


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**TEXTS OF JOINT USA-USSR STATEMENTS
FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C.,
31 MAY-3 JUNE 1990**

The attached texts are being circulated at the request of the Permanent Mission of the United States and the Permanent Mission of the Soviet Union.

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Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles capable of carrying such weapons, and certain other missiles and missile technologies. The more nations that possess such weapons, the more difficult it will be to realize the desire of people everywhere to achieve effective arms control and disarmament measures and to reduce the threat of war. Weapons proliferation can provoke or intensify insecurity and hostility among nations, and threatens mankind with warfare of unprecedented destructiveness.

Our discussions over the past months point the way to a new era in relations between our two countries. We have taken major steps toward concluding agreements to reduce our own strategic nuclear arsenals, to bring limits on nuclear testing into force, and to reach a global ban on chemical weapons. Together with the nations of Europe, we are taking unprecedented steps to reduce existing conventional weaponry as part of a process of building a lasting structure of European security. The progress we are making and the commitments we have made in these bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts clearly demonstrate that arms reductions can contribute to increased security, even when there have been long-standing and deep-seated differences between countries.

The historic steps we have taken to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and to cooperate in the interests of international stability create the possibility of even closer and more concrete cooperation in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and missile non-proliferation.

With these considerations in mind, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- o Declare their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles capable of carrying such weapons and certain other missiles and missile technologies, in particular those subject to the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);
- o Agree to work closely together and with other members of the international community to develop and to put into action concrete measures against the proliferation of these types of weapons; and

- o Call on other nations to join in a renewed commitment to effective non-proliferation measures as a means of securing international peace and stability and as a step toward the effective limitation worldwide of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and missile technology.

The two sides have taken specific actions to advance these commitments.

Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation

In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- o Reaffirm their steadfast and long-lasting commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to strengthen the international nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime;
- o Reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and agree that it continues to make an invaluable contribution to global and regional security and stability;
- o Urge all countries which have not yet done so to adhere to the NPT;
- o Urge all NPT parties to implement scrupulously their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations under the Treaty;
- o Affirm their intention to cooperate together and with other Treaty parties to ensure a successful 1990 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which would reaffirm support for the objectives of the Treaty and its importance to international security and stability;
- o Support the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and urge all countries in the region to bring it into force at an early date;
- o Reiterate their continuing commitment to strengthening the IAEA, whose unique system of safeguards has contributed to the widespread peaceful use of nuclear energy for social and economic development;
- o Support increased international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards;
- o Call on all non-nuclear-weapons states with unsafeguarded nuclear activities to place these activities under international safeguards;

- o Agree on the need for stringent controls over exports of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, to ensure that they will not be misused for nuclear explosive purposes, and urge all other nations capable of exporting nuclear-related technology to apply similarly strict controls;
- o Continue to support efforts to improve and strengthen the international nuclear export control regime;
- o Support discussions among states in regions of nuclear proliferation concern for the purpose of achieving concrete steps to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, and, in particular, join in calling on the nations of the Middle East, Southern Africa, and South Asia to engage in and pursue such discussions;
- o Agree to continue their regular, constructive bilateral consultations on nuclear weapons non-proliferation.

Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation

In order to stem the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- o Have signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, demonstrating that controls on -- indeed the elimination of -- such missiles can enhance national security;
- o Reaffirm their intention that the START Treaty be signed by the end of the year;
- o Affirm their support for the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Regime, covering missiles, and certain equipment and technology relating to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers and they call on all nations that have not done so to observe the spirit and the guidelines of this regime;
- o Are taking measures to restrict missile proliferation on a worldwide basis, including export controls and other internal procedures;
- o Have instituted bilateral consultations to exchange information concerning such controls and procedures and identify specific measures to prevent missile proliferation;

- o Agree to work to stop missile proliferation, particularly in regions of tension, such as the Middle East;
- o To this end, affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives to reduce the threat of missile proliferation, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives;
- o Recall that they favor international economic cooperation including cooperation aimed at peaceful space exploration, as long as such cooperation could not contribute to missile proliferation;
- o Appeal to all countries -- to exporters of missiles and missile technology as well as purchasers -- to exercise restraint, and express their willingness to continue their respective dialogues with other countries on the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology.
- o Are resolved, on their part, to continue to work to strengthen such international restraint with respect to missile and missile technology proliferation.

Chemical Weapons Non-proliferation

In order to stem the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- o Declare that a multilateral, effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention banning the development, production and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis is the best long-term solution to the threat to international security posed by the use and spread of chemical weapons, and that non-proliferation measures are considered a step toward achieving such a convention;
- o Will intensify their cooperation to expedite the negotiations in Geneva with the view to resolving outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date;
- o Have instituted bilateral confidence building measures, including chemical weapons data exchange and reciprocal site visits;
- o Have just signed a trailblazing agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;
- o Commit themselves, in that agreement, to take practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention;

- o Having declared their possession of chemical weapons, urge other states possessing chemical weapons to declare their possession, to commit to their destruction, and to begin immediately to address, through research and cooperation, the need for chemical weapons destruction capability;
- o State that they themselves will not proliferate chemical weapons;
- o Have instituted export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons. These measures are not intended to hinder or discriminate against legitimate peaceful chemical activities;
- o Have agreed to conduct bilateral discussions to improve the effectiveness of their respective export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;
- o Conduct regular bilateral consultations to broaden bilateral cooperation, including the reciprocal exchange of information on the problems of chemical weapons proliferation;
- o Confirm their intent to pursue political and diplomatic actions, where specific cases give rise to concerns about the production, use or spread of chemical weapons;
- o Join with other nations in multilateral efforts to coordinate export controls, exchange information, and broaden international cooperation to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;
- o Reaffirm their support for the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law;
- o Are taking steps to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol by:
 - Encouraging states that are not parties to accede;
 - Confirming their intention to provide active support to the United Nations Secretary General in conducting investigations of reported violations of the Protocol;
 - Affirming their intention to consider the imposition of sanctions against violators of the Protocol, including those under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
 - Agreeing to consult promptly in the event of a violation of the Protocol to discuss possible bilateral and multilateral actions against the offender, as well as appropriate assistance to the victims of such violation;

- o Agree that the presence and further proliferation of chemical weapons in areas of tension, such as the Middle East, is particularly dangerous. The two countries therefore affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives in the Middle East and other areas, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives as:
 - Efforts to broaden awareness of the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation and its negative impact on implementation of the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;
 - Bilateral or multilateral efforts to stem chemical weapons proliferation, including the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons;
 - Efforts to destroy chemical weapons in advance of the multilateral convention on chemical weapons, as the United States and the Soviet Union are doing.

The United States and the Soviet Union call on all nations of the world that have not already done so to join them in taking comparable, effective measures to stem chemical weapons proliferation.

Joint Statement on the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

At their meeting in Geneva in 1985, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union emphasized the importance of the work aimed at utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes, and advocated the widest practical development of international cooperation in obtaining this essentially inexhaustible source of energy for the benefit of all mankind.

The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, involving joint efforts by the USSR, the United States, Japan and the European Community, under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is making significant progress towards this end. A conceptual design will soon be completed.

Noting with satisfaction the results being attained under this project, the United States and the Soviet Union look forward to continued international efforts aimed at promoting further progress in developing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes.

Joint Statement on
Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

During the state visit of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, President of the USSR, at the invitation of George Bush, President of the United States, the sides concluded a new U.S.-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. This Agreement strengthens the long-standing framework for important research in a number of fields of mutual interest, including controlled thermonuclear fusion, fundamental properties of matter, and civilian nuclear reactor safety.

Recognizing the need to manage responsibly the development and utilization of nuclear power, the two sides have agreed on cooperation in the study of the health and environmental effects of past, present and future nuclear power generation, and in strengthening operational safety practices in civilian nuclear reactors. The sides intend to develop and implement promptly a mutually beneficial joint program of work in these fields under this Agreement. They also agreed to explore the possibilities for cooperation in the management of hazardous and radioactive waste.