

Information Circular

INFCIRC/665

Date: 27 January 2006

General Distribution

Original: English

Communication dated 24 January 2006 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency

The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 24 January 2006 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran, attaching material concerning aspects of the nuclear policy and programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Note Verbale and, in accordance with the request of the Permanent Mission, its attachment, are reproduced herein for the information of Member States.



**Permanent Mission of
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**

Heinestr. 19/1/1 A-1020 Vienna/Austria
Phone: (0043-1) 214 09 71 Fax: (0043-1) 214 09 73 E-mail: PM.Iran_IAEA@chello.at

No. 010/2006

January 24, 2006

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency presents its compliments to the Agency's Secretariat and has the honour to request the attached martial, aimed at further enlightening Member States about aspects of nuclear policy and program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to be published as an official INFCIRC document and make it available to public through the IAEA website.

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Agency's Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.



Office of External Relations and Policy Co-ordination
Attn: Mr. Vilmos CSERVENY
Director,
IAEA, P.O. Box 100,
A-1400 Vienna



*Permanent Mission of
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*

Heinestr. 19/1/1 A-1020 Vienna/Austria

Phone: (0043-1) 214 09 71 Fax: (0043-1) 214 09 73 E-mail: PM.Iran_IAEA@chello.at

*Short Glance
On
Iranian Nuclear Issue*

22 January 2006

Islamic Republic of Iran, as the main victim of chemical weapons has always been among the most active member states of international organizations such as the IAEA and OPCW entrusted in combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iran attaches great importance to international cooperation in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The recent initiative of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran on nuclear disarmament during the United Nations General Assembly which paved the way for the adoption of the UNGA resolution calling the implementation of the decisions and resolutions of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, specially establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Middle East, confirms Iran's determination on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. During the last 27 years the Islamic Republic of Iran has spared no effort in cooperating with the Agency as far as its commitments under the NPT is concerned. Iran is the only Member State which voluntarily invited, in late 80s, the IAEA safeguards inspectors, headed by the DDG, to visit all sites and facilities at their discretion, even those locations not declarable under the Safeguards Agreement.

Islamic Republic of Iran is the only Member State that is implementing the Additional Protocol prior to ratification by its legislative body.

The following short critical review of the developments particularly during past three years reveals the facts confirming the exclusive nature of Iranian nuclear program and activities and full cooperation with international community. It also shows that the international

community has been, to a great extent misled with bias, politicized and exaggerated information on Iranian nuclear programs and activities. Iranian nuclear issues which should have been dealt in a purely technical manner within the framework of the IAEA, have been politicized.

The following international developments have had serious impacts on Iranian nuclear policies and activities:

- **The failure of the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNPICPUNE) in Geneva, in 1987.**
- **The failure of the Committee on Assurances of Supply in the IAEA which was entrusted to establish internationally recognized principles and legally binding instruments to assure sustainable nuclear supply, in Vienna in 1987 after 7 years of intensive deliberations.**
- **US was obliged under the contract made prior to 1979 to supply new fuel for Tehran 5 MW Research Reactor, being under the Agency comprehensive Safeguards, producing radioisotope for application in medicine, agriculture and industry. It neither gave the fuel nor the millions of dollars received for.**

Considering the aforementioned developments which proves the assertion of the lack of implementation of promotional pillars of Statute of the IAEA, article III in particular, as well as provisions of the Article 4 of NPT along with continuous sanctions by certain countries, and the last but not least the lack of any international legally binding instrument for assurances of nuclear fuel, the Islamic Republic of Iran had no choice other than to depend on its own resources and manpower in order to exercise its inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

A short review of the developments since three years ago:

- **Dr. ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA paid visit to Iranian nuclear installations particularly to the centrifuge enrichment facility in Natanz, in February 2003.**

- **Following the visit of the Director General, swipe sampling of the centrifuge components were made by inspectors. The analysis showed low and high enriched uranium particles.**
- **Iran claimed that the source of contamination has foreign origin.**
- **In order to give the IAEA chance to conduct technical activities proving that the allegations are baseless and with the aim of decreasing the political tension, Iran voluntarily decided to suspend its enrichment activities.**
- **While full cooperation with the IAEA was going on, Iran entered into constructive dialogue with almost all Member States of the IAEA such as the members of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), European Union, Russia and China with the aim of removing ambiguities on the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.**
- **There has always been consensus in the IAEA, particularly in the Board of Governors, that the suspension of enrichment activities is voluntary, non-legally binding measure. This essential non-legally binding parameter has been reflected in Tehran and Paris Agreements between Iran and EU3/EU as well as all decisions, conclusions and even resolutions of the Board of Governors.**

While appreciating the tremendous constructive work by the IAEA, and sincere attempts by Director General, Dr. ElBaradei, and his staff in resolving the issues, Iran has however serious concerns about the misunderstandings, confusions, misperceptions and the underestimation of great progress so far made on political grounds.

Short list of constructive and cooperative measures:

- **Iran has had close collaboration with the IAEA in many cases beyond its legal obligations, such as granting more than 27 accesses to military sites and workshops, facilitating interviews with several individuals.**
- **Iran intensified multilateral diplomacy with the Agency's Member States, members of Non-aligned Movement and European Union, China, Russia and other members of the Board of Governors with the aim of removing ambiguities.**
- **Iran has proactively cooperated with the Agency in an extraordinary manner during the last two years with almost continuous inspections, amount to over 1400 man-day inspection, which is unprecedented in the history of the IAEA.**
- **In an historical and unprecedented gesture, Iran decided to voluntarily and temporarily suspend its enrichment and**

reprocessing activities in order to give the Agency opportunity to perform its technical activities including sampling and analysis of the contaminated samples at Natanz.

- **Director General in his report to the Board of Governors confirmed that "Since December 2003, Iran has facilitated in a timely manner Agency access under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to nuclear materials and facilities, as well as other locations in the country, and has permitted the Agency to take environmental samples as requested by the Agency.**
- **The Director General informed the Board that "Since October 2003, Iran's cooperation has improved appreciably".**

The following major measures by Iran are the basis of his assessment:

- **Signature of the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003;**
- **Voluntary provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, from 18 December 2003, prior to its ratification, as if Iran has ratified it;**
- **Complementary access (more than 20) in accordance to the Additional Protocol, in many cases with 2 hours notice or less;**
- **Full and unrestricted access to all nuclear material and all facilities, in particular to the Enrichment Facility at Natanz, Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan;**
- **Provision of detailed information in connection with the imports of nuclear material and components related to the centrifuge and laser enrichment activities;**
- **Providing full detail information on the chronologies, activities, researches, progress reports regarding the enrichment activities, uranium conversion, plutonium separation, mining and milling, research reactor, heavy water production;**
- **Providing accesses to military sites following the allegations by a certain country and the opposition terrorist group supported by it. The inspection proved the allegations to be baseless;**
- **In October 2003, the Agency was granted to visit the military industrial complex called Kolehdoz that had been announced by terrorist group (MKO, NRCI) as relevant to enrichment activities. Following its inspection, the Agency reported in**

para49 of GOV/2005/67 : The results did not reveal any indications of activities involving the use of nuclear material;

- **In June 2004, the Agency was granted to visit the military complex of Lavisan-Shian where the Agency took environmental samples. As DG reported in para 102 of GOV/2004/83: " ...the vegetation and soil samples collected from the Lavisan-Shian site have been analyzed and reveal no evidence of nuclear material ";**
- **In January 2005, free access was granted to Parchin Military site. Environmental samples were taken. The Director General then reported that the results showed no indication of presence of nuclear material and that the Agency's inspectors did not see any relevant dual-use equipment or material;**
- **Provision of information on Heavy water Production Plant, prior to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, where Iran was not yet obliged to do so under its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INCIRC/153);**
- **Submission of more than 1000 pages of the initial declarations of the Additional Protocol on 21 May 2004 and subsequently routinely updated the declarations, which have been verified by the Agency.**

It is of a great concern and disappointment that the more Iran did cooperate and took additional steps, transparency measures, beyond its legal obligations, the more stringent Safeguards were applied, the more outstanding questions were resolved, language of the proposed resolutions by US and EU3 became tougher.

At the eve of the meetings of the Board of Governors the US political campaign against Iran is augmented with baseless allegations. It is somehow disappointing that the active cooperation of the Iran in granting prompt access to military sites, being directly related to national security, has not been duly reflected in the reports to the Board of Governors as well as the public.

Considering the facts that:

- **After over 1400 Man-days most robust inspections;**
- **Full implementation of the Additional Protocol, included performed more than 20 complementary accesses some with short**

notices of 2 hours or less during the past two years;

- **IAEA has confirmed that it has not found any evidence that Iranian nuclear materials and activities are diverted to prohibited purposes;**
- **All nuclear materials are accounted for;**
- **Iran decided to take a major proactive step, suspending voluntarily its enrichment activities, in order to give a chance for the Agency to perform technical analysis of the samples;**
- **The IAEA has confirmed, as reported by the DG (GOV2005/67), that the sources of HEU contamination are outside of Iran. It is proved that the HEU particles are not resulted from enrichment in Iran;**
- **Iran is implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol as if it has ratified it;**
- **The bitter past history of monopoly, sanctions as well as the lack of any international legally binding instrument for assurances of nuclear supply;**
- **As reflected in NAM declarations and even the resolutions, even the last resolution adopted by the Special Board of Governors, the suspension of all related enrichment activities are a voluntary and non-legally binding as a confidence building measure;**
- **The existence of scientifically well justified and technically reliable mechanisms and sophisticated surveillance equipment at the IAEA' Safeguards Department, capable of verifying the declared enrichment activities and the levels of enrichment, and giving assurance that such activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes;**

There is no reason for Iran to sustain its frustrated voluntary suspension of the R&D on enrichment as the result of which it would further be deprived from its inalienable right to work on nuclear fuel cycle, with the aim of producing required fuels for its research reactors and nuclear power plants.

(More comprehensive review is also reflected in the Agency's document INFCIRC/657).

As stipulated in article III of the Statute of the IAEA and the article IV of the NPT the state parties have full & inalienable right to conduct research on peaceful nuclear energy. As envisaged in article II," The Agency shall seek to accelerate and encourage the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". The article III authorizes the Agency to "encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world ...".

After more than two and half years of voluntary suspension, the triggering issue of contamination being resolved, there is no reason for Iranian Government to further deprive its nation from its inalienable right in doing research. The Agency was thus informed on 3 January 2006 that it will resume R&D as 10 January 2006, and requested the Agency to conduct timely and necessary preparations. Iran reiterated that such activities will be conducted in accordance with the Safeguards agreement of Iran with the IAEA. It further informed that it R&D is in small scale and not planned for nuclear fuel production. Thus, the suspension of enrichment on commercial scale, started since 2003, will be sustained.

Conclusion:

Reiterating that the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to the principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the nuclear weapons option is not in Iran's Defense Doctrine, it once again declares that it is determined to continue its full cooperation with the IAEA and implementation of its obligations under the Agency's Safeguards provided that Iran is not deprived from its inalienable right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear fuel cycle and research and development , as envisaged in the Agency's Statute and the NPT. At the same time Iran has always been ready to remove ambiguities on its nuclear activities. In this context Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to enter into negotiation on "Non-diversion of commercial large scale enrichment to military purposes" in and constructive and serious manner with well defined time frame.