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Communication from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Agency

1. On 25 February 2025, the Secretariat received a Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Agency.

2. As requested, the Note Verbale is herewith circulated for the information of all Member States.

Unofficial Translation

**ПОСТОЯННОЕ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
ПРИ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯХ
В ВЕНЕ**

**PERMANENT MISSION
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN VIENNA**

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The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has the honour to request to circulate among all IAEA Member States as soon as possible the information on the actual situation at the Russian nuclear facility Zaporozhskaya NPP (ZNPP) for the period from 13 November 2024 to 16 February 2025. The material also contains data on anti-Russian provocations by Ukraine during this period.

1. Ukrainian attacks against the ZNPP and the town of Energodar.

Ukraine continues to carry out attacks using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artillery against the ZNPP facilities, the satellite town of Energodar, where the plant's employees and their families live, and surrounding areas (map of strikes of the armed forces of Ukraine (AFU) is attached).

In the period from November 12, 2024, to February 10, 2025, Ukraine launched 1 190 UAVs (in November 2024 – 352; in December 2024 – 364; in January 2025 – 337; in February 2025 – 137). UAVs detection and suppression systems suppressed 912 objects; destroyed 34.

November 13, 2024 – Ukraine carried out artillery shelling of the town of Energodar, during which one town resident was killed. On the same day, the AFU attacked the checkpoint at the entrance to the town using a copter-type UAV.

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Vienna

November 19, 2024 – the AFU carried out a strike using a UAV on the administration building of the town of Energodar.

December 4, 2024 – Ukraine carried out an attack using a UAV on the "Luch" electrical substation.

December 10, 2024 – during the rotation of IAEA Secretariat experts at the ZNPP, the AFU launched a series of strikes on vehicles used for transportation of Agency personnel.

January 5, 2025 – Ukraine attacked using an aircraft-type UAV the ZNPP training center, damaging the building's roof. On the same day, a "Warmate" loitering munition was shot down 400 m from the plant.

January 19, 2025 – as a result of strikes by four Ukrainian UAVs on the Zaporozhskaya Thermal Power Plant, pipes and industrial buildings were damaged.

January 20 and 29, 2025 – Ukrainian UAVs attacked the Zaporozhskaya Thermal Power Plant.

January 22, 2025 – the AFU carried out an attack using three copter-type UAVs on a water intake in the town of Energodar, a residential building and a parking lot.

January 26 and 28, 2025 – Ukraine attacked using copter-type UAVs residential buildings in the town of Energodar.

On January 30 and February 2, 2025, the AFU carried out another attack using UAVs on residential buildings in the town of Energodar.

February 8, 2025 – Ukraine tried to attack using a UAV one of the ZNPP power units.

February 9, 2025 – the AFU attacked using a UAV the checkpoint at the entrance to the town of Energodar.

February 12, 2025 – Ukraine disrupted the rotation of the IAEA Secretariat experts at the ZNPP. The Ukrainians not only repeatedly attacked the convoy with Russian military personnel and Agency Secretariat specialists leaving the plant (there were four artillery and three mortar attacks, as well as five attempts to strike using

UAVs), but also refused to allow the IAEA representatives to go to the handover place (photos of the result of the attacks are provided in the attachement; the video is available at the following link: https://cloud.mail.ru/public/mUnV/iSTdaP7Sy). Those IAEA experts had been waiting to replace their colleagues at the ZNPP since early February 2025. At the same time, Ukraine carried out another UAV raid on the station and its satellite town of Energodar.

February 13, 2025 – the AFU carried out an artillery attack on the open switchgear of the Zaporozhskaya Thermal Power Plant (15 shells were fired).

The most heinous crime of the Ukrainian special services was the murder on December 17, 2024, of the Head of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant-General Igor Kirillov, who actively contributed to strengthening of the ZNPP safety and security.

2. Operation and maintenance of the ZNPP.

Currently, all ZNPP power units have been switched to the "cold shutdown" mode. Power unit No. 1 is undergoing scheduled repairs; power units No. 2-6 are in a state of forced outage.

In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 5, 2022, No. 711 and the Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation of October 30, 2022, No. 2195, licenses for the right to carry out work in the field of atomic energy use, issued by the Ukrainian regulator in relation to the ZNPP facilities before September 30, 2022, remain valid until the expiration of these licenses or until January 1, 2028.

The "Preparatory plans for submitting an application for a license to operate a spent nuclear fuel dry storage facility (SNFDS) and power units No. 1-6 of the ZNPP" have been developed and put into force. In October 2024, Rostechnadzor received documents for a license to operate the SNFDS; their examination is currently underway.

On December 16, 2024, Rostechnadzor issued a license for the operation of radiation sources (installations, devices and products containing radioactive

materials) to the operating organization JSC “EO ZNPP”; on December 20, 2024, a license application with a set of documents was sent to Rostechnadzor to obtain a license to operate power unit No. 1 of the plant. It is planned to complete the preparation of documents for obtaining a license to operate power units No. 2-6 and send the relevant materials to Rostechnadzor by the end of 2026.

On January 13, 2025, the repair campaign at the plant began.

Scheduled repairs of safety systems and electrical equipment are being carried out at power units No. 2-6. Safety system equipment and equipment important to safety are undergoing maintenance and testing in accordance with schedules and regulations.

Emergency restoration work was carried out on the open switchgear 750 kV, as well as on transformers of the “Raduga” and “Vodozabor” substations after damage during Ukrainian shelling.

Continuous monitoring of the operating conditions of nuclear fuel is organized and maintained. Nuclear safety during fuel handling at the ZNPP is ensured by means of transportation and storage, which are designed in such a way that under normal operating conditions and during design accidents, subcriticality is ensured at all stages of handling nuclear fuel.

The ZNPP's auxiliary power supply is provided via the 750 kV “Dneprovskaya” and 330 kV “Ferrosplavnaya-1” high-voltage lines.

In order to additionally ensure independent power supply to the plant, three mobile diesel generators with a voltage of 6 kV and a capacity of 2 MW each have been supplied. 18 diesel generator units are in constant readiness mode. The total reserve of diesel fuel is more than 3 000 tons.

Three gas boilers with a capacity of 17.4 MW each and 19 gas unit modular boilers (UMB) with a capacity of 3 MW each are used to supply heat to the industrial site of the ZNPP and the town of Energodar. Nine diesel UMBs are in reserve.

A set of measures to prepare for the autumn-winter period has been implemented at the ZNPP industrial site and its facilities. In case of emergency, 55 low-power diesel UMBs have been installed in the town (currently in reserve).

According to the design, the ZNPP is supposed to be supplied with water from a cooling pond with feed from the Kakhovskoe Reservoir. As a result of Ukraine's damage to the Kakhovskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant dam in June 2023, the design scheme for the plant's water supply was disrupted.

As a compensatory measure, drilling of 11 artesian wells was carried out in order to provide a flow rate of over 250 m^3/hour. During January 2025, the water level in the cooling pond remained stable – within 14.12 m.

On January 15, 2025, a contract was signed for the manufacture and delivery of a cooling pond recharge station designed to provide a design recharge flow rate of up to 18,000 m^3/hour. Its manufacturing is underway.

Federal state supervision of the use of atomic energy at the ZNPP site is carried out in the regime of constant supervision by the Russian regulatory authority – Rostechnadzor. Authorized personnel of Rostechnadzor carried out 62 control and supervisory procedures (CSP) in the period from November 12, 2024, to February 10, 2025; 36 of them were with the participation of the IAEA Secretariat experts. In total, 271 CSP were held in 2024, 107 of them were with the participation of the IAEA Secretariat experts.

Spare parts and devices are delivered to the ZNPP according to requests and on time. The plant equipment is similar to the equipment of Balakovo NPP, Novovoronezhskaya NPP and Rostovskaya NPP. The production of spare parts, devices and tools for repair work on NPP equipment has been established. Maintenance, repair, as well as control of the base metal and welded joints of equipment and pipelines are carried out in accordance with the approved schedules.

3. Radiation monitoring at ZNPP.

Monitoring of the radiation situation at the ZNPP is carried out by 14 posts of the information and measuring system “Koltso”.

Radiation monitoring is carried out by more than 2000 measuring channels. Average daily emissions of radioactive substances into the environment through ventilation pipes of power units and special buildings do not exceed the established permitted levels.

The radiation background in the area where the ZNPP is located ranges from 8 to 15 microR/h, which corresponds to the natural radiation background.

Data from continuous radiation monitoring at the plant site, in the sanitary protection zone and observation zone are transmitted to the ZNPP internal crisis center.

The results of radiological monitoring indicate that the station has no significant impact on the environment in the area where it is located.

4. Personnel and personnel training.

As of February 3, 2025, 4966 employment contracts have been signed, of which 953 are with operational personnel. There are enough employees at the plant to ensure its safe operation, as well as scheduled repairs.

In order to ensure safe and reliable operation of the nuclear installations of the ZNPP power units, a system of professional personnel training is successfully functioning.

To maintain emergency preparedness, the plant conducts training in accordance with the annual schedule of special exercises to practice actions in emergency situations.

In 2024, 76 emergency response training exercises were conducted with emergency personnel of the special departmental formation (SDF). The frequency of training is once every six months for each member of the SDF. Based on the results of each training, reports on its implementation were compiled.

In accordance with the schedule, on January 26, 2025, fire department exercises were held on the topic “Fire extinguishing at nuclear power facilities” (location: electrical equipment rack of ZNPP turbine hall No. 5).

5. Interaction with the IAEA Secretariat.

Currently, upon request of the IAEA Director General and with the consent of the Russian Federation, there are three experts from the Agency Secretariat at the plant, who arrived at the ZNPP during the regular rotation, which took place on December 10, 2024.

The IAEA Secretariat specialists visit the following plant facilities: hydraulic structures; turbine halls, including block pumping stations and reactor halls of power units, including containment rooms, safety systems rooms, electrical rooms, main and backup control rooms, backup diesel power plants; 750 kV open switchgear; industrial procurement management, electrical and mechanical warehouses; power repair department workshops; water radiochemical laboratory rooms, chemical workshop and radiation safety workshop.

During the specified period, the IAEA Secretariat experts visited the training centre with a full-scale simulator, the dry storage site for spent nuclear fuel, the central control room and the external radiation monitoring laboratory; the radioactive source storage laboratory.

Experts from the IAEA Secretariat and specialists from Rostechnadzor participate daily in a morning briefings with the plant director.

The Russian Federation ensures comfortable stay of the Agency Secretariat specialists at the plant: each IAEA representative is provided with a separate living room. If necessary, Agency representatives are provided with free medical care. If the operational situation allows, IAEA Secretariat experts make weekly visits to Energodar, accompanied by a security service personnel and translators.

6. Social support and cultural initiatives.

The Russian Federation continues to make efforts aimed at improving the quality of life of the ZNPP personnel and the working conditions at the plant.

Registration of voluntary and compulsory medical insurance programmes continues, as well as provision of financial assistance to the ZNPP employees, which is provided in accordance with the collective agreement.

All station employees are insured at the employer's expense under voluntary health insurance programmes.

Rehabilitation and health-improving programmes are also being implemented for the ZNPP employees and their family members, including children (distribution of vouchers to sanatorium resorts).

Medical examinations of the plant's personnel are carried out in accordance with the schedule.

Repair and restoration work continues at the following ZNPP facilities located in the town of Energodar: swimming pool (major repairs to the premises in the right part of the building, replacement of all engineering systems, roof repairs); sports and fitness complex (repairs to premises, roof of the building).

In addition, from November 12, 2024, to February 10, 2025, repair work was carried out at the following social facilities in Energodar: kindergarten No. 4, kindergarten No. 10, and the Epiphany Cathedral.

The social life of the ZNPP employees and their family members is actively developing. Various educational, cultural, entertainment and sports events are reguarly held.

Data on the situation at the plant can also be found on the official website of the ZNPP (https://znpp.ru) in the section "Current status of the ZNPP".

7. Other questions.

On December 12, 2024, an extraordinary session of the IAEA Board of Governors, convened at the initiative of the Kiev regime with the support of the "collective West", considered a draft resolution submitted by Ukraine entitled "Implications of Unstable Energy Infrastructure Critical to Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Plants".

Paradoxically, it was one country that insisted on holding this event and discussing the draft resolution, the same country that literally the day before had attacked the IAEA personnel working at the Russian ZNPP. It is clear that the Ukrainian side did not want to admit its guilt and tried with all its efforts to divert

international attention from the crime it had committed, the circumstances of which were obvious to everyone.

Ukraine and its Western patrons included a provision in the resolution that explicitly expands the IAEA's mandate to assess energy infrastructure, which goes far beyond the Agency functions under its Statute. This is not the first time that Kiev has abused its membership in the IAEA Board of Governors. Thus, the Agency Secretariat is increasingly drawn into the political games of Ukraine and its curators, which, under any pretext, are trying to expand the IAEA activities in new directions in a way that is advantageous to them, contrary to the organization's mandate.

We welcome the decision of those IAEA Member States that refused to support this resolution. They have clearly demonstrated their rejection of the course of involving the Agency in serving the interests of Western countries.

Along with this, we note that during the specified period, there has been an increase in the number of attacks by Ukraine on both Russian nuclear power plants and on nuclear facilities under its control, which once again demonstrates that, for the sake of selfish political ambitions, nuclear safety issues are of no importance to Kiev.

On January 29, 2025, in the immediate vicinity of the Smolenskaya Nuclear Power Plant, a Ukrainian aircraft-type UAV with an explosive charge of up to 20 kg in TNT equivalent was destroyed.

On the night of February 13-14, 2025, Ukraine committed a provocation at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP), striking the Shelter facility with a UAV. At one time, Russia participated in international efforts to build this facility, designed to help eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident that occurred in Ukraine in 1986.

All this confirms that nuclear technologies in the hands of Kiev is a serious threat to international peace and security.

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the IAEA Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.

Attachment: 10 pp.

Vienna, " " February 2025

Armed Forces of Ukraine strikes on the Zaporozhskaya NPP and the town of Energodar

Elements of a detonated Ukrainian UAV 60 meter from the perimeter of the Zaporizhzhya NPP on September 25, 2024

Elements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces strike UAV suppressed in the area of the checkpoint of the open switchyard ORU-750 kW on September 29, 2024

Consequences of the artillery strike by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the city of Energodar on November 13, 2024

Consequences of the artillery shelling by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the "Zarya" substation 09/28/2024

Consequences of the artillery shelling by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the "Luch" substation 09/17/2024



Consequences of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' strike using UAVs on the transport department 09/07/2024

Consequences of the Ukrainian Armed Forces strike using UAVson the "Zarya" substation on September 20, 2024

Consequences of the Ukrainian Armed Forces strike using UAVs on a gas station on September 22, 2024

Consequences of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' artillery strike on the water intake October 21, 2024

Consequences of the Ukrainian Armed Forces strike using UAVs on a residential building on September 25, 2024.


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




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
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