It is a pleasure to be in Brazil and to address this distinguished meeting at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brazil has a remarkable record of participation in all aspects of the work of the Agency. It has been a member of the IAEA since its establishment in 1957 and has served continuously on the Board of Governors. Indeed, Brazil's commitment to the IAEA was highlighted this year when I invited an outstanding Brazilian diplomat, H.E. Ambassador Machado Quintella, to chair the Senior Expert Group which I convened to carry out an in depth review of the future programme of activities of the Agency. She performed her tasks with skill and distinction.
Brazil has reached a high level of development in the utilisation of nuclear techniques. It is one of the few countries that have mastered the entire nuclear fuel cycle from uranium extraction through to fuel fabrication for use in its research and power reactors. It is also very encouraging to note progress in the construction of the ANGRA II nuclear power plant which is expected to be commissioned in 1999 and the commitment to complete ANGRA III. I understand that plans for the creation of a new nuclear centre in the State of Pernambuco are well advanced. I am sure the centre will be a catalyst for the scientific and technological development of Northeast Brazil. I wish to congratulate Brazil on these achievements.
I would also commend Brazil's strong contribution to the cause of nuclear weapons non proliferation and nuclear arms reduction. Brazil's recent ratification of the CTBT and accession to the NPT, together with its founding support for the Eight-Nation Declaration "Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: the Need for a New Agenda" has reaffirmed its credentials in the forefront of efforts to create a safer world free of nuclear weapons.
Before turning to my topic today, The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Technology Transfer for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and the Strengthening of the Safeguards System, I would like to introduce the Agency. The IAEA was established 41 years ago to be the focal point for international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy. The Statute outlines its twin objectives: to seek to enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace and development and to ensure, so far as it is able, that nuclear energy is used at a high level of safety and exclusively for peaceful purposes. The two objectives are interdependent.
As the only world-wide intergovernmental organization dedicated to nuclear science and technology, the Agency has the role of an international focal point for standard setting, independent analysis, technology transfer and verification. Part of this role is to serve as a clearinghouse for scientific and technical information on all aspects of nuclear technology, including radiation protection and safety issues. As the Senior Expert Group which I mentioned earlier reaffirmed, the value and the reputation of the Agency depend on its scientific and technical competence and objectivity. It is from this perspective that I will focus on the Agency's role in three areas: verification and the strengthened safeguards system, technology transfer and, finally, nuclear power and sustainable energy development.
The hopes for a more secure world rest crucially on advancing the agenda for nuclear arms reduction and their eventual elimination. Indeed, as Brazil's Permanent Representative to the Agency, Ambassador Celso de Ouro-Preto, stated to the IAEA General Conference this year: "In an international environment marked by an economic crisis of practically global proportions, the task of reinforcing world security through non-proliferation and disarmament has acquired renewed urgency".
An effective verification system is indispensable to the realisation of these hopes. Through its verification activities, the IAEA endeavours to provide the necessary assurance that States are complying with their nuclear non-proliferation and arms control commitments. Over 180 States have undertaken to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear material and activities.
Verification must provide a high degree of assurance that States are in full compliance with their obligations. Until the early part of this decade, IAEA safeguards activities were focused primarily on nuclear material and activities declared by the State. The shortcomings of this system pointed out in Iraq made it clear that to be truly effective, safeguards must be able not only to verify declared nuclear activities but also to detect possible undeclared activities at an early stage.
The Iraq experience led to the development of a more effective safeguards system that is designed to provide a higher degree of assurance not only about nuclear activities declared by a State but also about the absence of undeclared activities. To do this, the system needed to move beyond its focus on nuclear material accountancy - essentially a quantitative audit system designed to keep track of material declared to the Agency - to a qualitative system in which the Agency has a better vantage point from which to develop a comprehensive picture of all nuclear activities to enable it to detect any inconsistency which suggests that information provided by a State may not be correct or complete.
This has required development in three major areas: more information, more access and greater use of advanced technology. Under the strengthened system, States are required to provide more detailed information covering all aspects of their nuclear and nuclear-related activities. The system provides for substantially broader access for inspectors. With respect to technology, next year the Agency will be introducing, on a routine basis, remote monitoring technology which will transmit verification information to IAEA headquarters in near-real time, appropriately authenticated and encrypted.
In order to introduce this strengthened safeguards system, in May last year the IAEA Board of Governors approved a Model Additional Protocol which provides the necessary legal authority for implementing the new measures. On the basis of the model, States are invited to conclude a Protocol additional to their existing safeguards agreement. To date, Additional Protocols have been signed with 34 States. Consultations are at an advanced stage with a number of other States.
I strongly believe that adherence should be global. I would hope that all Latin American countries would continue their tradition at the forefront of the international non-proliferation regime by moving rapidly to conclude Additional Protocols. Our goal is that by the year 2000 all States will have signed and brought into force their Additional Protocols.
This more finely meshed verification system can raise substantially the level of assurance, but it must be recognised that, even with full implementation, nuclear safeguards cannot provide 100% guarantees. Some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical system that aims to prove the negative, i.e. to prove the absence of concealable objects or activities.
Thus nuclear safeguards must be seen as only one part of the overall non proliferation regime. They are a critical element, but not the only element in establishing whether a State is complying with its undertakings. The level of assurance derived from safeguards must be supplemented and reinforced by other mutually reinforcing components of the non proliferation regime, most importantly, the political elements. These components of the regime include export-import controls, regional and global security arrangements and the engagement of the Security Council as appropriate. Recent experience in South Asia has shown again that all components need to work together for the non-proliferation regime to be fully effective.
Last year we celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first nuclear weapon free zone in a populated region. The Treaty obliges each Contracting Party to negotiate multilateral or bilateral safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Thirty-two countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region are now party to the Treaty. With Cuba's signature in 1995, it is to be hoped that it could soon enter into force for its entire zone of application.
In addition to its respective global and regional responsibilities under the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty, pursuant to the bilateral Argentina-Brazil "Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Utilisation of Nuclear Energy", the Agency is a Party to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement which entered into force in 1994 This Agreement defines the obligations and roles of the two States, the IAEA and ABACC in the implementation of international safeguards. Under the Agreement, ABACC and the IAEA co-operate to avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities but in a manner that enables each organization to reach its own independent conclusions.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the safeguards arrangements pursuant to the Argentina-Brazil bilateral Agreement have helped to keep nuclear weapons out of Latin America and have been a precedent and an encouragement to similar initiatives in other regions. Nuclear weapon free zones have been established in the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia and there are ongoing efforts to establish such a zone in Central Asia. Some of the co-operative safeguards arrangements under the ABACC agreement may be of interest as a precedent in other areas. For example, in the Middle East, pursuant to a mandate from the IAEA General Conference, the Agency has been consulting with States in the region and familiarising government officials with safeguards concepts, tools and possible modalities which may be relevant to any future nuclear weapon free zone in that region.
I would conclude my remarks on the role of IAEA safeguards by mentioning the work we are undertaking with respect to several other prospects for verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements. In addition to a complete ban on nuclear testing, two actions have always been identified as indispensable to nuclear arms reduction and nuclear disarmament: freezing the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such materials. I am pleased to note that measures are being taken in both areas.
In August, the Conference on Disarmament finally agreed to commence negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In furtherance of a UN General Assembly Resolution , I wrote to the President of the Conference on Disarmament to offer, if requested, the assistance of the Agency in developing the technical verification arrangements for such a treaty.
Over the past two years, the Agency's Secretariat has been involved in discussions with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to develop modalities for possible IAEA verification that nuclear material transferred from the military sector in the two countries remained irreversibly in the peaceful sector. Progress was made in September when I met Ministers of both countries to set goals for future work.
I have also welcomed the recent decision of the UK, as a result of its Strategic Defence Review, to determine that substantial amounts of fissile material are now surplus to its military programme and that these will be available for IAEA safeguards under the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement between the UK and the Agency.
The Agency stands ready to contribute its verification and safeguards expertise and experience to the full realisation of these initiatives. An important question that still needs to be addressed is financing. In response to a request from the Board of Governors, the Secretariat is preparing an options paper on this subject. In my view, the possible establishment of a Nuclear Arms Control Verification Fund based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions could be a viable option to finance these initiatives and possibly the verification of other nuclear arms control and reduction measures.
The potential for nuclear weapons proliferation and for threats to public safety from illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources is an area of major international concern. In the past 15 months, the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database Programme has recorded 17 incidents involving nuclear material (mostly in insignificant quantities) and 22 involving other radioactive sources. Through information exchange, training, technical assistance and other support services, the Agency assists Member States to prevent, detect and respond to theft, diversion and other unauthorised uses of nuclear material and other radioactive sources. Also, at the request of the UN General Assembly, the Agency has been contributing to the ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly to elaborate a draft convention on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.
I turn now to the IAEA's role in technology transfer. Meeting the needs and aspirations of the world's growing population requires the application of the best available technologies, including nuclear technology. The IAEA is the principal vehicle for multilateral nuclear technology transfer. It collaborates with a wide range of organizations to meet scientific and technical challenges in areas such as health, food security, pollution control, water resource management and safe and sustainable energy production.
Nuclear techniques are often one component of larger national and regional development programmes. Frequently they are used to gather essential scientific data for project planning or to test results. Their value lies not only in their direct impact on developmental goals but also as a catalyst and a contributor to the efforts of others. For this reason, the Agency places high priority on establishing partnerships for development with other organizations.
The Agency pursues an integrated approach to technology transfer. Under the Regular Budget the results of some 400 scientific and technical meetings each year are widely disseminated through IAEA scientific, technical and information publications. Through the Agency's INIS database, which was established in 1970, bibliographic records on all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology are easily accessible.
Unique in the UN system, the IAEA operates its own research and service laboratories. These provide a wide range of technical services in physics, chemistry, hydrology, nuclear instrumentation and agriculture to assist developing countries. In this UN International Year of the Ocean, the role of the Agency's Marine Environment Laboratory (MEL) in Monaco has been highlighted. MEL is dedicated to studies of pollution including radioactivity and the effects of human activities on the marine environment. The Agency also awards Research Contracts which bring together scientists in developing and industrialized countries to progress towards common goals through information exchange on research activities.
The Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme is funded by Member States through voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund with the specific objective of technology transfer, bearing in mind the special needs of developing countries. Support for this Fund is an integral part of the international consensus relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy that is embodied in the IAEA Statute and the NPT.
The goal of our technical co-operation strategy is to promote tangible socio-economic impact by contributing directly in a cost effective manner to the achievement of the major sustainable development priorities of each country. The role of the Agency is threefold: a) to ensure that nuclear technology is the most effective and appropriate technology to address a particular problem; b) to ensure that this technology is transferred safely, in the most efficient and effective manner, and; c) to ensure that the recipient country has adequate infrastructure to adopt and sustain such technology. The size of the programme is modest - about US$ 80 million per year - but the results have been outstanding
The Technical Co-operation Programme is driven by the requests of Member States for assistance in practically all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It comprises national, regional and interregional projects. In order to support common interests between countries and permit better use of resources, we are particularly fostering regional co-operative agreements for technical co-operation among developing countries.
In Latin America, the ARCAL regional co-operative arrangement was established in 1984. This year it was elevated to the status of a regional intergovernmental agreement. Through ARCAL hundreds of scientists have received training, a network of laboratories for preventive maintenance of instruments has been established, radioisotopes to improve livestock breeding are being produced in the region, radiation protection programmes have been upgraded, isotopic techniques for have been introduced for hydrology studies and a regional information network has been established.
I am pleased to say that Brazil is an active participant in the Agency's technical co-operation activities at both the national and regional levels. For example, a project for the local production of ultra-pure iodine-123 has been completed with excellent results. Once registered with the Ministry of Health, the use of this radioisotope for medical diagnosis will enable radiation exposure of patients to be reduced considerably and an increased number of patients to be treated.
An ongoing project utilizing electron beam technology to purify waste water is producing very encouraging results in reducing toxicity of industrial wastes in the City of Sao Paulo. A pilot plant has been established with Agency assistance at the Institute of Nuclear Energy and Research in Sao Paulo. An international pharmaceutical company, the State sanitation company and the oil industry, are participating in studies to determine whether the technique can be used effectively at the industrial level. Positive results of the project would greatly benefit the local environment and produce significant savings for the chemical industry.
A project that is being finalized this year has supported the establishment of a radiation metrology network to carry out a national programme of quality assurance and auditing for calibration services of radiation measurement instruments. The network comprises five laboratories in Rio de Janero, Sao Paulo, Pernambuco, and Belo Horizonte. The nation wide availability of high quality calibration standards radiation will significantly strengthen the quality of radiation protection. And these are but a few of many examples of the success of the Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme.
I will now turn to the role of the Agency with regard to nuclear power and sustainable energy development. Global energy demand is growing as a result of economic development and increases in world population. For developing countries it is projected to increase two to three fold in the next thirty years, depending on the economic growth scenario. Concern about the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on global climate has also grown. The importance of meeting the Kyoto Conference targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions was reaffirmed last month in Buenos Aires at the Fourth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Thus the challenge for both developed and developing countries is how to meet growing energy demand without unnecessarily contributing to global climate change. Energy produced from fossil fuels accounts for about half of human-made greenhouse gas emissions. While there are many hopes for the use of alternative clean energy sources, including nuclear fusion technology, except for hydro power, which has limited growth potential in many countries, and nuclear power, at present there are no other economically viable, minimal greenhouse gas emission options for base load power generation.
The facts of nuclear power can be stated simply. At the beginning of this year, 437 nuclear reactors, operating in 31 countries, provided about 17% of global electricity and accounted for the avoidance of about 8% of global carbon emissions. The accumulated operating experience reached a figure of over 8,500 reactor-years.
The choice of nuclear power and of a particular energy mix is a national decision to be made in the light of national priorities and considerations. For many countries, nuclear power generation has particular advantages. It is a mature technology for cost-effective mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and reduction of air pollution. It can offer national security advantages by reducing dependence on an import of fossil fuel. And the use of nuclear reactors for co-generation applications such as water desalination and industrial heat can make a positive contribution to meeting national development goals.
But while nuclear power is making a significant contribution to the world energy mix, it is not the right technology for every country. Nor is it the role of the IAEA to seek to promote nuclear power in any commercial sense. However, in the current absence of alternatives, the Agency has a responsibility to ensure that the nuclear power option is given a full and fair hearing. As a centre of scientific and technical expertise, the specific role of the Agency is to ensure that the tools and methodologies are available for objective comparative assessment of all available energy options.
To these ends, the Agency has pursued an intensive programme of helping Member States to develop their own capacity for informed decision making in the energy sector in general and in the electricity sector in particular. Through a number of sophisticated databases and methodologies (such as the DECADES programme, WASP software and FINPLAN full comparative assessments of different energy options can be conducted on an objective basis. This means economic, environmental and risk analysis of all processes throughout the fuel cycle - from mining or resource extraction to electricity generation and waste disposal.
Over 30 countries are presently using these comprehensive analytic tools, many under the aegis of two major IAEA co-ordinated research projects. Several international organizations such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development utilise analytic data from these programmes before approving lending for investment in electricity projects. In this way, IAEA analysis and results contribute to the goals of sustainable energy development.
Ensuring that the facts are known is one part of the challenge for nuclear power. Equally important, particularly for public confidence, is a demonstrated global record of safety in all activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. This decade, the global safety record for nuclear power plants has shown continued improvement. However, as with all materials that can be harmful if misused, continuous efforts are required to ensure that the technical and human requirements of safety culture are maintained at their optimum.
Safety is the responsibility of national governments. The contribution that the IAEA makes is through the development of a comprehensive nuclear safety regime consisting of binding international agreements, detailed safety standards and measures to provide for the application of those agreements and standards.
In recent years, several important international conventions, negotiated under the IAEA's auspices, have helped to fill gaps in the international nuclear safety regime - conventions relating to physical protection, civil liability for nuclear damage, nuclear safety and the safety of waste and spent fuel management. We remain responsive to initiatives concerning other areas in which the international community as a whole might benefit from binding norms.
The Agency's Safety Standards Series publications represent international consensus on safety requirements and their implementation. In the present biennium we have undertaken the preparation or revision of the entire corpus of safety standards - a total of some seventy documents - to ensure that they are comprehensive, scientifically accurate and up to date.
The provision of safety assistance services is vital to achieving best practices in the application of safety standards. The Agency provides a wide range of such services. For example, this year the Agency conducted its one hundredth Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission to examine the adequacy of safety features at nuclear power plants.
An important aspect of nuclear safety concerns waste management. Through assessment of different technologies and information dissemination, the Agency assists Member States in their management of low and intermediate level waste. With respect to high level radioactive wastes, we are encouraging Member States to develop disposal plans and construct disposal facilities nationally or, particularly where small amounts are involved, in co-operation with each other. Only when available technical solutions for safe and permanent disposal of wastes have been demonstrated will the public accept the advantage of nuclear power of generating comparatively very small volumes of wastes.
In this context I would mention the Agency's programme with respect to radium conditioning. Almost all countries have now stopped the medical use of radium sources but there remain about 10,000 spent radium sources in Latin America and the Caribbean. The IAEA has been providing advice on how these sources can be conditioned for safe storage pending final disposal. But many countries lack the technical infrastructure to ensure that the conditioning operation can be done with the necessary quality assurance. The Agency is assisting these countries to conduct national campaigns by expert teams to collect, treat and condition all identified spent radium sources. Since 1996, six national campaigns have been completed in the Latin American region. The remainder will be concluded by the end of 1999. Brazil has been instrumental in these activities by making available its team from CDTN/9 to implement the practical fieldwork in these campaigns. The Agency and Member States in the region that benefited from these campaigns very much appreciate Brazil's contribution.
Finally, I would refer to the concerns expressed by some countries about the safety of radioactive material transport. In response to a resolution of the IAEA General Conference adopted last year, the Secretariat prepared a comprehensive report on binding and non-binding international regulations related to radioactive material transport safety and their implementation. The report showed that all major shipping countries have binding regulations which are based on the IAEA Transport Regulations.
In a resolution this year, the General Conference observed that shipments made in compliance with requirements which are based on the IAEA Transport Regulations provide a high degree of safety. The resolution also invited States shipping radioactive materials to provide, upon the request potentially affected States, appropriate assurances that their regulations take into account the IAEA Transport Regulations and, further, to provide other relevant information. This is a positive development.
As is evident from this brief overview of only a portion of the activities and programmes of the IAEA, the international nuclear agenda is growing not shrinking. The same cannot be said for the IAEA budget which for many years has been kept to essentially zero real growth. In this situation, it is essential that we ensure that our own house is in the best possible order, that we are meeting the priorities of our Member States in a rapidly changing world and that we make the most efficient and effective use of the funds that they allocate for our work. So, although the Agency has always enjoyed a reputation for good management, we have recently redoubled our efforts to improve our internal working procedures and extend and strengthen our internal 'efficiency culture'.
At the end of the day, the success of the IAEA is the success of its Member States. Nuclear energy has always been met by a mixture of hopes and apprehensions. I firmly believe that it is incumbent on us all to strengthen international co-operation to maximize the hopes and eliminate the sources of apprehension. This is a task to which the IAEA remains dedicated.