The Agency was represented last month at a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the United Nations to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related international instruments. While the scope of the future instrument is yet to be determined, it is evident that important issues of direct relevance to the Agency such as the relationship with the Physical Protection Convention and consistency of nuclear terminology, need to be properly addressed at the preparatory stage. The Secretariat's comments on the draft convention containing specific suggestions on these aspects were well received and they were issued as a committee document... The Agency will continue to provide assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee. Our objective is to support all efforts to thwart acts of terrorism and to achieve a high degree of security for nuclear material and other radioactive sources while avoiding duplication and overlap with the Physical Protection Convention.

The Agency has an extensive range of services for the application of safety standards. They have been available for some time and are being continually reviewed and improved. Actions have been taken to improve, for instance, the integration of the Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs), the Assessment of Safety Significant Events Teams (ASSETs) and the Assessment of Safety Culture in Organizations Team (ASCOTs).

These are valuable services that Member States should utilize. They benefit the individual state and, indeed, the international community as a whole. They are the best practical way for safety culture to penetrate borders. I would like to see all countries accept our services, and particularly the OSARTs.

In this context we have been moving towards an integrated approach of "thematic planning" to ensure that the Agency's resources - be they regular budget, extra-budget, or technical cooperation funds - provide efficient and effective safety assistance and services to meet the priority needs of all Member States. For example, the first thematic plan to become operational was the Model Project on "Upgrading Radiation and Waste Safety Infrastructure" whose objective is to have in place, by the end of this year, a working system of notification, authorization and control, and an inventory of all radiation sources in the 53 participating developing countries...

I would inform you that the third and final meeting of the International Advisory Committee on Radiological Conditions at the Atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa took place in Vienna at the beginning of February. The Study is now essentially complete and publication is scheduled in May. It is intended that the results will be released in a Board document and, simultaneously, the conclusions and recommendations will be presented by the Chairman of the Committee at various locations to the people of the South Pacific. A conference to review the Study is to be held in Vienna in late June.

I can also report good progress towards the conclusion of Protocols Additional to Safeguards Agreements. To date, seven States have signed Protocols (Armenia, Australia, Georgia, Lithuania, Philippines, Poland, Uruguay). One such Protocol is in force (Australia) and one is being applied provisionally (Armenia). I am also very pleased to note that you have before you for approval this week the text of a proposed Protocol for Jordan.

Since the last Board Meeting in December, official consultations have been held about the conclusion of Additional Protocols between the IAEA and Hungary; the IAEA and Canada; the IAEA, the 13 Non-Nuclear Weapon States of the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom); the IAEA, France and Euratom; the IAEA, the United Kingdom and Euratom; and the IAEA and Japan. We have also held informal discussions about Additional Protocols with representatives of China, Russia and the Republic of Korea. All these consultations and discussions have been useful and constructive. Next week, consultations with the United States will take place and there will be further discussions with Canada and the Member States of the European Union. It is our hope to submit a number of these draft Protocols for the Board's consideration in June.

In December, I informed the Board that no progress had been made on important issues during the eighth round of technical discussions with representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which took place in Vienna in the week beginning 20 October 1997. The same lack of progress characterized the ninth round which took place in Pyongyang from 23 - 28 February 1998. Some day to day implementation issues were resolved. However, there was still no progress with regard to other long-standing and important issues including agreed measures for the preservation of information, which must remain available to enable the Agency to verify, in the future, the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration and compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. The DPRK continues to link progress in the consultations with the Agency to progress in the implementation of the Agreed Framework, which according to DPRK, is well behind the agreed schedule.

Additional, the DPRK side continued to reject sampling and measurement at the reprocessing plant, e.g. of the liquid nuclear waste to verify that there is no movement or operation involving such waste. The DPRK side also rejected the taking of environmental swipe samples at the hot cell of the research reactor which is presently under a routine inspection regime, since they consider that the DPRK's Safeguards Agreement is not fully in force. There was also no progress on the issue of access by inspectors to technical support buildings at facilities subject to the freeze.

I would also report that the whole canning operation for the irradiated fuel is now expected to be completed by May 1998. Thereafter, it is expected that the continuous presence of Agency inspectors in Nyongbyon will be reduced from three to two...

Members of the Board will have seen Agency document INFCIRC/548 of 4 March 1998. This reproduces, at the request of Thailand, the depository power, the text of the Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) which entered into force on 27 March 1997.

The Parties to the Treaty foreshadow certain functions for the Agency in such areas as safeguards and nuclear safety and expect the Agency to assume these functions. As you can see from the document before you, the IAEA safeguards system is one of the pillars of the control system provided for in the Treaty for the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations of the States Parties.

The Agency continues its work in Iraq and is focusing most of its resources on the implementation and strengthening of its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. As I reported in December, the Agency's continuous presence in Iraq was restored following the 23 day interruption in November 1997. Monitoring activities have since continued unimpeded.

The Agency's Iraq Action Team held technical discussions with the Iraqi counterpart in December 1997 to follow up on matters described in the October 1997 report to the Security Council.

The Iraq Action Team also participated in the February visit of the Secretary-General to Baghdad, which resulted in agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the modalities of access to Presidential Sites. The MOU recorded inter alia: Iraq's reiteration of its undertaking to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA; and Iraq's undertaking to accord to UNSCOM and the IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access in conformity with Security Council resolutions. In addition, the MOU outlined special procedures for "initial and subsequent entries" to Presidential Sites, which are to be implemented by a Special Group established for that purpose and headed by a Commissioner, appointed by the Secretary-General.

The Special Group will comprise technical experts from the IAEA and UNSCOM as well as a number of senior diplomats to observe that the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding are interpreted in "good faith". Within the Special Group, the IAEA will continue to be responsible for conducting verification tasks relevant to the nuclear field, whereas UNSCOM will continue to focus on the chemical, missile and biological areas, as appropriate. Reporting on technical findings will remain the respective functions of the IAEA and UNSCOM.

As you are aware, the Secretary-General has appointed Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala as the Commissioner and, in consultation with the Chairman of UNSCOM, the Commissioner and myself, has established specific detailed procedures for access to Presidential Sites, called for under the MOU. It is expected that joint IAEA/UNSCOM inspections of Iraq's Presidential Sites will be carried out in the near future.