In the year ahead of us two anniversaries of particular importance to the IAEA will occur. It will be 50 years since the founding of the United Nations and it will be 25 years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force. The stock-taking at these anniversaries is a good starting point for thinking about future directions. We must ask how we can best cope with today's and tomorrow's issues and how we can make optimal use of the IAEA in all areas of its mandate.

The IAEA and the UN System

Let me begin with some comments on the IAEA as a part of the UN family. There is frequent criticism of a lack of cohesion and co-ordination in the UN System - not least in analyses made in connection with the UN's 50th anniversary. I submit that this criticism is not valid for the IAEA's relations with the UN and UN organizations. This Conference and the Agency's Board of Governors have a practice of following the UN lead in political matters, e.g. on representation issues. The Agency also seeks to fully play its role in system-wide efforts declared by the UN, such as the current work to promote sustainable development by implementing Agenda 21. Above all, the cases of Iraq and DPRK have demonstrated the close, prompt and effective liaison and interaction which exist between the IAEA and the UN in accordance with the IAEA Statute and the relationship agreement with the UN. The Security Council has looked to the IAEA as the nuclear inspection arm of the UN system and the Agency has looked to the Council as the body politically responsible for the implementation of nuclear arms control measures. As attention to nuclear non-proliferation increases and more nuclear arms control measures requiring verification are adopted it would be reasonable and cost- effective to continue building on this distribution of functions and to avoid any duplication.

In welcoming the personal representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Giorgio Giacomelli, I would ask him to convey to the Secretary-General our appreciation for the excellent and close liaison that is maintained with him and, through him, with the United Nations, in particular the Security Council. I am pleased that we have recently established a secure phone and fax line between the Secretary-General s office and my office. I hope, however, that we shall not need to use it very often.

The IAEA's co-operation with other organizations in the UN system is extensive. On this occasion there is a special reason to single out the Agency s co-operation with the FAO and UNESCO. This year we are celebrating the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the division which we operate jointly with the FAO and whose very successful activities testify to the increasing relevance of nuclear techniques for food production and preservation. It gives me great pleasure to welcome to our Conference the Director-General of the FAO, Dr. Jacques Diouf. I am glad that he will address our Conference.

There is also special reason to mention our close co-operation with UNESCO in jointly administering the International Centre of Theoretical Physics at Trieste. After 30 years, during which the IAEA has had operational responsibility for the Centre, this role is expected soon to be transferred to our co-administrator, UNESCO. Since its creation in 1964, the Centre has grown rapidly. I want to acknowledge our great indebtedness to Professor Abdus Salam, who has been the dynamic leader of the Institute and who has now left that post. I also want to thank the Italian Government for its great generosity in supporting the Centre. We are confident that the Centre will continue to be an important meeting place for physicists from industrially advanced and developing countries and a place of intellectual excellence.

The IAEA and the NPT

As I said in my opening sentences, it will next year be 25 years since the Non- Proliferation Treaty entered into force. The more than 160 parties to the Treaty will review the past experience of the Treaty, consider its future and decide on its extension. The cases of Iraq and DPRK have raised questions about the reliability of commitments made under the Treaty and pointed to the need for strengthening verification under the Treaty. These questions will undoubtedly be discussed. At the same time the parties to the Treaty can take encouragement in the continued increased adherence to the Treaty. The IAEA is contributing substantial background material in support of the Conference, particularly concerning safeguards implementation and the transfer of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. We look forward to the guidance of the Conference in these tasks.

The functions of the IAEA

Let me now continue with some comments on the overall function of the Agency in today s and tomorrow s world. It has been customary to refer to the Agency s functions as being dual - promoting the use of nuclear energy on the one hand and providing verification of its peaceful use on the other. However, a simple distinction between a promotional and regulatory function does not do justice to the full range of functions and activities envisaged by our Statute. Where, for instance, does the Agency s normative work in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection fit? The Statute provides the Agency with a number of broad functions and activities and Member States have an interest in the effective pursuit of all these functions and activities and I take it that this is the thrust of the resolution entitled Strengthening of the Agency s Main Activities which was adopted by consensus last year. I also take it that the right response to this interest consists not only in the transfer of more nuclear technology and in updating and strengthening the Agency s safeguards system but also in the development of international rules and services in the field of nuclear safety, and even the performance of verification tasks requested by the Security Council or under bilateral or multilateral agreements in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. All these activities are clearly within the mandate of the Agency. I would suggest that the demand for balance between them should mean that none of them should be neglected.

The real constraint to the strengthening of the various parts of our mandate and activities does not, I submit, lie in any statutory restraints but in the zero real growth straitjacket and in the non-payment and late payment of contributions.

The nuclear power option

I turn now to report on Agency activities relating to nuclear power. The Agency s Conference two weeks ago on the Nuclear Power Option showed that it is relatively easy to describe the current status of nuclear power, but hard to predict its future role. Some Member States are fast expanding their nuclear power capacity, a few are decided opponents of nuclear power and several have a wait and see attitude. What factors may be important for the future?

The first important factor is the very general prediction that even with ambitious conservation efforts the world will greatly increase its use of electricity in the decades before us. There is an understanding that such an increase is of vital importance for economic development and for improvements in standards of living. As the viable sources of large scale electricity generation are limited at least for the next few decades, to the burning of fossil fuels, to hydropower and to nuclear power, it ought to be in the interest of governments to stimulate a discussion of the rational merits and demerits of the different options. The Agency has a long tradition of comparing the economic and other viability of nuclear power and other electricity sources in different countries. Together with a number of other organizations it is now pursuing the so-called DECADES project, with the aim of responding to the growing interest in the comparative assessment of different electricity generation options, from the viewpoints of environment, reliability and economy.

Such assessments are of interest, not least in connection with the search for scenarios to counter the emission of greenhouse gases, notably carbon dioxide, to reduce the risk of global warming. It is striking, but not surprising, that the scenarios which achieve the most effective reduction in CO2 emissions have a strong component of nuclear power. Indeed, each terawatt hour of electricity produced by coal produces about one million tons of CO2. The 2000 terawatt hours produced annually by nuclear power avoids 2000 million tons of CO2 emission as compared with an alternative of burning coal. The Agency has continued to participate in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in particular by contributing to the chapter dealing with Energy Supply Mitigation Options in its report. This participation has enabled us to highlight the fact that realistic, sustainable electricity supply strategies will require a balanced mix of energy sources in the world, including a significant volume of nuclear power.

In view of the uncertainties which are connected with the projections of global warming, some critics have warned against expensive - and perhaps ultimately unnecessary - changes in the pattern of energy use. However, because nuclear power is generally competitive with fossil fuelled electricity generation there should be no economic objection to meeting additional electricity demand and to replacing obsolete fossil generated electricity by nuclear power. As before, the objections remain chiefly in the areas of safety and proliferation. I shall come back to them.

The future of nuclear power may also be influenced by its versatility. Our common focusing on the large-scale base load electricity generating nuclear plants should not lead us to ignore the role that nuclear reactors could play in providing electricity for smaller electric grids, as would be required in many developing countries, or to supply district heating, to desalinate water and to produce process heat for industry. In all these areas, which are not much in focus at present, it is desirable that exchange of information and experience continue in the IAEA so that maximum knowledge will be available whenever the political interest in these options emerges - as it may well do. The same applies to breeder reactors and to all the various advanced reactors, which are being developed.

Nuclear Safety

I spoke initially of the need for international organizations to adapt to meet new needs. One of the areas in which the IAEA has drastically expanded its activities to respond to the new needs is nuclear safety. In document GC(XXXVIII)/INF/6 the General Conference is informed for the first time in a comprehensive manner of the various measures taken by the Agency to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection.

The Chernobyl disaster triggered the prompt elaboration of binding IAEA conventions on early notification and emergency assistance. These conventions now form part of the international legal infrastructure of nuclear power and periodic exercises test their readiness. While an updated convention on liability is still sorely needed in this legal infrastructure, a convention on the safety of nuclear power was adopted last June and there is a consensus that a convention should be worked out on the safe management and disposal of nuclear waste.

Such legal instruments, building on the still developing array of detailed but non-binding standards and guides, respond to new expectations in the international community. National authorities retain the full responsibility and control of the safety of nuclear operations and waste handling. Yet, they wish to have an insight - notably through internationally organized peer reviews - into how this responsibility is exercised in other countries and to have also a possibility to urge compliance with common standards.

The many Agency services which have emerged in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection - OSARTs, ASSETs, RAPATs, etc. - also constitute a response to the new needs of Member States. No supranational supervision is involved in these services which are performed only on request and, indeed, in many cases only against full or partial payment. Yet, their general impact is undoubtedly one of inducing national adherence to internationally acceptable standards.

Nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The Agency's assessment activities related to the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union have continued. Significant progress has been made to establish a consensus on priorities for safety improvements pertaining to the different generations of WWER and RBMK reactors. This consensus provides guidance both for national programmes to improve safety, and for the international assistance efforts co-ordinated by the G-24 mechanism. It also offers information of relevance for the practical and useful work that is performed by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), whose President, Mr. R?my Carle, I am happy to welcome.

Experts visiting many plants report that safety is improving, though not at the same pace in all plants and in all countries. It is clear that significant efforts will still be necessary for years to come and that the main burden for updating or phasing out reactors will be carried by the countries concerned.

Special attention was given to the nuclear plant at Chernobyl after the Ukraine government s decision, in 1993, to continue operating it. Following examination of the plant by an Agency team of safety experts, a meeting was convened in Vienna in April this year to consider possible measures to deal with the safety situation which had been identified. Future Agency engagement in this work will depend on the decisions which the Government of Ukraine will take in the light of all the circumstances before it and following its contacts with the G-7 and the G-24.

As indicated in the IAEA s programme and budget for the period 1995 and 1996, extrabudgetary funding will continue to be required to carry out the Agency s programme on safety of WWER and RBMK reactors. I take this opportunity to thank governments - in particular the Government of Japan - for their past contributions and to remind them of the further need for financial and expert support to continue this programme.

Basic Radiation Safety Standards

Let me now mention another important development in the area of radiation safety - the agreement on International Basic Radiation Safety Standards sponsored by six international organizations, including the IAEA. The new Standards, which were adopted by the Board of Governors last week contain important guidelines on the responsibilities for the control and safety of radiation sources as well as for the protection of workers, the general public and medical patients. The importance of this guidance is realized when we remember that medical uses of radiation are by far the greatest man-made contributor to general radiation exposure. The Standards also contain guidelines for intervention levels in emergency situations. These could help to avoid the kind of confusion which we witnessed after the Chernobyl accident and which resulted from countries adopting widely differing intervention levels - many of which lower than was radiologically justified.

It will take some time for the new Standards to be formally adopted by all the Sponsoring Organizations. When this has been done the standards are published in final form. We believe they will have a major impact on the improvement of radiation safety worldwide.

Spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes

In the area of management of spent nuclear fuel and the disposal of radioactive wastes, States make increasing use of the IAEA as a channel for the exchange of experience, as a means for elaborating joint norms and as a mechanism for securing services. Considering that long- lived nuclear waste will be a global heritage it is reasonable that international consensus is sought on how we deal with it.

I am pleased to report to you that in the area of the safe interim storage of spent fuel, three guides reflecting best international practice have reached their final stage of preparation. They cover the design of spent fuel storage facilities, the preparation of safety analysis reports and the safe operation of spent fuel storage facilities.

Spent fuel from research reactors poses a different set of issues. The life span of a large number of research reactors is being extended and this is leading to a need to expand spent fuel interim storage capacities. As a first step to help address the present problems the IAEA has established a data base on research reactor spent fuel inventories and has registered the problems of individual facilities. As a second step the Agency has been convening regional workshops to share experience and expertise in this particular field.

The transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear applications

In most countries the desire to acquire new nuclear techniques led early to the establishment of special atomic energy commissions with budgets of their own and mandates to promote the peaceful use of these new techniques under radiologically safe conditions. The Agency has a long record of successful co-operation with such institutions, both on the transfer of nuclear science and technology and in safety matters. However, the greater the practical use being made of these technologies the more the transfers tend to be handled through commercial channels or by specialized departments within institutions for agriculture, hydrology, medicine or industry. The IAEA must and does adapt its role in the transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear applications to this new situation.

One change introduced in 1984 was from a one-year to a two-year programming cycle for the Agency s technical co-operation. It is now regarded as an improvement which has increased both flexibility and effectiveness. There have also been significant changes in the orientation of the Agency s efforts to transfer nuclear science and technology, many of which result from system-wide recommendations within the UN family. One such recommendation is to seek increased assurance that the TC programme for each country is in line with national development priorities - to ensure that there will be a continuing national commitment to the programme. Another recommendation is to place emphasis on the transfer of science and technology that will help to increase food supplies and improve health. A third recommendation is to stress sustainable development and the protection of the environment in line with Agenda 21. A fourth emphasis emerging from our own consideration is to ensure radiation protection. All the transfer of nuclear science and technology that we could help to achieve would be discredited if it were not matched by steps to ensure safety.

Last year the ambition to reach excellence in the orientation and execution of TC supported activities was manifested in the concept of the TC model project. Member States have reacted very positively to this idea, which requires that projects should respond to real needs in a country, generally have an impact on end users; make important and necessary use of a proven nuclear technique; and should be strongly supported by the recipient country, thereby ensuring sustained application after the completion of the TC project. While these criteria have been used as a basis initially to select a limited number of projects, they are meant in the future to inspire the whole TC programme. This redirection will need much dedicated work not only by the Agency but also by recipient organizations and governments.

Now let me give you some examples of the work that is going on:

A very successful project designed to increase the supply of food was the vaccination campaign in Africa against the virus-borne rinderpest. The Agency s limited but vital contribution was a nuclear based test technology and a programme for quality control amongst the institutes which carried out the actual testing.

Projects involving the sterile insect technique (SIT) are also designed to increase food supply by protecting crops and livestock. I am glad to report to you that our staff at the Seibersdorf Laboratory have achieved a new breakthrough in the application of the SIT relating to Mediterranean fruit fly. By using nuclear techniques they have developed a new strain of this fly which, when treated with hot water, leaves only male survivors. This makes it possible to limit the release of the flies to sterile males, thereby allowing considerable economic gains and avoiding damage to fruit. The new development has led to much interest in using this Agency championed technique in countries of the Eastern Mediterranean - Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, the territory under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian authorities, and Egypt. It may be that through the use of this nuclear based technology, all Mediterranean countries will become a medfly-free zone.

Before leaving the SIT I must mention that programmes involving this technique are also being developed to eradicate some other species of insects in many other countries. Presently SIT is being used to eradicate the tse tse fly from the island of Zanzibar to secure large new areas for food production.

Food Irradiation

Food irradiation has been thoroughly tested, has been internationally approved by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and has considerable potential to prevent spoilage through insect and bacterial infestations as well as sprouting. I am pleased to report to you that practical utilization of food irradiation has gained momentum both in advanced and developing countries. A pilot project on "Improving safety and quality of food and food ingredients by irradiation" is being planned with initial emphasis on expanding trade in irradiated spices from developing countries. It is also to be noted that international trade in irradiated food is likely to increase following the entry into force next year of an Agreement under the Uruguay Round of GATT facilitating trade in food, including irradiated food, which has been processed according to international standards or recommendations. Importantly, the media seem to have become increasingly objective in informing the public about the safety and benefits of food irradiation. This could lead to wider acceptance of irradiated food in both advanced and developing countries - benefitting health and reducing spoilage.

Hydrology

Without water there is no food production. The Agency has worked for more than three decades in isotope-based hydrology methodologies which have proved to be very powerful and often indispensible tools in developing and managing water resources, especially in arid and semi-arid regions. The Agency is continuing and intensifying these activities in which the Board of Governors is taking a particular interest. I may mention as an example that a regional project using isotope techniques for water resources development and management in some North African countries is now being finalized for consideration by the Board.

Nutritional Studies

A second main orientation of the IAEA s transfer of nuclear techniques seeks - in accordance with UN system-wide priorities - to preserve and improve human health. Let me give just one example of these efforts - the development and transfer of nuclear technologies to monitor applied nutritional intervention programmes. This programme is prompted by goals identified by the FAO and the WHO and involves projects in some 30 countries. A key to solving nutrition problems is the ability to make accurate nutritional assessments and to recommend foods which improve nutrition while making efficient use of scarce resources. Isotope techniques have proven to be powerful tools for improving nutrition in developed countries. Therefore, the IAEA has started programmes to make nuclear technologies more accessible to health and nutrition specialists in developing countries, and to identify local foods which most efficiently meet requirements for essential nutrients.

Environmental protection

A significant number of the Agency s technical programmes and TC projects have relevance for environmental protection, sustainable development and the implementation of Agenda 21. Let me mention two current projects.

In Poland a very large model project involving an Industrial Demonstration Plant for Electron Beam Purification of Flue Gases , with a cost estimate of over $18 million is being implemented. In this project electron beams from an accelerator are used to help transform flue gases containing sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from coal burning plants into fertilizer. The technology has been applied successfully on a pilot scale. The major part of the cost of the project is covered by Poland, but we hope that significant voluntary contributions will cover the rest of this important project.

The second project is still under study. Together with several other international organizations, the IAEA would participate with radioisotope techniques in an effort to assist the States around the Caspian Sea to investigate the causes of the dramatic rise in the level and the pollution of that Sea.

Resources

The task of transferring nuclear techniques and technology poses major challenges to the IAEA and particularly to its TC programme. It also poses a challenge to the recipient States whose commitment and co-operation are required. Finally it challenges donor States both as contributors to the Technical Assistance Fund and to other funding mechanisms. In this regard I admit considerable concern. Although the agreed target for the fund has been steadily increasing and stands at US $58.5 million for 1994, pledges for this year were only 66.6% of the target as of 1 September and of those pledges only 33.2% had actually been paid. I earnestly appeal to Member States to pledge according to targets and to pay their pledges so as not to jeopardize the Agency s programme. I also urge them to examine whether they can, in some cases, support projects in particular countries with resources from the bilateral aid programmes which they may already have with these countries. Regrettably we must register that the UNDP which used to be an important source of funding now finances only a few projects and that we have so far not been successful in getting any funds from a new source to which we had attached some hope, namely the Global Environment Facility.

In these circumstances we can only place our expectations in the direct contributions of IAEA Member States which are politically committed, under our Statute and under the NPT, to facilitate the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology.

Safeguards Verification, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Arms Control

One of the most important functions of the IAEA has been and remains to verify the peaceful nature of nuclear activities through safeguards. The Agency s experience is unparalleled in the UN system and could be made use of in verifying future nuclear arms control and disarmament arrangements.

The discovery by the IAEA after the Gulf War that Iraq, despite full-scope safeguards, had been able secretly to develop a substantial programme for uranium enrichment and for weaponization accelerated the efforts to strengthen the safeguards system and to reduce the risk that material or installations which should have been subjected to safeguards could remain undeclared and undetected. It was realized that for this purpose the IAEA needed above all increased access to information and easier access to relevant sites and installations.

Some proposals have already been endorsed by the Board of Governors, e.g. regarding the early provision of design information and the reporting on the export and import of nuclear material and specified equipment. Further proposals for a strengthened and more cost effective safeguards system are being considered in Programme 93+2" to be presented to the Board of Governors in March 1995. Key proposals relate to increased access to information about a State s nuclear programme and increased physical access to sites. These are complementary features leading to increased nuclear transparency and increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. They can be seen as a natural extension of actions already adopted by the Board of Governors. The programme also includes the study of a number of technical and administrative efficiency measures that could become part of a streamlined and fully rationalised safeguards system. Thanks to the co-operation of a large number of Member States, many new concepts are undergoing field tests and a clean laboratory facility is being established at Seibersdorf for the receipt and handling of safeguards samples.

There is no doubt that the credibility of non-proliferation commitments will become increasingly important as the number of nuclear weapons in the world is reduced. Safeguards have a vital role to enhance this credibility and should not be viewed by States as intrusions into their sovereignty but as opportunities to demonstrate compliance with important international obligations. This is also how governments generally view safeguards. Similarly, the increasing number of invitations to the Agency to visit any place any time are means by which States, in their enlightened self-interest, can increase their transparency and, at the very least, dispel specific unfounded alllegations or suspicions which may have been advanced. I trust more such invitations will be issued. I also trust governments will eliminate a number of restrictions which still reduce the effectiveness of safeguards and lead to unnecessary cost. Many governments continue to insist on restrictions, based on nationality, regarding the designation of international inspectors. Visas for each visit are required by some States and the inspectors freedom of access to facilities and communications with headquarters are sometimes limited. Why can such barriers not be removed? Are not the interest of all States best served by competent and independent inspectors operating with minimal restrictions? Special arrangements should really only be needed to protect sensitive military or industrial secrets.

If there is considerable scope for strengthening the safeguards system and reducing some costs in it, there is at the same time a vital need to maintain a stable and adequate financial basis for it. The number of safeguards agreements continues to grow - several new agreements were endorsed at the most recent meeting of the Board. More than 800 facilities and other sites are under Agency safeguards. It is of great importance that during the next year member governments reach agreement on reliable and equitable arrangements for the financing of safeguards. They may also need to consider arrangements for the funding of new verification activities.

Safeguards Implementation in DPRK

The report contained in document GC(XXXVIII)/19 summarizes the safeguards implementation in the DPRK. As of the time in 1993 when the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the NPT and then suspended the effectuation of its withdrawal, it appears not to have recognized any legal obligation to accept safeguards inspection under its agreement with the IAEA. Rather it has followed - and it still continues to follow - an … la carte approach, in which the extent of access for safeguards inspection varies depending inter alia upon developments in its negotiations with a third party. From the Agency perspective the situation is different. Both the IAEA and the United Nations have concluded that the safeguards agreement remains valid and that the Agency is under an obligation to seek to implement it fully. This, indeed, is what the Agency has consistently tried to do and is still trying to do. By the time when the Board of Governors met in June this year the Agency, after a long interval, had been enabled to inspect all declared nuclear installations as required by the safeguards agreement. However, the refusal of the DPRK to co-operate in providing access to additional sites and information and the loss of data which resulted from the method of fuel core discharge that the operator chose for the 5 MW Experimental Reactor last spring prevented the assessment of the nuclear material inventory declared by the DPRK. It also prevented a resolution of the inconsistency between this declaration and findings of the Agency.

Although the DPRK appeared immediately after its withdrawal from membership in the IAEA last June to reject all safeguards inspection, this position was somewhat modified following the meeting between the late President of the DPRK and former US President Carter and the Agency has been enabled to maintain the continuous inspector presence basis at Nyongbyon which began in May. During the summer inspectors were enabled to monitor some of the activities at the 5 MW plant. This was in line with the request directed to the Agency by the Security Council in late May. Maintenance of surveillance and seals at the reprocessing plant also continued. However, the Agency s requests for access to the fuel fabrication plant, fresh fuel storage facilities and the new reprocessing line under construction were denied during the summer.

On 5 September representatives of DPRK indicated to IAEA inspectors on site that following recent progress in the bilateral talks with the United States the DPRK was ready to enlarge the scope of inspections and inspections have now in fact been completed at the fuel fabrication plant and at the fresh fuel storage facility. Access to the reprocessing line under construction, however, has not been granted. I should add that the results of the inspections which took place in March and May this year have not provided any indication of reprocessing of recently irradiated fuel or of loading of fresh fuel into the reactor.

I certainly hope that all declared facilities will soon again be fully subjected to safeguards. I also hope that additional information and visits to additional sites will be forthcoming.

Verification under Security Council Resolution Mandate in Iraq

Under the mandate of the Security Council the IAEA has, to date, carried out 26 inspection missions in Iraq and has completed the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all known nuclear weapons usable materials, facilities and equipment. In particular the IAEA has arranged for and supervised the removal, from Iraq, of all highly enriched uranium and the demolition of all facilities and the removal or destruction of non-nuclear materials and equipment, which could be used for the production of nuclear weapons. The IAEA is satisfied that the scope of Iraq s former nuclear weapons programme is well understood and that, as a result of the destruction, removal and rendering harmless activities, no capability for the production of nuclear weapons exists in Iraq.

Progress towards this conclusion was facilitated by a series of high-level technical talks begun in July 1993, in the course of which Iraq provided additional information regarding its former nuclear weapons programme with respect to supply and procurement channels and sources of external technical support with particular regard to their centrifuge enrichment programme. The significant aspects of these disclosures have been satisfactorily verified.

Since its acknowledgement, in November 1993, of Security Council resolution 715(1991), Iraq has provided to the IAEA the reports, required under that resolution to enable the IAEA to complete the preparations for the implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan. With the establishment, at the end of August, of its continuous presence in Iraq, the IAEA is in a position to implement its ongoing monitoring and verification plan. Monitoring and verification measures will be subject to modification as technical needs arise or as advanced technologies become available.

As required by Security Council resolution 715, the IAEA, the UN Special Commission, and the Sanctions Committee, have developed a mechanism for monitoring future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq. It is expected that the Security Council will, in the near future, approve this jointly-developed mechanism, which will form part of the IAEA s ongoing monitoring and verification activities in Iraq.

The implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan does not foreclose the exercise, by the IAEA, of its right to investigate any aspect of Iraq s former nuclear weapons capability, in particular, the right to follow-up on any new information obtained by the IAEA and assessed as warranting further investigation.

As is well known, the IAEA s current activities in Iraq are not based upon the safeguards agreement with Iraq but on the mandate given by the Security Council and consequently verification activities in Iraq go considerably beyond those which are required under an NPT- type safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, our experience in Iraq has proved useful in the development of safeguards measures which will provide greater assurance of the non-existence of clandestine nuclear activities.

Safeguards in Different Regions: The Middle East

The General Conference last year requested me to continue consultations with States of the Middle East region to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all activities in the region. In pursuance of this mandate and as reported in a document before you (GC(XXXVIII)/18), I have had further contacts with States in the region and the Agency has continued to participate in the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security. Additional views regarding verification modalities and national objectives relevant to Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zones were obtained during my visits to Iran, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. I intend in the coming year to continue my consultations in capitals. The meetings of the Multilateral Working Group have taken place against the backdrop of important developments in the bilateral peace process. As a follow up to the Seminar on the Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in the Middle East which we organized last year in Vienna, arrangements are being made within the framework of the Working Group to enable representatives of Middle East States to see a demonstration of verification techniques and to become acquainted with ways in which regional verification in Europe complements the IAEA s international verification.

Safeguards Implementation under the Tlatelolco Treaty

Argentina, Brazil and Chile have now ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the IAEA entered into force in March this year. As Cuba has declared that it intends soon to adhere to the Tlatelolco Treaty, we can expect that this Treaty will enter into force, formalizing the Latin American and Caribbean region status as a nuclear-weapon-free region. This is to be much welcomed.

Safeguards in Africa

South Africa s adherence to the NPT and Algeria s indicated intention to do the same raise the expectation that Africa, too, will soon become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The General Conference last year requested the Director General to continue to assist the African States in their efforts towards establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free-zone. Such assistance has been given and I am glad to tell you that in May the UN/OAU Group of Experts reached agreement on the draft text of a Treaty establishing such a zone. This text entrusts the Agency with the task of verification.

Safeguards in the Newly Independent States (NIS)

Another area of increasing IAEA safeguards activity is the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. All these countries - with the exception, of course, of the Russian Federation - have declared their intention either to become or to remain non-nuclear-weapon States. So far, nine - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania and Uzbekistan - have acceded to the NPT. As of now three safeguards agreements pursuant to the NPT are in force in the NIS (with Armenia, Latvia and Lithuania) and the Board has approved four further agreements (with Belarus, Estonia, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan). To date one of these agreements (with Kazakstan) has been signed. Also, the Board last week approved the text of a safeguards agreement with Ukraine, which includes provisions for the application of safeguards by the IAEA to all nuclear material under the jurisdiction or control of the Ukraine.

In preparing for full implementation of safeguards in the NIS, the Agency has provided advice on the legal framework for control of nuclear activities in these countries. Furthermore, in collaboration with a number of Member States, the Agency has provided assistance in establishing state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, advice on physical protection and on mechanisms for reporting of imports and exports relevant to safeguards. To date nearly 30 fact-finding missions and technical visits have been carried out for these purposes.

Dismantling Nuclear Weapons

A Cut-Off Agreement

While safeguards verification of nuclear material recovered from dismantled weapons will foster confidence that none of this material will be used to produce new weapons, the objective of verifying compliance with an agreement to prohibit the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes would be to create confidence that nuclear weapons arsenals could not be increased on the basis of newly produced nuclear material.

In December last year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, without a vote, a resolution which recommended the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and which further requested the Agency to provide assistance for examination of verification arrangements for such a treaty as required . To ensure that the IAEA Secretariat will be able to provide prompt and sound advice, I have established a working group within the Secretariat which is examining relevant issues and preparing background papers. We thus stand ready to assist governments as requested by the General Assembly.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

During the past year the Agency has been invited by the Ad Hoc Committee on a CTB of the Conference on Disarmament to provide information about the Agency's infrastructure and technical expertise in connection with the discussion of verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Presentations have been made on the Agency s experience in radionuclide monitoring and on-site inspections as relevant to a CTBT.

In the view of the Agency Secretariat a verification role under a CTBT would be consistent with the Agency's mandate and would fit well with the Agency s current activities in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Indeed, there is an obvious overlap between the commitment by a State not to test a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device and a non- proliferation commitment by the same State not to use nuclear material for weapons or explosive purposes. Thus Agency verification under comprehensive safeguards agreements is directly relevant to verification of compliance with a test ban agreement. Any non compliance with a CTBT would also be non-compliance with a comprehensive safeguards agreement - and both violations would be reported to the Security Council. Thus, setting up a new organization to verify obligations under a CTBT, the objective of which is in part identical to that of non- proliferation treaties, could lead to complications and would undoubtedly prove more costly than using the Agency for both regimes.

Management of Plutonium and HEU

Last year, I noted that the current process of nuclear disarmament in the US and Russia and ongoing reprocessing of spent civilian nuclear fuel would lead to substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) which needed to be stored before use or disposal. I also drew attention to the international interest in the storage of such materials taking place under conditions of adequate physical security, nuclear safety and - not least - under conditions providing a high degree of assurance that the material will not be used for weapons or explosives. Also, informal discussions have focussed on possible additional confidence-building measures. There seems to be broad agreement that the peaceful storage or use of plutonium and HEU should be highly transparent. One possible step is the regular publication of information on stocks of separated civil plutonium. It has also been proposed that the IAEA might be asked to attest the consistency of information thus made public with information available to it under the safeguards system.

Trafficking in Nuclear Material

The international community has been much alarmed by recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Over the last year the Secretariat has recorded many incidents which warranted follow up. Fortunately information received indicates that only small quantities have been involved and in no case does the material appear to have come from a nuclear weapons stockpile. This does not mean that there is not a serious problem. Uncontrolled movement of nuclear material clearly involves both radiation safety and proliferation risks.

There have been extensive discussions between States in recent weeks in search of remedies to the trafficking problem. The IAEA Secretariat has also consulted many Member States exposed to trafficking to identify ways in which the Agency might help mitigate the problem, and areas of the work, like police investigation, in which as a rule the Agency has no role to play. It seems widely agreed that preventing diversion at the sources is crucial and nuclear material accounting and control together with physical protection systems are central to such prevention. The Agency has been active for many years in arranging for training, in providing expert advice and in co-ordinating the elaboration of guidelines in these two areas. With adequate resources these efforts could be expanded without delay. Further, the current Agency system of collecting and analysing open information obtained from the media and Member States could be improved significantly. An improved system would allow systematic reporting to Member States, helping them to separate fact from fiction and providing a basis for assessing the real extent of the problem.

In order more systematically to consider ideas from Member States about increased Agency activities to assist in the combatting of trafficking, I am ready to convene a Round Table of government experts that could recommend specific action which could be taken promptly.

Finally on this issue, one could ask whether it is not time for all Member States with nuclear material under their control voluntarily to commit themselves to protect such material, at a minimum, at the levels given in the Agency s Guidelines for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material contained in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3.

Concluding Remarks

My comments today, I trust, demonstrate the continuing importance of the Agency s existing programmes and the certainty that some new responsibilities will have to be assumed to meet emerging new requirements of Member States.

It is entirely appropriate to insist that existing resources be used well and only for activities to which governments accord high priority before additional resources are requested. I think governments would agree that the IAEA has a good record in this regard. We have sharpened our budget and programme setting process with a view to redirecting resources to higher priority activities. We are strengthening the monitoring and evaluation of our programmes to ensure efficient delivery and to better assess their impact. We are moving to a programme based accounting system which will also help us focus on programme delivery. We have mastered a long cash crisis and have been able to progressively implement activities which had to be deferred as a result of late payment of contributions. Starting in 1995, we will return to implementing close to the full approved programme and budget for that year. These developments all contribute to strengthening our main activities and they create a good basis for the Agency to assume new responsibilities if governments so decide.

However, for the Agency to successfully meet the current and expected demands for Agency activities, more adequate, orderly and predictable financing is needed. Many important activities are now only possible because of the extrabudgetary support from some Member States. This is not a desirable long-term solution. A new understanding amongst governments is needed to secure adequate and timely funding for the full range of present and new activities which the Agency is called on to undertake.

My last comments relate to our staff and to our host country.

Reports submitted to the Conference on the Staffing of the IAEA Secretariat demonstrate that gradually we are attaining greater diversity in staff recruitment - proportionally more professional staff from developing countries and proportionally more professional staff who are women. This is positive and the process must continue. It will.

I want to acknowledge my indebtedness to the staff of the Agency. I am glad to head a team - both professional and general service staff - which has proved capable of successfully meeting the many challenges of the past year. Through dedicated hard work and with minimal increase in numbers this team has managed to respond to the increasing demands which Member States place on the IAEA.

In closing, I want to thank our host Government and host City for their continued efforts to facilitate our working conditions and to make the life of our many visitors as well as our resident international civil servants safe, comfortable and enjoyable.