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(GC(XXXIV)/914)

REVISION OF ARTICLE VI OF THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE

1. On 14 September 1990, the Board of Governors agreed to the transmission to the General Conference of the appended report of the informal working group to examine different proposals on the revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole re-established by the Board in October 1989 pursuant to resolution GC(XXXIII)/RES/523.

2. With regard to item 2 on the working group's agenda ("Participation by non-Board members in the meetings of the Board's committees (TACC and A&B Committee)", the Board affirmed that "all Member States shall be afforded every opportunity to participate fully in the deliberations of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee and the Administrative and Budgetary Committee and that they shall have their views taken into account in the formulation of the Committees' recommendations and reflected in the reports which the Committees submit to the Board." Also, it reaffirmed that "every endeavour should be made for the Committees' recommendations to be achieved by consensus and that this objective would be facilitated by more extensive informal consultations." In addition, there was agreement that "this matter will be reviewed in the coming year, for which purpose the next Chairman of the Board should consult with the chairmen of the area and regional groups."

3. With regard to item 3 on the working group's agenda (Participation by non-Board members in the meetings of the Board"), the Board reaffirmed that "Rule 50 should be applied in a liberal manner" and agreed that "this matter will also be reviewed similarly in the coming year."

4. The summary records of the Board discussions relating to this item since the Conference's thirty-third regular session will be circulated in an Addendum to this document.

5. Pursuant to the suggestion made in paragraph 30 of the working group's report, the Board recommends that the General Conference request it to establish a successor working group with the mandate set out in General Conference resolution GC(XXX)/RES/467.

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REVISION OF ARTICLE VI OF THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE
INFORMAL WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE DIFFERENT PROPOSALS
ON THE REVISION OF ARTICLE VI OF THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE

Report of the working group

1. In October 1989, pursuant to General Conference resolution GC(XXXIII)/RES/523, the Board of Governors re-established "an informal working group open to all Member States in order to continue to examine different proposals on the revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole". In December 1989, the Board's Chairman informed the Board that he had asked the Governor from Malaysia, Ambassador Halim bin Ali, to chair the working group and that Ambassador Halim bin Ali had accepted.
2. The working group held five meetings (one each in January, February, April, May and June), and representatives of over 40 Member States took part in its deliberations.
3. The working group based its discussions on the following agenda:
 1. Expansion of the Board: examination of the "Italian proposal"^{1/} taking into account the following considerations:
 - (a) Political balance within the Board
 - (b) Equitable representation of Member States
 - (c) Effectiveness and efficiency of the Board
 2. Participation by non-Board members in the meetings of the Board's committees (TACC and A&B Committee).
 3. Participation by non-Board members in the meetings of the Board
 4. Principle and criteria of designation of Board Members
 5. Re-election of members to the Board
 6. Geographical division
 7. Other matters

^{1/} See Attachment 1.

Item 1

4. While it was acknowledged that political changes were taking place in the world which might alter the present political balance within the Board, it was felt that -- to have a chance of success -- any formula for expansion of the Board would, for the time being, have to be based on the present political balance.

5. There was a broad understanding that the present political balance was preserved by the "Italian proposal". However, some participants stated that this did not in any way imply endorsement of the "Italian proposal".

6. A few participants felt that the concept of "political balance" was unclear and a few others even felt that, as no change to the present political balance was contemplated in the "Italian proposal" (the object of which was simply to increase the membership of the Board), the concept was irrelevant in the current debate. One participant drew attention to the fact that no reference was made in the Statute to "political balance".

7. Some participants doubted the need for an enlargement of the Board if there was to be no change in the present political balance or in the degree of equitableness of representation.

8. A few participants belonging to areas which would not get any additional seats on the Board pursuant to application of the "Italian proposal" stated that they would be unwilling to accept the proposal. A spokesman for the African Group stated that, in the view of that group, the "Italian proposal" (judged in the light of the political balance within the Board, the equitable representation of Member States, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the Board) did not adequately meet the problem of the under-representation of African Member States on the Board.

9. Differing views were expressed regarding the present and proposed size of the Board (35 and 44 seats respectively) relative to the total membership of the Agency (113 members), as compared with the situation in other organizations belonging to the United Nations family.^{2/}

10. It was agreed that "equitableness of representation" could be assessed on the basis of various factors, and mention was made in this context of Annex 1 ("Equitable representation" under IAEA Statute Article VI: some factors for assessment) to Appendix 1 to document GC(XXXII)/851.

11. Speaking in favour of the "Italian proposal", one participant stated that -- with the substantial increase in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy -- more Member States than before now wished to be involved in the decision-making process, and in this connection one participant pointed to the expansion of its nuclear power programme in recent years as an example of the important changes that had occurred in the civil nuclear field.

12. Differing views were expressed as to whether the proposed increase in the size of the Board would detract from or contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Board. In this context the view was reiterated^{3/} that the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency as a whole was more important than the effectiveness and efficiency of the Board. Also, the view was expressed that the effectiveness and efficiency of the Board did not depend on the Board's size -- the important thing was that the Board should be representative of the Agency's membership.

13. Some participants commended the effectiveness and efficiency of the Board, whereas one participant considered the Board's present mode of operation to be undemocratic, anachronistic and outdated. In this connection,

^{2/} A paper submitted by the United States for consideration in this connection is contained in Attachment 2.

^{3/} See para. 6 of the Appendix to GC(XXXIII)/892.

it was stated that no-one had ever claimed that the Board was ineffective or inefficient; it was also stated that "effectiveness and efficiency" were subjective concepts when considered in the context of the optimum number of Board members.

Item 2

14. Discussion of the participation of non-Board members in meetings of the Board's committees (essentially TACC and the A&B Committee) focussed on ideas, put forward in 1988 and 1989 by Argentina and Cuba, whereby all Member States would have the right to participate in such meetings as full committee members -- without any restrictions or limitations.^{4/}

15. There was substantial support for the "Cuban proposal"^{5/}, several participants favouring its implementation on a trial basis -- for two or three years. Some participants suggested that discussion of the question of expansion of the Board be suspended during the trial period. Some participants (including the spokesman of the African Group), while supporting the "Cuban proposal", considered that the opening-up of TACC and the A&B Committee to all of the Agency's Member States should not constitute a substitute for expansion of the Board. At the same time, several participants expressed reservations about the "Cuban proposal" or objected to it outright.

Item 3

16. At its fourth meeting, the working group considered a proposal for amending Rule 50 of the Board's Rules of Procedure^{6/} drafted by Italy and the Philippines on the basis of separate proposals previously submitted by those two countries.

^{4/} In this connection, see paras 18-21 of Appendix 1 to GC(XXXII)/851 and Annex 3 of the Appendix to GC(XXXIII)/892.

^{5/} See Attachment 3.

^{6/} See Attachment 4.

17. Support was expressed for the proposal on the grounds that: it made a clear distinction between -- on one hand -- countries which were Member States of the Agency and -- on the other -- countries which were not Agency Member States or other entities; that it would not lend itself to different interpretations by different Chairmen of the Board; that it would encourage Member States which were not currently members of the Board to participate in the Board's work; and that it was more in line with actual current practice in the Board than Rule 50 in its present form.

18. Several participants expressed reservations about the proposal, mainly on the grounds that it did not in fact reflect current Board practice and that its adoption could have unforeseen repercussions of an undesirable nature. One participant expressed the view that, like the mode of operation of the Board, Rule 50 was undemocratic, anachronistic and antediluvian.

19. At the working group's fifth meeting, Italy submitted a new proposal, drafted in the light of the discussion during the fourth meeting and intended to be a compromise proposal.^{7/} In view of the submission of this proposal, the Philippines re-submitted its earlier proposal (referred to in paragraph 16 above).^{8/}

20. Some participants considered that the new proposal submitted by Italy was an improvement over the proposal which had been submitted by Italy and the Philippines, but could not support it at that stage. Some other participants objected to all three proposals on the grounds that the present practice -- involving the application of Rule 50 -- provided adequate opportunity for Member States not currently members of the Board to participate in the Board's meetings and preserved the statutory distinction between members of the Board and Member States not currently serving in the Board. Some further participants, while expressing a preference for the proposal which had been submitted by Italy and the Philippines, stated that they could go along with

^{7/} See Attachment 5.

^{8/} See Attachment 6.

the new proposal submitted by Italy; they considered that, at all events, Rule 50 needed to be amended. It was observed that those who objected to the proposal to amend Rule 50 were all designated members of the Board (although not all designated members of the Board objected).

Item 4

21. The working group considered a Secretariat paper entitled "Criteria for the designation of members to the Board of Governors".^{9/}

22. The view was expressed that, while the criteria for designation might have been clear in the early years of the Agency, they were not any longer. A proposal was made that the Board be strongly urged to indicate clearly and unequivocally, when making designations of members pursuant to Article VI.A.1, the ten Member States which fall within the purview of the clause "most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials" and similarly to name the three Member States "most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials" in each of the eight areas in which none of the aforesaid ten is located.

[Emphasis supplied]

23. The proposal was not considered in detail by the working group.

Item 5

24. The working group considered a Secretariat paper entitled "Re-election of members to the Board of Governors".^{10/}

25. The view was expressed that the possibility of re-election (the re-election of a Board member occupying a "floating" seat to an "area" seat or vice-versa) limited the scope for the election of a larger number of countries

^{9/} See attachment 7.

^{10/} See Attachment 8.

to the Board. The view was also expressed that, although re-election was perhaps undesirable in principle, the absence of the possibility of re-election could create difficulties for certain areas where relatively few Member States were located.

26. For lack of time, the working group did not discuss this question further.

Item 6

27. It was recalled that the question of the division of the Agency's membership into the eight areas referred to in Article VI had been discussed briefly by the working group in 1988^{11/} and that Cuba had submitted to the working group tabular and graphics material illustrating the impact of a division of the Agency's membership into five regions in 1989^{12/}.

28. The view was expressed that the present geographical division of the Agency's membership was anachronistic; the regional areas were unique and did not conform to United Nations practice. However, the working group decided that, for lack of time and given the rapid changes currently taking place in Europe, it should not pursue the question of geographical division for the present.

Item 7

29. There was no discussion under the heading "Other matters".

SUGGESTED ACTION BY THE BOARD

30. The working group suggests that the Board recommend to the General Conference that it request the Board to establish a successor working group with the mandate set out in General Conference resolution GC(XXX)/RES/467.

^{11/} See para. 17 of Appendix 1 to GC(XXXII)/851.

^{12/} See Annex 2 to the Appendix to GC(XXXIII)/892.

AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE VI OF THE STATUTE OF THE AGENCY

Proposed by Italy and co-sponsored by Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Sweden

Replace the text of paragraph A of Article VI of the Statute by the following:

"A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:

1. The outgoing Board of Governors shall designate for membership on the Board seventeen members from among the most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials, so that the Board shall at all times include in this category two representatives of the area of North America, one representative of the area of Latin America, seven representatives of the area of Western Europe, two representatives of the area of Eastern Europe, one representative of the area of Africa, one representative of the area of the Middle East and South Asia, one representative of the area of South East Asia and the Pacific, and two representatives of the area of the Far East.
2. The General Conference shall elect to membership of the Board of Governors:
 - (a) Twenty-six members, with due regard to equitable representation on the Board as a whole of the members in the areas mentioned in sub-paragraph A.1 of this article, so that the Board shall at all times include in this category six representatives of the area of Latin America, four representatives of the area of Western Europe, three representatives of the area of Eastern Europe, seven representatives of the area of Africa, four representatives of the area of the Middle East and South Asia, one representative of the area of South East Asia and the Pacific, and one representative of the area of the Far East. No member in this category in any one term of office will be eligible for re-election in the same category for the following term of office; and
 - (b) One further member from among the members of the areas of South East Asia and the Pacific and the Far East, two consecutive terms of office served by members of the area of South East Asia and the Pacific alternating with one term of office served by a member of the area of the Far East."

THE SIZE OF THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS COMPARED TO
SIMILAR BODIES IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Submitted by the United States of America

The attached table compares the size of the IAEA Board of Governors with the size of the executive bodies of other international organizations (specialized agencies and autonomous bodies) which have a similar constitutional structure and membership. By similar constitutional structure is meant that each of these organizations has a general conference or general assembly which exercises legislative functions and a board or council which acts as an executive committee to carry out the statutory functions of guiding the organization between meetings of the general conference or general assembly. International organizations which do not have this basic constitutional structure or which are regional in membership are not included because they would not allow meaningful comparison. The International Labor Organization has also been excluded from the analysis because the unique composition of, and voting arrangements in, its governing bodies do not permit a proper comparison with the IAEA. The data are taken from United Nations Handbook 1989, published by the Ministry of External Relations and Trade of New Zealand, pp. 108-145. For each of the 13 international organizations listed, the table shows (a) the number of members of the executive body, (b) the total membership, and (c) the relationship of the number of members of the executive body to the total membership expressed as a percentage.

The following observations may be of interest:

- The membership of the executive bodies of these 13 organizations ranges from 15% to 35% of the total membership.
- The average for the 13 organizations is 24% and the median is 22.5%.
- The membership of IAEA Board of Governors is 31% of the total membership of the Agency.
- Of the 13 organizations, two (UNIDO and UNESCO) have a higher percentage than the IAEA. One has the same percentage as the IAEA (FAO), and nine have lower percentages.
- The Italian proposal to increase the size of the Board of Governors to 44 members would increase the membership of the Board to 39% of total Agency membership and give the Agency the highest percentage of the 13 organizations listed.

**Size of IAEA Board of Governors
Compared to Executive Bodies in Similar
International Organizations**

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Size of Executive Body</u>	<u>Total Membership</u>	<u>% Exec. Body/ Total Membership</u>
IAEA (Board of Governors)	35	113	31%
FAO (Council)	49	158	31%
ICAO (Council)	33	160	21%
IFAD (Executive Board)	18	110	16%
IMO (Council)	32	133	24%
IMF (Executive Board)	23	151	15%
ITU (Administrative Council)	43	166	25%
UNESCO (Executive Board)	51	158	32%
UNIDO (Industrial Development Board)	53	150	35%
UPU (Executive Council)	40	169	23%
WHO (Executive Council)	31	166	19%
WMO (Executive Council)	36	161	22%
WTO (Executive Council)	21	106	20%

**Some considerations about the question of committees of the Board
open to all Members of the IAEA**

(Proposal by Cuba)

1. All Member States of the IAEA should have the right to participate in all meetings of committees of the Board (TACC and ABC) without any restrictions or limitations.
2. The committees of the Board (TACC and ABC) would consider all the items included in their respective agendas and present their recommendations to the Board in reports adopted at the end of their meetings.

If the committees could not reach an agreement on a specific topic, the different views expressed during the consideration of this topic should be reflected adequately in the report.

3. The committees would take decisions only on recommendations to be considered by the Board.
4. TACC and ABC would work as Board committees open to all Agency Member States for an experimental period of three years, at the end of which the Board would either extend the period for three more years or reconsider its decision.
5. The committees would designate rapporteurs responsible for the preparation of their reports in the same way as is done now.
6. The Chairman of the Board would be the Chairman of the committees (TACC and ABC).
7. The committees would work in the manner and spirit that have characterized their work until now - i.e., they would aim to improve and strengthen the activities of the IAEA for the benefit of the IAEA's Member States.

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY ITALY AND THE PHILIPPINES

Rule 50

- A. The Board shall invite all Members of the Agency which are not members of the Board to participate, without the right to vote, in the deliberations of the Board.

- B. The Board may invite any State which is not a Member of the Agency, any specialized agency, other inter-governmental organization or non-governmental organization or any individual to be represented at or to attend any meeting of the Board.

NEW PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING RULE 50 OF THE BOARD'S
PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE

Submitted by Italy

Rule 50

- A.: Members of the Agency which are not members of the Board may request to attend any meeting of the Board. Such Members shall be entitled to take part in the discussions of the Board without the right to vote or to participate in the adoption of resolutions or decisions. Except when the Chairman of the Board decides otherwise, they will be given the floor on each item of the agenda after the members of the Board.
- B.: The Board may invite any State which is not a Member of the Agency, any specialized agency, other inter-governmental organization or non-governmental organization or any individual to be represented at or to attend any meeting of the Board.

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE PHILIPPINES

Rule 50 Representation of States, Organizations
 and Individuals

The Board SHALL invite any State which is a Member of the Agency but not a Member of the Board, AND MAY INVITE any State which is not a Member of the Agency, any specialized agency, other inter-governmental organization or non-governmental organization or any individual to be represented at or to attend any meeting of the Board, AS OBSERVER, WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO VOTE.

CRITERIA FOR THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Secretariat paper

Introduction

1. At its meeting on 3 April 1990, the informal working group requested the Secretariat to prepare a paper – for consideration by the group at its next meetings (to be held on 17 May 1990) – regarding criteria for the designation of members of the Board.

2. The designation of Board members is dealt with in Article VI.A.1 of the Statute, which now reads

"A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:

1. The outgoing Board of Governors shall designate for membership on the Board the ten members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials, and the member most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials in each of the following areas in which none of the aforesaid ten is located:

- (1) North America
- (2) Latin America
- (3) Western Europe
- (4) Eastern Europe
- (5) Africa
- (6) Middle East and South Asia
- (7) South East Asia and the Pacific
- (8) Far East."

3. In Article VI.A.1, the words "most advanced" occur twice, and the informal working group's request to the Secretariat is presumably designed to elicit some clarification as to how one determines which members/member are/is "most advanced ..." – i.e. how one determines that country X is more advanced than country Y.

4. In response to the informal working group's request, the Secretariat feels that it should make clear at the outset that its ability to provide such clarification is strictly limited: designations by the Board under Article VI.A.1 are made following inter-State consultations in which the Secretariat is not involved. Accordingly, this paper consists of an "outsider's" historical account of what has happened in this connection since the Agency's inception, together with some commentary designed to assist members of the group in their consideration of this matter.

Historical account

5. In the early years of the Agency, when the Statute spoke of the "five members most advanced", it was accepted that the five members in question were Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, and none of them were - or ever have been - challenged.

6. When it came to designating the "most advanced ..." member in each of the areas not represented by any of those five, there was only one area with regard to which uncertainty existed - Latin America: in the early 1960s, the Board appointed a panel of experts to consider the competing claims of Argentina and Brazil to be the "most advanced ..." member in that area. The panel took into account: production of uranium; design and construction of small experimental reactors; accelerator technology; production of thorium and beryllium; metallurgy (both as involved in the manufacture of fuel elements and generally); utilization of experimental facilities and research reactors; production and use of isotopes; health and safety; research in physics and chemistry. It concluded "that there is not sufficient basis for stating that either Argentina or Brazil is the Latin American country 'most advanced ...'". Meanwhile, Argentina and Brazil (presumably with the

agreement of most other Latin American countries) had reached a compromise which appears to provide for Argentina and Brazil to alternate as the designated Latin American country, each of them occupying an elective seat on the Board in those years when it is not a designated member.^{1/}

7. In 1973, an amendment of Article VI providing – inter alia – for the designation of the nine (instead of five) "most advanced ..." members entered into force, and during the years 1973–83 the Board each June designated 12 members pursuant to the provisions of Article VI.A.1.

8. On each occasion during that period, the Chairman of the Board read out (in alphabetical order) the names of the 12 members whom he was proposing for designation without indicating which member was being proposed as one of the nine "most advanced ..." or as the "most advanced ..." member in its area. Where two or more members belonging to the same area were proposed (Canada and the United States in the case of North America), the members in question were clearly regarded as being among the nine "most advanced ...". In those cases where only one member belonging to a given area was proposed, matters were less clear: one might hazard a guess that country X was being proposed as one of the nine "most advanced ..." and country Y as the "most advanced ..." in its area, but one could not be absolutely certain. This element of uncertainty still exists.

9. Until 1977, South Africa was designated each year, presumably as the "most advanced ..." African country, despite frequent objections due to South Africa's apartheid policy. In June 1977, the Board designated Egypt instead of South Africa, following a lengthy debate and two roll-call votes. Egypt has been designated each year since 1977.^{2/}

^{1/} The other countries designated at that time as the "most advanced ..." in their respective areas were South Africa, India, Australia and Japan. Altogether, the Board designated ten countries.

^{2/} In this connection, see paras 15–99 of GOV/OR.501, paras 1–47 of GOV/OR.520, paras 73–76 of GOV/OR.533 and paras 6–10 of GOV/OR.548.

10. During the late 1970s, some West European countries (Belgium, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland – and maybe others) began questioning the designation of Italy – presumably as one of the "most advanced ...", given the fact that France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom (all belonging to the area of Western Europe) were also being designated. It would seem that those West European countries believed themselves to be at least as "advanced ..." as Italy. Consultations within the West European group appear to have resulted in temporary arrangements that determine which country will occupy one of the designative West European seats. The interested countries may also be elected to the Board from time to time.

11. In June 1984 (the year in which China joined the Agency), the Board agreed unanimously to recommend to the General Conference that it approve an amendment to Article VI.A.1 designated to increase from nine to ten the number of "most advanced ..." members to be designated (the recommended draft resolution was adopted by the General Conference in the following September). The Board then agreed – inter alia – on the following points: that 13 members instead of 12 should be designated for the period 1984–85; that in future the outgoing Board would designate 13 members instead of 12 until the entry into force of the recommended amendment; and that it was understood that the designation of 13 instead of 12 States did not alter the status of the nine States which had hitherto been considered to be the "most advanced ..." and which had been designated in the past. The 13 countries designated in 1984 were those designated in 1983 plus China. The Board has designated 13 countries each year since 1984.

12. The Board's unanimous recommendation was accepted by the General Conference, which amended Article VI.A.1 in September 1984. The amendment, which was in effect implemented by the Board as an interim measure during the period 1984–89, came into force on 28 December 1989 – after its acceptance by two-thirds of the Agency's Member States as provided for in Article XVIII.C(ii) of the Statute.

RE-ELECTION OF MEMBERS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Secretariat paper

1. The provision in Article VI.A.2(a) concerning the re-election of members to the Board reads as follows: "No member in this category [emphasis added] in any one term of office will be eligible for re-election in the same category [emphasis added] for the following term of office". Article VI has contained such a provision since approval of the Statute, 1956.

2. Members "in this category" are Board members occupying what are commonly called "area" seats - as opposed to "floating" seats. "Floating" seats are the subject of Article VI.A.2(b) and (c), which contain no provisions barring re-election.

3. As a result of the "no re-election" provision in Article VI.A.2(a) and the absence of such a provision in Article VI.A.2(b) and (c),

(i) a Board member occupying an "area" seat is not eligible for immediate re-election to an "area" seat, but is eligible for immediate re-election to a "floating" seat;

(ii) a Board member occupying a "floating" seat is eligible for immediate re-election to a "floating" seat or for immediate re-election to an "area" seat.

4. From the records it would seem that there have been no cases of immediate re-election of a Board member occupying an "area" seat to an "area" seat; this is not surprising, given the "no re-election" provision in Article VI.A.2(a). On the other hand, the records indicate that there have been no cases of immediate re-election of a Board member occupying an "area" seat to a "floating" seat, despite the fact that this is not precluded by a "no re-election" provision.

5. The records indicate that there have been no cases of immediate re-election of a Board member occupying a "floating" seat to a "floating" seat, again despite the fact that this is not precluded by a "no re-election" provision, but there appear to have been two cases of immediate re-election of a Board member occupying a "floating" seat to an "area" seat: the Philippines occupied a "floating" seat in 1973-75 and an "area" seat in 1975-77; the Republic of Korea occupied a "floating" seat in 1985-87 and an "area" seat in 1987-89.

6. It may be noted that the proposal made by Bangladesh, Egypt, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria and Pakistan in 1977 for amending Article VI.A.2 (the "3+2" proposal - GC(XXI)/584) does not contain the "no re-election" provision, whereas the proposal made by Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in 1978 (the "1+1" proposal - GC(XXII)/602) and the "Italian proposal" do contain it.

7. It may also be noted that in 1988 the informal working group reported that there was widespread feeling in the group that the "no re-election" provision was unduly restrictive and unnecessary, but that some members felt that the issue needed to be examined further.