The primary focus of this meeting of the Board is safety. A demonstrated global record of safety in nuclear, radiation and radioactive waste will be, in my view, a determining factor for the future role of nuclear technology. To achieve such a record will require close international co-operation, by everyone for the benefit of everyone. Accidents know no borders and Member States are increasingly seeking the involvement and assistance of the Agency in the safety field. This is a welcome development. International co-operation in the safe use of nuclear technology should not be perceived as an intrusion on national sovereignty but, on the contrary, as an investment in the future of nuclear energy and nuclear applications and an invaluable aid in assisting States in exercising their right to use them.
Nuclear Safety Review for 1998
First, among the safety related events which did occur at nuclear power plants, we can report that there were no accidents causing public harm. But the events underline the fact that there is no room for complacency. Constant attention must be given not only to technical safety measures but also to managerial and organizational practices.
Second, the transport of spent fuel in three European countries was stopped after inspections of transport containers revealed minute levels of radioactive contamination which were higher than those specified in the Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. This event led to widespread public concern and emphasized once again the importance of strict adherence to the Transport Regulations and the importance of transparency in public communication.
Third, there were a number of accidents and events concerning abandoned radiation sources, known as orphan sources. In Georgia and in Turkey, orphan sources resulted in serious radiation overexposure of the persons who came into contact with them. Last week, another overexposure occurred in Peru. These events underline the fact that ensuring adequate national control of radiation sources is a serious challenge and a priority in the radiation safety field.
Fourth, there was increased co-operation between national regulatory bodies, including the first meeting of the ten members of the Network of Regulators of Countries with Small Nuclear Programmes and the announcement of the formation of a Western European Nuclear Regulator's Association comprising nine States of the European Union. These developments are to be welcomed - information exchange leading to harmonized regulatory approaches based on common safety criteria is a positive contribution to worldwide safety. The Secretariat intends to offer full co-operation to these and other such organizations.
The Agency's own safety related activities were directed at advancing the three main elements of the global safety culture: legally binding international agreements; internationally harmonized safety standards; and measures to assist in the application of these conventions and standards.
Safety Conventions
The first Review Meeting under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which now has 49 Contracting Parties, is scheduled for 12-23 April this year. Peer review is key to the Convention's aim of achieving and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. The Review Meeting will provide the first test of this process. The signing and ratification process for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management continues, albeit at a slow pace. At the end of 1998, 37 States had signed, but only five had ratified the Joint Convention. Entry into force requires ratification by 25 States, at least 15 of which have an operational nuclear power plant. I would like to urge those that have not yet signed and ratified the Joint Convention to do so.
The Secretariat's efforts to contribute to preventing, detecting and responding to illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources are being strengthened. To provide a focal point for the Agency's activities in this area, I have established an Office for Physical Protection and Material Security, within the Department of Safeguards. The Agency will increase its assistance to Member States with a view to improving their physical protection systems. This will partly be achieved through technical co-operation, where a new project on physical protection has recently been approved.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is the legally binding undertaking in this area. In my comments on the SEG report, I have indicated that some States party to this Convention have requested the Agency to hold an experts meeting in 1999 to discuss whether the scope of the Convention continues to be adequate. I have recently received letters from the Permanent Mission of Australia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania and the Resident Representative of the United States of America who, on behalf of their Governments, have asked me to convene such a meeting. The Foreign Minister of Romania and the Resident Representative of the USA have also informed me that there are ongoing contacts among States party to the Convention regarding this matter.
I am pleased to report that a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the State of Kuwait is before the Board for its consideration. Thirty eight States have not yet fulfilled their obligation under the NPT to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. In the light of the NPT Review Conference next year, we are redoubling our efforts to encourage them to do so as soon as possible.
I am also pleased to report that two further proposed Protocols Additional to comprehensive safeguards agreements are before the Board for consideration: one with Norway and the other with the Republic of Korea. Board approval of these would bring to 40 the number of States with approved Additional Protocols, although the number of Additional Protocols which have entered into force is still five.
Since the November Board meeting, discussions and consultations about the conclusion of Additional Protocols have taken place with a number of States (Albania, Azerbaijan, Cuba, Kuwait and Turkey). A Protocol Additional to the Russian Federation's safeguards agreement has been agreed ad referendum and other countries have indicated they may soon be able to conclude Additional Protocols. Accordingly, I hope to be able to submit further Additional Protocols to the Board at its June meeting. I have recently been officially informed that one such Protocol will be with the Government of Romania. However, if we are to achieve universal subscription to the Additional Protocol by the year 2000, States which have not yet concluded Protocols must do so soon. The Secretariat will continue to do all that it can to assist them.
A 12th round of technical discussions between the Agency and the DPRK took place in Pyongyang from 9 to 12 March 1999. The discussions enabled some day-to-day problems to be resolved but, again, there was no tangible progress on any of the important issues which have been outstanding since the Agency started to implement the freeze on the DPRK's graphite operated reactors and related facilities in November 1994. Progress in these discussions has been again linked by the DPRK to progress in the implementation of all aspects of the Agreed Framework.
With regard to the preservation of information to enable the Agency ultimately to verify the DPRK's initial declaration, no agreement has been reached on either the documents to be preserved or the mode of their preservation. Moreover, no progress has been made on any other outstanding issues.
It is now more than three months since the Agency has been able to carry out inspections in Iraq. As a result, it is unable to provide any assurance pursuant to the mandate entrusted to it by Security Council resolutions.
On 30 January 1999, the President of the Security Council issued a note (S/1999/100) recording the Council's decision to establish three panels on Iraq, one of which is to examine the situation regarding disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues. The panels are to make recommendations to the Council no later than 15 April 1999. In response to the above mentioned note the IAEA has prepared an assessment paper on its activities in Iraq. This has been distributed as GOV/INF/1999/4.
The Agency has three representatives on the panel, which is entrusted to "make recommendations to the Security Council on how, taking into account relevant Security Council resolutions, to re-establish an effective disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq". The panel held its first meeting, in New York, during the week of 22 February and is meeting in its second session this week. I will keep the Board informed of the recommendations of the panel and the response from the Security Council.