An IAEA project has developed new tools to strengthen the nuclear supply chain against counterfeit items.

Counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items (CFSIs) pose an often-overlooked threat to nuclear security. Whether introduced accidentally or with malicious intent, CFSIs can cause equipment failure, disrupt and compromise safety and security systems, or leave facilities vulnerable to sabotage or espionage. Researchers on an IAEA project developed strategies to deter and detect such items in the nuclear supply chain to help countries protect their nuclear infrastructure.

“The risk from potential vulnerabilities and other failures which can be introduced by the inadvertent or malicious installation of CFSIs is real,” said Itimad Soufi, Head of the Nuclear Security of Materials Outside of Regulatory Control Section at the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security, which ran the one-year coordinated research project. “The project focused on how we can reduce the likelihood of a nuclear security event caused by counterfeit components entering the supply chain.”

The project brought together researchers and experts from 11 countries. They studied the risks posed by CFSIs in the nuclear supply chain and developed practical tools, strategies and recommendations to counter them. The project focused on six key areas:

• Strengthening legal frameworks
• Improving procurement practices
• Developing detection technologies
• Assessing and managing risk
• Promoting international information sharing.
• Examining global impact.

The participants’ strong engagement demonstrated that CFSIs are a shared concern. Confidentiality concerns, fear of litigation, and national security restrictions were identified as key obstacles to international information sharing about CFSIs.

One of the researchers Mirjana Cujic, Senior Research Associate at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Serbia, examined vulnerabilities in nuclear supply chain procurement operations. She said: “The project relevance remains strong, particularly as global supply chains face increasing challenges, and it provides a foundation for long-term improvements and policy advancements.”

As globalization expands the nuclear supply chain, it brings both increased efficiency and greater exposure to security vulnerabilities. The COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated existing challenges by disrupting international logistics and oversight mechanisms, creating new opportunities for CFSIs to infiltrate critical infrastructure unnoticed.

The CRP directly addressed this threat by facilitating a coordinated international action. “Its work aligns with the IAEA’s broader goals to support innovation, build resilience, and strengthen international cooperation in nuclear security,” added Soufi.

The researchers taking part in the research project have produced 17 peer-reviewed publications and conference presentations, including a handbook by King's College London titled Securing the Nuclear Supply Chain: A Handbook of Case Studies on Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items.

The IAEA?Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on the Nuclear Security Implications of Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSIs) ran from 2023 to 2024. Future activities and initiatives are planned to expand the impact of this work, including building capacity and raising awareness on this complex topic.