Some fifty years ago the Cold War began. Today it is over and the old adversaries work together. Fifty years ago the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki started the nuclear arms race. Today we are witnessing a nuclear arms race in reserve and the nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant. By contrast the first controlled nuclear chain reaction under Enrico Fermi a little over fifty years ago in Chicago has led to a worldwide nuclear power industry which today generates almost as much electricity as all the world's hydropower. About fifty years ago the United Nations was established to be handicapped most of this time by the deadlock of the Cold War. Today this crippling effect is over and more problems are placed on the tables of the UN family of organizations than they have the capacity to handle.

Thus, five years before the end of the century we live in a world that is radically different from the one which existed five years before the middle of the 20th century. I shall try to discuss the three important developments which I have mentioned: The coming of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - for electricity generation, for medicine, for agriculture; the end of the era of nuclear weapons and the challenges of the United Nations after the Cold War.

Energy and the Environment

Energy is the lifeblood of modern society - essential for industry, transport, heating, welfare, but also the source of pollution and environmental threats. A high standard of living is invariably linked to a high energy consumption.

The average North American now uses some 7200 kg of oil equivalent per year, while the average Indian makes do with 280 kg. If we look at the use of electricity, the picture is similar. Norway has the highest annual per capita consumption in the world - some 25 000 kWh- almost all of it hydro generated; Bangladesh has among the lowest - less than 100 kWh/capita/year. In Chile it is about 1600, in Argentina and Uruguay it is about 1700.

Although they have some 75% of the world s population, the developing countries currently use only some 30% of the primary energy and some 25% of the electricity produced in the world. It is therefore not surprising that these countries plan to increase their energy and electricity production to improve their standards of living and to meet the needs of growing populations.

Conservation - meaning either a more efficient or a more selective use of energy - is important to offset some of the increasing demand for energy, including electricity. But it is unrealistic to hold that conservation measures can completely offset new demand or even reduce the total energy consumption.

While the drive for expanded production, more transport and higher standards of living are essential reasons for the ever growing demand for energy, population increase, especially in the developing world, is another crucial factor. Indeed, if the size of the world s population is not stabilized, it is hard to see how energy provision and environmental protection could be managed. Let me give you some figures. At the time of the birth of Christ, the world population is estimated to have been around 350 million. By the year 1900, it had increased to 1.5 billion. In 1990, the population of our globe was about 5 billion and in the year 2000 we expect it to be 6 billion. Thus, in the last ten years of this century we expect to increase by as much as we did during the first 1900 years after the birth of Christ. There will be formidable problems to supply these growing numbers of people with enough energy.

In its last report (1992) the World Energy Council estimated that between 1990 and 2020, world energy demand might increase by 98% in the "enhanced economic development" case, by 53% in the "reference/business as usual" case and by 29% in the "ecologically driven" case which assumes drastic measures for efficiency improvement and energy savings. We must ask ourselves: "Where will this energy come from?" We cannot change our energy systems overnight. In the foreseeable future, there will be an energy mix, as there is today. Fossil fuels now cover nearly 90% of the world s total energy use. Regrettably there is no economically viable way in which the CO2 from the burning of fossil fuel can be removed or neutralized. The Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 devoted much attention to the need to stabilize CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to reduce the risk of global warming. The Conference refrained from telling us, however, how this was to be achieved.

Many governments in Western industrialized countries today either postpone decisions on additional power generation or opt for a greater use of natural gas, which produces about half as much CO2 per energy unit as does coal. There is an increasing general awareness among governments, however, that, although expansion of CO2-free nuclear power alone cannot solve the problem of CO2 emissions and global warming, nuclear power must be part of the solution. The awareness is also increasing that renewable sources of energy apart from hydro power - I have in mind solar, wind, geothermal - which today constitute less than 0.3% of the world s energy - cannot realistically be expected to reach more than a few percent in the next decades. Fusion energy is many decades away - if it can at all be harnessed. Fast breeder reactors, on the other hand, are an available technology which would make the world s uranium resources an almost limitless energy basis. However, with the present low uranium prices, breeder reactors are not needed. Light water reactors produce electricity more cheaply at the present time.

If we are driven to the conclusion that an expanded use of nuclear power must be an important part of the future global energy mix, we are obliged to tackle the problems which make many people sceptical of nuclear power, namely: (a) the fear of another Chernobyl; and (b) the fear of radioactive wastes.

There is, first of all, a tremendous need for a better understanding of nuclear matters. They need to be demystified. If we use gravity to our benefit, why should we not also use radiation for our benefit? It is true that radiation must be handled with respect and that the public is less tolerant of accidents in nuclear power plants than of accidents in, say, hydro dams or chemical industries. We must therefore ensure a very high level of radiation protection and nuclear safety everywhere in the world. The risk for accidents can hardly be reduced to zero, but improved practices and improved technology can minimize risks and limit the consequences of such accidents as do occur.

Turning to the issue of nuclear waste, it is a common - and erroneous - perception that satisfactory methods to safely dispose of the long-lived nuclear wastes do not yet exist. A nuclear plant of 1000 MW(e) will produce 30 tons of highly radioactive waste per year and the methods which have been worked out for disposing of this waste in metal containers deposited deep down in stable geological formations are designed to ensure isolation for tens of thousands of years. These methods would seem to pose much smaller risks to us than the methods we use for disposing of the waste resulting from the burning of fossil fuels, namely to emit them into the atmosphere and to dump them on the surface of the world. This is not to ignore that the methods of handling, transporting and disposing of nuclear waste and of plutonium - including the shipment of plutonium - can and should be further improved.

My conclusion is that the need for more energy, in particular electricity, combined with the environmental problems already linked with the present level of use of fossil fuels, will make it necessary to expand the global use of nuclear power. Ongoing work to further reduce the risk of nuclear accidents and their consequences through improved technology and high international safety standards, as well as further development of nuclear waste disposal techniques, will gradually, I believe, reduce the public scepticism. I am thinking primarily of the technologically advanced countries. In developing countries the introduction of nuclear power will be slow. However, the transfer to those countries of nuclear techniques in the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry is fast increasing. Let me describe, by way of example, the technical co-operation between the IAEA and Chile.

Transfer of Nuclear Technology - Technical Co-operation

The range of activities carried out under the IAEA technical co-operation programme - including ARCAL (Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Latin America) - covers many areas: food and agriculture, industry, human health, radiation protection, nuclear power and its fuel cycle, safety of nuclear installations and radioactive waste management. About 2000 experts are sent every year to assist our Member States and about 3400 nationals receive training each year under the Fellowship and Training Course Programme. For 1995 the technical co-operation programme of the IAEA amounts to some 70 million dollars.

I am pleased to say that Chile is one of our best-organized counterparts and a country which has made excellent use of technical co-operation programmes. Over the years Chile has received more than 9 million dollars in direct assistance. At present there are 15 projects under implementation, to which five new projects approved for 1995-96 and amounting roughly to 1 million dollars should be added.

Let me give only two examples of achievements in the technical co-operation between Chile and the IAEA:

• As a result of an Agency-assisted project in the field of mineral exploration, a phosphorite deposit was found which, I understand, is now being exploited by a private enterprise on a commercial basis;
• A project on soil fertility and plant nutrition using the phosphorus-32 and nitrogen-15 techniques, was instrumental in optimizating the use of fertilizer in wheat crops and fruit production.

Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control, IAEA Inspection

The publicity and attention devoted to the nuclear arms race and the threat of nuclear war long overshadowed the attention devoted to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Let us hope that with accelerating arms control and disarmament the public will discover the benefits of the peaceful applications. The nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia will be cut from some 65 000 warheads to a few thousand.

There are some very specific questions that I should like to focus on in the exciting process of nuclear disarmament and arms control.

A first question is what will happen to the quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium that will be recovered as the warheads are dismantled? The answer is that the enriched uranium can be diluted and used as fuel in nuclear power reactors to produce electricity. The plutonium can also be turned into fuel for ordinary light-water reactors or be burnt in reactors specifically built for the purpose - or be disposed of as waste. At present large quantities of plutonium from the US weapons programme have been placed by the US under IAEA control.

Another question relates to the existing capacity in some States, including the five declared nuclear-weapon States, to produce nuclear material for weapons use. If more nuclear material is no longer needed for weapons, it should not be difficult for nuclear-weapon States to agree to stop producing such material for weapons use. Such a "cut-off agreement" is in fact under discussion and it would be of direct relevance for those States which have a capacity to produce weapons-useable material and which have not already renounced nuclear weapons, i.e. the five declared nuclear-weapon States and Israel, India and Pakistan. The problems of effectively verifying such a cut-off agreement would be substantial. It would require a lot of inspection.

A third question - of great current interest - is whether a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons might be within reach. Recently only China has been testing. The US, UK, France and Russia are presently observing declared moratoria. In a world of drastically shrinking nuclear arsenals and growing detente it is likely to appear incongruous to continue any nuclear testing. Although a few still urge some continued testing to check the safety and reliability of existing weapons, who can be sure such tests would not in reality be to try out new types of weapons?

A fourth question - and one of most direct relevance to the IAEA - relates to the effect of the present international climate on the efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries - what is generally termed the non-proliferation regime, formalized above all in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

There are some who seem to think that the risk of a spread of nuclear weapons is increasing with the disappearance of the Cold War and of clear and disciplined military blocks. Certainly the Security Council shows an increasing determination to prevent a spread of nuclear weapons to further countries. In the statement made at the summit-level meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, the members declared that, I quote: "The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security ...".

Given that Article 39 of the UN Charter enables the Council to decide on enforcement action when it identifies a threat to peace, the statement quoted seems to be a stern warning that the Council will feel free to take severe action to prevent proliferation.

It is true that some new risks of a further spread of nuclear weapons have arisen. The disintegration of the Soviet Union gave rise to three new independent States with nuclear weapons on their territory: Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan. However, today all the three are non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all the nuclear weapons on their territory have either been sent to Russia or are to be sent there. With diplomacy, security guarantees and some funds the risk of proliferation seems to have been averted.

Evidence of another risk arising in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has been seen in the increased incidence of trafficking in nuclear materials. Steps are now taken to strengthen the co-operation between European customs and police authorities to stop this trade which is linked to widespread criminality. The IAEA is actively helping the countries in question strengthen their control over facilities which are authorized to have nuclear material and thereby to prevent any such material coming adrift illegally. Until now, as far as we know, no weapon grade highly enriched uranium or plutonium have been diverted through the black market. Most cases investigated by the IAEA have turned out to involve natural uranium, depleted uranium or low enriched uranium and the plutonium cases have mostly had regard to minuscule quantities.

A more serious risk of nuclear proliferation was identified with the discovery after the Gulf War that Iraq, a party to the NPT and a State accepting IAEA safeguards, had a secret programme aimed at the production of highly enriched uranium and nuclear weapons. Fortunately, despite a billion-dollar effort, some years of work would have remained before Iraq could have made a bomb. However, the case raised several disturbing questions. When the NPT was concluded, the proliferation concern was chiefly about advanced countries - like Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Japan - going for nuclear weapons. These countries seem later to have securely settled for a non-nuclear-weapon status. However, the case of Iraq showed that a growing number of developing countries might be attaining a technological level at which nuclear weapons might - with money and time - be within reach. Were there more Iraqs? The other disturbing matter was that Iraq had been able to hide its large programme to the IAEA, to satellite observation and to intelligence. Were the safeguards toothless? How can the risk of nuclear proliferation be countered in today s world?

The case of Iraq led to a great deal of soul searching and innovative thinking. It has always been understood that the incentive to go for nuclear weapons lies in security problems and that the first barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in adequate national security. Hence detente, security guarantees and assurance that neighbours do not develop nuclear weapons are the best measures. For the Middle East, to take an example, a well verified nuclear-weapon-free zone, including Israel, Iraq, Egypt, Iran and many others, as a part of a peace settlement is the obvious most important strategy.

A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions applied by States which are able to supply nuclear material and equipment and so-called dual-use equipment. Following the case of Iraq a tightening in these restrictions has taken place, measures sometimes criticized by developing countries which claim that import for legitimate peaceful uses is hampered.

A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the awareness that a discovery through the IAEA safeguards system of a secret nuclear programme will lead to severe reactions by the UN and governments. Indeed, even a lack of co-operation with the IAEA might lead to suspicions and reactions. To function effectively this deterrent presupposes that the IAEA safeguards system has a high capacity to detect any hidden nuclear programmes. After the discoveries in Iraq a number of measures have been taken to strengthen the safeguards system and additional measures are being developed. It was, indeed, through new improved safeguards analysis that the conclusion was reached in 1992 that the DPRK has more plutonium than what it declared to the Agency.

After numerous trials in several countries which have volunteered co-operation, I am confident that with a moderate increase in general openness about nuclear programmes and increased access for IAEA inspectors, the governments of the world can have a safeguards system that will very much reduce the risk of any significant secret nuclear programme going undetected. Another matter is how the international community and the Security Council will react to discoveries or refused co-operation to clarify a situation. The case of Iraq was one model. The case of the DPRK a totally different one.

If there is some room for concern about the continued risk of nuclear proliferation, we should also note some highly positive developments. The Treaty of Tlatelolco will enter into force when all signatories have ratified it, and the prospects are that this will happen soon. Argentina and Brazil have opened up their nuclear installations to each other and to comprehensive international safeguards and Cuba has declared its readiness to join the Treaty. I note with appreciation the leading role of Chile in proposing the amendments that are making the Treaty generally acceptable.

For many years there was concern that South Africa might be developing nuclear weapons. However, in August 1991 South Africa adhered to the NPT and the country became the first to roll back from a nuclear-weapon status. By now a number of other African States, hitherto outside the NPT, have joined the Treaty and Algeria has declared that its ratification is imminent. The prospect of Africa becoming a nuclear-weapon-free continent has therefore increased considerably.

While France and China adhered to the NPT IN 1992 and thereby brought all the declared nuclear-weapon States into the Treaty, there does not seem to be any early prospect of India and Pakistan divesting themselves of the capacity they have to produce weapons useable nuclear material. With over 160 parties the Non-Proliferation Treaty is nevertheless an extremely successful arms control treaty, which has been of the greatest importance to prevent a general quantum leap in the megakilling capacity of States. The ambition should be to make it universal and of unlimited duration. The ambition should further be to reduce to a minimum the nuclear weapons in the hands of individual States and to transfer them to an international institution at some time in the future.

In 1995, a conference will take place to decide whether the NPT should be extended for an unlimited period of time or for specific periods. The most serious criticism that has been directed at the Treaty in the past has been that while it demands of non-nuclear-weapon States the very concrete and substantial commitment to renouncing nuclear weapons, it only commits nuclear-weapon States parties to make their best efforts to agree on disarmament. With drastic reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia, and with a general trend towards disarmament, the aims of the NPT to stem both vertical and horizontal proliferation are now in better harmony. However, in the absence so far of a fully negotiated complete test ban treaty and an agreement on a cut-off of production of nuclear material for weapons, there is at present uncertainty as to how the conference will go.

The United Nations - Life After 50

For the United Nations the end of the Cold War, of the ideological struggle and of the various local conflicts linked to that struggle whether in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia or Nicaragua, mean that many new windows of opportunity open in the disarmament and security fields: the Security Council s ability to act effectively against Iraq s aggression and occupation of Kuwait marked a high point and led to statements about a "new international order" under which aggression would be repelled. Today, the pendulum has swung to moral indignation over the lack of effective action in former Yugoslavia, in Somalia and in Rwanda.

However, we need to nuance our judgements both about the past and present performance of the United Nations. The past fifty years have not been without some progress. Although effective security-related action through the UN was mostly impossible during the Cold War, there was not complete paralysis. The practice of peace-keeping developed and was very valuable in some situations; the great process of decolonialization took place in this period; the universal recognition - but not universal respect - of human rights was achieved; central areas of international law were developed and codified - on diplomatic and consular relations, on the law of the sea, on the law of treaties; the North/South dialogue started in this period, creating an awareness of the danger and inequity of a division of the world into rich and poor and of the need for action to speed up development; some disarmamen t and arms control was also achieved - the partial nuclear test ban treaty, NPT, ABM and START I; and last, but not least, a strong beginning was made to identify and analyse the growing environmental problems and to take action on some of them.

But much in the United Nations during the Cold War was rhetoric.

In today s radically changed world the fear of mutual extinction by nuclear weapons and war between great powers is disappearing. The Warsaw Pact no longer exists and NATO, having lost the enemy for which the alliance was created, is groping to redefine its role. Today the great powers do not try any longer to exploit local conflicts and inflame them. Rather, they seem reluctant to be drawn into such conflicts and to insist that any action should be under UN authorization!

Regrettably, while many local conflicts which were fuelled from the outside have died out - Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Salvador - others burn bright without outside incitement - Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Afghanistan. Yet other conflicts, like Cambodia and Angola, remain glowing embers threatening to re-ignite. It is fashionable these days to pour scorn on the United Nations for its patent inability to protect the Bosnian Muslim population and to protect civilians in Rwanda and Somalia. The Bosnian situation is compared to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich. The UN - and to a lesser extent NATO - is held guilty. It does not take much effort, however, to discover that the lack of effective action by the Security Council in these cases is not due to any significant statutory or organizational weakness in the UN or NATO, but to the clear unwillingness of States members to commit, perhaps long term, the considerable military and economic resources that would be needed for effective action. Peace-keeping - essentially the use of military forces to oversee the peace - is much less costly and thus more attractive, but regrettably it only works well when all conflicting parties want it and are prepared to respect it.

Before we rush to condemn the reluctant governments in the Security Council and in NATO for their lack of moral fibre, perhaps we should ask ourselves if we as parents would be willing to send our sons into battle to help solve the conflicts we are talking about. We might further ask ourselves as taxpayers how much money we are willing to contribute to required UN operations. I suspect we shall find that most people would be prepared to sacrifice a lot when they feel that the freedom or vital security interests of their own country are at stake. They are unwilling, however, to make big sacrifices when the vital interests of their own countries are not at stake. We should not be surprised then that their governments are not ready to contribute sufficient resources to ensure effective action by the UN or NATO, where they rightly or wrongly do not perceive their own vital interests to be threatened.

One measure that could help to bring about effective armed action by the UN in some small-scale conflicts would be the establishment of a few fully internationally integrated UN legions. It would cost money and such legions would hardly be adequate to perform effectively in a rather large conflict like Yugoslavia, but such a scheme would somewhat isolate an intervention undertaken by the UN from a national public opinion in individual States.

Let me conclude with some reflections on the situation of the principal organs of the United Nations and on some non-security related challenges before the system in the decade to come.

The intensified discussion about an expansion of the Security Council is further evidence of the changes that have occurred in the world. During the Cold War it would have been perceived as a joke to propose that Germany and Japan should become permanent members. Permanent members were the victors of the Second World War, five military great powers possessing nuclear weapons. Today, the military power of the United States, Russia and others is becoming less relevant. They cannot bring themselves to use it in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. Today, economic power is often more relevant than military power and Germany and Japan are asking to sit where their power is needed. It is clear, moreover, that the weight and influence of the developing countries is now such that even with limited economic power they will demand greater representation in the Security Council. This is certainly needed - for the most powerful international organ should not act without the effective participation of governments that represent the greater part of humanity.

There is, at present, a great deal of resentment in the General Assembly about the exclusiveness of the Security Council and the lack of transparency in its working. For the General Assembly, in which Andorra like China has one vote, it is difficult to envisage any other role than that of being a world forum in which all States have the right to voice their views. However, the vast majority of developing States might feel that their interests were better taken care of if the role of the South in the Security Council was strengthened.

What is the role of the Secretary-General of the UN in the years to come? The great powers may often be inclined to limit his or her role to quiet diplomacy, to the considerable job of managing the UN and to accepting and carrying out the mandates handed down by the Security Council. Other Member States and public opinion are likely to want a Secretary- General able to initiate and lead, as an impartial voice and as a conscience of the world. To combine the role of an impartial political leader, a diplomat and conciliator and a mega-manager will not be easy for anyone.

Let me end by listing some of the key non-security related problems which I think the UN will have to face in the next decade. First, the promotion of decent standards of living is the greatest need of the large majority of humanity. This will require enlightened policies by all, including the rich countries which have the major influences on the world economy, on the World Bank and the IMF.

Secondly, it is possible that the environmental threats to our planet and our well being will turn out to be our greatest concern in years to come: ozone depletion, global warming, acid rains, pollution of ground water, depletion of fisheries. These problems will call for increased vigilance and action both at the national and international level. Without effective policies to slow and eventually to stop population growth there is little hope that we can protect the environment and raise standards of living.

Third, some political, social and cultural challenges: the struggle to uphold human rights, to advance the status of women and to promote and maintain democracy, will require persistent action. Further, with ever increasing international integration - not least through the influence of media - there will be a need for measures to preserve the cultural diversity that is the rich heritage of the time before the world became one global village. Lastly, we need to ensure that governments unite in their efforts to fight criminality. There is a risk otherwise that the criminal elements in the world will integrate faster than the civilized elements do.