved the Agency's programme and budget and, in particular, its technical activities in the nuclear power, nuclear safety and life sciences areas. It noted with satisfaction the recent increase in resources made available for the technical co-operation programme and, in that connection, thanked all the donor countries for their generous contributions. Nonetheless, a substantial number of technically sound projects had not been financed because of a lack of resources. Those projects should be financed on a non-discriminatory basis in line with the Agency's Statute.

50. As he had stated earlier, the Agency must preserve a balance between its promotional and regulatory functions. He acknowledged the importance of, and fully supported, the Agency's safeguards activities, but they should not expand at the expense of promotional programmes. Since 1970, the safeguards budget had increased by a factor of more than 27 (from US $1.23 million to US $33.7 million), while in the same period technical assistance funds had risen by a factor of less than 9 (from US $2.7 million to US $23.5 million). The Agency's resources would be more equitably distributed between those two functions if the technical assistance programme were financed from the Regular Budget or through other comparably predictable and assured resources.

51. The slow rate of progress in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) on a set of principles for international co-operation was a source of concern, since the Committee's work was vital for the growth of nuclear trade. CAS did not have an unlimited amount of time at its disposal for, with every passing year, the risk increased that its deliberations would be overtaken by events, with new suppliers undoubtedly appearing on the nuclear market. It was certain that, given a constructive attitude and the political will, the problems facing CAS could soon be overcome.

52. His delegation had strongly condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre both during the General Conference and in the Board. That irresponsible and unwarranted act of aggression had done irreparable damage to the cause of the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy and urgent action was required at international level to ensure that such acts could not be repeated in the future.

53. The Director General's efforts to improve the level of representation of developing countries on the Agency's staff was sincerely welcomed. But although positive steps had been taken, much remained to be done. The overall representation was still below 20%, a figure which was clearly inadequate since developing countries accounted for two thirds of the Agency's membership. It was essential to keep in mind the goal set in resolution GC(XXV)/RES/386, namely that the number of staff drawn from developing countries should be substantially increased. The availability of qualified nationals from those countries for both the Agency's administrative and technical tasks was no longer an obstacle as had been demonstrated by the quality of the candidates put forward.

54. It was gratifying to note the twentieth anniversary of the close and fruitful association of the Agency and FAO through the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Isotopes and Radiation Applications of Atomic Energy for Food and Agricultural Development. It was to be hoped that the activities of that Division would continue to expand and that, through it, the Agency would step up its role in the new and fast-emerging techniques of genetic engineering and biotechnology.

55. He was particularly pleased to see that 1984 marked the twentieth anniversary of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste. Under the capable leadership of Professor Abdus Salam, the Centre had become in the words of the Director General, a remarkable instrument for the exchange of knowledge and experience in the physical sciences.

56. It was a matter of regret that the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy had been deferred to 1986. In a spirit of mutual accommodation, some progress had recently been made at the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee for that Conference. If that spirit were maintained, it would augur well for the success of the Conference.

57. Turning to Pakistan's national nuclear programme, he noted that peaceful nuclear activities had been expanded in several domains. Despite the unjustified embargo imposed on supplies for the KANUPP power plant, the latter had continued to operate satisfactorily and had achieved the maximum design burnup after several years of irradiation. His Government was fully convinced

of the economic competitiveness of nuclear power within the context of Pakistan's energy resources since it was twice as cheap as imported oil. Everything was therefore being done to plan further nuclear power plants and his country would welcome any international co-operation in that respect.

58. Pakistan had made significant progress in the use of nuclear energy for health, agriculture and industry. New nuclear medicine centres had been opened in 1983. In the agricultural sphere, new programmes had been launched with the emphasis on genetic engineering and biotechnology. Commercial-scale irradiation facilities for food preservation were being planned in order to reduce the excessive losses experienced with certain food crops. Pakistan was ready to share its experience in that area with other developing countries.

59. In conclusion, he wished to thank the Agency for its assistance in implementing Pakistan's programme. He assured the Director General of his country's continued support and co-operation in ensuring that the Agency's activities benefited all Member States.

60. Mr. ONGKILI (Malaysia) said he was aware of the efforts of the Director General and his staff to preserve the integrity of the Agency. Their dedication and invaluable services deserved the highest praise. His country was also grateful to the Agency and its Member States for having provided technical assistance when it was needed, either under the RCA or through the Agency itself. That assistance had been of considerable value in satisfying Malaysia's immediate and long-term needs.

61. The Agency had faced many challenges in the past and, if it could survive the immediate dangers facing it, it would have every chance of contributing to the future of a world quite different from the one that existed at present. Given the potential of an age of abundance and progress, all that actually been achieved was a divided world, where poverty, ignorance and cruelty placed future generations in jeopardy.

62. The Third NPT Review Conference to be held in 1985 would be an acid test for implementation of that Treaty. A number of events affecting NPT and the Agency had occurred which bore witness to the growing dissatisfaction of the Treaty signatories. It was a matter of increasing concern that the spirit of the Treaty was not being respected. Discrimination among the signatories had become a fact of life. Efforts were needed to break free from the old

tendency of placing one group above another in terms of rights and dignity. The actions of the signatory States must be based on the principle of equality. As had already been stated several times during the general debate, there was a trend towards the use of national legislation to amend international treaties. An extreme case was the unwarranted attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre, a facility which was subject to Agency safeguards. There was no doubt that that act had harmed the Agency and many Member States. His country would like to see efforts towards devising a new international instrument which would protect all nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes from armed attack.

63. Obstacles to the transfer of technology, the different or discriminatory treatment of countries, stringent nuclear export regulations and an inconsistent nuclear policy were unacceptable since they could only harm international treaties and the Agency's integrity. Nuclear science was becoming a dominant factor in the world but, instead of giving a sense of power, the feeling aroused was one of weakness and futility. The developing countries, in particular, suffered from that dichotomy and from frustration. The forces of ignorance and greed were distorting nuclear science and diverting it towards war and destruction.

64. It had to be emphasized, therefore, that the NPT must be based on a balance between certain obligations and privileges. According to Article VI of NPT the nuclear powers should undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. That was why Malaysia was against the testing of weapons, the dumping of waste and the permanent stationing of nucler weapons in the Pacific.

65. With regard to the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the work done recently at the fifth session of the preparatory committee in reaching a compromise offered some grounds for hope. The Chairman of the committee should be commended for his efforts. A light - albeit a flickering one - could at last be seen at the end of a very long tunnel.

66. There was a pressing need to increase the representation of persons from the developing countries on the Agency staff. His delegation was convinced that the Director General was making every effort to implement resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/419, which called on him to continue to take further steps to increase the number of staff members drawn from developing areas. In order to help the Agency speed up implementation of that resolution, his country would accept only safeguards inspectors from developing countries. Such inspectors would have a better appreciation of the local problems which were common to all developing countries, where sensitivities and taboos still played an important role and whose system of values was too often ignored by developed countries.

67. In the field of nuclear technology transfer, the international climate was extremely uncertain and a consensus was still being sought on assurance of supplies. It was in the interests of the international community to find a way out of that impasse. The Agency had a major part to play in protecting the interests of countries with small nuclear programmes which required guaranteed access to the whole of the fuel cycle. His country valued the ideals of CAS highly and praised the many advanced countries which had recognized the possible repercussions of a policy of denial and had therefore supported the establishment of CAS.

68. It should also be remembered that, knowledge knowing no boundaries, basic nuclear technology had already spread to almost all countries. The time lag in applying the results of research had shortened considerably. It was unfortunate that, in the current age of scientific revolution, the results of nuclear research were applied most rapidly in the military sphere while obstacles were placed in the way of the transfer to the developing countries of peaceful nuclear technology. It was thus impossible, in a climate of megalomania and hegemony, to ignore the threat of total destruction which one side of that scientific revolution posed for mankind.

69. His delegation supported the amendment to Article VI.A.1 of the Statute, the purpose of which was to increase the number of designated seats on the Board without requiring any sacrifice by the present incumbents. In the light of that amendment and with regard to amending Article VI.A.2, the Agency could not continue to apply a system of double standards when it came to allocating

seats to other Member States. An equitable and reasonable solution to that problem must be found in the near future and the Agency would need the co-operation and understanding of all Member States for that purpose.

70. He was pleased to announce that he had been authorized by his Government to pledge a voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in line with his country's assessed share for 1985.

71. In the field of safety and the management of nuclear wastes, a subject which the Director General had discussed at some length in his statement, the developing countries would have to face a growing problem as their nuclear expertise advanced. Their national legislation would probably prove to be inadequate. The Agency should therefore update its Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection and publicize them more widely by distribution in the form of a manual. In that way, they would ultimately constitute standards that were universally accepted by Member States.

72. Finally, to fulfil his obligations, man was entitled to acquire as much fresh knowledge as possible but he must also strive to create a balanced community. To achieve that goal that community must have the highest moral standards and follow the principles of justice, tolerance and moderation in all circumstances.

73. Mr. do NASCIMENTO e SILVA (Brazil) expressed his delegation's deep satisfaction at the admission of the People's Republic of China to the Board of Governors. That was an event which had been eagerly awaited by one and all. In August 1984, during a visit by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China to Brazil, the two countries had concluded an agreement on co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

74. His delegation welcomed the pragmatic approach to world problems and to the Agency's own problems that the Director General had manifested in his address. The Director General had broached a subject of vital importance to the public throughout the world, namely the arms race. His delegation fully agreed that there was a need for increased awareness of the fact that, while the current failure in the field of disarmament might be frustrating and alarming, that was no reason to relax efforts, in the interests of all, to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Although disarmament was not one of the Agency's direct objectives, its silence on that matter might be

misinterpreted by the public at large. In his message, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had drawn attention to the terrible dangers inherent in the use of atomic energy for military purposes, dangers which must be controlled and eliminated. The Agency was in a position to implement Article III.B of its Statute, under which it was required to "Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international co-operation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament ...".

75. Since the previous session of the General Conference, his country had continued to devote considerable effort to implementing its ambitious programme for the peaceful uses of nucler energy, even though it had been compelled to slow down somewhat on account of general economic difficulties and their adverse effects on the balance of payments.

76. Despite those difficulties, his country was determined to continue to strengthen its support for the Agncy's activities. As far as technical co-operation was concerned, Brazil had managed to increase the number ot fellowships awarded for traning courses or scientific visits. At the Agency's request, it was co-operating with other developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

77. His country had also appointed experts - lecturers for training courses and representatives in various working groups - to take part in the Agency's technical co-operation programme. The Agency's laudable intention to make greater use of the technical expertise available in developing countries was to be encouraged.

78. His delegation declared again its willingness to participate in and co-operate with regional co-ordinated programmes in Latin America which were currently undergoing an in-depth review. With regard to Agency training courses, Brazil was looking forward to hosting the interregional course on dosimetry to be held before the end of 1984, as well as the course on exploration drilling and ore reserve estimation for uranium deposits scheduled for April or May 1985.

79. Further, the implementation of Braziian projects under the regular technical assistance programme had been fairly satisfactory. Some aspects of technical co-operation, however, needed to be improved or corrected. For example, the Agency had purchased more than 90% of its equipment in industrialized countries. A thorough study should be made of the current capability of developing Member States to supply the Agency with equipment and materials.

80. His country reaffirmed its support for the initiatives taken by the Agency in the nuclear safety area, particularly the development of the Incident Reporting System, the dissemination of probabilistic methods for reactor safety assessment, and the series of codes and guides published under the NUSS programme.

81. The technical and social importance of the network of secondary standard dosimetry laboratories (SSDL) should again be stressed, though the future of the network gave cause for alarm in that the funds available for it were being reduced.

82. It was well known that the Brazilian Government had always given its full support to the Agency's safeguards system. The most recent demonstration of that support had been the establishment of a safeguards laboratory to measure nuclear materials which, when completed, would be a useful addition to the network of analytical laboratories used for Agency safeguards. The design and mode of operation of the laboratory were modelled on those of the Agency's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, and thanks were due to the Department of Safeguards for the assistance it had provided on several occasions for that purpose.

83. He wished in that context to refer again to the Director General's statement, in which he had pointed out that there was sometimes a tendency to view Agency safeguards as a kind of appendage to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and that the importance attached to NPT should not blur awareness of the fact that Agency safeguards were based directly on the Agency's Statute. He had gone on to say that NPT made use of the Agency's safeguards as did the Tlatelolco Treaty, and that most safeguards agreements with the Agency were concluded pursuant to obligations entered into

by States parties to those two Treaties. That statement was a very timely one, since on more than one occasion delegations seemed to have failed to understand that in nuclear matters the Agency's Statute was second only to the United Nations Charter.

84. Brazil was convinced that the Agency's credibility must be enhanced if a universal and non-discriminatory dissemination of the benefits of the uses of nuclear energy was to be achieved. The attainment of that goal would reaffirm the inalienable right of all countries to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

85. Mr. HAVEL (Czechoslovakia) reiterated his delegation's view that the Agency was undoubtedly the most important specialized body within the United Nations system. The current difficulties of the international situation, which had increased tension in both the military and the political sphere, were adversely affecting the Agency's work. In that connection, he drew attention to the peace initiatives which the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other countries belonging to the socialist community had recently taken, particularly those formulated by the CMEA Council at its meeting in June 1984.

86. His country continued to support the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the number of nuclear-weapon countries grew, so would the danger of those weapons being used. It was for that reason that Czechoslovakia and the other socialist countries were doing everything in their power to avoid the unleashing of a nuclear conflict, to end the arms race and to strengthen peace, security and co-operation throughout the world. It was essential in that context to reinforce and improve not just the safeguards system and the exchange of information on safeguards, but also the inspection system now that some States were seeking to limit the Agency's verification activities at nuclear facilities. The offer made by the Soviet Union to submit some of its peaceful nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards and its willingness to conduct the necessary negotiations on that question with the Agency in the near future were greatly welcomed.

87. His country was particularly interested in the export of nuclear materials provided they were not used for spreading nuclear weapons and supported any move that would encourage such exports. It was satisfied with the results obtained so far by CAS and commended the work done by the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage.

88. It was essential to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The Agency was one of the most important bodies for multilateral negotiations on questions of disarmament and nuclear disarmament in particular. The Third NPT Review Conference to be held in Geneva in 1985 would be a very important event in that sense. Among other things, that Conference would be examining an important document on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

89. All Member States which had not yet done so were urged to sign the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials so that it could enter into force as soon as possible.

90. His delegation approved the Agency's accounts for 1983 (GC(XXVIII)/714) and the Agency's Programme for 1985-86 and the budget for 1985 (GC(XXVIII)/715).

91. Czechoslovakia had decided to participate in the nuclear power plant Incident Reporting System.

92. His country attached great importance to the Agency's programme of techical assistance and co-operation and participated actively in its execution. In 1985, his country would make a voluntary contribution totalling 2.8 million Czechoslovak crowns.

93. The aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in which his country was principally interested were those enabling it to meet its growing basic energy requirements. Czechoslovakia's nuclear power plants were equipped with WWER-440 reactors currently producing 440 MW. During the 1990s, reactors with a rated capacity of 1000 MW would be commissioned with the result that, by the year 2000, Czechoslovakia would have twelve 400 MW units and at least six 1000 MW units, representing a total capacity of 12 700 MW. All those power plants would supply not only electricity but also heat for towns located within a radius of 50 kilometres.

94. In conjunction with the Soviet Union, his country had constructed WWER-440 reactors, steam generators, compensators, shut-off valves, special pumps and auxiliary systems for the primary circuit. Czech industry supplied WWER-440 nuclear power plants with more than 80% of all their technological

equipment and was beginning to produce the components required for WWER-1000 reactors. It had also exported equipment for the first two units of the PAKS power plant in Hungary and for one unit of the same type in the German Democratic Republic.

95. That proved, therefore, that a small country like Czechoslovakia could play an important economic and technical role in the development of nuclear energy, while honouring the principles which underlay the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

96. A new nuclear safety supervisory body had been set up in accordance with a law passed during the current year.

97. His country also attached considerable importance to the use of nuclear techniques to promote economic and social development within the country. The most important areas in that respect were food and agriculture, and in particular induced mutations, radiopharmaceuticals and radioimmunoassay. More than 50% of the radioisotopes produced in Czechoslovakia were used in medicine, the remainder being employed in industry and in mineral resource exploration. Good economic results had been obtained and his country was therefore planning to broaden the range of isotope applications.

98. As concerned the Agency's activities, his country, and probably other Member States too, would be interested to see the revival of a review journal similar to the Agency's former "Atomic Energy Review", which could publish articles by leading experts on individual topics and would thus promote an exchange of information both within the Secretariat and between institutions and laboratories in Member States. The Agency should give greater attention to problems relating to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. In that connection, exchanges of information and meetings by specialists would be extremely useful to Member States in which nuclear power plants were being constructed or planned.

99. In conclusion, he drew attention to the agreement concluded between Czechoslovakia and Austria on relations between the two countries in the development of nuclear energy, which should enable a number of problems common to the two countries to be resolved. The agreement was an excellent example of co-operation in nuclear energy matters.

100. Mr. AUDLAND (Commission of the European Communities) said that he would like to mention the industrial and economic aspects of nuclear energy in the European Atomic Energy Community up to the year 2000.

101. The development of the nuclear industry did not take place in a vacuum. Nuclear power plants were intended to help meet energy needs. Where it existed and where it had been adopted, the nuclear option was an integral part of overall energy policy. The basic objective of the Community energy policy for more than ten years, had been to reduce dependence on oil. It had been decided that by the year 1990 oil should account for only 40% of total energy supplies. In other words, between 70 and 75% of the electricity should then be produced from nuclear energy and solid fuels in order to diversify energy sources by the year 2000.

102. The Community was aware of the role of nuclear energy and had drawn up a development policy for it, although not all of its member States had national nuclear energy programmes. It had also adopted certain basic strategies; for example, it was in favour of fast reactors and spent fuel reprocessing. A 12-year plan of action (1980-1992) had been agreed upon in the key field of waste management and disposal.

103. The European Economic Community had been developing nuclear energy for 25 years. Despite certain setbacks, nuclear energy had become an industrial and economic reality.

104. At present, some 25% of the net electricty production in the Community was of nuclear origin, and in some Member States that percentage was as high as 50%. That was a major achievement, particularly when the situation in other large industrialized regions was considered. The decision taken, especially after the first oil crisis, to increase nuclear power production had proved its worth. If the Community had continued to be as dependent on oil to generate electricty, all the oil produced by Member States in the North Sea would have been needed to meet the requirements of the electricity sector.

105. The Community owed that progress to a strong nuclear industry which had enabled nuclear energy to become a reliable and economically viable substitute for oil, gas and coal for generating electricity. The Community's nuclear

industry was unique. In addition to plant construction, it included all the associated fuel cycle services (conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication reprocessing and treatment of radioactive waste). In the key sector of enrichment, industrial capacities had been created through international co-operation both for ultracentrifugation and for gas diffusion.

106. Whereas the Governments of Member States and economic operators were taking decisions along those lines, EURATOM, for its part, had been taking initiatives in various fields of competence, including research and development, health and safety, safeguards, co-operation agreements with major supplier countries, and loans for investments in the nuclear sector.

107. At a meeting of its Council of Ministers in May 1984, the Community had decided to continue restructuring its energy pattern and reducing dependence on oil. Since most of the objectives for 1990 would be met, Member States had agreed that the time had come to set new and longer-term objectives. The Commission was at present preparing the ground work.

108. In the case of nuclear energy, the Commission was to propose an illustrative nuclear programme, the third of its kind, which would set out the main guidelines for development and the Community's future nuclear energy needs. That programme, which would be in no way binding and which was still the subject of consultations with Member States and industry, should assist public authorities, economic operators and experts who helped form public opinion in Member States, and should facilitate decisions at all levels. It would demonstrate that the share of nuclear energy in electricity production would continue to increase, the installed nuclear capacity would reach 100 GW(e) by the year 1990. By that time, about 35% of electricity production would be nuclear which would mean a reduction in the use of oil. That trend would continue after 1990 and it would be economically justified since total production costs would be so much lower than in the case of oil-, gas- or coal-fired plants.

109. But challenges would have to be met in order to make the most of nuclear energy. The first challenge lay in the potential for developing exports and imports of nuclear power. There was already substantial trade across some of the Community's internal frontiers, and since not all Member States had adopted the nuclear option, the development of such trade could offer economic

advantages both to recipient and supplier countries. The former would be able to reduce expenditure on oil and gas by importing cheap nuclear power, and the latter would be guaranteed improved and more economical operation of their own nuclear power plants.

110. The second challenge concerned the choice of strategy for the use of plutonium. Plutonium could be used as a fuel in reactors currently in operation, but its most effective use was in fast breeders. The Commission had always supported the development of fast breeder reactors, on the grounds that the Community, which imported 75% of the uranium it needed, should in due course, under healthy economic conditions, use that technology to reduce its heavy external dependence. With the multinational Superphénix project in France, the technology of fast breeders was at the industrial prototype stage. Therefore, it was worthwhile continuing research along those lines in order to make fast breeders economically competitive with LWRs in the medium term. It seemed likely that fast breeder reactors would soon be competitive with coal-fired electricity power plants.

111. The third challenge was that facing the nuclear power plant construction industry. It was a double challenge. On the one hand, that industry had to develop new capacities to cope with the needs arising from the installation of fast breeders. In that context the Commission welcomed the decision taken a few months previously by several Member States of the Community to establish closer co-operation on the construction of new fast breeders. That was a useful step towards establishing a rational industrial basis. On the other hand, more traditional nuclear industry had to adapt to a slower pace in the placing of orders. In the search for more rational structures that sector could benefit from increased co-operation at Community level.

112. In the longer term, consideration would have to be given to thermonuclear fusion. The Joint European Torus (JET), the first European fusion reactor and the largest tokamak in the world, had become operational a year before. JET had been entirely designed and constructed under a Community research programme. Eighty per cent of its construction had been financed by EURATOM and the rest by Member States, together with Sweden and Switzerland. Fourteen months after its startup, the results had been better than expected, both from a technical and scientific point of view, with, for example, a world record

confinement of the plasma for 0.7 seconds. The Community therefore had a good basis for developing the new generation of fusion reactors. A group had been set up more than a year previously to do the preparatory work for the next device (the Next European Torus - NET).

113. Since the last session of the General Conference, co-operation between EURATOM and the Agency in the field of safeguards and of research and development had increased and he was confident that trend would continue.

114. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq), exercising his right of reply, pointed out that during the debate mention had been made of an attack that Iraq was alleged to have made with a single missile on the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

115. He wished to make three points. First, no military activity had been recorded on the date of the alleged attack, 24 March 1984, as could be easily verified from the military communiqués issued by Iran and Iraq. Second, the Director General had not accepted Iran's request to hold an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Governors to review that question. Third, the Board of Governors, having heard the representative of Iran speak on the matter in June, had decided, again owing to lack of evidence, not to include the item on the agenda.

116. The Iranian charge was nothing more than propaganda. What was more, no one would believe that a nuclear power plant could be attacked with just one missile.

117. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran), exercising his right of reply, said that his Government had always given great consideration to the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities against armed attacks, and had unreservedly supported resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/407 adopted by the General Conference at its previous session. Since then, that resolution had been violated.

118. He referred to document INFCIRC/318 relating to the military attack on the Bushehr nuclear power plant in the Islamic Republic of Iran and to the Iranian request to include an item in the agenda for the session of the Board of Governors in June 1984. He regretted that its request had not been granted.

119. His Government had provided a detailed account of the attack and had furnished all the proof at his disposal, which he had believed to be sufficient at that time. His Government had invited the Director General to set up a group of experts to conduct an on-the-spot investigation of the attack. That invitation, which had never been taken up, was still open.

120. However, in reply to the arguments of the Iraqi régime that there was insufficient evidence and that the claim by the Islamic Republic of Iran was totally unfounded, he drew the attention of the General Conference to two documents: a letter dated 24 March 1984 from Mr. Norbert Schmidt, Kraftwerk Union AG (KWU), site manager and the official in charge of the team working at the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant at the time of the incident, which described the military attack; and a letter of 27 March 1984 from the Head Office of KWU at Erlangen (Federal Republic of Germany), addressed to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and confirming the attack.

121. His delegation hoped that those documents would dispel once and for all any lingering doubts about the attack having taken place and would demonstrate that it was unjust and totally against the spirit of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/407 that the matter had not been included in the agenda for the June session of the Board of Governors. The persistence of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to that matter was justified and, in the long term, was in the interest of all Third World countries. His delegation believed that the Iraqi régime had been led to behave in such an irresponsible manner and to attack the Bushehr nuclear power plant, in violation of Agency resolutions, as a direct result of the leniency shown by the Agency with regard to the Israeli military attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities. That leniency had naturally fostered aggression and, if the Agency decided not to investigate the act perpetrated by the aggressive Iraqi régime, it would only encourage other aggressive regimes, elsewhere in the world, to engage in similar irresponsible attacks against other States, with disastrous consequences.

122. Since he did not have time to read out the letters he had mentioned, the President of the General Conference was requested to have the texts of them distributed to all Member States of the Agency.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.