On 13 October, I briefed the Security Council in connection with the Agency's sixth consolidated report on implementing the mandate entrusted to it by the Council. The report noted that the Agency's extensive inspection activities in Iraq since May 1991 had resulted in a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. This picture traced the programme from the production and procurement of natural uranium compounds through Iraq's development of enrichment processes to the design and experimental work for the eventual weaponisation of highly enriched uranium. In the course of these verification activities, all of Iraq's known nuclear weapons-related assets were destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. As a result, there are now no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability - facilities or hardware - for the production of weapon-usable material in quantities of any practical significance.
Although more information from Iraq in three areas would help to reduce any uncertainty in the technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, the lack of this information does not present a technical impediment to the full implementation of the Agency's Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) plan. The three specific areas involve: Technical documentation; external assistance to Iraq's nuclear programme; and documentary evidence of Iraq's abandonment of that programme, including the adoption of measures and the enactment of penal laws to enforce its cessation.
As Members of the Board are aware, the scope of the Agency's inspection activities had been restricted by Iraq's decision of 5 August. This decision provided continued access for environmental monitoring activities but confined Agency access for inspection to those sites for which Iraq was required to provide six-monthly declarations of assets and activities. Thus the Agency was unable to fully implement its OMV plan, which is an integral whole. Consequently, the assurances the Agency was able to give were seriously weakened.
On 11 November, in consultation with the UN Secretary-General, on the grounds of safety and security, I took the decision to temporarily relocate to Bahrain all IAEA inspectors who were then in Baghdad. On 17 November, however, as a result of a reversal by Iraq of its decision to restrict the work of the IAEA and UNSCOM inspectors, the Agency's Nuclear Monitoring Group returned to Iraq and started an intensified programme of inspections aimed at re-establishing continuity of knowledge of Iraq's relevant activities, facilities, and equipment.
In the past eight days, the Agency's Nuclear Monitoring Group has completed 21 inspections at previously inspected sites and has participated, with UNSCOM, in two joint inspections at so-called capable sites. In parallel with its site inspections, the Nuclear Monitoring Group has continued with wide-area environmental monitoring programme.
In due course, I will report to the Security Council on the results of these inspections and on the extent and nature of co-operation received from the Iraqi counterpart. Once the IAEA and UNSCOM have reported full co-operation from Iraq, the Security Council, based on further reports by UNSCOM and the IAEA on their abilities to fulfil their mandates, is expected to initiate a comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.
I am pleased to report that six further proposed Protocols Additional to safeguards agreements are before the Board for its consideration. In five cases (Cyprus, Hungary, Japan, Monaco and Slovenia) they are additional to comprehensive safeguards agreements and in one case (China) it is additional to a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with a nuclear-weapon State.
To date, the Board has approved Additional Protocols with 32 States: 29 of them with non-nuclear-weapon States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, and three with nuclear-weapon States. Four Additional Protocols have entered into force (Australia, Holy See, Jordan and New Zealand) and three Protocols are being applied provisionally (Armenia, Ghana and Uzbekistan).
A number of further Additional Protocols are being discussed with the relevant States, including the Czech Republic, Norway, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Turkey. The Secretariat hopes that these and Protocols with a number of other interested countries (Bangladesh, Belarus, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Estonia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Kuwait, Mexico, Namibia, Switzerland and Ukraine), can be finalized before the next meeting of the Board of Governors. I again urge those States which have not yet done so to build upon the current momentum and take the steps necessary to conclude a Protocol Additional to their specific safeguards agreements.
Work is continuing within the Secretariat on the development and implementation of elements of the Strengthened Safeguards System. High priority is being given to work on integrating the traditional nuclear material accountancy-based safeguards system with the new strengthening measures. An Experts Group was convened in September to help the Secretariat define a conceptual framework for evaluating the integrated safeguards system in preparation for a consultants meeting in December. Subjects to be discussed at this meeting will include recommendations on the concept of an integrated safeguards system and on further Member State involvement in its development.
You will recall that, in my report to the General Conference in September on the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, I noted that the Agency continues to assert its right to carry out inspections under the DPRK's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, which remains binding and fully in force. At the same time, we are verifying a freeze of the graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities at the request of the Security Council and maintaining a continuous inspector presence in the DPRK for that purpose. As the Board is aware, the Agency has received only limited co-operation from the DPRK. Since 1995, there has been no progress in our efforts to obtain access to the information which the Agency deems necessary to preserve in relation to the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration and to reach agreement on the measures required for its preservation.
Unless such information is available to the Agency, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the Agency to verify, in the future, the DPRK's compliance with its safeguards agreement. I would recall, in this connection, that under the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States of America, such verification of compliance is necessary before any key components of the light water reactor can be delivered. I regret to report that no tangible progress was made during the eleventh round of technical discussions between the Agency and the DPRK which took place in Vienna from 5 to 8 October 1998.
On a more positive note, the canning operation at the five megawatt (electrical) reactor has resumed, the reactor pond is being cleaned and the remaining fuel rods lying at the bottom of the pond are being collected for canning. It is hoped that the operation will be completed soon and that all the irradiated fuel rods can be placed accordingly under Agency seal. Once this is done, we will be in a position to reduce, from three to two, the number of our inspectors residing in the Nyongbyon area.
Finally on this item, I would like to comment on media reports of a particular underground site in the DPRK. During the latest technical meeting, and in answer to the Agency's queries on the matter, the DPRK side referred to their talks with the USA in which they had described the site in question as a "civil underground structure". We will continue to follow up on this issue to the extent that relevant information is available to us and to take whatever action may be necessary under the safeguards agreement.
With respect to the Mochovce-1 nuclear power plant in Slovakia, the group of internationally recognized experts assembled by the Agency to review technical documentation and data on the integrity and brittle fracture safety assurance of the pressure vessel met in Vienna in September. They concluded that the issues raised had been conservatively addressed. On the basis of the information presented and reviewed, and their understanding of international practices, the experts identified no concerns with the integrity of the pressure vessel.
In response to a further request from Slovakia, the Agency organized two missions to Mochovce by international teams of experts. In October, a mission reviewed design modifications which have been made to the plant and concluded that all other safety issues previously identified by the Agency had been addressed by the safety improvement programme or were being addressed by ongoing work. A second mission visited the plant last week to review the seismic safety and has presented its findings to the Slovak authorities.
Further to a resolution of the General Conference (GC(42)/RES/11), the Secretariat has intensified its work, both internally and in co-operation with Member States, to address the year 2000 computer system problem in respect of nuclear and medical facilities which use radioactive materials. With respect to safety, a meeting of experts was held in Vienna two weeks ago to draft guidance for nuclear utilities on identifying and correcting problems and on contingency measures. A meeting to prepare similar guidance for medical applications will be held before the end of the year. A questionnaire has also been placed on the nuclear safety pages of the Agency's Web site, by which Member States can inform the Secretariat of the diagnostic and remedial actions they have taken. The information gathered will be disseminated among Member States. Further actions are planned throughout 1999.