On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, it might be appropriate to review some of the main achievements and challenges facing the international community in the field of competence of the IAEA, which was created to foster international co-operation in the field of the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy.
The NPT Conference
International efforts to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons have resulted in the non-proliferation regime, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty at its centre and the IAEA providing the function of verifying compliance with non-proliferation pledges. In May this year, the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely. This decision underlined the broad and solid commitment of the then 178 parties to the Treaty. In my view, the extension decision and the principles and objectives and the strengthened review process which were also adopted should be read as a collective commitment to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy and the renunciation of nuclear weapons; a commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire such weapons; and a commitment by the weapon States to nuclear disarmament with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons.
The outcome of the NPT Conference has far-reaching implications for the future work of the IAEA. The Agency's role as a center for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was confirmed and the IAEA was expressly recognized as the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements. The Conference called on NPT parties with concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements to direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA for it to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. The Conference further called for support of the Agency's efforts to strengthen safeguards and to develop its capability to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. I take this as a sign of trust in the Agency's existing role in the field of verification.
The Conference also expressed its support for an expanded IAEA role in verification. It recommended that nuclear material released from military use be placed under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable, and that safeguards should be universally applied once the elimination of nuclear weapons has been completed.
The NPT Conference called for the early conclusion of an agreement to end the production of nuclear material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and endorsed the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones. It also set 1996 as the target date for the completion of a nuclear test ban, universally recognized as a vital component of the non-proliferation regime and an important step towards nuclear disarmament. There is an emerging consensus that IAEA safeguards would be an essential element of the verification of a cut-off agreement. It is also to be expected, if the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements are an indication, that the Agency would have a verification role in any future nuclear-weapon-free zone. With regard to a comprehensive test ban it is relevant to note that such a ban - verified by the IAEA - is already in force for the more than 170 non-nuclear-weapon States who have accepted comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities. These States are obliged not to use any nuclear material for explosions and IAEA safeguards are required to verify that this obligation is respected. What role the Agency might be asked to assume under a comprehensive test ban treaty is still a matter of discussion at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Entrusting the IAEA with the verification function of a CTBT would undoubtedly save resources, which would seem natural at a time when efforts are urged to avoid duplication, overlap and unnecessary cost in the UN family. It would also permit more rapid implementation.
Strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards System
Credible IAEA verification of States' compliance with their nuclear arms control pledges is becoming an increasingly important factor in global security and nuclear disarmament. The lessons of Iraq and the increasing demands placed on IAEA safeguards have necessitated that its safeguards system be strengthened and made more cost-effective. In particular, governments and the public now demand that the IAEA safeguards system should have the capacity to detect any secret, undeclared nuclear material and installations. There is also a greater understanding and readiness to accept that such verification must comprise no-notice inspections, greater freedom of movement for the inspectors and use of the most modern means of detection and communication. The Agency's efforts to develop a strengthened safeguards system have focused on three essential elements. The first is increased access to information about a State's nuclear activities, the second is broader access to sites and locations within a State, the third is maximum use of new and available technologies to increase detection capacity and, in due course, to reduce the frequency of on- site inspection. I am pleased to note that the Agency's Board of Governors has already accepted the first part of the Agency programme to strengthen its safeguards system, the so- called Programme 93 + 2. The Secretariat is in a position to implement these new measures after the required consultations with Member States. The second part of the programme, which relates to measures requiring additional legal authority, is due for consideration by the Agency's Board of Governors within some months. The test of any new measure is that it enhances the effectiveness of the system and is cost-effective. Experience gained in field trials of some of the new measures suggests that they can be implemented without much additional intrusion or cost to the States.
On the other hand, a significant increase in the IAEA's verification effort in terms of cost and resources may result if nuclear material released from the military programmes of nuclear-weapon States are placed under IAEA safeguards, as urged by the NPT Conference. Verification of some such material released from the weapons programme of the United States was started a year ago. These expanded efforts could require new arrangements to ensure that the released material would permanently remain under safeguards and that the financing of such verification is assured.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Last year I reported that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not in full compliance with its safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT. This continues to be the case. In the framework that was agreed to between the DPRK and the USA on 21 October 1994, the DPRK agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and stated its intention eventually to come into full compliance with the safeguards agreement. As you are aware, the Security Council, confirming that the DPRK's safeguards agreement remains in force and binding, requested the Agency to take the necessary steps to monitor the freeze. With the authorization of the Board, we have been doing this inter alia through the maintenance of a continuous presence of Agency inspectors in the DPRK. I can confirm that the freeze has been put into effect and has been maintained to date. For the DPRK to come into full compliance with the safeguards agreement, however, it must enable the Agency to verify effectively the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's declaration of its nuclear material subject to safeguards. Until this co-operation - long overdue - comes about, it is essential that all necessary steps be taken to preserve information that may be relevant to the eventual verification of the DPRK's initial declaration.
Technical meetings have been held with the DPRK on a number of occasions to discuss activities that are required by the Agency for it to fulfil its obligations under the safeguards agreement including monitoring the freeze. Since the first of these discussions in November last year, arrangements have been made which enable the Agency to meet many of its obligations. However, a number of issues remain to be resolved, including the measures required for the preservation of information.
Iraq
Let me now turn to Iraq. As I reported to the General Assembly last year, it is our conclusion that the essential components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon programme have been identified and destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. This assessment was not based on faith in Iraqi statements, but on data gathered during inspection, on information provided by the suppliers and Member States and, to a great extent, on analysis of the large number of original documents which were obtained in Iraq early in the inspection process. Since August 1994, IAEA inspectors have been continuously present in Iraq to perform on-going monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. This does not exclude the further conduct of inspections for the purpose of investigation, should such an investigation be called for, for example, to verify new information.
Recently the IAEA received additional information on Iraq's former nuclear weapons programme by way of new declarations, voluminous documents and other materials, which were transmitted to the IAEA and UNSCOM by Iraq following the departure of the former Iraqi Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization. What we have been told is that in 1990, Iraqi authorities instituted a crash project to take safeguarded highly enriched research reactor fuel and transform the fissile material for use in a nuclear weapon. It is uncertain whether Iraq would have been able to overcome the considerable technical difficulties involved in this project. As it was, the project was made impossible by damage inflicted on the nuclear research centre at Tuwaitha by the January 1991 bombing and the safeguarded nuclear fuel was fully accounted for in the IAEA post-war inspection. The new Iraqi declarations, along with all of the documents and materials to which I have referred, are currently being carefully examined for any new data. What can be concluded at this stage is that Iraq's withholding of information, documents and materials clearly constitutes a breach of Iraqi obligations under the Security Council resolutions and that the crash programme was in violation of the safeguards agreement and the NPT.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
As requested last year by the Agency's General Conference, the Agency has continued to assist the African States in their effort to establish an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and in particular to help elaborate its verification regime. A draft treaty text which, inter alia, entrusts the Agency with the task of verification, was adopted by the African Heads of States in Addis Ababa last June and is now before the General Assembly. We look forward to performing the verification role in an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
The General Conference of the IAEA continues to call upon all parties directly concerned in the Middle East to consider taking the practical and appropriate steps required to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region. This year's resolution once again requested the Director General to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region and the preparation of model verification agreements as a step toward to the establishment of such a zone. I intend to continue my visits to and consultations with States in the region in order further to explore the verification questions and the material obligations which may be agreed upon and which may call for verification.
Trafficking in Nuclear Materials
For the last two years the international community has been expressing alarm at the number of incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials as well as other radioactive sources. Although the reported cases in 1995 show a decreasing trend, this is no cause for complacency. It is clear that greater efforts are needed and that States must pay increased attention to the physical protection of all radioactive material - and especially weapons useable nuclear material - whether in use, transport or storage. While the primary responsibility in the field of illegal trafficking falls upon the State concerned, authorities in many countries, as well as a number of international organizations, are seeking to strengthen and co-ordinate their efforts to better protect and control radioactive materials. The IAEA has recently hosted a large inter-agency meeting for that purpose.
Within the IAEA a plan of action has been put in place. The Agency is establishing a data base of trafficking incidents to provide factual information to Member States' governments and to the public. Further, as effective national accounting and protection is the basic prerequisite for preventing nuclear material from falling into unauthorized hands, the Agency is conducting training courses in the implementation of State systems of accounting and control of nuclear material and in physical protection methods and technology. The Agency has also co-ordinated technical support efforts in the upgrading of physical protection of nuclear material in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, with the assistance of many donor countries.
Nuclear Safety
Since the Chernobyl accident, the Agency's role in the field of nuclear safety has been gradually expanding. In addition to the sharing of information and the development of safety guidelines and standards, the Agency has moved progressively in the field of providing advisory services to Member States, such as the Operational Safety Advisory Review Teams (OSARTs) which provide expert services in assessing and advising on operational safety of power reactors, and the Analysis of Safety Significant Events Teams (ASSETs). Agency work on assessment of the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union has continued; an international consensus now exists on the major safety issues and their significance for each of the various reactor types. The emphasis is now shifting to a review of the status of implementation of the proposed safety improvements and to the collection of up-to-date information on the upgrading situation at each of the reactors involved. The results of our work provides input into bilateral and multilateral assistance projects co-ordinated by the G-24 mechanisms in Brussels.
The decision to operate - or not to operate - a reactor is a national prerogative. The IAEA has not been given any supranational competence in this regard. However, the Agency continues to provide, upon request, expert advice on the safety of reactors and on safety improvements needed. On some occasions the Agency has advised that it would be imprudent for a particular reactor to operate unless safety improvements were ensured.
No nuclear accident has been the subject of more analysis, both as regards its causes and its consequences, than the one at Chernobyl. Even so - or perhaps precisely for this reason - the accounts and explanations vary considerably, especially as to the radiological impact of the accident on the health of the affected people and the environment. It is evidently desirable that this impact be scientifically established as is the radiological impact of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the tragic accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986, the Agency and several other organizations - e.g. the WHO and EU - are organizing, in April next year, an international conference to seek a common understanding of the nature and magnitude of the consequences of that accident. Let me add that while such understanding is highly desirable, there is no reason for anybody to delay action and assistance to alleviate the situation of the people concerned. Many inquiries following the Chernobyl accident have documented the distressing situation in which they live.
In the field of nuclear power safety, the IAEA has long issued recommendations based on best experience and practice. More recently the Agency has also moved to developing binding international safety standards. This is a clear manifestation of the increased interest of the international community that nuclear safety be at a high level everywhere. There is a growing realization that an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere. A major accomplishment was the adoption in June last year of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. So far the Convention has been signed by 59 States. It may be expected to enter into force next year. This month representatives of signatories of the Convention and other interested States will hold their second meeting to discuss matters relating to the implementation process.
Still in the field of nuclear safety and security, let me note that these subjects will be taken up at a summit meeting to be hosted in Russia next spring. It is to be hoped that the summit will give political impetus to work in the field of nuclear safety and security, thereby reducing risks and making nuclear power more broadly acceptable to the public.
Nuclear Waste
Nuclear waste disposal remains a major concern among the public in many countries. This concern might lessen when governments and industry have actually established repositories for wastes of different levels of radioactivity. From the scientific and technical standpoint there are no serious obstacles to the building of repositories which remain safe for extremely long periods of time. The selection of disposal sites, however, often meets with opposition. We can only place our faith in the effect of rational argument. An open dialogue with the public is required. The IAEA continues to be active in the field of radioactive waste management, including providing assistance to developing States in building up infrastructures for waste management, and promoting the minimization, safe processing, storage and disposal of radioactive wastes. I am pleased to report that work has already started on the preparation of a Convention on the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste providing binding standards. Significant progress has been made and it is to be hoped that a final draft could perhaps be ready sometime next year.
Energy to Support Sustainable Development
One of the greatest challenges facing the international community is to find the proper means of providing sufficient energy for sustainable development. That is to say providing energy without unacceptable damage to the environment. Experts have concluded that goals to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels are not attainable by the year 2000 under present conditions. In national action reports prepared by parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change many countries report that they will not achieve the goal they have set for themselves, goals that they have already agreed are not adequate for the long term. Indeed, looking around in the world we can easily see how the need for development and the correlated need for greater energy use is leading to the construction of ever more installations burning coal, oil or gas. Extensive analysis of energy options is clearly needed if we are to resolve the dilemma between development and preservation of the environment.
It is not very meaningful to analyse the economic and ecological aspects of any given energy option in isolation. All sources and uses of energy have their risks - as, indeed, an absence of energy carries risks. Only an analysis of different options side by side can tell us which energy policy is economically and ecologically least burdensome.
The IAEA is co-operating with several international organizations in drawing up methodologies and data bases for comparative assessment of different options for the production of electric power. An international symposium addressed this issue in Vienna last month. This is an area where difficult policy decisions must be taken. Governments need to devise long-term energy policies that are economically and ecologically acceptable. Solar power, wind power, biomass and other renewables will bring a valuable but minor contribution to the global energy supply within the next few decades. There is scope for more efficient energy use, and it should be promoted. In most places it will not offset the need for additional energy and it is evident that developing countries will need energy in much greater amounts. There are no new energy sources on the horizon that can magically meet these needs. Fusion is still very distant.
Expansion of nuclear power, which now provides about 8% of the world's energy and 17% of its electricity, could provide a part of the solution on the supply side without increasing emissions of CO2, SO2 or NOx. The main obstacle to increased use of nuclear energy is public concern with safety, radioactive waste and non-proliferation. Any particular energy mix chosen has to be based on comparative risk assessment of the various sources of energy and will need to be thoroughly explained to the public. The IAEA will continue to make available the data that are relevant in this regard and factual information relevant to nuclear safety radioactive waste and non-proliferation.
Few developing countries have a technological level and infrastructure that would allow them to make use of the present type of nuclear power reactor. It is to be hoped that in the future smaller and less costly nuclear reactors will become available for use by developing countries for the generation of electricity and perhaps in the desalination of water to compensate for scarce fresh water resources. Developing countries, members of the IAEA, are keenly interested in these questions. It is obvious that the rapidly increasing number of cities of more than a million, even more than 10 million, inhabitants in developing countries cannot be provided with electricity generated by, say, solar cells, wind mills or biomass. Their real choice for decades to come will be between fossil fuels and nuclear power.
Technical Co-operation
At present only a few developing countries use nuclear power. However, most of them are intensely interested in non-power nuclear techniques that may help their development and the IAEA is engaged in assisting the transfer of such techniques. Emphasis is being placed on techniques which will contribute to sustainable development, food production and preservation, the harnessing of fresh water resources, industrial uses and the promotion of human health. The Agency has undertaken several initiatives recently to strengthen its technical co-operation programme and to make it more effective and more relevant to sustainable development. Working together with Member States, the Secretariat has started preparing country programme frameworks which will help focus the technical co- operation programmes on key areas of government priority, with fewer but better focused projects. Another measure planned is the promotion of technical co-operation among developing countries or TCDC, with the aim of sub-contracting institutions in developing countries which are recognized as centers of excellence in a particular field to implement selected technical co-operation projects.
At the NPT Review and Extension Conference all participants acknowledged the importance of the work of the Agency as the principal agent for the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries and welcomed the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme. It was also recognized that the success of these programmes depends on the availability of predictable resources. I sincerely hope that the Agency's Member States will pay their contributions to the technical co-operation fund in full and in time for the Agency to be able to continue to perform its development mission successfully.
Co-ordination in the UN System
During the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations I cannot close my statement to the General Assembly without some comments on co-ordination within the UN family, of organizations and on effectiveness and efficiency. In both respects severe criticism has been voiced.
That co-ordination is difficult in a vast system of organizations, authorities and administrations is no novelty to national governments, many of whom have experience of similar problems, although they have the advantage of a central government and a legislature. Within the UN family action by ECOSOC and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) and under informal contacts and arrangements can help harmonize activities and prevent some overlap. Between the IAEA and the United Nations, the most important contacts occur in cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements. The cases of Iraq and the DPRK have given us much experience in co-operation.
The ACC, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, is increasingly - and, I think, with some success - trying to ensure effective system-wide responses in matters - such as sustainable development, African development, the role of women - which are relevant in all or most organizations. The technique recently employed of indicating lead agencies for certain questions may prove helpful.
Effectiveness and Efficiency in the UN System
Effective action by organizations in the UN family is in many cases directly dependent on the degree of co-operation that can be achieved between Member States. There is also much action that is undertaken mainly by the Secretariats. Here effectiveness depends largely upon the same factors as those which influence efficiency: availability of adequate and predictable resources, co-operation of States that may be affected and last, but not least, the competence and skill of management and staff in the Secretariats. We stand or fall on the quality of our management and staff. This is true of the IAEA and, I am sure, for the other organizations in the UN family.
The IAEA has some unique features which continue to serve us well in staffing, but which may also deter some qualified experts to join us: professional staff are not recruited for a career in the IAEA but for a period of five to seven years. This policy of rotation has been followed to ensure a continuous influx of talents fresh from laboratories, nuclear installations and other institutions, talents abreast of the latest developments in their field. To have the respect and co-operation of the experts with whom our staff interact in Member States, our professional staff must be on par with the national experts.
Remuneration in the Common System
I am not suggesting that there is a direct correlation between remuneration and work delivery. However, there is not the slightest doubt that when weighing the pros and cons of employment in an international organization, remuneration, home leaves, education grants for children, pension benefits, etc. have a very significant impact on potential candidates and, hence, on our ability to recruit staff of the highest calibre.
In this regard, the IAEA and other organizations are dependent upon the so-called UN Common System of remuneration, to which we have adhered. This system, as it now stands, falls short on several counts. Let me give you just a few illustrations. We have general service staff who turn down offers of posts at the professional level because this would lower their salary. Since 1984 professional remuneration in Vienna has lost about 20% of its purchasing power. A senior energy economist who goes from the Agency to the World Bank may expect a 40 percent higher salary; a safeguards inspector who leaves the Agency for EURATOM may expect his income to increase by at least one third. We do not know how many candidates refrain from applying for a job in the Agency because they are offered better conditions elsewhere, but we know that only 4-6 percent of those who nowadays apply for jobs with us meet our exacting recruitment standards.
Salary Increase for Improved Recruitment
As Director General of the IAEA I joined other executive heads in a statement recently adopted by the ACC which inter alia endorses the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) recommended salary increase which would bring UN remuneration into the middle of the margin range approved by the General Assembly. Such a step, in itself urgently needed, would have to be subsequently supplemented, however, by a longer term strategy of restoring competitivity.
An improvement in the remuneration system is not a panacea to all the problems that UN organizations are facing in management. It might even look to some as an odd response to a critical financial situation and to sharp criticisms for waste and inefficiency. I would submit, however, that the remuneration system is part of the present problem. Unless management is given the ability and freedom to recruit professional staff of the highest calibre from anywhere in the world - and this can only be done if remuneration is internationally competitive and governments refrain from interfering in a fair selection process - it will be hard, if not impossible, to achieve the continuous improvement in quality and efficiency that is rightly called for in the Secretariats of UN organizations.
I am sorry to bring these mundane matters before you, but this august body, the General Assembly, not only lays down political guidance to us in Vienna but also decides on employment and other conditions which directly affect our and other international organizations' ability to fulfil the mandates given to us.
Let me end on a nice note telling you that Vienna, although in some respects an expensive city, is an excellent work station and the Austrian Government and the City of Vienna the friendliest of hosts.