

Information Circular

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General Distribution

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Communication dated 4 June 2014 received from the Permanent Mission of Israel to the Agency concerning a statement by Israel

1. The Director General has received a note verbale dated 4 June 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Israel to the Agency attaching a statement by Israel regarding agenda item 6(d) of the Board of Governors' meetings starting on 2 June 2014: "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran".
2. The note verbale and, as requested therein, its attachment are circulated herewith for information.



PERMANENT MISSION OF ISRAEL
TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND
THE PREPCOM - CTBTO

נציגות הקבע של ישראל
לסוכנות הבינלאומית לאנרגיה אטומית ולועדה המכינה
של הארגון ליישום האמנה למניעת ניסויים גרעיניים

04 June 2014

Excellency,

The Permanent Mission of Israel to the IAEA presents its compliments to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and has the honor to attach a copy of Israel's statement regarding agenda item 6(d) of the Board of Governors: "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (*GOV/2014/28, GOV/INF/2014/6, GOV/INF/2014/10*)."

This statement was not delivered during the Board of Governors meeting due to the Jewish holiday Shavuot. It however represents Israel's position on this agenda item. The Permanent Mission of Israel would be grateful if the attached Statement could be circulated as an official INFCIRC document to the attention of all IAEA Member States.

The Permanent Mission of Israel to the IAEA avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the International Atomic Energy Agency the assurances of its highest consideration.

Merav Zafary-Odiz



Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Israel
To the IAEA and the CTBTO PrepCom

H.E. Mr. Yukiya Amano
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

Statement by Israel**On the Director General's Report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

This statement was not delivered during the Board of Governors meeting due to a Jewish holiday Shavuot. It however represents Israel's position on this agenda item.

Israel thanks the Director General for the recent Report, and expresses its appreciation to the Department of Safeguards for their continued professional verification-related efforts regarding Iran's nuclear program.

The recent Report does not provide any comfort with regards to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program, which was developed for military purposes. Israel continues to be deeply concerned, and believes that the Iran simply managed, once again, to buy additional time while not being sufficiently cooperative and transparent with the IAEA's investigation, in particular with regards to Possible Military Dimensions (PMD)-related issues.

Israel stresses that the monitoring and verification activities conducted by the IAEA in relation to the measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), as well as the implementation of the measures agreed under the Framework for Cooperation, do not address the core of the international concerns, which are connected to activities conducted by Iran for the sole purpose of the

development of a nuclear weapons device. Israel therefore believes that the November 2011 Board resolution should be fully implemented without delay, and that the concerns regarding Iran's activities related to nuclear weapons development should be thoroughly investigated and clarified.

The Framework for Cooperation includes an Iranian commitment to cooperate with the Agency's verification activities aimed at resolving all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA; present and past issues. It must be clear that the burden of proof is on Iran. However, Iran continues to abuse what is termed as a "step-by-step" approach to the resolution of outstanding issues. The agreement reached by Iran and the Agency in Teheran, after the deadline for the implementation of the second stage already expired, yet again includes too little. It includes issues already covered by the JPA, and only two issues that were included in the Annex to the DG's report from November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Six months after the Framework for Cooperation was agreed between Iran and the Agency, one issue out of 12 outstanding ones, which were termed "Possible Military Dimensions" to the Iranian program, was addressed without resolution, while only two additional ones will supposedly be addressed in the following months. Not surprisingly, Iran claimed for a civilian application of the EBW detonators development.

This pace of investigation is unacceptable. If Iran were genuine about clarifying what it often terms as "ambiguities", then we would expect a completely different approach, that is addressing all 12 issues simultaneously and in a timely fashion.

Israel continues to harbor no illusions regarding the nature of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. Iran will continue to provide false explanations and to hide the true nature of its activities. It is thus of utmost importance that, while implementing a system assessment, the IAEA will not draw any conclusions on

the nature of Iran's activities on each issue in turn, but rather after integrating and evaluating all the information in a holistic approach.

Iran continues to enrich uranium contrary to the UN Security Council Resolutions, which remain in force. Neither the daily access given to Agency's inspectors at the enrichment facilities, nor the fact that there are currently no inter-connections between cascades, have an effect on Iran's conduct of R&D work related to more advanced centrifuges and its continued accumulation of enriched uranium. The level of enrichment in this regard is less significant. It is the scope that matters. Moreover, Iran has yet not agreed to implement the revised Code 3.1 or the Additional Protocol.

The burden of proof remains on Iran to provide full transparency, which means to provide to the Agency full access to information, documents, facilities, locations, equipment, and individuals. This is in order to fully clarify PMD issues, most of which remain outstanding. Words and commitments are simply not sufficient. The IAEA should pressure Iran to provide the necessary cooperation to resolve all outstanding issues in a timely manner, as well as to maintain its professional mandate by conducting a thorough investigation and avoiding premature, incomplete, conclusions.

End.