At the outset, let me commend for your consideration two applications for Agency membership: the first one from the Republic of Botswana, the second from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Nuclear Power
You have before you the 2001 Update to the Nuclear Technology Review. As you can see from this update, six new power reactors were connected to the grid in 2000. Combined, however, these six represent only 3% of the total installed electricity capacity added in 2000 - a much lower percentage than the overall 16% nuclear share of global electricity generation.
Other developments continue to paint a mixed picture. As I have frequently stated, the future of nuclear power will depend on factors such as economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability, safety and public acceptance. Given the widely predicted increases in energy demand, the World Energy Council has concluded that a total reliance on fossil fuels and large hydroelectric facilities is not sustainable, and that the current position of nuclear power needs to be stabilized, with the possibility of future expansion. This emphasizes the vital importance of keeping the nuclear option open through maintaining nuclear competency, increasing nuclear safety, developing new and innovative reactor and fuel cycle technologies, and implementing a policy of outreach and education.
Two upcoming events may have an important impact on the role of nuclear power in the future. The first is the 9th Session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD-9), which will take place in New York next month, focusing on energy and transport. The second is the 6th Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (CoP-6), which will reconvene in Bonn in July. One of the important issues before the Conference is whether nuclear power would be recognized as a technology for greenhouse gas reduction under the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. The Agency has been active in these two forums to ensure that there is a level playing field for the different energy options. However, additional efforts by participants would be required if nuclear power is to receive full recognition as a potential contributor to sustainable development.
Non-Power Applications
Document GOV/2001/9 deals with the subject of isotope hydrology for water resources management. In this connection, let me note that March 22 is being observed asWorld Water Day to raise awareness of the non-availability of safe drinking water for a large fraction of the world population. There is an urgent need to co-ordinate the activities of all international and national bodies in this area and the Agency's isotope hydrology programmes are being increasingly integrated with those of other international organizations such as WHO and the World Bank, as well as with national agencies, with the common goal of providing safe drinking water to all.
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
You also have before you the Nuclear Safety Review for the year 2000. As reflected in the Review, there is evidence of continuing general improvement in the operational safety of nuclear power plants worldwide.
The Agency's safety review services are extremely useful in corroborating safety improvements and in validating all aspects of safety performance. Drawing on this experience, the Secretariat has identified key attributes of operational safety at nuclear power plants and established measurable indicators in each area. The proposed framework was tested in pilot studies, and a meeting of specialists confirmed its usefulness. We are refining aspects of this framework through a co-ordinated research project, and the feasibility of an international system of safety performance indicators will be discussed during the Agency's International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety in September.
The Agency's safety review services continue to be in high demand. Over the past five years, the rate at which Member States implement the corrective safety measures recommended through Agency reviews has improved from 80% to 92%. One illustration relates to the startup of the Temelin nuclear power plant. In response to requests from the Czech Republic, we carried out an Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission at Temelin in February. This will be followed in June by an International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) mission, and in October by a Design Review of the Temelin plant modifications.
Safety of Research Reactors
The safety of research reactors - with issues such as limited regulatory supervision, loss of expertise, inadequate maintenance, inadequate fuel storage, and degraded or obsolete equipment - continues to be an area of Agency focus.
To partly address this situation, I have augmented the Agency resources for Integrated Safety Assessments of Research Reactors (INSARRs) and other research reactor safety efforts. Agency review services for research reactors are also increasing the emphasis on effective regulatory oversight and the management of safety.
As research reactors age, as spent fuel accumulates, and as that spent fuel ages, it is important to maintain uncompromised safety levels. The US Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program has been in place since May 1996 and has already provided for the return to the USA of a large amount of US origin fuel elements, helping to reduce spent fuel inventories at research reactors worldwide. In addition, discussions were initiated last year between the Agency and the Russian Federation on the feasibility of a similar programme to return Russian origin research reactor fuel for storage and disposition. Several eligible countries have already indicated interest in that programme. A preliminary meeting of the three main parties will take place in Vienna in early April.
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities
Another important safety issue is the safe decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The Agency presently has projects to provide direct decommissioning technical assistance to the BN-350 nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, Unit 1 of Ignalina in Lithuania, and all three Chernobyl units in Ukraine - as well as broad scope training activities on decommissioning to assist other Member States.
Safety of Radiation Sources
Another area of continuing concern involves the safety of radiation sources. During the year under review, accidents relating to radiation sources resulted in a number of fatalities and serious exposures. It is clear that national and international action on improving the safety of radiation sources is still required.
Under the Agency's Action Plan, a Code of Conduct on the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials has been prepared, accompanied by a technical document on the categorization of radiation sources. I trust that Member States will follow the guidance provided by the Code.
Marine Transport of Radioactive Material
During the last few months, a number of Member States have drawn the Secretariat's attention to the growing public concern about the safe transport of spent fuel and radioactive waste by sea.
The General Conference has recognized that adherence to the Agency's safety standards in this area should provide a high level of safety during transport. The General Conference resolution has also encouraged Member States to avail themselves of the Agency's Transport Safety Appraisal Services (TranSAS), to ensure that Agency safety standards are being adequately applied. Unfortunately, very few States have made use of these services. I would therefore encourage all States to do so.
Depleted Uranium
In my December statement to the Board, I referred to the Agency's participation in a field mission to Kosovo, led by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), for an environmental assessment of the consequences of the use of depleted uranium (DU) in ammunition during the Kosovo conflict.
The UNEP report was released last week. The Report concluded that no widespread ground contamination was found in the investigated areas and, therefore, that the corresponding radiological and chemical risks are insignificant. Although UNEP's findings show no cause for alarm, the report describes specific situations (e.g. high radiation doses as a result of prolonged contact with DU ammunition, or ingestion of small amounts of contaminated soil) where risks cannot be excluded, and the possible DU intake might be somewhat higher than the applicable standards. In addition, according to the Report, some uncertainties still exist relating to the longer term behaviour of DU in the environment. For these reasons, the Report calls for certain precautionary actions.
The Agency and other relevant United Nations organizations have received requests for similar assessments in other regions, including the Balkans, as well as in the Gulf and the Middle East, where it is known or believed that DU in ammunition has been used in the past. We intend to respond to these requests in a timely manner. I will be meeting shortly with my colleagues, the heads of UNEP and WHO, to discuss this matter, and we intend to respond to such requests in a co-ordinated fashion within our respective mandates.
In addition, and in order to broaden the scientific understanding on DU, the Agency is offering a training course, organized in collaboration with UNEP and WHO, on "Depleted Uranium in the Environment." The course will be designed for participants from countries that may have been affected by environmental releases of DU or that provide peacekeeping forces to those countries, as well as other interested countries.
Other Safety Initiatives
As I have said on many occasions, nuclear safety is a matter of the highest priority - as reflected in the importance we give to various safety conventions, safety standards and safety services. The key factor, however, is implementation - practical steps that will have a positive impact on safety. In December, I proposed three initiatives that could enhance safety in practical ways. The first was to encourage the exchange of regulators or other safety personnel between national or international organizations, to share hands-on experience and transfer "best practices." While this has already been done to a limited degree, I proposed having the Agency explore the concept on a broader scale. We have begun looking for increased opportunities to set up these exchanges, sponsored under our technical co-operation programme, and a number of countries have already indicated an interest in participating.
The second initiative was for the Agency to promote an enhanced network of communication among emergency response centres - particularly those having nuclear facilities of the same design - and especially for immediate assistance during nuclear emergencies. I have directed the Secretariat to begin exploring how we can enhance these emergency communications. And the Russian Emergency Response Co-ordinator was here recently to discuss how closer communication links could be established among those centres that support reactors of Soviet and Russian design.
Safety Standard Discussions with ICAO
The third initiative was for a comparison between the respective programmes for the development and implementation of safety standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and those of the Agency, with a view to identifying possible options for strengthening our nuclear safety regime. A team from the Agency Secretariat visited ICAO recently and I was particularly impressed by the ability of ICAO to develop a comprehensive audit system to review the national implementation of its standards on the safety of civil aviation operations - in contrast to the Agency's current safety services that focus on specific aspects of safety. I intend to ask the Secretariat to investigate the feasibility of an additional Agency "integrated safety evaluation" service, along the lines of the ICAO model, which could offer States an opportunity to review their overall nuclear safety programmes.
I turn now to the subject of nuclear verification and security of material. I am pleased to bring to the Board's consideration a draft safeguards agreement between the Republic of Niger and the Agency pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This is a welcome development as it fulfils a long standing obligation on the part of one of the world's leading uranium producing States.
At the same time, I call upon the other 53 States which have not yet fulfilled their commitments under the NPT to bring into force safeguards agreements with the Agency at the earliest opportunity. This lack of progress on the conclusion of remaining safeguards agreements - nearly one year after the prominence given to this issue in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference - is most disappointing.
Equally disappointing is the lack of a single new Additional Protocol for the Board's consideration. To date, the Board has approved 57 Additional Protocols, 19 of which have entered into force or are being provisionally applied. As I have often stated, only in States with a safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol in force can the Agency provide comprehensive and credible assurance about the fulfilment of non-proliferation obligations.
Pursuant to the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and last September's General Conference resolution, the Secretariat has developed and is implementing an Action Plan to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. In this regard, I welcome the co-operation and assistance which Member States are providing for regional seminars now being planned, to be held in New Zealand, Japan, Kazakhstan and Peru.
Physical Inventory Verification in Iraq
In January 2001, the Agency carried out a verification of the remaining nuclear material in Iraq, pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. With the co-operation of the Iraqi authorities, Agency inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material still in Iraq that is subject to safeguards. As is well known, however, these physical inventory verifications do not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, nor do they provide the needed assurances sought by the Council, that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under these resolutions.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The Agency continues to maintain a continuous inspector presence in the Nyongbyong area of the DPRK, for the purpose of monitoring the "freeze" on the DPRK's graphite moderated reactors and related facilities. Nevertheless, the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK remains at a standstill, and I regret to say that no change in the situation seems likely in the near future. The Agency is still unable to verify the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's report on all nuclear material in the State.
On the subject of the DPRK, however, I should note that in response to a request from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the Secretariat will conduct a design safety review of the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant model to be provided by KEDO to the DPRK. The review is currently targeted for June of this year, and will include a site visit. The costs of the review will be paid by KEDO.