I would like this morning to offer a global perspective on the development of nuclear energy at the beginning of the 21st century. The views are from the vantage point of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and are structured around the three pillars of our work - technology, safety and safeguards.
Before addressing each of these topics, I would like to take a few moments to set the context of where we stand today, and where we may be headed.
Just over fifty years ago, scientists first split the atom and controlled the nuclear chain reaction. Since then, the world has witnessed destruction from the force of the atomic bomb and realized - less dramatically perhaps - the real and tangible benefits of using atoms for peaceful purposes. Hospitals here in Asia and other parts of the world today use nuclear and radiation tools to provide health care. Domestic and industrial electricity is supplied by nuclear power plants. Foods are processed and industries are operated more efficiently as a result of the use of nuclear instruments and radiation processes. Water resources are mapped and replenished with the aid of knowledge gained through the use of radioactive and environmental tracers.
We sometimes hear that nuclear technology is diminishing in importance. Media stories point to the electricity sector, where more nuclear power plants are planned to be closed down than started up worldwide. They point to radiation accidents that spread concern over the safe use of radioactive materials. They point to the lack of significant progress in demonstrating solutions for disposing of waste that remains highly radioactive for thousands of years. Yet, I suggest, that the nuclear story portrayed in the media can sometimes be misleading.
The new millennium finds the technology - in nearly all of its peaceful applications - in transition, with changes leading to a future that is built on a more solid basis. Developments over the past decade are taking root. They include steps to upgrade the safety of nuclear and radiation technologies, enhance their competitiveness, strengthen safeguards over nuclear materials effective use and transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies where these are the most appropriate tools. The global nuclear agenda remains therefore very challenging - and the interests of IAEA Member States in nuclear technologies remains as high as ever.
With these opening thoughts, let me now turn to the three main pillars of the IAEA’s work. In light of the presentations that will follow my own, I will not attempt to present a detailed review of each particular topic but only a broad overview.
One sign of the continued importance of nuclear technology is the high demand for these technologies to support the basic needs of human development in areas such as food production, water resources, health care, environmental protection and electricity production. In fact, the use of these technologies in developing countries is growing, as local infrastructures improve. The Agency’s role as a centre of nuclear technology is threefold: (1) to act as a catalyst for the scientific community and as a centre of information for the latest technology; (2) to conduct comparative assessments on the risks and benefits of nuclear and other technologies that enable States to make informed and appropriate choices; and (3) to act as a centre for the transfer of nuclear technologies so that they stay accessible to all IAEA Member States, and particularly to developing countries. This role goes hand in hand with another of the Agency’s main objectives - namely to ensure that nuclear energy is used safely and peacefully within a sound and established system of controls.
An important part of the Agency’s role in the field of nuclear technology is its technical co-operation programme with about $80 million a year. This programme is the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear science and technology to developing countries. Emphasis is placed on supporting what are called Model Projects, which now number more than one hundred, many of them being carried out in Asia. In Thailand, I am pleased to note that one Model Project - for the health screening of newborn infants in rural areas - has recorded steady progress and is now leading to regional initiatives built on the expertise acquired.
The standards for Model Projects are high. They must be capable of making a visible and positive difference to a country’s needs. This means that they must attract strong governmental commitment and be part of the country’s overall national development strategy. The standards are high because the Agency’s resources are limited. We necessarily have to be selective and results-oriented. Our resources, by themselves, cannot solve national development problems. But States have seen that the Agency’s assistance has a catalytic effect when it is strongly backed and combined with other resources that the country has at hand.
Another integral element of our technology transfer strategy is the formation of partnerships. We are increasingly reaching out to partner organizations in the field of international development - including non-governmental organizations, scientific institutes and academic associations in civil society. By joining forces and establishing synergy, we are finding that our work can have a far bigger impact than if we acted alone.
The IAEA also actively supports regional co-operation programmes, including the highly effective RCA in the Asia and Pacific region. A complementary objective is the formation of regional centres of excellence. Through workshops, training and seminars, such centres can serve as important channels for sharing expertise already acquired by specialists in developing countries.
Let me now turn to the question of nuclear power. Analysts foresee an increase in electricity demand worldwide by a factor of two to three over the coming decades, and in Asia by an even higher factor depending on economic growth. Several countries here already use nuclear power for electricity production, and a number of others, including Thailand, are keeping the option open. Only about 4% of total electricity generation in developing countries is now produced by nuclear power. Most of it - nearly 75% - is still generated by oil, coal and other fossil fuels.
Naturally, it is up to each country to decide what energy mix is best for it. This decision will be influenced by several factors, primarily the preference for low price and low risk, and for energy independence. In increasingly deregulated and privatized markets, the economics of electricity generation have become the prime decision criterion. Nuclear power faces stiff competition from fossil fuel alternatives and its competitiveness must be evaluated on a case by case basis.
The need for energy supplies that are environmentally benign is also becoming an increasingly important factor in view of the growing concern about local air quality, regional acidification and possible global climate change. On all of these counts, nuclear power is a viable option for electricity generation.
In this context, the Agency provides tools for carrying out comparative assessments of alternative energy scenarios, including country case studies when requested, to assist national decision makers. At the global level, we are also actively engaged in providing factual information to a world energy assessment about the role of nuclear power in helping to achieve environmental targets and commitments under the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.
While the issue of climate change has renewed interest in the nuclear option, this alone is not likely to revive its market prospects. For there to be a revival of interest in nuclear power, the industry must show a consistent safety record and be economically competitive. In addition, public support must be secured. I will return to the subject of safety later on. About competitiveness, let me just say that one prerequisite for the industry is to develop new, economically competitive reactor technologies incorporating inherent safety features.
Another prerequisite is, as I said, public support. New approaches - tailored to the local and national needs of the countries themselves - may be needed to help people gain a better understanding of energy, economic and environmental issues associated with nuclear power. For its part, the Agency, with the generous support of Japan, initiated in the late 1980s national and regional public information seminars such as this one taking place today. We are now introducing other activities through a strengthened outreach programme with industry groups, non-governmental organizations and other bodies. In late 1999, senior managers of nuclear research centres met to exchange experience, and to define ways for strengthening collaboration, and last week industry representatives came together in Vienna.
As we know from past experience, a priority requirement for gaining and sustaining public support is the assurance of safety throughout the nuclear industry. This brings me to the second pillar of the Agency’s work.
The dynamic nature of the nuclear landscape is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the fields of nuclear, radiation and waste safety. The 1986 Chernobyl accident showed that nuclear safety issues are not confined by national borders. The past fifteen years have seen the international community make steady progress in the formation of a legally binding safety regime. New safety conventions have been concluded to cover, for example, nuclear plant safety, radioactive waste management and spent fuel management. A major challenge for the Agency today is to help countries implement the obligations they undertake through these agreements.
Equally important is the need to have agreed detailed safety standards. By next year, the IAEA expects to complete the revision of its entire set of international safety standards - some seventy documents in all. To help countries put these into practice, we are focusing on peer reviews, expert missions and other advisory approaches.
Radioactive waste is an area being given particularly close attention. In Spain this March, the IAEA is sponsoring an international conference on the safety of radioactive waste management that will address issues in depth and make recommendations of what needs to be done. It follows a symposium held last year in the Republic of Korea on the technologies of waste management. That symposium reconfirmed that technologies exist for the safe, environmentally sound and cost effective management of radioactive wastes. Important now is an actual demonstration of these technologies, and sustained efforts to keep the public engaged in the formulation and development of waste management programmes.
Another important and long standing concern has been the safe transport of radioactive material. By its very nature, the international transport of such material requires common standards that keep abreast of scientific and technological developments. In recognition of this need, the Agency has developed comprehensive transport regulations supplemented by a number of safety guides and practices. These documents - which apply to the transport of radioactive material by all modes on land, water and in the air - establish standards covering radiation to persons, property and the environment. They are now widely integrated into national and international transport regulations. The Agency is currently examining possible further refinements and modifications to the regulations which may be warranted by technical advances or operational experience. Additionally, to assist States in the application of the regulations, a new service has been initiated - called the Transport Safety Appraisal Service.
Illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials is one of the major challenges posed by international terrorism and crime. The Agency has been monitoring reported cases of illicit trafficking - in recent years, about 140 incidents involving nuclear material and about 125 involving other radioactive sources have been officially reported by about 60 States, though most of these cases involved materials that cannot be directly used for making nuclear weapons.
An integral component of the IAEA’s efforts against illicit trafficking is a close alliance with responsible national and international authorities, including customs and law enforcement organizations. One important aim is to assist border officials and customs officers in their efforts to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive materials.
These actions are a component in the broader context of global efforts to strengthen the security of nuclear material and prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other treaties, States have entrusted the IAEA with the task of verifying the commitment of States to use nuclear material and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Agency’s system of safeguards has become a central element of what has come to be known as the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Safeguards have been strengthened in substantive ways since 1991, when events in Iraq demonstrated the limitations of the system then in place. Earlier, the safeguards system focused mainly on nuclear material and activities declared by the State. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved measures to enable the Agency to detect possible undeclared material and activities. The Board specifically approved a legal document known as the Model Additional Protocol. It grants the Agency additional legal authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures. These include greater access to information and broader rights of access to sites and other locations for Agency inspectors. On the basis of this model text, States are invited to conclude a Protocol additional to their existing safeguards agreements with the IAEA. To date, Protocols with 46 States have been approved by the Board, and the Agency is actively working with governments to expand the list of signatories and to bring more agreements into force.
The strengthened safeguards system is a major step forward. But the system’s full potential can be realized only through universal adherence to the Additional Protocol and the full integration of its measures. As more Protocols enter into force, the Agency will be able to provide the international community with more credible assurance about both declared nuclear material in a State and about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Of course, safeguards in themselves do not - and cannot - prevent States from acquiring nuclear material, facilities or technology. But they can be - and indeed have been - the trigger that sets in motion responses by the international community. They are part of a wider set of mutually reinforcing elements that constitute the global regime against weapons proliferation.
Among these elements are regional arrangements such as nuclear-weapon-free zones, whose formation the Agency continues to support. We have provided assistance to States in the negotiation and implementation of such zones. Over the past five years, the Treaty of Bangkok has entered into force, the Pelindaba Treaty in Africa has been concluded, and a treaty for Central Asia is being negotiated. The Agency’s fundamental role here is to ensure that these treaties contain effective verification provisions.
Another essential element of the global regime is progress towards nuclear disarmament. While much has been achieved since the end of the Cold War, major challenges still lie before us. Each step towards nuclear disarmament brings us that much closer to a safer world, and sharpens the focus on the need for credible verification of arms control.
Through a joint initiative started in 1997, the Agency is working with the Russian Federation and the USA to set up verification arrangements for nuclear material removed from weapons programmes. The aim is to develop modalities for Agency verification of such nuclear material to ensure that it remains permanently outside the weapons programmes.
States also are discussing a treaty that would seek to ban the production of nuclear material for weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Recent progress has been limited, but the Agency has been asked to assist in developing the verification arrangements for such a treaty, and if one is concluded, stands ready to provide verification services.
In my mind, we should not underestimate the importance of these opportunities. They will require additional investments, but the dividends are high. A sustained reduction in military stockpiles of fissile material - together with the proposed production ban - could usher in the beginning of a new era in nuclear disarmament. This would be no small achievement, one certainly worth striving for.