Since the establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency, we have been dedicated to the achievement and promotion of a vision, “Atoms For Peace”: on the one hand, the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, with the aim of their eventual elimination - and on the other, the sharing of safe and secure nuclear technologies in peaceful applications that benefit humankind. I will speak briefly today about the IAEA’s progress in working toward those goals.
Technology
Nuclear Power
The urgent need for sustained human development will clearly necessitate increases in the supply of energy in the coming decades. Nuclear power continues to be a significant contributor to the world’s electricity supply, and is the only source that can provide electricity on a large scale with comparatively minimal impact on the environment. In 2001, nuclear power supplied 16.2% of the world’s electricity, up from 15.9% in 2000. This increase was mainly due to continuing improvements in the management of nuclear power plants.
With regard to the construction of new plants, Asia and Eastern Europe remain the centres of expansion. At the beginning of 2002, 17 of the 32 nuclear power plants under construction globally were in four States - China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea - with the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe accounting for an additional 10 units. Some important developments have also taken place recently in Western Europe and North America. The US Government is committed to work with the nuclear industry to have a new nuclear plant operating in the USA before the end of the decade. This would be the first decision to build a new nuclear plant in the USA since the 1970s. And in May, the Finnish Parliament ratified the Government’s favourable “decision-in-principle” to build a fifth nuclear power plant. This is also the first decision to build a new reactor in Western Europe in 15 years, and contrasts with past decisions in Belgium, Germany and Sweden to phase out nuclear energy.
In the light of this renewed interest in nuclear power, a key challenge for the industry will be to prove that available new designs address the often expressed concerns about nuclear power. Work is being carried out on many new designs that aim to produce electricity at an enhanced level of safety and with improved economic competitiveness. Some designs include additional goals, such as producing potable water at minimal cost, incinerating long lived radioactive waste and reducing plutonium stockpiles.
The IAEA continues to encourage technology development and innovation, for example, through its International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). INPRO is currently working with both developed and developing countries to understand and define the requirements of future potential users of nuclear power, in areas such as safety, non-proliferation, waste disposal, infrastructure capabilities and economics.
Waste Management
With respect to the management and disposal of spent fuel and high level radioactive waste - a major point of public concern with respect to nuclear power - I am pleased to report that some important progress has taken place in the past twelve months. In the USA, the selection of the Yucca Mountain site as a repository for high level waste and spent fuel has already been approved by the President and the Congress. And Sweden has begun geological investigation of candidate sites for a spent fuel repository. Thus - together with Finland’s decision last year to go forward with a deep disposal facility near the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant - it is likely that by the end of the next decade, one or more high level waste repositories will be in operation. This is essential to gaining public acceptance and public confidence, by demonstrating that technologically and environmentally sound waste disposal solutions exist and are actually working.
Late last year, the Agency launched a new initiative to assist Member States in their efforts to move forward with the disposal of high level and long lived radioactive wastes through a “Network of Centres of Excellence” for training and for demonstration of disposal technologies in underground research facilities. This network, built initially around facilities made available by the Governments of Canada and Belgium, has now expanded to include underground facilities in Switzerland and the USA. To date, 19 developing Member States have indicated an interest in training scientists through the network.
Non-Power Nuclear Applications
Nuclear technologies in many areas other than nuclear power provide preferred solutions - and sometimes the only solutions - to economic and social problems. As the Agency reported at the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development, of the more than $500 million worth of technical co-operation provided by the IAEA in the last ten years, more than 800 projects, valued at over $200 million, have specifically supported Agenda 21 priorities such as “Land and Agriculture,” “Human Health” and “Fresh Water.” I would point out that one of the conclusions of the Summit emphasized the need to ensure capacity building and the transfer and use of modern technology as a prerequisite for development. The IAEA is contributing energetically to this effort.
Many of the IAEA’s developing Member States have given high priority to the introduction or upgrading of radiotherapy services. Radiotherapy is used with curative or palliative benefit for over 50% of cancer patients in industrialized countries. However, fully two-thirds of global teletherapy equipment serves the populations of industrialized countries - and the remaining one-third is stretched among the remaining 5.5 billion people. We expect therefore that requests for assistance will increase, especially given our recent successes in initiating radiotherapy programmes in developing Member States such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Mongolia, Namibia and Uganda.
Tsetse flies, and the sleeping sickness they transmit to humans and the ngana disease they transmit to livestock, create a significant burden on rural populations across Sub-Saharan Africa - not only in terms of direct health effects, but also by restricting the use of draft animals in crop production. The IAEA supports the efforts of African Member States to implement their tsetse eradication campaign across the continent, with the expanded application of the radiation-induced sterile insect technique. Mali has begun preparation for releasing sterilized tsetse flies over an area of 2500 square kilometres, and Ethiopia is constructing a factory for sterile tsetse production that will supply a similar project over a 5000 square kilometre area.
The use of isotope hydrology to manage water resources is continuing to gain recognition through IAEA technical co-operation projects in 40 countries around the world. Isotope production is being used in Latin America and elsewhere to map underground aquifers for improved groundwater management, and has been used in Asia for investigation of and recovery from contamination events. In addition, we are exploring uses of isotope hydrology to assist in river basin management and — based on our successful experience in Venezuela in isolating and correcting dam leakage — we are working with multiple teams under the African Regional Co-operative Agreement to assess the leakage and structural integrity of dozens of dams across Africa.
Radiation is used regularly in an extensive range of industrial applications, ranging from the sterilization of medical products to the surface treatment of sheet metal and piping to enhance corrosion resistance. Radioisotopes are used to map and enhance the productivity of oil fields in the Middle East and elsewhere, and for trouble shooting in various operational aspects of petrochemical complexes. And in the Republic of Korea, an electron beam facility is being used to enhance the treatment of waste water from a dye complex.
These are only a few of the ways in which the IAEA is using nuclear technologies to support development goals, by working closely with, and responding, to the needs and priorities of our Member States.
Safety
Safety in nuclear activities around the globe is vital to the continued sustainability of nuclear technologies. While safety is primarily a national responsibility, it is equally a legitimate international concern. A nuclear or radiological accident, like other environmental accidents, respects no boundaries. It is satisfying therefore, to note that nuclear safety continues to improve at power plants worldwide. Still, more work needs to be done. The need for a more effective and transparent global nuclear safety regime thus continues to be a high priority for the IAEA.
The development and adoption of legally binding norms has proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing safety worldwide. The Early Notification and Assistance Conventions are long established. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management has been in force for over a year. And in April, the IAEA hosted the second review meeting of the contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Vienna. However, many States are not yet party to these conventions, and certain key areas of the nuclear fuel cycle are still not subject to conventions.
The continuing evolution of a comprehensive body of safety standards, together with assistance in their implementation, is another key component of the global safety regime. In the mid-1990s, the IAEA undertook a systematic, rigorous effort to overhaul its entire corpus of standards. The new standards that have resulted are of the highest calibre, represent current international best practice and should be viewed as being universally applicable.
Safety standards are only effective, however, when applied in practice. The IAEA’s safety services - which range in focus from operational and radiation safety to safety culture and regulatory review - use Agency standards as a baseline, assist Member States in their application, and provide important feedback on their effectiveness. These safety services provide support and share valuable insights, and I continue to urge all Member States to use them.
Many Member States express concern over the risks involved in the transport of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive material. Work is continuing on refining the IAEA’s regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material. Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) missions, which help transporting countries to assess their effectiveness in applying IAEA transport standards, were carried out in Brazil and the United Kingdom this year. A TranSAS mission will be carried out in Turkey early next year, and preliminary discussions are underway with the Panamanian authorities for a possible mission that would include appraising operations in the Panama Canal. It is important that Member States - particularly transporting countries - make use of this valuable service. Naturally, the Agency will continue its efforts, in co-operation with all concerned, to enhance all aspects of transport safety. At an international conference next year, we will provide a forum for all interested Member States to discuss these transport safety issues in a comprehensive manner.
Against Nuclear Terrorism
Although the responsibility to counter potential acts of nuclear terrorism rests primarily with individual States, international co-operation is essential. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the IAEA moved swiftly to conduct a thorough review of its programmes related to preventing acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism, and to develop a comprehensive plan for upgrading nuclear security worldwide. The plan supplements national efforts in such areas as the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; the detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials - such as illicit trafficking across borders; and improved control of radioactive sources.
The plan is now being implemented on all fronts. Peer reviews have been carried out to assess the physical protection at nuclear power plants and other facilities. Workshops and training courses have been held to help governments assess the threats to their nuclear facilities, raise their standards of security, improve control of nuclear and radioactive material, upgrade their border monitoring, and prepare response plans for nuclear and radiological emergencies. We have also sent missions to Afghanistan, Georgia, and Uganda to assist in recovering radiological sources that went astray or were not adequately protected. And in mid-June, a partnership was established between Russia, the USA and the Agency to locate and secure powerful radioactive sources that were lost or abandoned during the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. In parallel we are also working towards global adherence to a strengthened Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
Effectively upgrading security to protect against nuclear and radiological terrorism will require a sustained, multi-year effort. We will continue to work vigorously with governments to reduce our vulnerability to nuclear terrorism.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
The universalization, consolidation and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including concrete steps to reduce the number of, and dependence on, nuclear weapons, are more important than ever for the continued credibility of the regime. As reaffirmed in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, IAEA verification continues to play a critical role in ensuring the health and vitality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The IAEA’s verification activities are designed to provide assurance that nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In the early 1990s, after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, the international community committed itself to provide the Agency the authority to strengthen its verification capability - specifically, its ability to provide assurance not only that declared nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful purposes, but equally important, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist.
This broader authority, however, is still far from universal. Regrettably, 49 States have yet to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to bring safeguards agreements with the IAEA into force, and since 1997, when the Model Additional Protocol was adopted, only 28 such protocols have entered into force. This is clearly not a satisfactory situation, far from it Without safeguards agreements in force, the Agency cannot perform any verification activities or provide any assurance of non-proliferation. And for States without additional protocols, IAEA rights of access remain essentially the same as in pre-Iraq days. The Agency can only provide the required assurances if we are given the corresponding authority.
Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq
Since December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to implement Security Council mandated verification activities in Iraq. The inspection activities that came to an abrupt halt at that time had successfully thwarted Iraq’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons programme - by destroying, removing, or rendering harmless all of Iraq’s facilities, equipment and material relevant to nuclear weapons production. In the intervening four years, we have continued to use satellite monitoring and conduct other analytical work; however, no remote analysis can enable us to reach conclusions without thorough on-site inspections.
With the adoption last Friday of Security Council Resolution 1441, we are now preparing to resume our inspection activities in Iraq as early as next week when the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and I are expected to lead an advance team of inspectors to Baghdad.
In my view, the success of inspections in Iraq will depend on five interrelated prerequisites: (1) Immediate and unfettered access to all locations and sites in Iraq and the full use of the authority provided to the inspecting organizations by the Security Council; (2) timely access to all sources of information, including all information available to States; (3) unified and full support by the Security Council throughout the inspection process; (4) the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspection process, free from outside interference; and (5) active co-operation from Iraq, with a sustained demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent, and to assist the inspecting organizations in fully carrying out their missions.
I appeal to the Government of Iraq to provide its full co-operation, and to the international community to give inspections all the required support. I hope and trust that with such cooperation and support we should be able to effectively discharge our mandate.
Status of Safeguards Agreement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Since 1993, the IAEA has been unable to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Due to a lack of access to information and sites, we continue to be unable to verify that the DPRK has made a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards under its NPT safeguards agreement.
Recent reports have suggested that the DPRK has in addition been working on an undeclared programme to produce highly enriched uranium. We have promptly asked the DPRK to confirm these reports, and expressed the need to discuss, at a senior level, this and all other issues relevant to DPRK compliance with its obligations under the NPT safeguards agreement. We have yet to receive a response.
Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East
Pursuant to the mandate given to me by the IAEA General Conference, I have continued to consult with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and the development of model safeguards agreements that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. I regret to report that I have not been in a position to make any progress in the implementation of this important mandate of direct relevance to security in the Middle East. As before, I will continue to exert every effort within my authority and, I trust, with the co-operation of all concerned, to move these discussions forward.
Nuclear Arms Control Efforts
Earlier this year, the Russian and US presidents signed a treaty in Moscow to further reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700 and 2200, respectively, by the end of 2012, and agreed to remove additional amounts of fissile material from military use. Also, at their June Summit, the G8 Heads of State established a Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and made a commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the next ten years to fund, inter alia, the disposition of excess weapons-origin fissile materials. These are important steps that hopefully will be followed by others, to generate momentum in moving the stalled nuclear arms control agenda forward.
I should mention that preparatory work has largely been concluded under the initiative by Russia and the USA to submit nuclear material released from their military programmes to IAEA verification, to provide assurance that they are irreversibly removed from these programmes. It is now for Russia and the USA to indicate the timing, modalities and types of material that they are ready to submit to IAEA verification.
Management of the Agency
This brief review of some of the IAEA’s activities makes it clear that the scope of our work continues to expand. Yet for fifteen years, despite these steadily growing responsibilities, the regular budget of the Agency has been essentially frozen. This policy has resulted in inadequate levels of financing for most of our areas of work. A primary example is in the safeguards area. With the chronic and corrosive degree of underfunding of this programme, and a continually expanding mission, we are coming close to being unable to provide credible safeguards. For the IAEA to fulfil its obligations and high priorities - while continuing to maintain appropriate balance between development and other statutory activities, as directed by our Member States - an increase in the level of resources for the next biennium is essential .
This overview of the past year of IAEA activities reflects a continuing evolution in all our areas of work - and, I believe, the dynamic nature of our programme in anticipating and responding to that evolution. The Agency continues to play a key role in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are shared globally, that nuclear activities are conducted safely, that nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities are adequately protected, and that a credible inspection regime exists to verify compliance with non-proliferation commitments. Naturally, our ability to effectively perform those functions depends on the commitment and support of our Member States, which I trust will continue to be forthcoming.
Let me conclude by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Government of Austria, which has continued for over four decades to be a most gracious and welcoming host to the IAEA.