On behalf of the entire staff of the Agency, I would like to join in extending my heartfelt condolences to the people and Government of the United States - and to all those directly affected by a tragedy that befell us all. We pray that they find the strength and faith to cope with their pain and sorrow.
This General Conference marks a time of personal reflection for me, as I am about to complete four years as Director General. I would like to review with you today some of the Agency's achievements and some of the challenges that we face in the three areas or pillars of our activities - technology, safety and verification. I will also discuss a number of topics related to technical co-operation and to Agency management.
Nuclear Power
The rapid expansion in global energy demand - and the growing awareness of the need for sustainable development - has put increasing focus on the environmental consequences of burning fossil fuels. Nuclear power is the principal alternative that can in the foreseeable future provide electricity on a large scale with practically no greenhouse gas emissions - yet nuclear power continues to be viewed with some concerns related to safety and non-proliferation.
The past twelve months have seen positive developments for nuclear power. In terms of performance, we have continued to see reduced generating costs, improved capacity factors, and the first licence extensions to 60-year lifetimes. Six new nuclear power plants were connected to the grid in the year 2000 - in Brazil, the Czech Republic, India, and Pakistan - and construction continued on 31 more, principally in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Views on the future of nuclear power, however, are still mixed: for example, while the United States Government's new Energy Policy gave an explicit endorsement to nuclear expansion, the German Government concluded an agreement with the industry to phase out nuclear power. This mixed view has also been reflected in the conclusions reached on the role of nuclear power at major conferences on climate change and sustainable development.
It may be too early to forecast how the future will unfold for nuclear power. Clearly there is a new, substantive debate on the role of nuclear power and a recognition in many quarters that its merits as a source of clean energy cannot simply be ignored. The crucial factors are three: whether nuclear power will be able to prove that it is a safe technology, whether it can be effectively safeguarded against diversion for non-peaceful purposes, and whether it is economically competitive.
There are currently around 25 innovative reactor and fuel cycle designs in various stages of development around the world. The Agency continues to provide technical assistance to Member States in their development efforts. In response to last year's General Conference resolution GC(44)/RES/22, we have established the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). The project objective is to support the safe, economical and proliferation resistant use of nuclear power to assist in meeting the global energy needs of the 21st century. The first phase of INPRO work will cover user requirements and potential applications. Ten Member States and the European Commission are currently actively engaged in this project through the provision of financial assistance and expertise.
The Agency has also continued to pay particular attention to the development of small and medium sized reactors for various applications, including seawater desalination. In May nearly 40 countries participated in our seminar in Cairo, Egypt, on small and medium sized reactors. A number of themes stood out clearly: economics, the need for designs to be demonstrated, the vital role of effective regulation, the successful resolution of waste issues and public acceptance.
Conferences on Climate Change and Sustainable Development
As I mentioned, nuclear power produces virtually no greenhouse gases - in fact, the use of nuclear power rather than fossil fuels reduces annual global carbon emissions by about 550 million tonnes (a total of 6200 million tonnes is emitted annually). But this point has not been translated into economic advantage because, until recently, there have been little to no limitations or taxes on greenhouse gas emissions and thus no economic value to their avoidance. In this context, the agreement reached in July in Bonn, at the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was an important development for nuclear power - a significant step towards widespread, co-ordinated restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, and thus towards giving tangible economic value to nuclear power's avoidance of such emissions.
Much of the press, in reporting on the Bonn Agreement, has focused on the exclusion of nuclear for emission reduction credits under two of the three flexible mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol to meet targets for greenhouse gas reduction1/ - specifically Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The lack of JI and CDM endorsement means that nuclear power must continue to prove itself in all countries as a least cost option under privatized market conditions, without depending on its environmental benefits for financial incentive. But on the other hand, as I mentioned, a more level playing field for nuclear power and other low greenhouse gas emitting technologies has been established through the Bonn Agreement, by prescribing that other technologies should internalize the cost of greenhouse gas emissions.
Another significant development in the past year was the Ninth Session of the Commission for Sustainable Development, CSD-9, in April in New York. It was the first time the Commission focused specifically on energy, and it offered a forum for a full discussion of nuclear power and sustainable development. After two years of preparation, countries agreed to disagree on the role of nuclear power in sustainable development, but were in agreement that "the choice of nuclear energy rests with [individual] countries."
The debate on nuclear energy's role in sustainable development will continue at the next conference of the UNFCC parties in Marrakech and at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg next September. The Agency will contribute to the WSSD as it has to the climate change meetings and the Commission on Sustainable Development, providing comprehensive and objective information on the role that nuclear power and other nuclear applications can and do play in sustainable development.
Waste Management
The back end of the fuel cycle - spent fuel and waste management and facility decommissioning - continues to be a major point of public concern regarding the role of nuclear power.
Dozens of disposal facilities for low level and short lived radioactive waste have compiled solid safety and environmental records. Indeed, a number of disposal facilities have reached their full capacity, been decommissioned and closed. As a whole, near term waste concerns - specifically the disposal of low level and short lived waste and the storage of waste in all categories - are already being dealt with safely and effectively.
However, high level waste management and disposal still faces public opposition in many countries. Progress towards the demonstration of successful high level waste disposal is therefore key to the future of nuclear power.
In that regard, some progress is worthy of note. Research is continuing on new techniques to reduce actinide generation and to transmute long lived radioactive wastes. Research is also ongoing on methods of retrieving wastes from geological repositories after emplacement, in case concerns arise about the safety of the repository, or preferred solutions are developed in the future.
On the disposal front, the Finnish Parliament in May ratified the Government's decision to construct a deep disposal facility for spent fuel at Olkiluoto. In Sweden, the number of candidate sites being investigated for a spent fuel repository was narrowed from six to three, with detailed geological investigations to begin in 2002. And for the proposed geological repository site at Yucca Mountain in the USA, the Agency has been participating in a series of international peer reviews, in support of the site recommendation that may be made to the US President later this year.
Another important development is the new law in the Russian Federation on importing spent nuclear fuel. For some States with small amounts of fuel and no infrastructure for storage or disposal, exporting fuel to the Russian Federation for storage would be a preferred solution. The Russian law, together with the ongoing US programme to accept from foreign research reactors the return of fuel of US origin, could lead the way for exploration of the feasibility of regional or international spent fuel storage facilities and/or geological disposal facilities - an approach that could have comparative safety advantages.
The Agency continues to work to maintain international focus on waste management issues, and to accelerate progress towards demonstrated solutions. As agreed by the Board of Governors last week, we will be preparing an international action plan on the safety of radioactive waste management. We have provided a broad range of information and assistance programmes in managing wastes not only from nuclear power operations, but also from industrial and medical activities - including recently published technical guidance on waste minimization. Another aspect of Agency efforts involves stimulating co-operative research on waste disposal technologies. Last year Canada offered to make its underground laboratory at Lac du Bonnet available to the Agency as an international training and demonstration facility for geological disposal technology. Belgium has now made a similar offer regarding its underground research laboratory at Mol, and next month the Agency will convene a meeting to define an initial programme of demonstration and training and to establish an international network of centres of excellence in geological disposal.
Decommissioning
The other major component of the back end of the fuel cycle is facility decommissioning. Among the dozens of research reactors shut down in recent years, many have been in countries that lack the required infrastructure, expertise and/or funding for decommissioning - making research reactor decommissioning an urgent safety issue. Fuel cycle facilities also present specific decommissioning needs, owing to widespread alpha contamination, high waste volumes and overall complexity.
For nuclear power plants, the increased interest in extending plant lifetimes in some countries may result in fewer decommissionings than anticipated over the next decade. In all cases, however - whether power reactors, research reactors or fuel cycle facilities are at issue - decommissioning planning and preparation must continue to ensure adequate funding, expertise and regulatory infrastructure. The Agency is active in each of these areas, providing safety standards and technical guidance, monitoring Member State implementation, and providing technical assistance to ongoing decommissioning projects in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine.
Non-Power Nuclear Applications
A major part of the Agency's technology activity is focused on transferring nuclear technology in applications other than nuclear power. Under both co-ordinated research projects (CRPs) and the technical co-operation (TC) programme, the Agency works to build up the scientific and technological capacities of its Member States, and functions as a catalyst for social and economic development. Let me mention a few examples.
In the area of human health, radiotherapy has long been recognized as a valuable tool in both the cure and palliation of cancer. The focus of Agency assistance in this area is increasingly shifting to developing countries, as life expectancies increase and cancer rates go up. Out of the projected 15 million cases in 2015, about 10 million are expected to be in developing countries. The Agency assesses shortfalls in the availability of radiation therapy services through its Directory of Radiotherapy Centres, currently collecting data from over 160 countries. We then seek to build up indigenous capabilities by training practitioners, improving the quality of therapy equipment, and increasing treatment quality and effectiveness. In Latin America, for example, university training has been established under an Agency TC project to address the regional need for a more than fourfold increase in medical physicists. Cyclotron facilities have been set up in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan and the Syrian Arab Republic for the localized production of short lived radionuclides for medical application. Agency projects have also focused on creating radiation oncology "Centres of Competence" in interested developing Member States - primarily in Africa and Eastern Europe in the past two years - using independent audit teams to evaluate all components of clinical practice, medical physics and radiation safety standards.
Malaria, a disease with a global impact of nearly half a billion clinical cases and about two million deaths per year, has become another target of the Agency's human health programme. Nuclear techniques for the molecular detection of drug resistant strains of malaria have been introduced in Kenya, Mali, Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, greatly facilitating treatment programmes at a speed and cost savings that conventional tests cannot achieve. On a related front, in response to last year's General Conference resolution (GC(44)/RES/24), preparations for laboratory and field research have been initiated to assess the feasibility of applying SIT to control or eradicate malaria-bearing mosquitoes.
In the area of water management, nuclear techniques are gaining increasing recognition. The Agency programme on isotope hydrology now includes 75 active TC projects in some 40 Member States. In Ethiopia, for example, the use of isotope hydrology helped to tap a new groundwater field to provide more than 40% of Addis Ababa's water supply. In view of the Agency's achievements in this field, we have been asked to lead the United Nations system celebration of World Water Day - focused on "Water for Development" - in March 2002.
Progress on developing nuclear techniques for the detection of abandoned land mines was assessed just last week at a research co-ordination meeting in St. Petersburg. These techniques could be significantly less costly and less labour intensive than conventional techniques. Two detection instruments are being developed - one based on neutron activation and the other on neutron scattering. Field tests on the former - the PELAN pulsed neutron generator - will be carried out under a European regional TC project.
In the area of food and agriculture, significant progress was made in the past year on a number of fronts. In the USA, for example, the use of food irradiation to ensure microbiological safety increased, with commercial scale irradiation of meat products and tropical fruit. In other countries such as Belgium, China, South Africa and Thailand, some varieties of irradiated foods have been made available at retail levels. The Agency has been working with the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and others to harmonize the international regulatory framework on food irradiation - as well as to transfer the technology to interested Member States.
Agricultural yield and livestock production continue to be enhanced by the expanding application of the sterile insect technique (SIT). At their July 2001 summit in Lusaka, the Heads of African State and Government approved a plan for the Pan-African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign (PATTEC), which will be supported by the IAEA, WHO and FAO, among others, to fight diseases that plague many African Member States. And the variety of applications for this technique continues to grow. The use of SIT to control fruit fly pests has long been recognized as an environmentally friendly alternative to insecticides. Pilot SIT control projects in various stages of progress in Israel, Jordan, the Philippines, South Africa and Thailand have been effective in reducing insecticide use and associated fruit losses - which should result in significant economic and environmental benefits to the affected countries.
As part of a long term Agency TC project, assistance with biosaline agriculture is ongoing in nine Member States. Salinization is a land use problem that can threaten human and animal life support systems in both developed and developing countries, but it is especially frequent and serious in arid and semiarid regions. A mixture of nuclear and conventional techniques is used both to assess the soil-groundwater-plant ecosystem and to develop technological options for recovering these saline lands for agriculture. Separate but related activities at the FAO/IAEA laboratory at Seibersdorf are continuing to develop salt tolerant strains of rice and other plants for field testing and eventual use in saline land recovery.
To improve indigenous industrial processes and products, radiation processing facilities have been set up in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan and the Syrian Arab Republic, supported in part by Agency TC projects. These facilities have a vast array of applications with positive impact on social and economic development. Examples include the sterilization of medical products, the production of hydrogen for medical use, and the surface treatment of metal sheeting and piping to enhance corrosion resistance.
Laboratory Activities
A primary role for the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf continues to be a focus on capacity building by training scientists from developing Member States in nuclear technologies. This quality training focuses on specific nuclear applications ranging from environmental monitoring to mutation plant breeding - including intensive courses, fellowships with hands-on practical studies, and research fellowships that last up to one year. Advanced studies and research for developing countries are also the focus of the IAEA-UNESCO Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Trieste, Italy - with more than 40 courses, workshops and conferences already scheduled for 2002.
Another important role for the Seibersdorf laboratories is to assist developing country laboratories in establishing the quality assurance practices to become accredited in nuclear analytical techniques. Regional TC projects are providing this assistance in Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and are now beginning in East Asia.
The Agency's Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco has been giving priority to the use of nuclear techniques for the sustainable management of coastal zones - the parts of the ocean closest to human use and needs. The proposed 2002-2003 programme groups together marine and terrestrial environmental activities. New directions include laboratory and field work on issues such as coastal water contamination, fishery concerns, harmful algae bloom and land-ocean groundwater interactions.
New Approach to Co-ordinated Research Projects
Last year nearly $7 million - plus significant extrabudgetary contributions - were awarded to institutes under Agency CRPs. In a new approach, the Agency is introducing advanced degree training by pairing research groups from developed countries with corresponding teams from developing countries. This capacity building approach is being tested with a few selected CRPs. In one example, nuclear tracing techniques will be used to evaluate the status of micronutrients in chronically undernourished populations. The research contracts awarded to developing countries will be used as fellowships in support of PhD studies in nutritional science at local universities, with paired institutions from developed countries providing co-operative study and supervision.
Challenges in Nuclear Technology
To conclude my review of developments in the nuclear technology field, I would like to highlight three important challenges. First, we must continue to encourage innovation in reactor and fuel cycle technology in a manner that matches the energy needs and requirements of users worldwide. For public acceptance, it is crucial that nuclear power technology, like other technologies, be innovative and be perceived as such. Second, we must increase our focus on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, providing solutions that create confidence about the safety of the entire cycle. And third, we must continue to provide Member States with objective and comprehensive information - including comparative assessments - to enable them to make informed choices about the use of nuclear technologies.
Safety in nuclear activities around the globe is also key to the future of nuclear energy. Since the Chernobyl accident, safety performance has continued to show significant improvement, but much remains to be done, at both the national and international levels.
International Conventions
The development and adoption of legally binding norms has proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing nuclear safety worldwide. However, many States are not yet party to the major conventions; certain key areas of nuclear activity are still not subject to conventions; and some of the conventions that exist are not comprehensive in their coverage.
I am pleased to report that the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management entered into force in June. The Joint Convention aims to ensure the protection of individuals, society and the environment during all stages of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. The first review meeting of the Contracting Parties is expected to take place in 2003.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety provides an important mechanism to ensure that key nuclear safety and radiological safety measures are in place at nuclear power plants. All but two of the States with nuclear power reactors are now party to the Convention. I urge all States that have not already done so to become parties to all the safety related Conventions. In addition, I believe we should continue to consider the merits of establishing legally binding norms in areas not currently covered by conventions.
Establishment of International Safety Standards
The development and maintenance of a comprehensive body of safety standards, together with the provision of assistance in their implementation, is a key component of the Agency's safety role.
The Agency's safety standards can influence national nuclear safety regulations, and an increasing number of States use IAEA standards directly or as the reference basis for their national regulations and guidelines.
The Secretariat, with the assistance of the Commission on Safety Standards, has initiated a study of the overall structure of IAEA safety standards to ensure that they are complete and updated. One critical gap is being addressed in the preparation of safety standards for fuel cycle facilities - a subprogramme beginning this month. We are also developing safety standards for the disposal of spent fuel and high level waste in geological repositories.
Application of Safety Standards
Safety standards can be effective only if applied in practice. The Agency continues to assist Member States in applying its standards, promoting information exchange on best safety practices, providing education and training for technical and regulatory personnel, targeting technical co-operation projects to specific Member State safety needs and rendering a broad range of safety services in response to Member State requests.
The Agency's safety services continue to be in high demand, particularly peer review missions in which international experts provide independent advice based on IAEA safety standards and best international practices. The benefits of these services are proven by the increasing degree to which follow-up missions find that identified safety problems have been resolved. Some services cover a broad scope, such as reviews of design or operational safety, or evaluations of national regulatory programmes; others focus on specific areas, such as seismic or fire safety or equipment ageing concerns.
In the past year, the Secretariat has begun to develop a more comprehensive approach to assessing the safety of a country's overall nuclear programme - an "Integrated Safety Evaluation." Our current intention would divide this service into two tracks. The first would evaluate a State's legal and governmental infrastructure in terms of the effectiveness of the national regulatory body. The second track would focus in parallel on all aspects of the safety of nuclear activities, including facility design and operation, radiation safety, control of radioactive sources, spent fuel and waste management, and the transport of radioactive materials.
The Integrated Safety Evaluation would thus provide a diagnostic of the country's overall "nuclear safety profile", tailored to the degree of complexity of the country's nuclear programme, and identifying those areas where safety enhancements should be focused. The results of the Integrated Safety Evaluation would be consolidated in a report to be prepared jointly by the Agency and the respective country. When developed, internationally recognized Safety Performance Indicators would be incorporated as a feature of these reports. Periodic report updates - for example, every three years - would serve as the technical basis for prioritizing safety actions and adjusting the focus of Agency safety services to be provided.
Research Reactor Safety
Last year I reported to you the Agency's emerging concerns regarding the safety of research reactors. In the past year, the Secretariat initiated a range of measures towards the establishment of a fundamental, internationally accepted safety regime for research reactors. In addition to work performed on research reactor safety standards, incident reporting and regulatory supervision, the Secretariat in May convened a working group of Member State experts to identify key issues and recommend a course of action. In addition to previously identified concerns - such as degraded equipment, inadequate fuel storage and lack of regulatory oversight - the working group also noted that the absence of adequate funding and the lack of clear courses of action among Member States must be addressed if the current situation is to be improved. The working group recommended establishing an international action plan for research reactors that would include: an assessment survey to correct the absence of information on the safety status of research reactors worldwide; preparation of a Code of Conduct and a system for monitoring its implementation; and a review of the Agency's research reactor assistance programmes to ensure that priority is being given to issues of highest safety relevance. These recommendations were endorsed by the Board of Governors last week, and we intend to go forward with the development of an action plan.
Radiological Protection of Patients
Two years ago, following a radiotherapy incident involving around 100 patients in Costa Rica, the General Conference asked the Secretariat to develop a plan to improve the radiological protection of patients. This request was timely; the use of radiation medicine is growing rapidly, with new diagnostic and therapeutic techniques. This expansion promises to be of great societal benefit, but care is needed to ensure that radiation doses are delivered as prescribed.
To this end, the radiation dose assurance service that the Agency is running jointly with the WHO is an important tool, focused on fostering a worldwide culture of quality assurance in human health. The Agency is consulting with WHO to expand collaboration on this service.
An international conference was convened in Málaga, Spain, this year in response to the General Conference resolution. The conference brought together medical physicists, radiologists, regulatory authorities and related professional associations. The conference recommendations were reported to the Board of Governors last week, and we intend to go forward with preparing an action plan on the radiological protection of patients.
Safety of Radiation Sources
On several occasions I have highlighted the serious safety and security issues associated with uncontrolled radioactive sources. Agency intervention and assistance has repeatedly been requested when sources have become "orphaned" from regulatory controls, in some cases causing inadvertent exposure to people. After two years of intensive work by the Secretariat and Member State experts, I am pleased to report that our Action Plan on radioactive source control has been successful in strengthening national regulatory capabilities in dealing with these safety and security issues. In Buenos Aires last December, an international conference of national regulators noted the success of the Action Plan and recommended a number of improvements. A revised Action Plan was approved by the Board of Governors last week and has been submitted to the General Conference.
Common Forum on Chernobyl
This year marked the 15th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. With Agency support, two international conferences in Kiev focused on consequences of the accident, including health, environmental and social impacts. Two weeks ago, I again visited some of the affected areas in Belarus, and I was pleased to see some of the benefits of Agency technical assistance - citizens are returning to villages that have been decontaminated, and crops are being raised on some of the contaminated land.
A lack of trust still prevails among the people of the region, however, due in part to the contradictory data and reports - on the precise environmental and health impacts of the accident - among national authorities, as well as among the relevant international organizations. In my view, it would be helpful to establish a common forum on the consequences of Chernobyl, in which the relevant United Nations organizations and the governments of the affected countries would deliver a clear and unified message to the people of the region and the public at large.
Environmental Restoration of Areas Affected by Radioactive Residues
At an international symposium in the USA in 1999 and a follow-up conference in Moscow late last year, international experts assessed the extent and nature of areas contaminated by radioactive residues, the legacy of past nuclear events, industrial activities and nuclear testing. The Moscow conference came to a number of notable conclusions: first, that more scientific inquiry is needed to understand the nature and geographic extent of contaminated areas; second, that a moral obligation to future generations exists to "remediate" these areas, despite the limited resources available; and third, that the relevant international organizations should pursue international consensus on the criteria for declaring restored areas acceptable for public use - as well as the criteria for acceptable levels of radioactive residues to be present in internationally traded commodities. The Secretariat will continue its work on this issue with a view to providing a consensus proposal next year.
Assessing the Effects of Depleted Uranium
Last November, the Agency participated in a preliminary field mission to Kosovo, led by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), to assess possible consequences of the use of depleted uranium (DU) in ammunition during the Kosovo conflict. The UNEP report concluded that no widespread ground contamination was found in the investigated areas and, therefore, that the corresponding radiological and chemical risks are insignificant. Nonetheless, the report called for certain precautionary actions.
The Agency is still working to respond - with UNEP and WHO - to requests received from various States in the Middle East and the Balkans regarding additional radiological assessments of DU residues. A mission to Kuwait began just last week, and other missions will follow as resources permit. In addition, we are holding a training course on the environmental effects of DU, organized with the help of UNEP and WHO, for participants from countries that may have been affected by environmental releases of DU or that provide peacekeeping forces to those countries.
Challenges in Nuclear Safety
Clearly, a number of challenges remain in the area of nuclear safety. The first challenge, which was strongly emphasized earlier this month at the International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety, is to continue to improve safety in areas where vulnerability is apparent - such as research reactors - and to cultivate a nuclear safety culture globally. Nuclear safety is primarily a national responsibility, but is also a legitimate international concern; nuclear safety practices, like environmental practices, have implications that transcend national boundaries. The Chernobyl accident made that clear and resulted in the upgrading of safety practices in many countries, but we must continue to address the remaining unevenness in safety practices in different countries.
The second challenge, which is intimately linked to the first, is the international harmonization of safety norms - not simply as written, but also as applied - and the development of legislative and regulatory infrastructures in all countries, with proper independence, adequate financial resources and trained personnel.
A third challenge relates to the need for transparency of all nuclear activities. This again is key to public acceptance. This transparency should include effective communication on events, feedback on operational experience, self assessments and peer reviews. Agency safety services can play an important role in this regard.
Maintenance of Knowledge and Expertise
A final challenge, applicable to both nuclear technology and nuclear safety, relates to the substantial and continuing need for nuclear expertise and trained personnel that will exist well into the future. Fundamental nuclear research has been receiving less support from governments in recent years, and many university programmes in nuclear sciences and nuclear engineering have closed because of decreasing interest. In addition, as the nuclear workforce ages and retires, the accompanying loss of institutional memory may in some cases have significant safety implications. This could clearly have major implications for technology development, as well as major safety implications.
Because of these trends Member States have become increasingly concerned about the maintenance and preservation of knowledge and expertise in nuclear science, technology and engineering. In some Member States, such as Canada, the government has begun to work with universities and industry to address this issue through fellowships, cross career training and other approaches. And the Republic of Korea has proposed the creation of an international university devoted to teaching and research in nuclear technology. The Agency has a new subprogramme for 2002-2003 on Maintenance of Knowledge in Nuclear Science and Technology. We intend to convene a meeting on this topic in the near future, to discuss the size and nature of the problem, what various Member States are doing and what can perhaps be done to address the issue collaboratively.
Safeguards Implementation Report for 2000
In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that, for all 140 States with safeguards agreements in force, no indication was found of diversion of nuclear material or misuse of facilities or equipment that had been placed under safeguards. On this basis the Agency concluded that the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. Moreover, for seven States - each of which had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force or being provisionally applied - the Agency's evaluation was able to provide broader assurance: not only that there had been no diversion of declared nuclear material, but also that there was no indication of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.
I am pleased to note, in addition, that the Agency achieved its inspection goals to a greater extent than ever before, with safeguards expenditures at the same level as in 1997, and with the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities under safeguards continuing to increase
Status of Safeguards Agreements
I continue to be concerned about the lack of progress on concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In the early 1990s, after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, the international community declared its readiness to give the Agency broader authority to strengthen its verification ability - particularly its ability to detect undeclared activities. Except in a limited number of countries, however, we still do not have that authority - because such authority requires that, for every country in question, a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol be in force.
In response to last year's General Conference resolution, the Secretariat has increased its efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, by means of regional seminars that have been convened or will be convened in Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand and Peru, and by systematically approaching Permanent Missions and capitals. Despite these efforts, however, 50 States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remain without a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force. For those countries the Agency cannot provide any safeguards assurance.
The status of adherence to additional protocols is also disappointing. Since 1997, when the Board of Governors adopted the Model Additional Protocol, the Board has approved additional protocols for only 58 Member States, and only 22 of these have entered into force or are being provisionally applied.
Progress on Integrated Safeguards
Since last year's General Conference, we have made significant progress in the development of integrated safeguards - that is, in integrating traditional nuclear material verification activities with new strengthening measures, particularly those of the additional protocol. While cost savings will no doubt arise from this integration, our objective is not only cost savings, but more importantly the improved effectiveness of verification activities. To date, the primary focuses of work have been the detailed development of integrated safeguards approaches for various types of nuclear facilities, the conceptual development of the "State level" approach, and the preparation of implementation guidelines and criteria.
The Secretariat expects to have largely completed the conceptual framework for the implementation of integrated safeguards by the end of this year. Actual implementation of integrated safeguards in a given State, however, cannot proceed until that State has both a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, and the Secretariat has drawn the requisite conclusions.
Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq
For nearly three years, the Agency has not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and related resolutions. As a consequence, we are not able at present to provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under these resolutions. Clearly, the longer the suspension of resolution related inspections lasts, the more difficult it will be and the more time will be required for the Agency to re-establish a level of knowledge comparable to that achieved at the end of 1998.
The Agency remains prepared to resume its verification activities in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions at short notice, with the assistance and co-operation of UNMOVIC. If we were to resume those activities, and could be satisfied that Iraq's past and present nuclear activities and nuclear assets have not changed since December 1998, we would be in a position to move to full implementation of the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) plan. This plan, as designed, would enable the Agency to investigate the few remaining concerns relating to Iraq's past clandestine nuclear programme, as well as any new concerns that arise.
In January 2001, the Agency carried out a verification of the nuclear material remaining under safeguards, pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. With the co-operation of the Iraqi authorities, Agency inspectors were able to verify the presence of this material. However, as I have stated before, these physical inventory verifications do not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, nor do they provide the needed assurances sought by the Council.
Status of Safeguards Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Since 1993, the Agency has been unable to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In accordance with the "Agreed Framework" between the USA and the DPRK, however, the Agency has since November 1994 been monitoring the "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite moderated reactor and related facilities, and has also maintained a continuous inspector presence at the Nyongbyong site.
The Agency continues to be unable to verify the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration. As I noted last year, the work required to verify that all nuclear materials subject to safeguards in the DPRK had been declared to the Agency would take 3-4 years. In May of this year, the Agency proposed to the DPRK the first concrete steps that need to be carried out in that verification process, and indicated our readiness to start implementing these measures as soon as we are permitted to do so. We have not yet received a response from the DPRK, which continues to link its acceptance of Agency verification of its initial declaration to progress in the implementation of the Agreed Framework.
Application of Agency Safeguards in the Middle East
In keeping with my mandate from the General Conference, I have continued to consult with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and the development of model agreements that would contribute to the eventual establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in that region. Regrettably, I have not yet been able to make progress in fulfilling this mandate. Regarding the Forum envisioned in last year's General Conference decision, the report before you, which includes the views of seven States from the region, demonstrates that little agreement exists on the scope of the agenda for such a Forum. I will continue my consultations with the parties, with the hope of convening the forum at an early date.
Progress on the Trilateral Initiative
Within the framework of the Trilateral Initiative to submit nuclear material released from the military programmes of the Russian Federation and the USA to Agency verification, consultations continued in an effort to resolve various legal and technical issues, including the development of a new Model Verification Agreement.
In the past 12 months, progress was made on developing technical criteria and methods for implementing verification measures. Agreement is still to be reached on the scope of the verification measures, the nature of the material subject to verification, and the duration of verification measures under the agreements. I will be meeting with both parties this week, to take stock of progress and give direction for further work.
Security of Material
The first International Conference on Security of Material was held in Stockholm in May, with participants from 66 countries and five international organizations. Security experts emphasized the need for increased co-operation between the relevant organizations, such as customs organizations, Interpol, national governments and the Agency; the importance of improving awareness of potential threats, incidents of theft and sabotage, and illicit trafficking; and the need to enhance research and development on techniques for detection and analysis. The conference concluded that a comprehensive approach to security of material is warranted, considering both the risks for nuclear proliferation and possible radiation and health effects. The conference encouraged States to become parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
The conference also highlighted the Agency's key role in supporting these efforts at the national level through the development of norms and guides, co-ordination of technical development and assistance to States in implementing security measures. Through a regional TC project, we have devoted significant effort to the training of customs officials, border guards and criminal police on detection techniques, equipment use and response mechanisms to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. More than 400 officers have been trained to date.
As you will recall, in November 1999 I convened an informal open ended expert meeting to discuss whether the >Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was in need of revision. Last week, the Board of Governors endorsed the recommendation of the expert meeting that the international physical protection regime clearly needed to be strengthened, and that a spectrum of measures should be employed - including the drafting of a well defined amendment to strengthen the Convention, to be reviewed by States Parties with a view to determine if it should be submitted to an amendment conference in accordance with Article 20 of the Convention. As recommended, I will convene an open-ended group of legal and technical experts in December 2001 to draft such an amendment.
The expert meeting also recommended the establishment of a set of "Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles" for submission to the Agency's Board of Governors. These Security Fundamentals are not intended to replace or detract from the more detailed recommendations in INFIRC/225, nor to diminish the need for all Member States to become party to the Convention. Rather, these Security Fundamentals, which were endorsed by the Board last week, should provide an appropriate framework for strengthening and raising awareness of the physical protection regime.
Challenges in Nuclear Verification
Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and moving towards nuclear disarmament continues to be a major human endeavour. Agency verification is a cornerstone of that endeavour. A number of challenges are critical to our future success.
The primary challenge for the Agency is the universal application of its safeguards system - that is, the conclusion of the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all States that have made non-proliferation commitments, and the continuation of efforts to achieve the universality of the non-proliferation regime. While this objective continues to be supported by all, the necessary actions are not being taken by Member States. This is an unsatisfactory situation. The Agency can only provide the required assurances if we are given the corresponding authority.
Second, we must support the development of an effective national and international system for the physical protection of nuclear material and the combating of illicit trafficking, both to avoid the risk of nuclear proliferation and to protect the public from possible radiation and health effects. In light of recent events, this cannot be overemphasized.
Third, we must make accelerated and tangible progress towards nuclear arms control and disarmament. This is crucial for sustaining and consolidating the non-proliferation regime in the long run. The "unequivocal commitment" by the nuclear weapon States during the 2000 NPT Review Conference to "accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons" has yet to be followed with concrete steps. In that process, it is imperative to develop an alternative system of collective security that does not depend on nuclear deterrence. In my view, the best disincentive to acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is an approach to security that does not depend on the amassing of weaponry, but puts more emphasis on economic and social development, good governance, respect for human rights and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The Agency's technical co-operation programme delivers approximately $65 million per year of expert services, training and equipment - complementing our regular budget programme under all three pillars of Agency activities, but in a manner directly tied to the specific priorities of recipient Member States. The TC programme for 2000 concentrates in part on a limited number of areas in which nuclear science and technology can have a strong developmental impact, in the fields of human health, agriculture, water resources management, environmental protection and industrial applications. At the same time, we continue to pay close attention to the core areas of nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management. The selection of projects of course remains the prerogative of Member States. But given the limited resources available, governments have to set priorities as to whether they prefer to equip a laboratory, acquire expertise in applying specific nuclear techniques, or cover the costs of experts performing a safety review.
In managing the TC programme, we have focused increasingly on better ways to partner with other international organizations, including not only our counterparts within the United Nations system, such as FAO and WHO, but also regional organizations such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU). In a time of limited financial resources, these partnerships help to leverage resources in areas of common interest. An excellent recent example is our strengthened co-operation with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific to address environmental problems, technology transfer and information networking in Asia. Another example relates to water management: we are joining with the Organization of American States, the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility to protect and sustainably manage the Guarani Aquifer - the largest groundwater aquifer in South America, with enough freshwater, if protected, to supply the needs of over 300 million people.
We are also increasing our presence at relevant international forums - such as this year's World Food Summit, the OAU Summit in Lusaka, and the third conference on Least Developed Countries in Brussels - to identify additional opportunities for partnership and to make other multilateral and bilateral organizations aware of the roles we are playing in applying nuclear techniques to meet development challenges. As the upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development, we will report that, of the more than $500 million worth of technical co-operation provided by the Agency since 1992, more than 800 TC projects, valued at more than $200 million, have specifically supported Agenda 21 priorities such as "Land and Agriculture," "Human Health" and "Fresh Water."
In a similar vein, we have made efforts to engage the private sector and international foundations as potential stakeholders in nuclear science and technology. One example is our joint effort with the Musculo-Skeletal Transplant Foundation, focused on irradiation processing to permit broader use of sterilized human tissue grafts. These collaborations can serve to broaden public awareness of the Agency's role in sustainable development issues, and to establish knowledgeable partner organizations that can perform the non-nuclear activities necessary for these projects to succeed.
Increasingly, recipient country governments are investing significant amounts of money in cost sharing to finance Agency TC programmes in their own countries. One example is the Government of Costa Rica, which has requested Agency support in building a national cancer institute. This week I will sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Costa Rican Minister of Health to establish a partnership in which the Agency will train the staff needed to run the institute and will help in preparing technical specifications for the equipment to be purchased. National authorities plan to contribute up to $6 million over the next four years to finance these activities.
Technical Co-operation Funding
In a resolution adopted last year, the General Conference established a "Rate of Attainment" for measuring the contributions paid to the Technical Co-operation Fund (TCF) as a percentage of the TCF target. The Conference approved TCF targets of $73 million for 2001 and 2002, and set the rates of attainment at 80 and 85%, respectively. However, the total amount pledged and paid to the TCF as of 15 September was only $40 million, representing a rate of attainment of only 55% so far this year. I would emphasize the Agency's reliance on all of you to pledge and pay your contribution to the TCF in full and on time each year and, for Member States who have not been paying, or paying only a portion, to at least pay the amount equal to the rate of attainment. This is essential if we are to have the resources sufficient to serve the needs of Member States.
Challenges for Technical Co-operation
The year 2000 represented a milestone in the development of the Agency's approach to technical co-operation. As shown in last year's report to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee, the targets set for implementing the first phase of the TC Strategy have been, for the most part, achieved. This shifts the programme from being technology driven to being driven by the needs and priorities of Member States - a change reinforced by the Agency's adoption of a results based approach to all its programmes.
This year we have begun the second phase of the TC Strategy. Our strategic goal in this phase is to change the image of the Agency's TC programme in the international community, so that donors, the United Nations family, NGOs and the private sector all recognize the Agency's potential role in sustainable development.
A second challenge for the TC programme is to further improve our ability to assess the impact of TC activities in recipient countries. As an initial step in this direction, we are supporting Brazil in designing and carrying out a self-evaluation programme covering TC activities from 1990 to 2000. We are encouraging other countries to perform similar self-assessments, so that lessons learned can be fed back into the design of future TC programmes.
A final TC challenge rests with Member States, to renew their commitment to provide their contributions consistently and reliably.
Over the past four years, we have initiated a programme of reform in the management of the Agency. Our annual Senior Management Conferences have had both catalysing and reviewing roles in this process, setting a "one-house" approach to the changes. Of particular importance has been the accelerated introduction of results based programming and budgeting - with full implementation in the preparation of the 2002-2003 programme and budget - accompanied by a transition to biennial programming and budgeting.
These changes have been facilitated by considerable restructuring within the Secretariat, including new offices for policy co-ordination and for programme support. In addition, the Office of Internal Oversight Services has been established to consolidate and rationalize all Agency oversight functions - including evaluation, management services, internal audit and investigation - into one office that reports directly to me. The establishment of the new Office is intended to enhance accountability and promote oversight independence. Adoption of these organizational changes into the culture of the Agency is being promoted through new Management Curriculum Courses, which are compulsory for all management staff.
Thus, while reform will remain an ongoing process and our search for efficiency gains and increases in effectiveness will remain energetic, the basic "machinery" is now sharp and focused
The Agency's Programme and Budget
The preparation of the Agency's programme and budget for 2002-2003 has been a particularly challenging process both for Member States and for the Secretariat - owing to the new programme structure and the introduction, as I mentioned, of full results based programming and budgeting. We also faced increased funding requirements for the technical co-operation and safeguards programmes and a higher than usual price adjustment resulting largely from a mandatory increase in the post adjustment for Agency Professional staff. I would like to thank Member States for the constructive manner in which each of these issues was resolved and the budget compromise rea