

# Information Circular

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**General Distribution**

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## Communication from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency

1. On 3 June 2025, the Secretariat received a Note Verbale, together with an attachment, from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency.
2. As requested, the Note Verbale and its attachment are herewith circulated for the information of all Member States.



PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND  
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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جمهوری اسلامی ایران  
نمایندگی دائم ترادقصر ملل متحد و سازمانهای بین المللی  
وین

*In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful*

No. 2517085

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has the honor to hereby enclose an Explanatory Note on the Report of the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors "Verification and Monitoring the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)" (GOV/2025/24 – 31 May 2025) and would like to request the latter to publish the Explanatory Note as an INFCIRC document.

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Vienna avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna, 3 June 2025

To: The Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)





Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Vienna

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### **Explanatory Note**

on the Report of the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors  
“Verification and Monitoring the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of  
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”  
(GOV/2025/24 – 31 May 2025)

The Islamic Republic of Iran would like to share its comments and observations on the Director General Reports to the IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2025/24 as follows:

1. The report on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2231, continues to include unnecessary details and predominantly sensitive classified information that should not be published without Iran’s consent as stipulated in Article 5 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214). Iran has repeatedly objected to this approach through Statements, Explanatory Notes, and Letter No. 684086 (4 February 2021, published as INFCIRC/954 on 9 February 2021). The letter states:
  - a. “...the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that official consent by Iran is necessary for the publication of the Director General's reports. Otherwise, the Secretariat and the Board of Governors would remain in defiance of confidentiality principles and legally responsible for such conduct.”
  - b. This unlawful trend must cease.
2. The separation of issues under two distinct reports (JCPOA and NPT Safeguards) has not been upheld. JCPOA-related matters appear in the NPT Safeguards report, and vice versa. The JCPOA was designed and acknowledged, including by the UN Security Council, as a unique political and diplomatic package. This makes it a self-contained legal regime, and its provisions should not be used to redefine obligations under other legal instruments like the CSA. This separation preserves the legal integrity and normative stability of both the NPT regime and the JCPOA. This clear boundary must be observed in all Director General’s reporting, as well.

3. The E3's failure to lift sanctions on Transition Day (18 October 2023, per JCPOA Annex V para. 20) constitutes unlawful non-compliance with the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231. Such intransigence is the epitome of their modus operandi towards the performance of their commitments, which at best could be described as perfunctory and lackluster.
4. Iran affirms that its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the Agency remains in force, fully obliged by, and continues to govern its legal obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Any conclusions regarding the Agency's inability to provide assurances about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program must be strictly confined to the JCPOA's voluntary verification measures and not extend to assessments under the CSA.
5. Iran remains committed to constructive engagement with the Agency and reiterates that the restoration of full JCPOA voluntary verification measures is contingent on the restoration of mutual compliance by all parties. Until such time, the Agency is requested to maintain its reporting within the legal confines of Iran's safeguards obligations and to refrain from conforming legal conclusions to political circumstances, and above all, to not go beyond the Agency's expressly defined mandate under UNSCR 2231.
6. Agency's statement in **para. 32** of GOV/2025/24, as "*Iran's decision to remove all of the Agency's equipment previously installed in Iran for JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring activities has also had detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme*", does not have legal basis under the CSA. There should be a clear distinction between legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Agency is highly expected to comply with this requirement which is essential to uphold the Statute of the Agency, as well as the respective CSA governing relations with the Agency.
7. On **para. 33** of GOV/2025/24, the voluntary and provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol has been ceased in accordance with the law passed by the parliament after the unlawful withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. The cessation of AP implementation is Iran's inherent right under paras. 26 and 36 of the JCPOA. Let it not be forgotten that the implementation of the Additional Protocol and its potential ratification by the Parliament were tied to the successful implementation of the JCPOA.

8. **On para. 34** of GOV/2025/24, there has been no limitation on the enrichment level based on the CSA. The fuel cycle activities including enrichment as a part of national policies of Member States has been well recognized by the NPT review conferences and the other UN Forums.